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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses one of the most significant problems facing the refugee protection regime: 
that the places in which people in need of international protection seek refuge are often as dan-
gerous and bleak as the conditions they fled. In response, many refugees and asylum seekers 
travel within and across borders in attempts to secure what they believe to be places of genuine 
sanctuary. While there are studies of these journeys by anthropologists, sociologists and crimi-
nologists, there is little investigation of the role courts play. This is despite refugees and asylum 
seekers in numerous jurisdictions increasingly turning to courts and other adjudicative bodies 
to ask for protection, not from persecution in their home country, but from a place of ostensible 
‘refuge’. I call these legal challenges ‘protection from refuge’ claims, and they have been made 
across four continents: Africa, Europe, North America and Oceania. Accordingly, the refugee 
litigants rely on different areas of domestic, regional and international law to frame their claims. 
This is the first study to group these cases together to examine how decision-makers respond to 
them and the consequences for refugees’ journeys in search of safe havens. 
While there are a number of examinations of how judges and other adjudicative decision-mak-
ers interpret refugee definitions, this thesis contributes to the literature by assessing how they 
approach the remedy: refuge. Many scholars put forward ideas of what refuge is or should be 
and legal experts outline the protections to which refugees are entitled. However, there is no 
dedicated study of how adjudicative decision-makers draw the contours and content of refuge 
through the prism of different areas of domestic, regional and international law. This thesis also 
adds new dimensions to gender scholarship by investigating how these judicial conceptualisa-
tions of refuge facilitate or hamper journeys for those who face the greatest challenges in reach-
ing places of sanctuary such as single women and unaccompanied minors. 
I argue that when protection from refuge claims first come before courts and other adjudicative 
bodies, decision-makers adopt rich and robust ideas of refuge beyond basic notions of safety 
and survival. These judicial approaches enable large numbers of refugees to use courts to access 
places where they believe they can attain a sense of refuge, but decision-makers are also sensi-
tive to the ways factors such as gender, age, sexuality, disability and care responsibilities relate 
to a person’s protection needs. However, these legal victories are ephemeral. In each jurisdic-
tion, decision-makers transition from purposive and comprehensive understandings of refuge 
to rudimentary ones. They also reframe these legal challenges in a way that creates additional 
V 
legal hurdles for refugees who have the greatest difficulties in attaining refuge such as female-
headed families, children and those with disabilities. This trajectory of judicial approaches to 
protection from refuge claims indicates that courts can play a powerful role in enabling access 
to refuge and addressing injustices and inequities in refugee protection, but, ultimately, legal 
decision-makers compound the difficulties inherent in finding sanctuary, perpetuate global in-
equities in refugee responsibility and render refuge elusive. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
JOURNEYS IN SEARCH OF REFUGE 
I INTRODUCTION 
The word ‘refugee’ has its roots not in what people are escaping from, but in what they are 
seeking: refuge.1 Today, the number of people searching for sanctuary in foreign lands is the 
highest ever recorded.2 However, many of the places to which people flee are sites of refuge 
only in a nominal sense. They are often unsafe and insecure;3 provide little access to healthcare,4 
                                                          
1 ‘Refugee’ derives from the Old French word ‘réfugié’, meaning ‘gone in search of refuge’: Glynnis Chan-
trill (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Word Histories (Oxford University Press, 2002) 424. 
2 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) estimates that at the end of 2017, the global 
refugee population was 25.4 million: UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017 (25 June 2018) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html> 13 (‘Forced Dis-
placement in 2017’). 
3 See, eg, Sharon Carlson, ‘Contesting and Reinforcing Patriarchy: An Analysis of Domestic Violence in the 
Dzaleka Refugee Camp’ (Working Paper No 23, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2005) 27–33; Jeff 
Crisp, ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’ (Working Paper No 68, 
The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, 2002) 14–16; Elena Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, ‘Concealing Violence Against Women in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps: The Politicisation of Victim-
hood’ in Hannah Bradby and Gillian Lewando-Hundt (eds), Global Perspectives on War, Gender and Health: The 
Sociology and Anthropology of Suffering (Ashgate, 2010) 91; Barbara Harrell-Bond, ‘Are Refugee Camps Good 
for Children?’ (New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No 29, UNHCR, 2000) 7; Barbara Harrell-Bond 
and Guglielmo Verdirame, Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism (Berghahn Books, 2005) 120–78; Ar-
afat Jamal, ‘Minimum Standards and Essential Needs in a Protracted Refugee Situation: A Review of the UNHCR 
Programme in Kakuma, Kenya’ (Report 2000/05, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, 2000) 18; Amy 
Lewis, ‘Gender-Based Violence Among Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Africa’ (2005–2006) 20 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 269; Daniel Ntwari, ‘Over 600 Refugee Children Abused in Rwanda 
Camps’, The East African (online) 9 April 2016 <https://allafrica.com/stories/201604090267.html>; Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Incident at the Manus Island Detention 
Centre from 16 February to 18 February 2014 (2014) ch 5; Senate Select Committee on the Recent Allegations 
Relating to Conditions and Circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru, Parliament of Australia, 
Taking Responsibility: Conditions and Circumstances at Australia's Regional Processing Centre in Nauru (2015) 
ch 4; UNHCR, ‘Refugee Women and Children Face Heightened Risk of Sexual Violence amid Tensions and 
Overcrowding at Reception Facilities on Greek Islands’ (Press Briefing, 9 February 2018) <http://www.un-
hcr.org/en-au/news/briefing/2018/2/5a7d67c4b/refugee-women-children-face-heightened-risk-sexual-violence-
amid-tensions.html>. 
4 See, eg, Australian Human Rights Commission, Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Human Rights: Snapshot Report 
(Second Edition) (2017) 37; Crisp (n 3) 23; Human Rights Watch, Greece: Inhumane Conditions at Land Border 
(27 July 2018) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/27/greece-inhumane-conditions-land-bor-
der?mc_cid=0e50786a23&mc_eid=677b225ed4>; Harrell-Bond and Verdirame (n 3) 241–52; Human Rights 
Watch, Greece: Asylum-Seekers Locked Up (14 April 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/14/greece-asy-
lum-seekers-locked> (‘Greece: Asylum-Seekers’); Jamal (n 3) 21. 
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education5 and employment;6 and have inadequate sanitation, shelter, food and water.7 Hatha-
way laments that ‘people guilty of absolutely no crime except for doing what we have said they 
may do, which is to come seek asylum, find themselves in horrific conditions’.8 These problems 
exist in places of so-called refuge in both the developing and developed world. Carens explains 
that despite being ‘supposedly safe havens’, in some refugee camps in the Global South, ‘the 
deprivation and danger appear to be as bad as the conditions from which refugees fled’.9 Re-
calling a refugee settlement known as the ‘Jungle’ in Calais, an Afghani refugee writes that it 
‘looked as though the world’s toilet had been flushed and the mess washed up here’.10 The 
conditions in some locales in which people seek refuge are so grim that many wish to return to 
the place from which they had initially fled.11 
In response to these dangerous and bleak conditions of refuge, asylum seekers and refugees 
adopt various strategies. As Ramsay explains, ‘[e]ven in contexts of uncertainty, refugees … 
imagine, and actively work toward, new futures’.12 Some move from camp environments to 
                                                          
5 See, eg, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the 
Eighth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/AUS/CO/8 (20 July 2018) [53]; Harrell-Bond (n 3) 8–
9; Harrell-Bond and Verdirame (n 3) 253–9; Jamal (n 3) 21–2. 
6 See, eg, Jeff Crisp, ‘A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas in 
Kenya’ (2000) 99 African Affairs 601, 628; Harrell-Bond and Verdirame (n 3) 215–24; Jamal (n 3) 8. 
7 Amnesty International, EU: Asylum-Seekers Must be Moved from Appalling Conditions (14 December 2016) 
<https://www.amnesty.org.au/eu-asylum-seekers-must-be-moved-from-appalling-conditions/> (‘EU: Asylum-
Seekers’); Australian Human Rights Commission (n 4) 35; Harrell-Bond (n 3) 1; Harrell-Bond and Verdirame 
(n 3) 225–40; Human Rights Watch, Greece: Asylum-Seekers (n 4); Jamal (n 3) 19–20; Henri Rueff and Alain 
Viaro, ‘Palestinian Refugee Camps: From Shelter to Habitat’ (2010) 28(2–3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 339, 356. 
8 James Hathaway, ‘The UN’s “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework”: Actually a “Contingent Refugee 
Assistance Project”’ (Speech delivered at the Refugee Law Initiative Eighth International Refugee Law Seminar 
Series, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, 21 May 2018) <https://soundcloud.com/refu-
geelawinitiative/the-uns-crrf-actually-a-contingent-refugee-assistance-project> (‘The UN’s “Comprehensive Ref-
ugee Response Framework”’). 
9 Joseph Carens, ‘Refugees and the Limits of Obligations’ (1992) 6(1) Public Affairs Quarterly 31, 40. 
10 Gulwali Passarlay and Nadene Ghouri, The Lightless Sky: An Afghan Refugee Boy’s Journey of Escape to a New 
Life (Atlantic Books, 2015) 292. 
11 Riham Alkousaa and Maximilian Popp, ‘European Purgatory: Migrant Smugglers Helping Refugees to Return 
to Turkey’, Spiegel (online at 30 June 2016) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/why-refugees-in-greece-
are-trying-to-go-back-to-turkey-a-1100452.html>; Amnesty International, ‘EU: Asylum-Seekers’ (n 7); Alexander 
Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System (Allen Lane, 2017) 129; Behrouz 
Boochani, No Friend But the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison (Pan Macmillan Australia, 2018) 164; Jeanne 
Carstensen, ‘Syrian Refugees Are Now Paying Smugglers to Take Them Back’, Global Post Investigations (online 
at 2 November 2016) <https://gpinvestigations.pri.org/syrian-refugees-are-now-paying-smugglers-to-take-them-
back-6fa9ef8242e3>; Christiano D’Orsi, ‘The World’s Largest Refugee Camp: What the Future Holds for Da-
daab’, The Conversation (online at 13 December 2017) <https://theconversation.com/the-worlds-largest-refugee-
camp-what-the-future-holds-for-dadaab-88102>; Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Refugees in Border Zone at 
Risk (20 September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/20/lebanon-refugees-border-zone-risk>; Rebecca 
Murray, ‘Refugees in Greek Legal Limbo: “I Want to Go Bank to Syria to Die”’, Middle East Eye (online at 23 
March 2017) <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/refugees-europe-s-periphery-face-traumatic-wait-
1189757890>; Georgina Ramsay, ‘Benevolent Cruelty: Forced Child Removal, African Refugee Settlers, and the 
State Mandate of Child Protection’ (2017) 40(2) Political and Legal Anthropology Review 245, 255. 
12 Georgina Ramsay, ‘Incommensurable Futures and Displaced Lives: Sovereignty as Control over Time’ (2017) 
29(3) Public Culture 515, 516. 
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urban areas due to the prospect of greater security, better living conditions and employment 
opportunities.13 Others are able to make much longer expeditions across a number of interna-
tional borders in search of sanctuary.14 These voyages are often hindered by various mecha-
nisms states use to constrain refugees’ movements.15 Factors such as age, gender, care respon-
sibilities and disability increase the challenges refugees face in their quests for refuge.16 As a 
result, journeys in search of refuge are rarely linear, but are instead ‘fragmented’.17 For exam-
ple, refugees sometimes become trapped in certain places, unable to travel onwards or return 
                                                          
13 Georgina Ramsay, Impossible Refuge: The Control and Constraint of Refugee Futures (Routledge, 2018) 87 
(‘Impossible Refuge’); UNHCR, UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps, UN Doc UNHCR/HCP/2014/9 (22 
July 2014) 4; UNHCR, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011) 17 <http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf>. 
14 See, eg, Gadi BenEzer and Roger Zetter, ‘Searching for Directions: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges 
in Researching Refugee Journeys’ (2015) 28(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 297; Richard Black, ‘Breaking the 
Convention: Researching the “Illegal” Migration of Refugees to Europe’ (2003) 35(1) Antipode: A Radical Journal 
of Geography 34; Alice Bloch, Nando Sigona and Roger Zetter, ‘Migration Routes and Strategies of Young, Un-
documented Migrants in England: A Qualitative Perspective’ (2011) 34(8) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1286; Jan-
Paul Brekke and Grete Brochmann, ‘Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum Seekers in Europe, National 
Differences, and the Dublin Regulation’ (2015) 28(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 145; Michael Collyer, ‘Stranded 
Migrants and the Fragmented Journey’ (2010) 23(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 273; Maria Cristina Garcia, Seek-
ing Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States and Canada (University of California Press, 
2016); Alison Gerard and Sharon Pickering, ‘Gender, Securitization and Transit: Refugee Women and the Journey 
to the EU’ (2014) 27(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 338; Ramsay, ‘Impossible Refuge’ (n 13); Dallal Stevens and 
Angeliki Dimitriadi, ‘Crossing the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in Search of “Protection” (2018) Journal of Immi-
grant and Refugee Studies DOI: 10.1080/15562948.2018.1444831: 1–17; Martina Tazzioli, ‘Containment Through 
Mobility: Migrants’ Spatial Disobediences and the Reshaping of Control Through the Hotspot System’ (2018) 
44(16) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2764; Susan Zimmermann, ‘Irregular Secondary Movements to 
Europe: Seeking Asylum beyond Refuge’ (2009) 22(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 74; Norman Zucker and Naomi 
Zucker, Desperate Crossings: Seeking Refuge in America (ME Sharpe, 1996). 
15 See, eg, Cathryn Costello, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Ex-
plored’ (2012) 12(2) Human Rights Law Review 287, 289; Janet Dench and François Crépeau, ‘Interdiction at the 
Expense of Human Rights: A Long-Term Containment Strategy’ (2003) 21(4) Refuge 1; Jennifer Hyndman and 
Alison Mountz, ‘Refuge or Refusal: The Geography of Control’ in Derek Gregory and Alan Pred (eds), Violent 
Geographies: Fear, Terror and Political Violence (Routledge, 2007) 77; Lana Maani, ‘Refugees in the European 
Union: The Harsh Reality of the Dublin Regulation’ (2018) 8(2) Notre Dame Journal of International and Com-
parative Law 83; Nicholas Maple, ‘Rights at Risk: A Thematic Investigation Into How States Restrict the Freedom 
of Movement of Refugees on the African Continent’ (New Issues in Refugee Research No 281, UNHCR, 2016); 
Penelope Mathew and Tristan Harley, Refugees, Regionalism and Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 2016) 2–15; An-
dreas Schloenhardt and Colin Craig, ‘Turning Back the Boats: Australia’s Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at 
Sea’ (2015) 27(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 536; Martina Tazzioli and Glenda Garelli, ‘Containment 
Beyond Detention: The Hotspot System and Disputed Migration Movements Across Europe’ (2018) Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 1; Leanne Weber, ‘Policing the Virtual Border: Punitive Preemption in Aus-
tralian Offshore Migration’ (2007) 34(2) Social Justice 77. 
16 See, eg, Mary Crock et al, The Legal Protection of Refugees with Disabilities (Edward Elgar, 2017) [5.1]; Chona 
Echavez et al, ‘Why Do Children Take the Unaccompanied Journey?’ (Issues Paper PDES/2014/03, Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit, UNHCR, 2014); Gerard and Pickering (n 14); Mariana Nardone and Ignacio Cor-
rea-Velez, ‘Unpredictability, Invisibility and Vulnerability: Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Minors’ Journeys 
to Australia’ (2016) 29(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 295; Sharon Pickering, Women, Borders and Violence: Cur-
rent Issues in Asylum, Migration and Trafficking (Springer, 2010) ch 2; Sharon Pickering and Brandy Cochrane, 
‘Irregular Border-Crossing Deaths and Gender: Where, How and Why Women Die Crossing Borders’ (2013) 17(1) 
Theoretical Criminology 27; Angelica Tello et al, ‘Unaccompanied Refugee Minors From Central America: Un-
derstanding Their Journey and Implications for Counselors’ (2017) 7(4) The Professional Counselor 360. 
17 Collyer (n 14) 275. 
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home. In other situations, refugees who feel they have found a place of refuge are forced to 
leave and must find ways to stay or return. 
As part of these fragmented journeys to secure a place of genuine refuge, some refugees and 
asylum seekers turn to courts or other adjudicative bodies. In these legal challenges, they ask 
for protection, not from persecution in their home country, but from a place of ‘refuge’. They 
want rescue from a place that raises serious protection concerns, but which is, notionally at 
least, serving as a place of refuge to hundreds or thousands of others. I refer to these actions as 
‘protection from refuge’ claims and they are the focus of this thesis. While there are studies of 
refugees’ journeys in fields such as anthropology, sociology and criminology,18 there is little 
consideration of the role such litigation plays in refugees’ searches for refuge.19 To address this 
lacuna, this thesis provides an account of how adjudicative decision-makers approach and de-
termine protection from refuge claims and examines whether these judicial20 approaches assist 
or hinder refugees (or particular refugees) in their search for a safe haven. 
In Chapter One, I first outline the ‘protection from refuge’ conundrum in more detail, specify 
my research questions and explain how they relate to the frictions inherent in these legal claims. 
I then describe the different types of protection from refuge claims emerging across different 
jurisdictions and areas of law and illustrate how they inform the thesis’ structure and theoretical 
framing. Next, I discuss the three methodologies employed across the thesis. Finally, I 
acknowledge the project’s scope and limitations, but highlight the ways the thesis adds to ref-
ugee law scholarship and the significance of these contributions more broadly. 
II PROTECTION FROM REFUGE FRAMEWORK: TENSIONS AND QUERIES 
I include in the ‘protection from refuge’ rubric cases determined by an adjudicative decision-
making body21 in which an asylum seeker or refugee is either resisting being sent to an alterna-
tive place of ‘refuge’ or is petitioning to be transferred from their current place of ‘refuge’ to 
another. For example, a refugee living in an urban area in Nairobi may be challenging their 
forced transfer to a refugee camp. Alternatively, an unaccompanied child asylum seeker living 
                                                          
18 See above nn 14 and 16. 
19 One notable exception is Costello’s examination of rights protections for refugees in Europe in which she ‘fol-
lows the journey of the protection seeker … in her attempt to reach a place of refuge’: Cathryn Costello, The 
Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 232, 252–77. I distin-
guish this thesis from Costello’s work below on page 17. 
20 Some protection from refuge claims are brought before courts but others are heard by adjudicative tribunals or 
United Nations (‘UN’) treaty bodies. I use the term ‘judicial’ for simplicity. 
21 This includes courts, but also other bodies that issue decisions or rulings on questions of law and/or fact such as 
adjudicative tribunals and UN treaty bodies. 
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in the Jungle in Calais may have initiated court proceedings in the United Kingdom seeking 
relocation there. I define ‘refugee’ broadly to include anyone granted refugee status under the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’)22 or a regional refugee 
instrument,23 given complementary protection,24 or eligible for protection and assistance from 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(‘UNRWA’).25 While refugee status is declaratory as opposed to constitutive,26 I use the term 
‘asylum seeker’ to refer to a person who is seeking international protection, but whose status 
has not been confirmed. 
Protection from refuge claims are a burgeoning and global trend. They started to emerge in the 
late twentieth century, but have increased in number over the last decade and have arisen in 
Africa, Europe, North America and Oceania. The majority are instigated in domestic courts and 
adjudicative tribunals, but others have been brought before supranational courts and United 
Nations (‘UN’) treaty bodies. Accordingly, protection from refuge claims are grounded in dif-
ferent aspects of international, regional and domestic law. What unites them is that all of the 
asylum seeker and refugee litigants are seeking the same outcome: a place of genuine refuge. 
Despite differences in the ways protection from refuge cases are framed, they raise similar 
quandaries for decision-makers that have implications for the international protection regime 
more broadly. These tensions are reflected in the phrase ‘protection from refuge’, which may, 
at first, appear to be paradoxical. The term ‘refuge’ is associated with notions of safety and 
                                                          
22 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 
January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
23 For example, the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, opened for signature 
10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974). 
24 Complementary protection is the term used to refer to those, ‘fleeing serious harm but who do not fall within 
the technical legal definition of a “refugee”’: Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) 1. See, eg, the European Union’s Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 13 December on Standards for the Qualification of Third Country Nationals or Stateless 
Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons eligible for 
Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (recast) [2011] OJ L 337/9-337/26 arts 2(f), 
15. 
25 Predominantly it is Palestinian refugees (those whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 
1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict) and 
descendants of male Palestinian refugees who are eligible for UNRWA protection and assistance: UNRWA, Con-
solidated Eligibility and Registration Instructions (CERI) (May 2006) [1] <https://www.unrwa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/ceri_24_may_2006_final.pdf>. 
26 Refugee Appeal No 75574 (Unreported, New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Chairperson Haines 
and Member Molloy, 29 April 2009) [58]; UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Ref-
ugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979, re-edited 1992) [28]; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 11 (‘The Rights of Refugees’). 
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wellbeing. Why would a person seek protection from a place intended to provide security and 
shelter? The apparent contradiction arises because the word ‘refuge’ is used both to refer to the 
idea of providing a safe haven (refuge as a concept) as well as the site in which that sanctuary 
may be provided (refuge as a place).27 In protection from refuge challenges, the ideal and the 
actuality of refuge both enter the judicial arena. When refugees make these claims, they draw 
attention to the disparities between ideas of what refuge is supposed to be with the material 
reality of the place in which they are or will be located. In other words, they highlight the 
incongruities between refuge as a concept and place. In arbitrating these disputes, decision-
makers have the opportunity to draw on frameworks available in international, regional and 
domestic law to elucidate the concept of refuge. For example, they may understand refuge as 
allowing refugees to thrive or merely survive. They could posit refuge as a duty or as an act of 
charity or discretion. Decision-makers must then determine the extent to which they can use 
these notions of refuge to cast judgment on spaces of refuge within or outside their borders. 
Another conundrum inherent in these cases and reflected in the title of the thesis is why a person 
must seek protection from a place of refuge. If a person does not feel secure in their current 
location, why can they not simply find alternative places of sanctuary? The reason why refugees 
often need to resort to legal processes to obtain protection from such places is due to the oper-
ation of containment mechanisms. Containment mechanisms are laws, policies or agreements 
that aim or are used to prevent refugees from moving within and across borders and restrict 
them to particular places of ostensible refuge.28 A containment mechanism could be, for exam-
ple, an encampment policy or regional or bilateral agreement restricting refugees’ movements 
and delineating responsibility for hosting refugees. Some scholars argue that states use the Ref-
ugee Convention as a containment mechanism.29 When refugees bring protection from refuge 
                                                          
27 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘refuge’ as meaning both ‘shelter from pursuit or danger or trouble’ and 
‘a person or place etc. offering this’: RE Allen (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Clarendon 
Press, 8th ed, 1990) 1009. A similar definition is provided in Mark Gwynn and Amanda Laugesen (eds), Australian 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 6th ed, 2017) 1197. Grahl-Madsen makes the same point 
with the word ‘asylum’. He explains that it, ‘has acquired a double meaning. It may mean a place or territory where 
one is not subject to seizure by one’s pursuers, or it may mean protection or freedom from such seizure’: Atle 
Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law: Volume 2 (AW Sijthoff-Leyden, 1966) 3. In Chapter 
Two, I outline why I use the term ‘refuge’, rather than ‘asylum’. 
28 Andrew Shacknove, ‘From Asylum to Containment’ (1993) 5(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 516, 
516, 521–3. States do not use the terms ‘containment agreement’ or ‘containment mechanism’ to describe these 
arrangements, but euphemistic terms such as ‘regional resettlement agreement’: Mathew and Harley (n 15) 9–10. 
However, Boochani stresses that it is important not to employ such euphemisms, because in doing so one succumbs 
‘to the language of oppressive power’: Boochani (n 11) 369. 
29 See, eg, BS Chimni, ‘From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable 
Solutions to Refugee Problems’ (2004) 23(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 55, 61–3 (‘From Resettlement’); BS 
Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South’ (1998) 11(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 
350, 356 (‘Geopolitics’); Emma Larking, Refugees and the Myth of Human Rights: Life Outside the Pale of Law 
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claims, they initiate a contest between their entitlement to refuge and states’ interests in con-
straining refugees’ movement within and across borders. The ways decision-makers determine 
this conflict will either disrupt or cement containment mechanisms. These judicial approaches 
could impede or facilitate refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. They also may assist or create 
additional hurdles for those who face the greatest difficulties in travelling in search of refuge, 
such as unaccompanied minors and single female-headed families. 
No study has grouped together protection from refuge challenges and examined the ways deci-
sion-makers respond to them and the consequences for refugees’ mobility. To address this, the 
research question posed in this thesis is: how do adjudicative decision-makers approach and 
determine protection from refuge claims? I also ask three sub-questions. First, how do decision-
makers conceptualise refuge, in particular, its functions, nature, threshold and scope, and does 
this differ with respect to factors such as age, gender, family responsibilities and disability? 
Second, how do decision-makers respond to the conflict between refugees’ searches for refuge 
and states’ desires to constrain refugees’ mobility within and across borders? Third, due to the 
ways decision-makers approach protection from refuge claims, are particular refugees more 
likely to be able to use courts to continue their journeys in search of refuge? 
III WHAT IS REFUGE AND WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROTEC-
TION FROM REFUGE CLAIMS?  
There are many different theories and models of adjudicative decision-making,30 but this thesis 
specifically investigates how adjudicative decision-makers approach protection from refuge 
claims and involves a consideration of how they conceptualise refuge. To investigate these 
questions, in Chapter Two I outline how scholars, UN institutions and refugees envision refuge. 
This provides the background against which I examine how decision-makers approach and un-
derstand refuge and address the discrepancies between these ideas of refuge and the reality. 
While there is no settled understanding of what refuge is,31 the analysis in Chapter Two indi-
cates that there are commonalities across scholarship from different disciplines with respect to 
                                                          
(Ashgate, 2014) 128; Patricia Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race: The European Response to “New” Asylum 
Seekers’ in Paddy Ireland and Per Laleng (eds), The Critical Lawyers’ Handbook 2 (Pluto Press, 1997) 96, 97; 
Patricia Tuitt, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee (Pluto Press, 1996) 69–71 (‘False Images’). 
30 See, eg, Tracey George and Albert Yoon, ‘Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox 
of Managerial Judging’ (2008) 61(1) Vanderbilt Law Review 1; Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist and Wendy 
Martinek, ‘Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals’ 
(2004) 48(1) American Journal of Political Science 123; Joseph Smith and Emerson Tiller, ‘The Strategy of Judg-
ing: Evidence from Administrative Law’ (2002) 31(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 61; Paul Weiler, ‘Two Models 
of Judicial Decision-Making’ (1968) 446(3) Canadian Bar Review 406. 
31 Ramsay, ‘Impossible Refuge’ (n 13) 156. 
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the starting points for elucidating what refuge is or should be. The literature on refuge also 
indicates that the concept is a robust one. There are sophisticated accounts of what refuge is 
intended to achieve beyond the ‘absolute priority on “saving lives”’.32 There are also well-
developed understandings of the nature of refuge as a remedy, legal status, duty and process. 
Scholars and UN institutions understand refuge to have a broad scope, encompassing a wide 
range of refugees’ needs, desires and hopes. The threshold of what is deemed to be adequate 
refuge is usually a high one, surpassing the basic duties of guaranteeing safety and providing 
essentials for the sustenance of life. Further, the conceptualisation of refuge presented in the 
literature is dynamic in the sense that there are considerations of the ways it may differ for 
people of different genders, sexualities and ages as well as those with disabilities and care re-
sponsibilities. To highlight the discrepancies between refuge as a concept and place, in Chapter 
Two I also discuss literature that examines the conditions in which refugees live. While some 
scholars explore the ways refugees adapt and cope in exile,33 I focus on studies, reports and 
testimonies that document the dismal reality of many places of refuge across the Global North 
and Global South. 
I explore the ways decision-makers respond to these disjunctures between ideas and actualities 
of refuge in Chapters Three to Seven. Across these chapters, I survey protection from refuge 
claims made in five distinct contexts. These different types of protection from refuge claims 
inform the thesis’ structure and theoretical frameworks. First, I examine protection from refuge 
claims grounded in human rights instruments. While the Refugee Convention provides a refu-
gee-specific rights regime,34 in many jurisdictions refugee litigants cannot directly plead the 
Refugee Convention. Therefore, they must frame their claim using other human rights instru-
ments. There is debate within human rights scholarship as to the utility of using human rights 
law to counter state policy. I draw on this literature to inform my assessment of the ways deci-
sion-makers employ human rights law to conceptualise refuge and respond to challenges to 
containment mechanisms. 
                                                          
32 Jean-François Durieux, ‘Three Asylum Paradigms’ (2013) 20(2) International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 147, 162. 
33 See, eg, Randa Farah, ‘Refugee Camps in the Palestinian and Sahrawi National Liberation Movements: A Com-
parative Perspective’ (2009) 38(2) Journal of Palestine Studies 76; Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘When the Self Be-
comes Other: Representations of Gender, Islam and the Politics of Survival in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps’ in 
Dawn Chatty and Bill Findlay (eds), Dispossession and Displacement: Forced Migration in the Middle East and 
North Africa (Oxford University Press, 2010) 17; Nadya Hajj, Protection amid Chaos: The Creation of Property 
Rights in Palestinian Refugee Camps (Columbia University Press, 2016); Lucy Hovil, ‘Self-Settled Refugees in 
Uganda: An Alternative Approach to Displacement?’ (2007) 20(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 599. 
34 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees (n 26) 4; McAdam (n 24) 5–6. 
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I begin my investigation of protection from refuge claims grounded in human rights instruments 
in Chapter Three, where I look to Europe. In the European context, asylum seekers and refugees 
use human rights law to request or challenge a transfer made pursuant to the European Union’s 
Dublin Regulation35 or other containment agreement. While these cases do not directly call into 
question the validity of these agreements, they have potential to set precedents that jeopardise 
their continued operation. These protection from refuge claims invoke the right to be free from 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to family life. These rights are not 
contained in the Refugee Convention and, when compared to the literature on what constitutes 
adequate refuge, would be considered inadequate on their own. Nevertheless, I consider how 
decision-makers use these rights as a prism to conceptualise refuge. I investigate whether these 
ideas of refuge, channelled through human rights instruments, lend potency to refugees’ at-
tempts to resist the constraints on their ability to travel across borders employed by European 
states. Finally, I ask whether, because of the way decision-makers approach these claims, only 
certain refugees can successfully wield human rights arguments to pursue their journeys in 
search of refuge in Europe. 
I continue my examination of the use of human rights arguments to secure protection from a 
place of refuge in Chapter Four, in which I discuss African forced encampment case law. In 
this chapter, I analyse legal challenges instigated by refugees living in urban areas who face the 
prospect of forced relocation to a refugee camp, as well as cases where refugees living in camps 
are petitioning for the right to leave. These cases are grounded in domestic, regional and inter-
national human rights and refugee law. They involve a much broader spectrum of rights than 
the European cases considered in Chapter Three. I explore whether the different human rights 
frameworks in Africa and Europe prompt distinct understandings of refuge and approaches to 
states’ powers to constrain refugees’ movements. I also ask whether, because of the ways Afri-
can decision-makers determine these claims, particular refugees are in a better position to use 
legal processes to resist confinement to a refugee camp. 
                                                          
35 Regulation (EC) 604/2013 of 29 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the 
Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Mem-
ber States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast) [2013] OJ L180/31-180/59 (‘Dublin Regu-
lation’). The Dublin Regulation is a European Union treaty that determines the European Union member state 
responsible for determining an asylum seeker’s refugee claim. There is a proposal for its reform: European Com-
mission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State 
Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a 
Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM (2016) 270 final’ (4 May 2016). 
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In Chapter Five, I shift focus and analyse protection from refuge claims that directly challenge 
the operation or validity of a bilateral or regional containment agreement. This has occurred in 
three regions: North America (an agreement between the United States and Canada), Oceania 
(agreements between Australia and Malaysia, Australia and Papua New Guinea and Australia 
and Nauru) and the European Union (the Dublin Regulation).36 Human rights arguments are 
present in these cases, but they are less central. The arguments pleaded by the refugee plaintiffs 
and defendant states traverse many areas of domestic, regional and international law. In decid-
ing these cases, judges must determine the extent to which they will take regional law, interna-
tional law or foreign jurisprudence into account. Another contentious issue is whether these 
legal frameworks permit them to pass judgment on another state’s laws and policies. Therefore, 
the main theme in Chapter Five is the role that cartographic and juridical borders play in pro-
tection from refuge challenges. I draw on theoretical literature on the relationship between law 
and borders to inform my analysis of how decision-makers approach these protection from ref-
uge claims. I examine the ways decision-makers position and manoeuvre juridical borders in 
constructing ideas of refuge and determining the legality of states’ attempts to prevent refugees 
crossing international borders in search of refuge. I investigate how the ways decision-makers 
place and shift these borders may advantage or disadvantage particular refugees and asylum 
seekers in their quest for refuge. 
The final two case studies consider protection from refuge claims that arise under the Refugee 
Convention. Human rights arguments are present in these claims and the role of borders is sig-
nificant, but another factor at play is the movement of those in need of protection from the 
Global South to the Global North. In these case studies, I investigate how decision-makers ap-
proach protection from refuge claims against the backdrop of Global North states’ concerns that 
potentially significant numbers of people may use the Refugee Convention to transfer their 
place of refuge from the developing to the developed world.37 To assist a dissection of decision-
                                                          
36 With respect to the European Union, I examine N S v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M E v 
Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (C 411/10) (C 493/10) [2011] 
ECR I-13905. In this case, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and High Court of Ireland referred a number 
of questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the answers to which would affect the Dublin Regula-
tion’s operation: Costello (n 15) 324, 333. This case is different from the cases discussed in Chapter Three, most 
of which are challenges made before the European Court of Human Rights under the Council of Europe’s Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Novem-
ber 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (‘ECHR’). These cases do not directly call into question 
the Dublin Regulation’s validity and the European Court of Human Rights does not have jurisdiction to make such 
a determination: Costello (n 15) 307. 
37 Chimni, ‘Geopolitics’ (n 29) 351; James Hathaway, ‘Why Refugee Law Still Matters’ (2007) 8 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 89, 89–90; James Hathaway and Alexander Neve, ‘Making International Refugee 
Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human 
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makers’ approaches to these claims, I draw on literature that employs critical race theory and 
third world approaches to international law to position the Refugee Convention as a contain-
ment mechanism. 
I embark on this line of investigation in Chapter Six in which I examine cases that are instigated 
by Palestinian refugees seeking refugee protection outside an UNRWA area of operation (Jor-
don, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza strip, East Jerusalem or the West Bank). In making these jour-
neys, Palestinian refugees confront article 1D: the Refugee Convention’s only exclusion and 
‘contingent inclusion’ clause.38 Decision-makers’ approach to these claims determine whether 
Palestinian refugees must remain in the UNRWA region to receive international protection or 
can seek refugee protection elsewhere. I investigate the ways decision-makers elucidate the 
concept of refuge in the Palestinian context. I ask whether decision-makers’ approaches to these 
claims provide grounds for large numbers of Palestinian refugees to obtain a place of refuge in 
the Global North or prioritise only particular Palestinian refugees. 
In Chapter Seven, I analyse cases in which decision-makers have to determine whether a person 
can seek refuge in an internally displaced persons’ (‘IDP’) camp. These cases arise under article 
1A(2) of the Refugee Convention and are made by putative refugees.39 In most jurisdictions, 
decision-makers will ask whether the putative refugee can relocate to another part of their coun-
try of origin or habitual residence in which they will have protection.40 In some of these cases, 
the putative refugee has pleaded that if they relocate, for example, from a rural to an urban area, 
they would end up living in an IDP camp. These cases have arisen in the United Kingdom and 
                                                          
Rights Journal 115, 116; Penelope Mathew, ‘The Shifting Boundaries and Content of Protection: The Internal 
Protection Alternative Revisited’ in S Juss (ed), The Ashgate Research Companion to Migration Law, Theory and 
Policy (Ashgate, 2013) 189, 206; Matthew Zagor, ‘The Struggle of Autonomy and Authenticity: Framing the 
Savage Refugee’ (2015) 21(4) Social Identities 373, 378–80. 
38 Susan Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics and Implications for a Just Solution’ 
(2002) 31(3) Journal of Palestine Studies 36, 39; Guy Goodwin-Gill and Susan Akram, ‘Brief Amicus Curiae on 
the Status of Palestinian Refugees under International Law’ (2000) 11 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 
187, 191; Mutaz Qafisheh and Valentina Azarov, ‘Article 1D’ in Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner and 
Felix Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) [25]. 
39 Persons outside their country of origin or habitual residence whose circumstances indicate they satisfy one part 
of the refugee definition (a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion), but who have not yet established another aspect of the 
refugee definition (that they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin 
or habitual residence). 
40 See James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 
2014) 332 (‘The Law of Refugee Status’) for a discussion of the legal basis of the internal protection alternative 
enquiry. 
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New Zealand.41 These decisions come within the protection from refuge rubric because the 
putative refugee is resisting the prospect of seeking refuge in an IDP camp, a place intended to 
provide refuge to significant numbers of people displaced from their homes.42 I examine how 
decision-makers conceptualise refuge in the context of there being many other people in the 
putative refugee’s homeland in need of protection. Due to the ways decision-makers approach 
these claims, which putative refugees are best able to resist the prospect of life in an IDP camp? 
In the concluding chapter, I identify patterns in the ways decision-makers across all of these 
jurisdictions, grappling with different legal instruments and doctrines, approach and determine 
protection from refuge claims. When protection from refuge cases first come before judicial 
and other decision-making bodies, adjudicators engage with the concept of refuge and even 
advance ideas about its functions, nature and scope. This judicial approach to the notion of 
refuge prevails over states’ containment policies and facilitates refugees’ journeys, particularly 
with respect to refugees from more marginalised backgrounds. However, these protection from 
refuge victories are short lived. In subsequent cases, decision-makers disengage from the notion 
of refuge and defer to state interests. These cases project minimalist notions of refuge and im-
pede refugees’ ability to continue their journeys in search of a safe haven. They also create 
additional barriers for women, children and people with disabilities and care responsibilities 
wanting to use court processes in their quests for a place of genuine refuge. 
                                                          
41 I conducted an extensive search of internal protection case law in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
States of America and European Union member states on LexisNexis, Westlaw and Refworld. The United King-
dom and New Zealand are the only jurisdictions in which the question of relocation to an IDP camp has arisen in 
cases where protection under the Refugee Convention (n 22) is being sought. The issue of internal relocation to an 
IDP camp has arisen in some decisions in which the individuals bringing the case are not entitled to refugee pro-
tection. See below n 96 for an example of such a case. As outlined on page 22, protection from refuge claims made 
by those whose claims for international protection have been unsuccessful are outside the scope of this thesis. 
42 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide that IDPs, ‘shall not be interned in or confined to a 
camp’ unless ‘absolutely necessary’: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN ESCOR, 54th sess, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (22 July 1998) principle 12(2). However, this ‘addresses the use of closed camps 
which internally displaced persons cannot leave, and has to be distinguished from the practice of using camps to 
host large numbers of such persons’: Walter Kälin, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations’ 
(Paper No 32, American Society of International Law Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, 2008) 32. In most 
contexts, IDP camps are intended to be sites of protection for IDPs and many are staffed by representatives from 
various international organisations such as the UNHCR, International Committee of the Red Cross, the United 
Nations International Children’s Fund and World Health Organisation: Brookings Institution, Protecting Inter-
nally Displaced Persons: A Manual for Law and Policy Makers (October 2008) 63 <http://www.un-
hcr.org/50f955599.pdf>; International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Position on Internally Displaced Per-
sons (IDPs) (May 2006) 4 <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2006_idps_en_icrcexternalposition.pdf>; 
Tim Morris, ‘UNHCR, IDPs and Clusters’ (2006) 25 Forced Migration Review 54, 54; Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring: Monitoring and Protecting the Hu-
man Rights of Refugees and/or Internally Displaced Persons Living in Camps, 168–9 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7part10en.pdf>; World Health Organisation, Environ-
mental Health in Emergencies: Displaced People <http://www.who.int/environmental_health_emergencies/dis-
placed_people/en/>. 
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IV METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, I employ three methodologies. First, I conduct what Minow calls a ‘recasting 
project’: a study that gathers ‘more than one “line” of cases across doctrinal fields’ to ‘show 
why they belong together’ and offer ‘a new framework or paradigm’ in which they can be ex-
amined.43 While analyses of case law are commonly categorised according to the legal frame-
work in which actions are grounded,44 I bring together cases on the basis of similarities in what 
the litigants are seeking. Thus, this project has methodological parallels with studies of reme-
dies. Remedies scholars collate jurisprudence with reference to what a court orders or grants as 
opposed to specific causes of action and draw together cases framed in different areas of law 
such as contract, tort, equity and property.45 Zakrzewski highlights the significance of such 
approaches by underlining that all civil litigants come to lawyers or courts wanting a remedy.46 
It is the lawyer’s job to work backwards and assist them to obtain that remedy by pleading their 
case using the appropriate cause of action.47 Similarly, Barnett and Harder emphasise that ‘the 
first question a client often has when consulting her solicitor is “what can I get?” rather than 
“what cause of action do I have?”’48 Translated to refugee law, the litigants in protection from 
refuge cases all seek what they believe to be a genuine place of refuge. Their representatives 
use the legal frameworks available to them to achieve this objective. The legal frameworks will 
differ depending on the refugee’s status and circumstances and whether they are in, for exam-
ple, Malawi, Greece, Canada, Australia or Papua New Guinea. There are significant distinctions 
between the ways protection from refuge cases are framed and the jurisdictions and institutional 
cultures of the decision-making bodies that determine them. Nevertheless, at the core of these 
claims, refugees and asylum seekers are using the legal frameworks available to them to resist 
transfer to or seek rescue from a place of refuge. While there are myriad studies on the ways 
decision-makers have interpreted the refugee definition,49 drawing all of these cases together in 
the one project will enable me to examine the ways they draw the contours and content of refuge 
as a legal remedy. 
                                                          
43 Martha Minow, ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide’ (2013) 63(1) Journal of Legal Education 65, 
66. 
44 Rafal Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified (Oxford University Press, 2005) 5. 
45 See, eg, Katy Barnett and Sirko Harder, Remedies in Australian Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2014) 1; Peter Birks, ‘Personal Property: Proprietary Rights and Remedies’ (2000) 11(1) Kings College Law Jour-
nal 1; Michael Tilbury, Principles of Civil Remedies (Butterworths, 1990); Zakrzewski (n 44). 
46 Zakrzewski (n 44) 1. 
47 Ibid 1. 
48 Barnett and Harder (n 45) 1. 
49 See below n 58. 
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A second methodology is comparative legal analysis. This involves searching for similarities 
and differences across legal systems and, in particular, looking for ‘differences in an area of 
perceived similarities, and for similarities in an area of perceived difference’.50 In the first two 
case studies (Europe and Africa), I assess whether these distinct human rights frameworks lead 
to analogous or divergent understandings of refuge and approaches to states’ abilities to con-
strain refugee movements. In the next case study, I compare the ways courts in Canada, Aus-
tralia, Papua New Guinea and the European Union approach challenges to regional and bilateral 
containment agreements. In particular, I assess the different ways courts in these countries po-
sition and manoeuvre juridical borders when determining direct challenges to a containment 
agreement’s operation or validity. The Palestinian case study involves a comparison between 
states’ divergent interpretations of article 1D of the Refugee Convention. Finally, the chapter 
on resisting the prospect of refuge in an IDP camp necessitates a consideration of jurisprudence 
from the United Kingdom and New Zealand—two jurisdictions that adopt different tests for 
when an internal protection alternative is available.51 This thesis also involves a comparison of 
decision-makers’ approaches across these different types of protection from refuge claims. 
Throughout the case studies and in the final chapter, I expose the similarities in decision-mak-
ers’ approaches despite these legal challenges being grounded in divergent legal frameworks 
and arising in different jurisdictions. 
Third, in my literature review and case studies, I ask ‘the woman question’.52 Bartlett explains 
that ‘looking beneath the surface of law to identify the gender implications of rules and the 
assumptions underlying them’ is a form of feminist legal methodology.53 Charlesworth high-
lights that this requires interrogation of the positive rules of law and the issues deemed ‘irrele-
vant or of little significance’.54 Edwards adds that these silences often ignore or ‘distort the 
concerns that are more typical of women than men’.55 Asking the woman question, or ‘asking 
                                                          
50 Gerhard Danneman, ‘Comparative Law: Studies of Similarities or Differences?’ in Mathias Reimann and Rein-
hard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 384, 406. 
51 New Zealand adopts the approach recommended in the First Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee 
Law, ‘Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative’ (1999) 21 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 134: Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 [2000] INLR 165 [65]. This approach has been rejected in the United 
Kingdom: Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5 [15]. The differences are elabo-
rated on in Chapter Seven. For a general comparison between the jurisprudence on the internal protection alterna-
tive in these two jurisdictions, see Bríd Ní Ghráinne, ‘The Internal Protection Alternative Inquiry and Human 
Rights Considerations – Irrelevant or Indispensable?’ (2015) 27(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 29. 
52 Katharine Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103(4) Harvard Law Review 829, 837. 
53 Ibid 843. 
54 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93(2) American Journal of International 
Law 379, 381. 
55 Alice Edwards, Violence against Women under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 30 (‘Violence Against Women’). 
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the gender question’,56 does not only involve consideration of women or gender. It includes 
‘identifying and challenging those elements of existing legal doctrine that leave out or disad-
vantage women and members of other excluded groups’.57 In Chapter Two, I pose the gender 
question by exploring literature that looks at what women are seeking when they search for 
refuge. Much of this scholarship provides a different perspective to understandings of refuge 
that do not specifically consider gender. I also cover material that gives insights on the nature 
of refuge sought by children and refugees with disabilities. In the case studies, I evaluate 
whether decision-makers’ conceptualisations of refuge respond to the needs of refugees of dif-
ferent genders, sexualities and ages as well as refugees with care responsibilities or disabilities. 
I also ask whether the ways decision-makers approach protection from refuge claims, and in 
particular, what they deem crucial and irrelevant, disadvantages certain refugees. Are women 
or men more likely to be the ideal protection-from-refuge litigant? Do decision-makers priori-
tise unaccompanied minors or families with young children in protection from refuge deci-
sions? Are refugees with disabilities in a more or less advantageous position to use courts and 
other decision-making bodies to continue their journey in search of refuge? 
V ORIGINALITY AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP 
There is a large body of literature on how courts and other decision-making bodies interpret 
refugee definitions and grounds for complementary protection.58 These studies examine how 
                                                          
56 Ibid 30. 
57 Bartlett (n 52) 831 (my emphasis). 
58 See, eg, Deborah Anker, ‘Legal Challenges From the Bottom Up: The Development of Gender Asylum Juris-
prudence in the United States’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee 
Law: From the Margins to the Centre (Routledge, 2014) 46; Michelle Foster, ‘Non-Refoulement on the Basis of 
Socio-Economic Deprivation: The Scope of Complementary Protection in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2009) New Zealand Law Review 257; Michelle Foster, ‘Why We Are Not There Yet: The Particular Challenge of 
Particular Social Group’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee Law: 
From the Margins to the Centre (Routledge, 2014) 17 (‘Why We Are Not There Yet’); James Hathaway and Jason 
Pobjoy, ‘Queer Cases Make Bad Law’ (2011) 44(2) New York University Journal of Law and Politics 315; Sat-
vinder Juss, ‘Problematizing the Protection of “War Refugees”: A Rejoinder to Hugo Storey and Jean-François 
Durieux’ (2013) 32 Refugee Survey Quarterly 122; Shauna Labman and Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Evaluating Can-
ada’s Approach to Gender Persecution: Revisiting and Re-Embracing “Refugee Women and the Imperative of 
Categories”’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee Law: From the 
Margins to the Centre (Routledge, 2014) 264; Constance MacIntosh, ‘When Feminist Beliefs Became Credible as 
Political Opinions: Returning to a Key Moment in Canadian Refugee Law’ (2005) 17 Canadian Journal of Women 
and the Law 135; Audrey Macklin, ‘Opening the Door to Women Refugees: A First Crack’ in Wenona Giles, 
Helene Moussa and Penny Van Esterik (eds), Development and Diaspora: Gender and the Refugee Experience 
(Artemis Enterprises, 1996) (‘Opening the Door’); Audrey Macklin, ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Cat-
egories’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 213 (‘Refugee Women’); Penelope Mathew, ‘First Do No Harm: 
Refugee Law as a Response to Armed Conflict’ in David Lovell and Igor Primoratz (eds), Protecting Civilians 
During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century (Ashgate, 2012) 159; Jenni Mill-
bank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation 
in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13(2/3) International Journal of Human Rights 391 (‘Discretion to 
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judicial approaches predominantly widen, but sometimes narrow, the categories of people who 
can claim international protection. In particular, there has been focus on the ways developments 
in jurisprudence on refugee definitions and complementary protection are consequential for 
female refugees,59 sexualities minorities,60 refugees with disabilities61 and child refugees.62 
In this thesis, I shift the focus from how decision-makers interpret refugee definitions to how 
they approach the remedy: refuge. While scholars from a number of different disciplines project 
ideas about what refuge should be,63 and legal experts and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) outline the rights to which refugees are entitled,64 this thesis 
will add to refugee law scholarship by elucidating decision-makers’ conceptualisations of ref-
uge. There is no study that specifically addresses decision-makers’ ideas of refuge and the con-
sequences for refugees’ mobility. The best-known study of the rights refugees are entitled to in 
a place of refuge is Hathaway’s seminal 2005 publication65 in which he elucidates a refugee 
rights regime through synthesising entitlements in the Refugee Convention with rights in the 
                                                          
Disbelief’); Hugo Storey and Rebecca Wallace, ‘War and Peace in Refugee Law Jurisprudence’ (2001) 95 Amer-
ican Journal of International Law 349. 
59 See, eg, Anker (n 58); Foster, ‘Why We Are Not There Yet’ (n 58) 17; Labman and Dauvergne (n 58) 264; 
Mackintosh (n 58); Macklin, ‘Opening the Door’ (n 58); Macklin, ‘Refugee Women’ (n 58). 
60 See, eg, Hathaway and Pobjoy (n 58); Jenni Millbank, ‘The Right of Lesbians and Gay Men to Live Freely, 
Openly and on Equal Terms is Not Bad Law: A Reply to Hathaway and Pobjoy’ (2012) 44(2) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 497; Millbank, ‘Discretion to Disbelief’ (n 58). 
61 Mary Crock, Christine Ernst and Ron McCallum, ‘When Disabilities and Displacement Intersect: Asylum Seek-
ers and Refugees with Disabilities’ (2013) 24(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 735. 
62 Mary Crock, ‘Lonely Refuge: Judicial Responses to Separated Children Seeking Refugee Protection in Aus-
tralia’ (2005) 22(2) Law in Context 120; Alice Edwards, ‘Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee 
Law’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UN-
HCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 46; Jason Pobjoy, 
The Child in International Refugee Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
63 This scholarship is explored in Chapter Two. 
64 See, eg, Michelle Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protec-
tion in Another State’ (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 223; Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality 
of the “Safe Third Country” Notion Contested: Insights from the Law of Treaties’ in Guy Goodwin-Gill and 
Philippe Weckel (eds), Migration & Refugee Protection in the 21st Century: International Legal Aspects (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2015) 665; Fourth Colloquium on Challenges in Refugee Law, ‘The Michigan Guidelines on Protection 
Elsewhere’ (2007) 28(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 207; UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the 
Concept of ‘Effective Protection’ in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Lisbon 
Expert Roundtable, 9-10 December 2002) (February 2003) [12] <http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/3fe9981e4.html>; UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No 85 (XLIX), UN Doc A/53/12/Add.1 (9 Oc-
tober 1998) [aa]; UNHCR, UNHCR’s Position on a Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning Host Third 
Countries (1 December 1992) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b31d47.html>. 
65 Hathaway, ‘The Rights of Refugees’ (n 26). 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights66 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.67 However, when refugees seek courts’ assistance in secur-
ing transfer to or rescue from a place of refuge, it is rare that they can directly plead these rights. 
As noted above, they often have to resort to other legal instruments to frame their case. Hatha-
way says that ‘[d]espite its length’, his study ‘is no more than a first step in the development of 
a clear appreciation of how best to ensure the human rights of refugees under international 
law’.68 In this thesis, I take another step. Rather than starting my enquiry, as Hathaway does, 
with reference to international legal instruments, I begin with the legal claims refugees have 
brought in their attempts to secure a place of genuine refuge. In this respect, this study has some 
parallels with Costello’s analysis of European cases in which asylum seekers and refugees are 
resisting transfers to third countries.69 This project departs from and adds to Costello’s im-
portant work by including but also looking beyond Europe, providing a more global perspective 
and investigating how decision-makers conceptualise what refuge is or should be through the 
prism of different legal frameworks. For example, do decision-makers conceive of refuge as 
providing only for refugees’ basic and immediate needs, or is there recognition that it must also 
enable refugees to live a rewarding life and look forward to a promising future? 
I also add a new dimension to the literature by asking these questions with reference to consid-
erations of gender. There is a large literature on decision-makers’ approaches to questions of 
gender, but the overwhelming majority of these studies focus on how decision-makers interpret 
refugee definitions and grounds for complementary protection.70 There are also studies of and 
guidance from the UNHCR on gender and protection of refugees while in a place of refuge.71 
                                                          
66 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). 
67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
68 Hathaway, ‘The Rights of Refugees’ (n 26) 991. 
69 Costello (n 19) ch 6. 
70 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank provide the most recent assessment of decision-makers’ approaches to gender 
concerns and describe their project as, ‘an international comparative project on gender-related persecution and 
[refugee status determination]’: Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank, ‘Introduction, Gender in 
Refugee Law – From the Margins to the Centre’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), 
Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre (Routledge, 2014) 1, 9 (‘Introduction’). There is only 
one chapter in Arbel, Dauvergne, and Millbank’s edited collection concerning what I call protection from refuge 
challenges, Arbel’s study of litigation on a containment agreement between Canada and the United States, which 
I draw on in Chapter Five. Edwards, ‘traces the history of feminist engagement with refugee law and policy’ from 
1950 to 2010: Alice Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law and 
Policy 1950-2010’ (2010) 29(2) Refugee Survey Quarterly 21. Her analysis of the ways decision-makers approach 
gender focusses on the refugee definition: at 23–31. 
71 See, eg, Chaloka Beyani, ‘The Needs of Refugee Women: A Human-Rights Perspective’ (1995) 3(2) Gender 
and Development 29; Dale Buscher, ‘Refugee Women: Twenty Years On’ (2010) 29(2) Refugee Survey Quarterly 
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What is missing is an assessment of the role of gender in decision-makers’ conceptualisations 
of refuge and approaches to refugees’ searches for refuge. In the most recent study of decision-
makers’ approaches to refugee status assessment, Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank state that 
jurisprudence has moved from being gender blind and being ‘a much better fit for men than for 
women’72 to a situation where ‘decision-makers in Western refugee receiving countries rou-
tinely put gender on the tick-box of topics for consideration’.73 In this thesis, I examine whether 
there has been a similar trajectory with respect to judicial approaches to the concept of refuge 
and contests between refugees’ entitlement to refuge and states’ interests in constraining refu-
gees’ mobility. 
There are four reasons why these contributions to scholarship are significant. First, examining 
how decision-makers approach and determine protection from refuge challenges will shed light 
on the ways adjudicative bodies cement or alter the current inequities in location of and respon-
sibility for refugees. Two of the most significant problems in refugee protection are protracted 
encampment situations74 and that the majority of the world’s refugees are hosted by states least 
able to do so.75 Accordingly, Juss posits that ‘the relevant ethical question’ is not ‘Who is a 
refugee?’ but ‘Whose refugee?’76 Betts and Collier explain that the role law can play in creating 
a fairer system is an important ‘empirical question’ and encourage scholars to investigate the 
                                                          
4; Jane Freedman, ‘Protecting Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: From International Norms to National Pro-
tection’ (2009) 48(1) International Migration 175; Jane Freedman, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in Refugee Protection’ 
(2010) 23(4) Cambridge Review of International Affairs 589; Susan Martin, ‘Refugee and Displaced Women: 60 
Years of Progress and Setbacks’ (2011) 3(2) Amsterdam Law Forum 72; Helene Moussa, ‘Violence Against Ref-
ugee Women: Gender Oppression, Canadian Policy and the International Struggle for Human Rights’ (1998) 
26(3/4) Resources for Feminist Research 79; Malinda Schmiechen, ‘Parallel Lives, Uneven Justice: An Analysis 
of Rights, Protection and Redress for Refugees and Internally Displaced Women in Camps’ (2003) 22(2) Saint 
Louis University Public Law Review 473; UNHCR, UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls 
(1st ed, January 2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/47cfa9fe2.pdf>; UNHCR, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response (May 
2003); UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No 93 (LIII), UN Doc A/AC.96/973 (8 October 2002) (b)(iii). 
72 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 70) 3. 
73 Ibid 1. 
74 UNHCR Executive Committee, Protracted Refugee Situations, UN Doc EC/54/SC/CRP.14 (10 June 2004); 
Betts and Collier (n 11) 137. 
75 Developing regions host 85 per cent of the refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate: UNHCR, Forced Displace-
ment in 2017 (n 2) 2. Also, in Europe, southern border states host disproportionate numbers of refugees due to the 
operation of the Dublin Regulation: Madeline Garlick, ‘The Dublin System, Solidarity and Individual Rights’ in 
Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker and Francesco Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum 
System: The New European Refugee Law (Brill, 2016) 156, 165–6; Francesco Maiani, ‘The Dublin III Regulation: 
A New Legal Framework for a More Humane System?’ in Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker and Francesco 
Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law (Brill, 2016) 
101, 112. 
76 Satvinder Juss, International Migration and Global Justice (Ashgate, 2006) 199. 
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conditions under which law can be used to reshape the current system of refugee responsibil-
ity.77 While there is scepticism about the long-term utility of using litigation as a tool to reshape 
refugee protection policy,78 for many refugees, turning to adjudicative bodies is the only option 
they have when attempting to continue their journey in search of refuge. When refugees insti-
gate protection from refuge challenges, decision-makers must determine questions about where 
they should be required to live and/or the state responsible for them. Through analysing the 
ways decision-makers determine protection from refuge challenges, I highlight the approaches 
likely to help to create a more just and equitable system of refugee protection and those that 
compound current injustices and inequities. 
Second, understanding the ways adjudicative decision-makers conceptualise refuge will pro-
vide an indication of the contours of refuge as a legal concept in situations where refugees are 
requesting or resisting transfer within and across borders. In many contexts, refuge is achieved 
or provided ‘outside or against the law’.79 For example, individuals often need to break the law 
when crossing borders to seek protection80 and those who harbour them sometimes do so at 
great risk to themselves and families.81 While I draw on these extra-legal ideas of refuge in 
Chapter Two, when decision-makers determine protection from refuge cases they outline the 
nature and content of refuge as a legal remedy. Legal doctrines are not only pragmatic tools to 
achieve particular outcomes, they are also a reflection of a community’s values. Durieux sug-
gests that ‘to define refugees is to say as much about “who we are” as about “who they are” – 
it goes to the identity of the definer’.82 Similarly, where we set the ambit of refuge—whether 
we are generous or uncharitable—is a reflection of the principles we hold. This thesis will pro-
vide insights on this by interrogating the ways adjudicative decision-makers as agents of states, 
                                                          
77 Betts and Collier (n 11) 209. 
78 Costello states that, ‘real access for most refugees will not be assured by litigation’ and suggests that the Euro-
pean Union must consider reforms such as issuing humanitarian visas: Costello (n 19) 232. 
79 Linda Rabben, Give Refuge to the Stranger: The Past, Present, and Future of Sanctuary (Left Coast Press, 2011) 
196. 
80 While many states impose criminal penalties on refugees for entering the country without proper authorisation, 
article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention (n 22) provides that states shall not impose penalties on refugees on 
account of their otherwise illegal entry of presence. For a discussion, see Hathaway, ‘The Rights of Refugees’ (n 
26) 370–439. 
81 For example, Rabben discusses the dangers assumed by those who harboured Jews during World War Two or 
hid escaping African American slaves before the American Civil War: Rabben (n 79) chs 5, 6. In some countries, 
harbouring refugees or providing them with assistance to cross a border is a criminal offence. For example, the 
Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile [Code for Entry and Sojourn of Foreigners and Right 
of Asylum] (France) art L622-1 provides that it is an offence to facilitate a person’s illegal entry or stay in France. 
In 2017, Cédric Herrou, a French farmer, was prosecuted for helping more than 200 asylum seekers enter and stay 
in France. However, in 2018 France’s Constitutional Court ruled that the principle of fraternity protected him from 
being charged and prosecuted for helping asylum seekers: Constitutional Council Decision No 2018-717/718, QPC 
(6 July 2018).  
82 Durieux (n 32) 151. 
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regional organisations and UN treaty bodies judge the quality of refuge to which a person is 
entitled. This is important because courts and other adjudicative bodies often provide an ‘alter-
native narrative’ of refugee rights when compared to a state’s legislative or executive arm of 
government.83 
Third, studying judicial notions of refuge will indicate whether courts and other decision-mak-
ing bodies can provide a forum to make refugees’ journeys in search of refuge more realisable 
for refugees from more marginalised backgrounds. The literature on refugees’ searches for ad-
equate places of refuge shows that these quests are often much more difficult for women, refu-
gees with care responsibilities and disabilities, children and the elderly.84 In their assessment of 
gender in refugee law scholarship and advocacy, Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank state that re-
newed focus on gender in refugee law is vital, because ‘while much has been accomplished, in 
the most recent years ground has also been lost’.85 In this thesis, I answer this call by examining 
whether the challenges women, children, parents and people with disabilities face in continuing 
their searches for refuge may be eased or compounded by the ways decision-makers approach 
protection from refuge challenges. I will investigate whether courts enable these refugees to 
continue their searches for refuge in a safe and legal manner.  
Fourth, understanding how decision-makers determine protection from refuge challenges is sig-
nificant because adjudicative bodies provide decisions that, in most cases, are binding.86 While 
the best outcome for refugees in their attempts to find places of genuine sanctuary may be 
achieved by regional or international legal reform, this has not eventuated. The international 
community has recently adopted a Global Compact on Refugees that seeks to establish a ‘more 
equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refu-
gees’.87 However, the Global Compact on Refugees is not legally binding88 and relies on states’ 
                                                          
83 Marinella Marmo and Maria Giannacopoulos, ‘Cycles of Judicial and Executive Power in Irregular Migration’ 
(2017) 5(1) Comparative Migration Studies 16: 1–18, 4. 
84 See, eg, Crock et al (n 16) [5.1]; Echavez et al (n 16); Gerard and Pickering (n 14); Nardone and Correa-Velez 
(n 16); Pickering (n 16) ch 2; Pickering and Cochrane (n 16); Tello et al (n 16) 360. 
85 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 70) 14. 
86 The only decisions considered in this thesis that are not binding are those of the Human Rights Committee 
considered in Chapter Three. The Human Rights Committee’s decisions are formally called ‘views’. 
87 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, GA Res 71/1, 71st session, 6th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/71/1 
(3 October 2016) [68]. Pursuant to para 69 of this United Nations General Assembly Resolution, the UNHCR was 
tasked with developing a comprehensive refugee response in coordination with states. The UNHCR released the 
final draft in June 2018: UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees: Final Draft (26 June 2018) <http://www.un-
hcr.org/5b3295167>. The final draft was provided to the United Nations on 2 August 2018: UNHCR, Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Part II Global Compact, 73rd sess, Supp No 12, UN Doc 
A/73/12 (Part II) (2 August 2018, reissued 13 September 2018) (‘The Global Compact’). The United Nations 
adopted the Global Compact on Refugees on 17 December 2018. 
88 UNHCR, The Global Compact (n 87) [4]. 
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benevolence and good will in responding to refugee situations.89 Early assessments indicate that 
the Global Compact on Refugees will continue the current ‘charitable approach’, whereby 
states, especially those in the Global North, are not obligated to assist developing regions strug-
gling with large numbers of refugees.90 The Global Compact on Refugees may help to change 
states’ normative attitudes towards refugees,91 but norm change takes time and refugees are 
‘dying while we talk’.92 Accordingly, the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees is un-
likely to reduce the significance of litigation for refugees attempting to secure a proper place of 
refuge. Through bringing these legal challenges before courts and other adjudicative bodies, 
refugees and asylum seekers are taking action to control their own destiny, rather than waiting 
for the international community to develop a more just system of refugee protection. 
VI THESIS LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE 
There are three limitations with respect to this thesis’ exploration of protection from refuge 
claims. First, I only examine cases that have come before decision-making bodies and reached 
the stage where a decision has been delivered. A broader project would also consider who has 
access to these decision-making bodies in the first place. Many factors determine whether an 
asylum seeker or refugee is able to access courts or other decision-making bodies to secure 
protection from a place of refuge. In particular, refugees in many jurisdictions do not receive 
free legal representation.93 Even when legal representation is available, factors such as language 
difficulties, youth, gender, disabilities, restrictions on freedom of movement, illiteracy, mental 
health conditions and mistrust of legal authorities can inhibit an asylum seeker or refugee’s 
                                                          
89 BS Chimni, ‘Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’ (2019) 20(2) International 
Journal of Refugee Law (advance); Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, The Global Compacts on Refu-
gees and Migration (November 2018) <https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/2018-global-com-
pacts-refugees-and-migration>. International cooperation will be achieved through measures such as a periodic 
global forum where states and other actors can make ‘concrete pledges and contributions towards the objectives 
of the global compact’ (UNHCR, The Global Compact (n 87) [17]) and seeking contributions from states to ‘es-
tablish, or enlarge the scope, size, and quality of, resettlement programmes’ (ibid [91]). 
90 Hathaway, ‘The UN’s “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework”’ (n 8). See also James Hathaway, ‘The 
Global Cop-Out on Refugees’ (2019) 20(2) International Journal of Refugee Law (advance). 
91 Alexander Betts, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?’ 20(2) International Journal 
of Refugee Law (advance). 
92 Hathaway, ‘The UN’s “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework”’ (n 8). 
93 Eleanor Acer, ‘Making a Difference: A Legacy of Pro Bono Representation’ (2004) 17(3) Journal of Refugee 
Studies 347, 349; Stephen Anagost, ‘The Challenge of Providing High Quality, Low Cost Legal Aid for Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees’ (2000) 12(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 577, 577; Barbara Harrell-Bond, ‘Start-
ing a Movement of Refugee Legal Aid Organizations in the South’ (2007) 19(4) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 729, 730; Hathaway, ‘The Rights of Refugees’ (n 26) 907–8; Shani King, ‘Alone and Unrepresented: A Call 
to Congress to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors’ (2013) 50(2) Harvard Journal on Legislation 331, 
339–41, 368–9; Rachel Levitan, ‘Refugee Protection in Turkey’ (2009) 32 Forced Migration Review 56, 56; An-
drew Schoenholtz and Jonathan Jacobs, ‘The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change’ (2002) 16 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 739, 742. 
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access to legal services.94 The second constraint of this study is that I only examine decisions 
published in English or where an English translation is publicly available. Finally, I only in-
clude decisions handed down on or before 31 August 2017. 
With respect to the project’s scope, the question this thesis poses is how do decision-makers 
approach and determine protection from refuge claims? To answer this question, in each case 
study I identify the techniques judges and other decision-makers use in arbitrating protection 
from refuge claims. It is beyond this project’s scope to investigate why decision-makers adopt 
particular approaches. As noted above, one of my findings is that there has been a shift in the 
ways decision-makers approach protection from refuge claims. This thesis offers speculations 
about what may have prompted these changes, but this is a question for future research projects 
and requires different methodologies from the ones this thesis employs. There are some studies 
on the reasons why judicial approaches to refugee law claims change,95 but none specifically 
address protection from refuge scenarios. 
With regard to the cases that lie outside the protection from refuge rubric, I do not consider 
cases that would otherwise fit within this framework but are brought by litigants who have 
claimed but been denied international protection.96 This is because I want to explore the func-
tions, nature, scope and threshold of refuge for those who are or may be entitled to some form 
of international protection. Therefore, the ways decision-makers conceptualise refuge for those 
otherwise not entitled to international protection is outside the scope of this thesis. Further, not 
included in the protection from refuge framework are cases that raise questions about where 
                                                          
94 Jacqueline Bhabha, ‘Seeking Asylum Alone: Treatment of Separated and Trafficked Children in Need of Refu-
gee Protection’ (2004) 42(1) International Migration 141, 143; Mary Anne Kenny, Nicholas Proctor and Carol 
Grech, ‘Mental Health and Legal Representation for Asylum Seekers in the “Legacy Caseload”’ (2016) 8(2) Cos-
mopolitan Civil Societies Journal 84; King (n 93) 368–9; Levitan (n 93) 56. 
95 See, eg, Chimni, ‘Geopolitics’ (n 29); Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29); Mary Crock, ‘Judging Refugees: 
The Clash of Power and Institutions in the Development of Australian Refugee Law’ (2004) 25(1) Sydney Law 
Review 51; Tuitt, False Images (n 29). 
96 An example of such a case is Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom [2012] 54 EHRR 9 (‘Sufi and Elmi’). In this case, 
the European Court of Human Rights considered whether a Somali man whose application for refugee status had 
been refused and a Somali refugee who had lost the protection of the Refugee Convention (n 22) due to art 33(2) 
could be deported. The issue was whether deportation to Somalia presented a real risk of treatment contrary to art 
3 of the ECHR (n 36). The European Court of Human Rights held that levels of violence in Mogadishu presented 
a real risk of treatment contrary to art 3: Sufi and Elmi [250]. The Court then considered the prospect of internal 
relocation to IDP camps in Somalia as well as to the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. It concluded that circum-
stances and conditions in both camp settings raised a real risk of treatment contrary to art 3: Sufi and Elmi [291]–
[292]. 
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refugees should be located within a state’s territory, but do not involve a refugee litigant de-
manding to be rescued from or transferred to a specific place of refuge.97 They do not come 
within the protection from refuge framework and usually do not involve a decision-maker ad-
dressing the discrepancies between refuge as a concept and place. Finally, I do not examine 
cases in which refugees are challenging detention and they are not detained pursuant to a bilat-
eral or regional containment agreement.98 These cases do not come within a protection from 
refuge framework because decision-makers are not determining whether the place of detention 
serves as an adequate site of refuge. Rather, in these cases, courts and other decision-making 
bodies are concerned with other issues such as whether detention is lawful or arbitrary. 
I also have chosen not to include cases concerning safe third country rules in domestic legisla-
tion unconnected with a bilateral agreement. Some safe third country provisions do not come 
within the protection from refuge framework because they operate to deny eligibility for refugee 
protection and do not require a determination of rescue from or transfer to an alternative place 
of refuge.99 Also, judicial review of safe third country decisions is heavily curtailed in some 
jurisdictions100 and, in others, legislation significantly restricts the considerations courts and 
                                                          
97 See, eg, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) 
v. Guinea, 249/02, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, December 2004; Kreis Warendorf v Ib-
rahim Alo and Amira Osso v Region Hannover (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-443/14 and C-444/14, 
1 March 2016). 
98 See, eg, Amuur v France (1996) III Eur Court HR 850; Plaintiff M76 2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multi-
cultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 251 CLR 322. 
99 For example, the relevant safe third country rules in Australia are contained in section 36(3) of the Migration 
Act 1958 (Cth) which provides that: 
Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or 
herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart 
from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national. 
Pursuant to this provision, the decision-maker is not required to determine whether or not the person can be sent 
to the relevant third country. In fact, in many situations the person cannot be sent to the relevant third country 
because they are not a national and there is no agreement between Australia and the relevant third country. 
100 Legislation in the United Kingdom allows for the removal of asylum seekers to a safe third country without 
substantive consideration of their asylum claim: Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 
s 33, sch 3. If the Secretary of State certifies that a person is proposed to be removed to the safe third country, the 
asylum seeker cannot bring an appeal alleging that the transfer would breach the Refugee Convention (n 22): 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 sch 3, pts 2.5(3)(a), 3.10(3), 4.15(3). This may 
be incompatible with Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast) [2013] OJ L 180/60-180/95 
art 38 that permits European Union member states to apply the safe third country concept, but only if the asylum 
seeker will be treated in accordance with specified principles including that the asylum seeker can request and will 
receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention (n 22). Also, Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary (European 
Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 47287/15, 14 March 2017) indicates that the European 
Court of Human Rights is willing to consider transfers via safe third country provisions to be in violation of article 
three of the ECHR (n 36). 
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other decision-making bodies can take into account when determining whether that third coun-
try is indeed safe.101 While there have been comparisons of safe third country legislation and 
practice,102 these restrictions make comparative assessments of judicial approaches difficult and 
ill-suited to the questions I pose in this thesis. 
VII CONCLUSION 
While scholars have investigated refugees’ quests within and across borders and outlined vari-
ous understandings of what refuge should be, there has been little work on judicial conceptual-
isations of refuge and how these may facilitate or impede refugees’ searches for sanctuary. This 
is despite refugees and asylum seekers in a number of jurisdictions turning to courts and other 
decision-making bodies to either resist or seek transfer to an alternative place of refuge. This 
thesis is the first study to draw together these protection from refuge claims and examine how 
decision-makers approach and determine them. In doing so, it deepens our understanding of 
judicial ideas of refuge and the role adjudicative bodies play in refugees’ journeys. In particular, 
this thesis identifies a pattern across the various jurisdictions in which protection from refuge 
claims are made. When such claims first come before adjudicative bodies, there is a period or 
moment in which decision-makers engage with the notion of refuge. They reflect on the nature 
of refugeehood and use the legal frameworks pleaded to address the predicaments faced by 
refugees and asylum seekers. Their notions of what refuge should be go beyond basic notions 
of safety and survival and advance ideas of refuge outlined by scholars and UN institutions. 
These judicial conceptualisations of refuge are also responsive to the particular needs of refu-
gees of different genders, sexualities and ages as well as to the difficulties faced by refugees 
with care responsibilities and disabilities. In these jurisprudential moments, refuge becomes a 
potent concept and one that refugees can wield to disrupt the continuation of containment mech-
anisms and continue their searches for refuge within and across borders. 
                                                          
101 For example, sections 36(4)–36(5A) of Australia’s Migration Act 1958 (Cth) limit decision-makers’ consider-
ations as to whether the asylum seeker would have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Refugee Conven-
tion ground in the third country, would be at real risk of suffering significant harm in the third country, has a well-
founded fear that the third country would return them to another country where they will be persecuted for a 
Refugee Convention ground, or has a well-founded fear of being returned to a country where there is a real risk 
they would suffer significant harm. 
102 Hathaway and Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (n 40) 30–1; Moreno-Lax (n 64); Jane McAdam, ‘Migrating 
Laws? The “Plagiaristic Dialogue” Between Europe and Australia’ in Hélène Lambert, Jane McAdam and 
Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 25, 
28–35; Charlotte Mysen, The Concept of Safe Third Countries: Legislation and National Practices (2017) 
<https://www.udi.no/globalassets/global/forskning-fou_i/asyl/the-concept-of-safe-third-countries.pdf>. 
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However, these victories are ephemeral. Decision-makers reverse or dilute initial protection 
from refuge successes by reframing the legal issues in ways that excise consideration of refuge 
as a concept, of refuge as a place, or of both. While the reasons for this change must be assessed 
with respect to what is occurring in each particular jurisdiction, the common outcome of this 
reframing is that decision-makers shift from a purposive and comprehensive understanding of 
refuge to a rudimentary one. Once this occurs, the protection from refuge litigant must prove 
that they are exceptional in some way. Decision-makers’ approaches to identifying the ‘atypi-
cal’ refugee often create additional hurdles for women, parents, children and those with disa-
bilities to use courts to seek a safe place of refuge. This disengagement from the concept of 
refuge and search for the extraordinary refugee transforms these judgments from refugee pro-
tection to migration management decisions. These judicial approaches impede refugees’ jour-
neys in search of refuge, perpetuate the current injustices and global inequities in refugee re-
sponsibility and render refuge, as both a concept and a place, elusive. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REFUGE AS A CONCEPT AND PLACE 
I INTRODUCTION 
The word ‘refuge’ is widely used in refugee and forced migration scholarship,1 but is ‘rarely 
distinctly defined’.2 The purpose of this chapter is to outline how scholars, United Nations 
(‘UN’) institutions and refugees approach and understand the notion of refuge and highlight the 
discrepancies between these ideas of refuge and the reality. The analysis in this chapter provides 
the backdrop against which I assess how decision-makers envision refuge and navigate the dis-
junctures between refuge as a concept and place in the following case studies. In this chapter, I 
first explain why I use the word refuge as opposed to similar terms commonly employed in the 
literature. I then identify the five dominant ways scholars approach what refuge is or should be 
for those with (or seeking) international protection. Next, I draw on scholarship from the fields 
of law, anthropology, history, geography, international relations, economics, psychology and 
sociology as well as UN materials and refugee memoirs to build a picture of the objectives, 
nature, scope and threshold of refuge.3 Finally, I examine material that documents what life is 
like in a number of sites of refuge. I suggest that the notion of refuge is a robust and highly 
developed one with many overlapping views about its objectives and content across different 
                                                          
1 See, eg, Catherine Besteman, Making Refuge: Somali Bantu Refugees and Lewiston, Maine (Duke University 
Press, 2016) (‘Making Refuge’); Catherine Besteman, ‘Refuge Fragments, Fragmentary Refuge’ (2014) 15(4) Eth-
nography 426 (‘Refuge Fragments’); Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee 
System (Allen Lane, 2017); Mary Crock, ‘Lonely Refuge: Judicial Responses to Separated Children Seeking Ref-
ugee Protection in Australia’ (2005) 22(2) Law in Context 120; Collette Daiute, ‘Narrating Refuge’ (2017) 13(1) 
Europe’s Journal of Psychology 1; Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Ref-
uge from Deprivation (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Maria Cristina Garcia, Seeking Refuge: Central Amer-
ican Migration to Mexico, the United States and Canada (University of California Press, 2006); Daniel Ghezel-
back, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World (Cambridge University Press, 2018); Jennifer Hynd-
man and Alison Mountz, ‘Refuge or Refusal: The Geography of Control’ in Derek Gregory and Alan Pred (eds), 
Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror and Political Violence (Routledge, 2007) 77; Klaus Neumann. Refuge Aus-
tralia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record (UNSW Press, 2005); Sarah Ogilvie and Scott Miller, Refuge Denied: 
The St Louis Passengers and the Holocaust (University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Linda Rabben, Give Refuge to 
the Stranger: The Past, Present, and Future of Sanctuary (Left Coast Press, 2011); Georgina Ramsay, Impossible 
Refuge: The Control and Constraint of Refugee Futures (Routledge, 2018); Susan Zimmermann, ‘Irregular Sec-
ondary Movements to Europe: Seeking Asylum beyond Refuge’ (2009) 22(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 74; Nor-
man Zucker and Naomi Zucker, Desperate Crossings: Seeking Refuge in America (ME Sharpe, 1996). 
2 Ramsay (n 1) 156. 
3 Because I am examining the concept of refuge with specific reference to those entitled to or seeking international 
protection, I do not consider more general theories of hospitality such as Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourman-
telle, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond, tr Rachel Bowlby (Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2000). 
 27 
scholarly disciplines and the wider literature. However, there is often a stark disparity between 
ideas of what refuge should be and the conditions those seeking refuge endure. 
II REFUGE, SANCTUARY, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: SYN-
ONYMOUS TERMS? 
The words ‘asylum’, ‘sanctuary’ and ‘refuge’ have similar etymologies. Asylum derives from 
the Latin form of the Greek word asylos,4 which means inviolability.5 It was first used to de-
scribe ‘some place or territory, large or small, where a person may not be seized by his [or her] 
pursuers’.6 The term sanctuary is closely linked to asylum and ‘comes from the Latin word for 
a sacred place’.7 Certain places of worship in ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome provided sanc-
tuary to runaway slaves and those accused of crimes.8 Refuge originates from the Latin word 
refugium, which means a place to flee to.9 One of its earliest uses is in the Hebrew Bible in 
which there were six cities of refuge where those accused of manslaughter were protected from 
avengers.10 
In more recent contexts, these terms are often used synonymously. The Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees’ (‘Refugee Convention’)11 drafters considered these words to have con-
gruity. The Peruvian delegate suggested that the word ‘asylum’ in the preamble should be 
changed to ‘refuge’, because in the Latin American context, ‘asylum’ was used for what he 
described as political refugees, whereas refuge was granted to ordinary refugees.12 However, 
the French representative countered that in France there was no distinction between the con-
cepts of asylum, refuge and sanctuary.13 The Chilean representative agreed that the word ‘asy-
lum’ had the same meaning as ‘refuge’ even in a Latin American context.14 The United Nations 
                                                          
4 Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law: Volume 2 (AW Sijthoff-Leyden, 1966) 3; 
Penelope Mathew and Tristan Harley, Refugees, Regionalism and Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 2016) 70; Mat-
thew Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 26; Rabben (n 
1) 18. 
5 Price (n 4) 26; Rabben (n 1) 18. 
6 Grahl-Madsen (n 4) 3. 
7 Rabben (n 1) 18. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Daiute (n 1) 5. 
10 Moshe Greenberg, ‘The Biblical Conception of Asylum’ (1959) 78(2) Journal of Biblical Literature 125, 125. 
11 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 
January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
12 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary 
Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh Meeting, UN Doc E/AC.7/SR.167 (22 August 1950) 5. 
13 Ibid 6. 
14 Ibid 6. 
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High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) speaks of people seeking or being granted ref-
uge,15 asylum,16 sanctuary17 or international protection.18 The authors surveyed in this chapter 
use one or all of these terms, and often interchangeably. 
Nevertheless, I predominantly employ the word ‘refuge’ for two reasons. First, the term ‘sanc-
tuary’ is more often associated with religious and community-based traditions of providing 
protection, whereas ‘asylum’ and ‘international protection’ are more likely to be used to refer 
to legal responses to people fleeing serious harm.19 ‘Refuge’ is more generic and can encompass 
both. While one of the aims of this project is to draw an outline of refuge as an enforceable 
legal concept, in doing so I do not want to overlook the similarities between legal understand-
ings of refuge and those from outside the field of law. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the 
analysis in this chapter, refuge is a more fitting and flexible term. Second, unlike the terms 
‘asylum’, ‘sanctuary’ and ‘international protection’, there is a close linguistic connection be-
tween the words ‘refuge’ and ‘refugee’. As noted in Chapter One, ‘refugee’ derives from the 
Old French réfugié, which means ‘gone in search of refuge’.20 In the discussion of the ways 
scholars conceptualise refuge, it will become apparent that the content of refuge is sometimes 
informed by the circumstances of those seeking it. 
III CONCEPTUALISING REFUGE: WHERE TO BEGIN? 
There are a number of starting points for imagining what refuge is or should be. A survey of 
scholarship on refuge, sanctuary and asylum indicates five dominant approaches, which I de-
scribe as historical and cultural, experiential, rights-based, philosophical and categorical. I out-
line each below, but it is important to emphasise that they are not mutually exclusive. Scholars 
often draw on more than one to outline their ideas of refuge. I identify these different inroads 
to theorising refuge so I can compare them to the ways decision-makers approach the concept 
                                                          
15 The UNHCR’s mission statement speaks of the need for refugees to ‘find safe refuge in another state’: UNHCR, 
Global Report 2017 (June 2018) 4 <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2017/pdf/GR2017_Eng-
lish_Full_lowres.pdf> (emphasis added). 
16 The UNHCR speaks of the importance of ‘preserving the character of asylum’: ibid 16 (emphasis added). 
17 The UNHCR refers to an asylum seeker as ‘someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed’: 
UNHCR, Asylum-Seekers <http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/asylum-seekers.html> (emphasis added) (‘Asylum-Seek-
ers’). Thomas Albrecht, the former UNHCR regional representative in Australia, stresses that, ‘[t]here is nothing 
illegal about seeking sanctuary from war and persecution’: Thomas Albrecht, ‘Australia’s Refugee Policy is a 
Failure. This is Not the Time to Shirk Responsibility’, The Guardian (online at 2 October 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/02/our-refugee-policy-is-a-failure-this-is-not-the-time-
to-shirk-responsibility> (emphasis added). 
18 The UNHCR refers to a refugee as someone who ‘seeks international protection’: UNHCR, Asylum-Seekers (n 
17) (emphasis added). 
19 Rabben (n 1) 196. 
20 Glynnis Chantrill (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Word Histories (Oxford University Press, 2002) 424. 
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of refuge. While an obvious hypothesis may be that courts and other decision-making bodies 
adopt rights-based thinking, there is potential for decision-makers to be influenced by other 
viewpoints. 
A Historical and Cultural 
One method for understanding the concept of refuge adopted by scholars across a number of 
disciplines is to refer to ancient, religious and cultural practices of providing safety. This is 
sometimes used to inform principles behind contemporary ideas of refuge. For example, legal 
scholars Mathew and Harley commence their discussion of the ‘moral and philosophical under-
pinnings of refugee protection’ by referring back to the ancient Greek tradition of granting ref-
uge in temples21 and exploring the practices of refuge in Islam, Judaism, Christianity and Bud-
dhism.22 They suggest that while sovereignty, as opposed to religion, is now the basis for asy-
lum,23 these ‘[p]rinciples of humanity and hospitality’ continue to be ‘important rationales for 
asylum’.24 Gil-Bazo surveys historical and religious practices of granting asylum to build an 
argument that the right to asylum is a general principle of international law.25 
In other studies, historical practices of refuge are used to espouse the role refuge plays in inter-
national relations. For example, political scientist Price traces the practice of asylum in ancient 
Greece and early modern Europe to show that it was originally ‘a legal defense to extradition’ 
and, thus, ‘depended upon a judgment that another state targeted the asylum-seeker for harm in 
a manner inconsistent with its rightful authority’.26 He draws on this history to argue that the 
current practice of asylum has a political dimension—it acts to condemn and reform persecutory 
regimes.27 
Studies of religious and cultural practices of refuge are also used to challenge and broaden 
dominant understandings of refugee protection. Anthropologist Chatty argues that in Middle 
Eastern countries, the Islamic notion of karam (which she translates as generosity and hospital-
                                                          
21 Mathew and Harley (n 4) 70. 
22 Ibid 70–3. 
23 S Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (Martinus Nijohff, 1971) 15, 16 cited in Mathew and Harley (n 
4) 73. For a discussion of the shift from religious practices of refuge to the development of asylum in international 
law, see Rabben (n 1) ch 4. 
24 Mathew and Harley (n 4) 73. 
25 Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘Asylum as a General Principle of International Law’ (2015) 27(1) International Jour-
nal of Refugee Law 3, 17–23. 
26 Price (n 4) 14. 
27 Ibid 14, 70. 
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ity) ‘effectively operates to provide the asylum-seeker with sanctuary and refuge in an environ-
ment where international protection does not exist’.28 She suggests that this duty-based ap-
proach to refuge should be melded with the ‘international rights-based protection approaches 
to refuge’.29 Another example is geographer Zaman’s study of Islamic traditions of refuge, 
which he suggests are commensurate with and, in some circumstances, greater than the protec-
tion afforded in the Refugee Convention.30 
B Experiential 
A different approach to understanding refuge is to explore what refugees themselves are search-
ing and hoping for. This is most often seen in ethnographic work. For example, Zimmermann’s 
study of Somali refugees’ journeys across Africa and Europe evidences that these refugees are 
seeking safety ‘as well as quality of life and certainty in exile’.31 Ramsay investigates how 
female refugees from Central Africa experience and imagine displacement32 and argues that a 
crucial aspect of refuge for women is ‘connection to others and relationship building’.33 
Besteman’s work with Somali refugees resettled in the United States indicates that they want 
to create ‘meaning in their new context’.34 
There are examples of what I call an experiential approach to envisioning refuge outside an-
thropological studies. Some scholars take refugee testimony before courts and tribunals to as-
sess the ways refugees conceptualise refuge.35 For example, Paik examines legal testimony 
given by refugees in a well-known United States case36 and argues that they wanted more than 
provision of enough food, water and shelter to survive.37 They resisted being the mere objects 
                                                          
28 Dawn Chatty, ‘The Duty to be Generous (Karam): Alternatives to Rights-Based Asylum in the Middle East’ 
(2017) 5 Journal of the British Academy 177, 196. 
29 Ibid 178. 
30 Tahir Zaman, Islamic Traditions of Refuge in the Crises of Iraq and Syria (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 26. 
31 Zimmermann (n 1) 74. 
32 Ramsay (n 1) 1. 
33 Ibid 207. 
34 Besteman, ‘Refuge Fragments’ (n 1) 426. 
35 Most of the scholarship on refugee testimony does not considers ideas of refuge but instead focuses on the ways 
refugees recount past experiences: see, eg, Toni Johnsen, ‘On Silence, Sexuality and Skeletons: Reconceptualizing 
Narrative in Asylum Hearings’ (2011) 20 Social and Legal Studies 57; Anthea Vogl, ‘The Genres and Politics of 
Refugee Testimony’ (2018) 30(1) Law and Literature 81; Matthew Zagor, ‘Recognition and Narrative Identities: 
Is Refugee Law Redeemable’ in Fiona Jenkins, Mark Nolan and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Allegiance and Identity in 
a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 311. 
36 Sale v Haitian Centers Council Inc 509 US 155, 133 (1993). 
37 A Naomi Paik, ‘Testifying to Rightlessness: Haitian Refugees Speaking from Guantánamo’ (2010) 28(3) Social 
Text 39, 53. 
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of humanitarian assistance38 and sought ‘recognition as full human subjects’.39 The use of ref-
ugee narratives is also present in psychological literature. For example, psychologist Daiute 
draws on stories from refugee children to argue that a crucial part of refuge is the ability to 
‘imagine a beautiful future’.40 
C Rights-Based 
Dominant in legal scholarship is the use of international human rights and refugee law to build 
a positivist picture of refuge. Hathaway draws on the rights in the Refugee Convention, as well 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)41 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’)42 to provide a comprehensive 
outline of the ‘common corpus of refugee rights which can be asserted by refugees in any state 
party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol’.43 McAdam looks to the Refugee Convention as 
‘a form of lex specialis’ and argues that it should be applied to those who do not meet the 
refugee definition, but are granted complementary protection.44 Adding to these studies on 
rights available to all refugees, there is scholarship on the ways human rights law may respond 
to the protection needs of women refugees,45 child refugees46 and refugees with disabilities.47 
                                                          
38 Ibid 53–4. 
39 Ibid 41. 
40 Daiute (n 1) 2. 
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). 
42 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
43 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 8 (‘The 
Rights of Refugees’). 
44 Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 1. 
45 See, eg, Chaloka Beyani, ‘The Needs of Refugee Women: A Human-Rights Perspective’ (1995) 3(2) Gender 
and Development 29; Jane Freedman, ‘Protecting Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: From International 
Norms to National Protection’ (2009) 48(1) International Migration 175; Malinda Schmiechen, ‘Parallel Lives, 
Uneven Justice: An Analysis of Rights, Protection and Redress for Refugees and Internally Displaced Women in 
Camps’ (2003) 22(2) Saint Louis University Public Law Review 473. 
46 See, eg, Christopher Bierwirth, ‘The Protection of Refugee and Asylum-Seeking Children, The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the Work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child’ (2005) 24(2) Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 98; Mano Candappa, ‘The Right to Education and an Adequate Standard of Living’ (2000) 8(3) The 
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A positivist approach to refuge for Palestinian refugees can be seen in Takkenberg’s study of 
the rights they are entitled to under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East’s (‘UNRWA’) protection and assistance mandate, statelessness law, 
and international humanitarian and human rights law.48 A rights-based approach to refuge also 
exists for putative refugees.49 Hathaway and Foster and the Michigan Guidelines on the Internal 
Protection Alternative suggest that the rights in the Refugee Convention should serve as a guide 
to the type of protections that should be available in the internal protection alternative.50 
Mathew proposes a slightly broader enquiry: decision-makers should investigate whether the 
putative refugee would have their international human rights protected in the proposed place of 
relocation.51 
D Philosophical  
A further way of conceptualising refuge is to draw on ethics or philosophy. A number of schol-
ars do this to justify providing refuge. For example, Goodwin-Gill’s study of temporary refuge 
cites Rawls’s idea of a natural duty of ‘helping another when he [or she] is in need or jeopardy, 
provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself’.52 Noll draws on the 
Kantian right to hospitality as part of his explorations of why states, especially those in the 
Global North, have an obligation to offer refugee protection.53 
However, some scholars go further and use ideas in the fields of ethics and philosophy to artic-
ulate the content of what states should offer those in need of international protection. This is 
evident in Betts and Collier’s study of refuge in which they refer to a ‘famous moral thought 
experiment’ regarding what a bystander should do when they discover a child in a pond asking 
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for help.54 Building on this scenario, they argue that states not only have an ‘unambiguous duty 
of rescue’,55 but an obligation to restore refugees’ ‘circumstances as near to normality as it is 
practically possible’.56 Another example is Gibney, who draws on theorists such as Locke and 
Walzer to develop a principle of ‘humanitarianism’ that should guide liberal democratic nations 
in their asylum policies.57 Humanitarianism provides that ‘states have an obligation to assist 
refugees when the costs of doing so are low’58 and can also be used to determine ‘how refugees 
and asylum-seekers can be rightfully treated’.59 Kritzman-Amir takes a different approach and 
refers to feminist ideas about ethics of care and theories of utilitarianism to frame refuge as a 
shared responsibility.60 Rather than outlining what refuge entails by reference to what a single 
state should provide to refugees, she suggests that states’ varying capacities to provide refuge 
is a prime consideration in determining which state should be responsible for refugees.61 
E Categorical 
Another method is to unpack what refuge is or should be by reference to the categories of people 
seeking international protection or to the defining features of refugeehood. Durieux states that 
fixing the label of refugee on a person or group (whether or not they come within a legal defi-
nition of a refugee) requires a response from the international community.62 Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify ‘the normative meaning of refugeehood’ to understand what response is 
appropriate.63 Demonstrating what can be called a categorical approach to elucidating refuge, 
Durieux posits that those who have a well-founded fear of persecution (as opposed to, for ex-
ample, those who flee natural disasters) are entitled to not only ‘protection against deportation’, 
but a ‘guarantee of admission and inclusion’.64 
A number of scholars also adopt a categorical approach by referring to the persecution aspect 
of refugee definitions to delineate the contours and content of refuge. For example, Hathaway 
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points to the persecution requirement to justify why those who come within the definition of a 
refugee in article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (‘Convention refugees’) are entitled to a 
special form of international protection.65 Price argues that the requirement to establish a well-
founded fear of persecution means that Convention refugees suffer ‘a distinctive kind of harm 
that calls for confrontation and condemnation’. Thus, refuge has an ‘expressive dimension 
[that] differentiates it from other modes of refugee assistance, which are focused exclusively 
on meeting refugees’ need for protection’.66 Conversely, McAdam highlights the similarities 
between Convention refugees and those who may not have a well-founded fear of persecution, 
but cannot otherwise avail themselves of the protection of their country, to argue that both 
should be entitled to ‘privileged treatment’.67  
Some scholars look beyond legal definitions of refugees to understand the essence of refugee-
hood and the appropriate response. For example, Shacknove argues that the idea of refugeehood 
should be extended to those whose governments cannot meet their basic needs.68 Accordingly, 
refuge encompasses ‘international restitution of these needs’.69 Taking an even broader view-
point of what refuge should encompass, Gibney describes refugees as people who have not only 
lost state protection but have been deprived of their ‘social world’.70 Therefore, refuge is not 
only about restoring their basic needs, but should offer a place in which refugees can rebuild 
‘communities, associations, relationships’.71 
IV WHAT ARE REFUGE’S FUNCTIONS? 
While the notion of refuge may have originated from ancient practices of providing safety in 
sacred spaces, contemporary understandings of refuge have developed to encompass objectives 
beyond protection from serious harm. Descriptions of refuge’s additional purposes range from 
restoration of ‘social and economic independence’,72 ensuring refugees can live a dignified 
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life,73 providing ‘a taste of the substance of the citizenship’,74 and finding a ‘solution to refu-
geehood’.75 However, there is no overarching theory of the objectives refuge should fulfil. As 
previously discussed, scholars have assembled examinations of refuge according to other con-
cerns such as the rights in the Refugee Convention or the categories of people entitled to inter-
national protection. 
I want to assess the extent to which decision-makers adopt a purposive approach to refuge and 
whether their perceptions of refuge’s objectives align with the understandings of scholars, the 
UN and refugees. Examining purposes and functions is one way of categorising and exploring 
remedies.76 While there is no dedicated study of what refuge is designed to achieve, the pattern 
that emerges across the literature is that refuge has three functions, which can be described as 
restorative, regenerative and palliative. Further, there is a temporal dimension to refuge’s func-
tions. Scholars, UN institutions and refugees speak of the need to live a rewarding life while 
displaced, have hope for the future and cope with traumatic experiences and memories. Below, 
I explore refuge’s objectives and temporality by outlining ideas about what it is designed to 
achieve with respect to refugees’ present, future and past. 
A Being Reborn in Exile: Restoration of a Meaningful Life 
The creation of a new life is a common motif for refuge in refugee memoirs. Passarlay, an 
Afghan refugee, speaks about being ‘born again’.77 Ahmedi, also an Afghan refugee, writes 
about wanting ‘to have a life’.78 Keitetsi, a Ugandan child soldier, describes resettlement in 
Denmark as being given ‘a new life’.79 Hakakian, a Jewish woman born in Iran and now living 
and working in the United States, says that to be a refugee is to ‘begin anew’80 and be ‘recast 
as a brand-new human engine’.81 This rebirth involves much more than being free from one’s 
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persecutors. Ahmedi explains that, ‘[y]ou might suppose that a person who has escaped from 
suffering and oppression and the threat of death will be grateful and content simply to exist 
after that and want nothing more. But the human heart easily grows restless … I had come to 
long for something more than the mere absence of pain’.82 
Scholars across a number of disciplines share the idea that refuge is intended to provide refugees 
with a life worth living, as opposed to the mere preservation of life. Legal scholars Hathaway 
and Foster contend that the rights in the Refugee Convention ‘have a restorative function, fa-
cilitating the re-establishment of a life’.83 Political scientist Gibney argues that refuge involves 
rebuilding a ‘meaningful social world’.84 Betts and Collier, professors of international relations 
and economics respectively, state that refuge is about restoring ‘basic features of a normal 
life’.85 Anthropologist Zimmerman writes of refuge as being able to ‘have a “life” rather than 
just to be alive’.86 There is also an understanding that building a rewarding and meaningful life 
while displaced involves giving back what may have been lost through persecution and dis-
placement but also providing conditions in which a refugee can grow and develop. Thus, we 
can see articulations of the restorative and regenerative functions of refuge during exile; I elab-
orate on both below. 
1. Restoring refugees to a position where they can be alive and have a life 
One restorative aspect of refuge widely discussed in the literature is the re-establishment of a 
safe, secure and free existence. The importance of immediately feeling safe in the country of 
refuge is reflected in refugee memoirs. Bashir, a Sudanese refugee, in writing about her escape 
to the United Kingdom recalls the moment of being ‘inside this machine that would fly me 
away to safety’87 and that ‘[m]y first priority had to be to get into England – for that meant I 
was safely out of Sudan … [H]ow I would live, my future – all of that could wait’.88 When 
Keitetsi was told that she could stay in South Africa, but would not receive housing or help in 
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finding employment, her response was, ‘I didn’t care, as long as I had escaped my pursuers’.89 
Ahmedi was overjoyed about the prospect of being resettled because in the United States: ‘[n]o 
one will attack me – the law won’t allow it’.90 
Restoration of a sense of security, safety and freedom as an important aspect of refuge is also 
evident in other sources. The UNHCR states that one of the aims of the Refugee Convention is 
achievement of a ‘peaceful life’91 and that ‘[r]efugees’ rights to security and personal safety 
underpin the entirety of the provisions of the [Refugee] Convention’.92 Similarly, Goodwin-
Gill argues that refugee protection is concerned with ‘life, liberty and security of person’.93 The 
importance of restoring safety, security and freedom in the context of displacement can be seen 
in the Refugee Convention’s travaux préparatoires with respect to the host state’s obligation 
to issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel 
document.94 The representative from the International Refugee Organisation stated that ‘[a] 
person without papers was a pariah subject to arrest for that reason alone’.95 The US representa-
tive emphasised the importance of identity papers to ensure that refugees ‘would be free from 
the extra hardships of a person in possession of no papers at all’.96 
Another restorative aspect of refuge is ensuring that refugees have the means to sustain life. 
The UNHCR states that refugees must have ‘an adequate and dignified means of subsistence’.97 
The UNHCR’s Executive Committee stresses the need for host states to ensure that refugees’ 
‘basic support needs, including food, clothing, accommodation, and medical care … are met’.98 
Supporting and reflecting these goals, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam highlight the importance of 
‘provisions with respect to subsistence’,99 and Hathaway emphasises that refugees are entitled 
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to ‘basic survival’ rights.100 Crock et al start their discussion of refugees’ rights with ‘the rights 
to sustenance and other basic needs’.101 
Further, the restorative function of refuge is understood to encompass refugees having choices 
about their lives’ directions. The Refugee Convention’s drafters stressed the importance of ref-
ugees being able to ‘perform the acts of civil life (marriage, divorce, adoption, settlement of 
succession, naturalization, acquisition of immovable property, constitution of associations, 
opening of bank accounts etc)’.102 The UNHCR understands that refugees should be integrated 
into the ‘framework of a community where they can recover the conditions of an active … 
life’103 and that the Refugee Convention is designed to ‘progressively restore the social and 
economic independence needed’ for refugees to ‘get on with their lives’.104 Betts and Collier 
speak about refuge restoring the conditions in which refugees can exercise autonomy.105 Further 
support for this position comes from Hathaway, who states that the rights in the Refugee Con-
vention ‘afford refugees a real measure of autonomy and security to devise the solutions which 
they judge most suited to their own circumstances and ambitions’.106 Reflecting on the relation-
ship between refuge and choice, Keitetsi explains that once she was resettled as a refugee, ‘I no 
longer had to live my life for others, and no force makes me act against my will’.107 
Beyond the re-establishment of safety, sustenance and choice, Passarlay’s and Ahmedi’s mem-
oirs provide insights on the restorative aspects of refuge for child refugees, in particular, the 
need to restore a sense of childhood. Both left Afghanistan as minors; Passarlay was unaccom-
panied and Ahmedi travelled with her mother, but often found herself effectively in the parental 
role due to her mother’s ill health. When Passarlay was finally able to start school in the United 
Kingdom after a long battle with immigration authorities, he felt ‘like a child again’.108 Ahmedi 
explains that, in the process of leaving Afghanistan, seeking refuge in Pakistan and being reset-
tled in the United States, ‘I was forced to grow up very suddenly’.109 After being resettled, she 
                                                          
100 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees (n 43) 84. 
101 Crock et al (n 47) 189. 
102 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 
Memorandum by the Secretary-General, UN Doc E/AC.32/2 (3 January 1950) (‘Memorandum’). They introduced 
the right to administrative assistance in article 25 of the Refugee Convention (n 11). 
103 UNHCR, ‘Statement by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan’ (n 91). 
104 UNHCR Executive Committee, Local Integration (n 72) [11]. 
105 Betts and Collier (n 1) 7. 
106 James Hathaway, ‘Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to “Date”?’ (2007) 20 Journal of Refugee 
Studies 347, 364 (emphasis in original) (‘Forced Migration Studies’). 
107 Keitetsi (n 79) 272. 
108 Passarlay and Ghouri (n 77) 342. 
109 Ahmedi and Ansary (n 78) 210. 
 39 
befriends an older couple and explains that they ‘are letting me live a little of my childhood 
now, even though I am past the time for it. They let me behave in very childish ways sometimes 
– I make demands and act silly’.110 
While there is a recognition that the prime concern of refuge is to meet refugees’ needs,111 there 
is also consideration of the ways refuge may be restorative in a more global sense. Restorative 
justice involves addressing and reducing instances of injustice.112 Some political theorists argue 
that refuge functions as a form of reparation for the harm and injustice done to refugees by 
individual states or the global community.113 This conceptualisation of refuge as reparation is 
particularly relevant in contexts where the host country may have, directly or indirectly, con-
tributed to the refugee being unable to return to their homeland.114 
2. Not just surviving, but thriving in exile 
Beyond restoring refugees to a position where they can lead a liveable life, scholars, UN insti-
tutions and refugees understand refuge to be a rejuvenating process allowing refugees to de-
velop and grow. For example, Ramsay’s work with refugees in Uganda and Australia shows 
that they want to ‘live lives of regenerative possibility’.115 Zimmermann’s study of Somali ref-
ugees indicates that they travel across Africa and Europe searching for a place where they can 
‘achieve something in exile’.116 UNRWA states that part of its mission is ‘to help Palestinian 
refugees achieve their full potential in human development terms under the difficult circum-
stances in which they live’.117 Betts and Collier argue that the international community should 
adopt a human development approach for all refugees.118 This means that ‘[f]or the period ref-
ugees are in limbo, we should be creating an enabling environment that nurtures rather than 
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debilitates’.119 Accordingly, refuge should encompass ‘all of the things that allow people to 
thrive and contribute rather than merely survive’.120 
Legal scholars highlight the ways the Refugee Convention and other international instruments 
give refugees the opportunity to develop, as opposed to merely survive, in the host country. 
Edwards reminds us that refugees have the right not just to seek, but to enjoy, asylum.121 This 
means that refugees should benefit in some way from their experience of refuge.122 Edwards 
gives as an example the right to work contained in the Refugee Convention, which provides 
refugees with an opportunity to improve ‘language and other skills’.123 Another indication of 
the idea that refuge is intended to be a time of growth and creativity is the Refugee Convention 
drafters’ insistence on protection of refugees’ artistic rights and industrial property.124 They 
recognised that such outputs are ‘the creation of the human mind and recognition is not a fa-
vour’.125 
When discussing refuge’s regenerative function, there is a tendency to describe it in economic 
terms. This is most readily seen in UNHCR materials. For example, the UNHCR stresses that 
the rights in the Refugee Convention ‘are essential to establishing refugees’ self-sufficiency 
and allowing them to contribute to, rather than depend upon, the country of asylum’.126 With 
reference to the right to education in the Refugee Convention, the UNHCR says that it helps 
refugees ‘garner the necessary skills to become self-reliant and increase their chances of em-
ployment’.127 Further, the UNHCR encourages host states to implement assistance programs 
that ‘integrate strategies for self-reliance and empowerment’.128 Some scholars also suggest that 
economic independence is one objective of refugee protection. For example, Hathaway and 
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Cusick state that the socio-economic rights in the Refugee Convention are designed to ‘ensure 
that refugees are able quickly to become self-sufficient in their country of refuge’.129 
There is no doubt that gaining employment and being able to contribute to the host country as 
employees, business owners or taxpayers is an important facet of refuge for many refugees. 
This comes through strongly in Bashir’s memoir. She writes that, once she was safely in the 
United Kingdom, she ‘wanted to contribute to this society. I was a trained medical doctor, and 
I knew this country needed doctors’.130 However, it is important not to overemphasise the eco-
nomic aspect of refuge’s regenerative objectives. Providing an insight into what female refu-
gees resettled in Australia want to achieve, Ramsay observes that their prime objective is to 
become pregnant and build a family.131 By doing this, these women are ‘actualising … the 
regenerative potentiality of finally being secure and safe enough to bear and rear children’.132 
Inhorn’s ethnographic work with Arab refugees in Detroit indicates that creating a family is a 
priority for both male and female refugees.133 These broader ideas about the ways refuge can 
be rejuvenating are also reflected in refugee memoirs. While Bashir wanted to contribute to her 
host country through employing her medical skills, she was not allowed to work. Rather, it was 
the birth of her son that gave her ‘the spirit and the will to live’.134 Providing an adolescent’s 
perspective of the regenerative aspect of refuge, Ahmedi writes that ‘I had come to crave some 
activity that would interest my mind. I wanted some fun’.135 
Not only is refuge supposed to be rejuvenating for the refugee, it is also understood to be re-
generative for host countries. Mathew and Harley argue that one reason for providing refuge is 
that ‘refugees are not just a short-term “burden” but are likely to make valuable contributions 
to their host countries’.136 Supporting this are a number of studies that highlight the ways in 
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which refugees enhance the social, civic and economic life of the countries in which they are 
granted refuge.137 
B Dreaming of and Creating a Tomorrow 
While one of the functions of refuge is to create a rewarding and meaningful life during refu-
geehood, a person is not expected to be a refugee forever. Refuge’s rejuvenating function is not 
limited to refugees’ experience of displacement; it also flows over into generating aspirations 
for the future. Haines’ history of refugees in the United States argues that if refuge ‘fails to 
provide a basis for hope for the future, then it is a poor refuge indeed’.138 This is also a central 
theme in refugee memoirs. Reflecting on her refugee journey, Ahmedi explains that when she 
was living as a refugee in Pakistan, ‘I had no source of hope out of which to nourish my struggle. 
When you see some possibility of getting out getting out of a pit, you can draw strength from 
the idea of where you will be once you get out: You see a goal worth fighting for. If the best 
you can hope for is to sink more slowly, struggle comes to feel pointless’.139 
For Ahmedi, hope came when she had the chance of resettlement in the United States, where 
she could ‘build a future’.140 Wek, a Sudanese refugee, recalls that when she left for the United 
Kingdom she ‘carried almost nothing, other than our family’s hopes for the future’.141 Later, 
when she was working as a model in New York, the US Committee for Refugees and Immi-
grants contacted Wek asking for her assistance in a campaign for Sudanese refugees. She ex-
plains that the letter was ‘heaven sent’ because ‘[t]hey were offering hope. They too believed 
in the possibilities for the future’.142 Boochani, a Kurdish refugee on Manus Island, writes that 
even in moments of despair it is crucial to be able to ‘erase all the sinking feelings of weakness, 
of demoralisation, of inferiority’ and ‘replace them with hope and joy’.143 
Scholars who take an experiential approach to understanding refuge speak of the importance of 
imagining and working towards a future. Ramsay says that refugees want to ‘actively create a 
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future’ as opposed to ‘simply surviving in asylum’.144 Their everyday existence is organised to 
achieve ‘a future in which their lives [will] be “better”’.145 Reflecting on her experience in 
counselling refugee children, Daiute writes about the ways they narrate their aspirations and 
imagine different futures.146 She argues that through this process child refugees create a sense 
of refuge.147 
Discussions of solutions to refugeehood are another way of expressing this aspect of refuge’s 
functions. Betts and Collier posit that refugees are ‘entitled to expect’ not only rescue and res-
toration of autonomy, but ‘an eventual route out of limbo’.148 Stevens argues that the ‘ultimate 
goal of refugee protection must be to achieve a satisfactory solution for the refugee’.149 Simi-
larly, Hathaway explains that an important role of the refugee protection regime is to ‘find a 
way to bring refugee status to an end – whether by means of return to the country of origin, 
resettlement elsewhere, or naturalization in the host country’.150 He also emphasises that refu-
gee law allows refugees to take the lead in creating their futures: ‘the Refugee Convention gives 
priority to allowing refugees to make their own decisions … to take the time they need to decide 
when and if they wish to pursue a durable solution’.151 One of the UNHCR’s objectives is to 
find durable solutions for refugees.152 Bartholomeusz and Takkenberg argue that, similar to 
Convention refugees, Palestinian refugees are entitled to durable solutions.153 Takkenberg sug-
gests that these include Palestinian refugees’ voluntary repatriation to their original homes, es-
tablishment of a Palestinian state and local integration in Arab host countries.154 
Refuge may also operate to engender hope, not just for refugees but for the future of the inter-
national community. While granting refugee protection is most commonly understood to be an 
                                                          
144 Ramsay (n 1) 81. 
145 Ibid 38. 
146 Daiute (n 1) 7. 
147 Ibid 8. 
148 Betts and Collier (n 1) 7. 
149 Dallal Stevens, ‘What do We Mean by “Protection”?’ (2013) 20(2) International Journal of Minority and Group 
Rights 233, 241. 
150 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees (n 43) 913. 
151 Ibid 914. 
152 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(V), UN Doc 
A/RES/428(V) (adopted 14 December 1950) ch I, para 1, ch II, paras 8(c), 9 (‘UNHCR Statute’). 
153 Lance Bartholomeusz, ‘The Mandate of UNRWA at Sixty’ (2009) 28(2–3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 452, 469–
73; Takkenberg (n 48) ch IX. 
154 Takkenberg (n 48) 327. However, the realisation of the first two is unlikely in the near future: Rashid Khalidi, 
‘Observations on the Right of Return’ (1992) 21(2) Journal of Palestine Studies 29, 38; Rosemary Sayigh, ‘Pal-
estinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future’ (1995) 25(1) Journal of Palestinian Studies 37, 57. On the 
right to return, see also Susan Akram and Terry Rempel, ‘Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing 
the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees’ (2004) 22(1) Boston University International Law Journal 1; John 
Quigley, ‘Displaced Palestinians and the Right to Return’ (1998) 39(1) Harvard International Law Journal 171. 
 44 
apolitical act,155 Price argues that by providing refuge, nation-states are not just caring for ref-
ugees, but condemning the country of origin’s laws, policies and actions.156 Thus, refuge is part 
of a ‘broader political program designed to reform the abusive state’.157 It is one way the inter-
national community can address the ‘root causes of refugee flows’ and promote ‘the rule of law 
and human rights’.158 
C Living With the Past 
While inspiring hope for the future is an essential function of refuge, refugees do not let go of 
the past and, sometimes, their past cannot be separated from their experience of exile and aspi-
rations for the future. Many refugee memoirs address the tension between looking to the future 
in their place of refuge and not being able to leave their past behind them. When Ahmedi was 
resettled in the United States, she writes that it was like ‘flying into my future – and yet – the 
past won’t let me go. Not completely. Not yet’.159 Some refugees write about the importance of 
taking the past with them into exile. For example, Bashir says that when boarding the plane that 
would take her to the United Kingdom, ‘[a]ll I had were my memories’.160 Hakakian explains 
that: 
When you become a refugee, abandon all your loves and belongings, your memories become 
your belongings. Images of the past, snippets of old conversations, furnish the world within 
your mind. When you have nothing left to guard, you guard your memories … Remembering 
becomes not simply a preoccupation but a full-time occupation.161 
Others speak of being unable to escape memories of the past. Keitetsi, a former child soldier 
and now a refugee in Denmark, writes, ‘[b]ut even with all of this freedom, I still have the fear 
that I had to carry every day of the desperation that I saw in almost any soldier … I was there, 
and I don’t need to imagine their pain. I know it, and still feel the abuse, and humiliation, scars 
which my body and soul will carry forever’.162 
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Refugees’ previous experiences and their connections to understandings of the present and fu-
ture are also themes in historical, psychological and anthropological scholarship. Historian 
Stråth posits that refugees’ reflections on their experiences are ‘always made from a changing 
present, constantly provoking new views of the past and new outlines of future horizons’.163 
Psychologist Daiute argues that making sense of their past is ‘a dimension of refuge’ for refugee 
children.164 She explains that when doing this, her clients often engage in ‘future narrating’ 
which is ‘a means of describing what may be past but re-cast toward the future’.165 Gemignani’s 
research with refugees from the Former Yugoslavia indicates that many avoid talking about the 
past ‘not as an attempt to erase the past’, but to ‘build a stronger future by still using the past’.166 
However, some refugees also actively engage with their memories because it gives them hope 
for the future.167 Gemignani suggests that some find ‘comfort in bringing to the present selected 
aspects and episodes of their past’, because the past is ‘a reminder that they might be able to 
recreate … the “good life [they] once enjoyed”’.168 In her anthropological work with Hutu ref-
ugees in a refugee camp and urban setting, Malkki observes different approaches to history and 
memory.169 For refugees living in a camp setting, a ‘shared body of knowledge about their past 
in Burundi’ informed ‘virtually all aspects of contemporary social life’.170 The past ‘was seen 
as a source of power, knowledge, and purity’.171 It enabled them to make sense of past violent 
events172 and imagine their future.173 However, urban refugees saw their past as ‘a problem that 
had to be erased or subdued’ and they did not want it to ‘define the present’.174 
In legal scholarship, there is much less focus on how refuge may address the past than on the 
ways it protects refugees while in exile and creates hopes for a secure future. Nevertheless, 
there is some indication in legal literature that healing from past trauma may be one aspect of 
refuge. There is some recognition of the need to consider past suffering in material addressing 
                                                          
163 Bo Stråth, ‘Constructionist Themes in the Historiography of the Nation’ in James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium 
(eds), Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press, 2008) 627, 629. 
164 Daiute (n 1) 8. 
165 Ibid 9. 
166 Marco Gemignani, ‘The Past if Past: The Use of Memories and Self-Healing Narratives in Refugees from the 
Former Yugoslavia’ (2011) 24(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 132, 142. 
167 Ibid 145. 
168 Ibid 145. 
169 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania 
(University of Chicago Press, 1995) 153, 233–4. 
170 Ibid 53. 
171 Ibid 233. 
172 Ibid 97. 
173 Ibid 59. 
174 Ibid 233. 
 46 
putative refugees. The UNHCR suggests that in judging the appropriateness of an internal pro-
tection alternative, ‘past persecution and its psychological effects’ must be taken into ac-
count.175 Mathew argues that ‘it should be accepted that a putative refugee has the right to 
special consideration with respect to human rights violations … because of the fact that she has 
already been displaced by persecution’.176 
Further, there is also consideration of the healing dimensions of refuge in situations where ref-
ugee status may have ceased,177 but where there are ‘compelling reasons’178 against returning a 
refugee to their country of origin due to previous experiences of persecution. Some of the Ref-
ugee Convention’s drafters were of the view that states need to ‘take particular account of the 
psychological hardship that might be faced by the victims of persecution were they returned to 
the country responsible for their maltreatment’.179 While there is debate about whether the com-
pelling reasons exception to cessation of refugee status still applies,180 some jurisdictions have 
chosen to adopt it.181 The UNHCR’s view is that the compelling reasons exception should apply 
to those who ‘have suffered grave persecution, including at the hands of elements of the local 
population’ and, in particular, children’s experiences of persecution should be given special 
consideration.182 
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Drawing on the above material, I suggest that refuge has a palliative function. Hathaway also 
contends that refugee protection is palliative; by this he is referring to the provision of surrogate 
state protection183 and the fact that refugee protection is apolitical.184 I am using palliative in a 
different and more literal sense—one of the aims of refuge is to provide a space in which refu-
gees can heal from or address past trauma. 
V WHAT IS THE NATURE OF REFUGE? 
Hathaway posits that the refugee regime ‘establishes a situation-specific human rights rem-
edy’.185 However, the term ‘remedy’ is used in a variety of different contexts and does not have 
a single, settled meaning.186 Remedies scholars highlight that it can refer to a procedure, the 
assertion of a right, insistence on performance of a duty, relief sought or outcome given.187 With 
respect to refugee and forced migration scholarship, we can similarly see that refuge as a rem-
edy is characterised in a variety of ways and I outline these below. The purpose of this discus-
sion is to provide a starting point for investigating the ways decision-makers understand the 
nature of refuge. 
One meaning of the term ‘remedy’ is the way in which the law addresses a problem or injus-
tice.188 Hathaway uses the term in this sense when he describes the rights in the Refugee Con-
vention as a human rights remedy. He explains that the Refugee Convention provides a ‘delib-
erate and coherent system of rights’ specifically designed to address the predicament of refu-
geehood.189 Similarly, McAdam stresses that the rights in the Refugee Convention are specially 
‘tailored to the precarious legal position of non-citizens whose own country of origin is unable 
or unwilling to protect them’.190 The idea of surrogate or substitute state protection, endemic in 
legal understandings of refugee protection,191 is also a characterisation of refuge as a response 
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to a wrong. Surrogate protection requires host countries to provide ‘the protection which the 
refugee’s own state, by definition, cannot or will not provide’.192 In essence, it gives refugees 
the status and political membership they have lost.193 Harvey argues that the provision of sur-
rogate state protection is necessary to insert refugees back into the nation-state system.194 Thus, 
refuge as a legal remedy is not a ‘radical departure from statist logic or a direct challenge to it’, 
but, rather, ‘sketches a story of human displacement that neatly aligns with seeing the world 
like a state’.195 
Another way in which scholars characterise the remedial nature of refuge is as the provision of 
legal status.196 Harvey explains that refugee law is distinct from other areas of human rights 
law, because of the ‘centrality it attaches to a legally endorsed status’.197 Whereas human rights 
are founded on the belief in the ‘inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family’,198 the provision of a legal status for refugees is a reminder that 
rights are often only realised through citizenship.199 Thus, refugee status is the ‘international-
ized vehicle for carrying elements of the ghostly substance of citizenship elsewhere (until nor-
mality is restored, wherever that may be)’.200 McAdam also stresses that it is through the pro-
vision of legal status that refuge is realisable.201 Scholarship on refugees’ perspectives on refuge 
also indicate the importance of legal status. For example, in Odhiambo-Abuya’s study of refu-
gees in Kenya, one of her interviewees states, ‘[i]t is better if you have status; status is every-
thing. Without status you have nothing ... With status, it is good. You can move freely with 
confidence and even go to school’.202 
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The remedial nature of refuge can also be characterised as a right, duty or responsibility. Asy-
lum or refuge has traditionally been conceived as a right of states to grant, but whether it is a 
right of individuals ‘remains one of the most controversial matters in refugee studies’.203 While 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights204 only provides a right to seek asylum,205 Moreno-
Lax argues that, at least in the European context, refugees have a right to access international 
protection.206 Gil-Bazo’s analysis of asylum as a general principle of international law indicates 
that ‘the right to asylum is enshrined in most constitutions of countries across different legal 
traditions’.207 She suggests that ‘the long historical tradition of asylum as an expression of sov-
ereignty has now been coupled with a right of individuals to be granted asylum of constitutional 
rank’.208 More generally, Edwards characterises asylum as a right to be enjoyed.209 Perhaps 
describing the other side of the coin, Betts and Collier describe refuge as a duty to rescue.210 
Durieux insists that admission of refugees is ‘a positive duty’.211 Mathew and Harley speak of 
‘taking responsibility for refugees’212 and, specifically, the ‘responsibility of states to protect 
refugees’.213 Providing a historical and cultural perspective, Rabben highlights that in some 
contexts, offering refuge is understood to be a religious duty.214 She refers to Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, in which the character Mary justifies harbouring a runaway slave to her husband 
on religious grounds: ‘Now, John, I don’t know anything about politics, but I can read my Bible; 
and there I see that I must feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and comfort the desolate; and that 
Bible I mean to follow’.215 
There is also a sense that refuge should be a shared duty or responsibility. There is a large 
literature on ideas of global solidarity and international cooperation in delivering refugee pro-
tection.216 For example, Hathaway and Neve describe refugee protection as a ‘human rights 
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remedy’ that states have ‘a shared commitment … to provide’.217 They advocate for common 
but differentiated duties (for example, wealthier countries providing aid to states hosting large 
numbers of refugees).218 Mathew and Harley investigate the potential for regional responses to 
give rise to responsibility sharing among states.219 Kritzman-Amir suggests that the prime con-
sideration in determining responsibility for a refugee or group of refugees is a state’s ‘absorp-
tion capacity’, which is its ‘ability to endure additional responsibility in a way that, from a 
functionality point of view, will not dramatically affect the State or will not radically influence 
its economy’.220 Applying this criterion would mean that countries such as Australia and Can-
ada should be responsible for a large portion of the world’s refugees.221 
In anthropological scholarship, refuge is often characterised as a process. As part of her ethno-
graphic study of Somali refugees resettled in the United States, Besteman argues that refuge is 
not bestowed, but gradually made through efforts of both refugees and the host society.222 Ram-
say’s observations of refugees resettled in Australia also leads her to characterise refuge as a 
journey that involves actions on behalf of refugees and the wider community.223 Both scholars 
caution against understanding refuge as a goal or end point. Besteman seeks to ‘challenge the 
conception of refuge as relief or resolution, the end of the journey’.224 Ramsay explains that 
‘when refuge is taken to be a process rather than a distinct “solution,” it becomes a possibil-
ity’.225 
VI SCOPE OF REFUGE  
The scope of refuge is understood to be broad, but indeterminate, and context specific. In par-
ticular, its content varies depending on factors such as age, gender, sexuality and disability as 
well as the host state’s circumstances and the length of time the refugee is in the host state. 
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Below, I outline scholars’ and the UNHCR’s ideas about the contours of refuge and throughout 
the case studies I use these to guide my assessment of decision-makers’ approaches to what 
refuge encompasses. 
A Scope of Refuge for Convention Refugees 
Anthropological studies of what refugees are searching for in exile indicate that personal safety 
is only one motivating factor.226 They also want socio-economic security,227 education and 
work prospects,228 freedoms and tolerance,229 homes and stability,230 the ability to build a fam-
ily,231 and a sense of community.232 They are not only escaping serious harm, but are trying to 
recreate a feeling of ‘wholeness’.233 Similarly, Betts and Collier explain that, ‘[e]xternal provi-
sion of food, clothing, and shelter is absolutely essential in the aftermath of having to run for 
your life. But over time, if it is provided as a substitute for access to jobs, education, and other 
opportunities, humanitarian aid soon undermines human dignity and autonomy’.234 
Legal scholarship on the content of refugee protection maps onto these studies of refugees’ 
wants and needs. The Refugee Convention provides rights to, for example, education,235 
work,236 welfare237 and housing,238 and scholars highlight that these rights are framed in a way 
specifically moulded to respond to refugees’ predicaments.239 Nevertheless, the Refugee Con-
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vention is not the only source of refugee rights and is inadequate on its own. McAdam high-
lights that ‘the conceptualization of protection [the Refugee Convention] embodies has neces-
sarily been extended by developments in human rights law’.240 Scholars and the UNHCR in-
voke rights in subsequent human rights treaties to articulate a comprehensive protection regime 
for refugees. For example, Hathaway argues that rights to physical security in the ICCPR can 
be imported to address gaps in the Refugee Convention.241 Additionally, there is no positive 
right to family unity in the Refugee Convention, but both Hathaway and Edwards highlight that 
refugees can claim rights to family unity under the ICCPR, ICESCR and Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (‘CRC’).242 
There is also a well-developed understanding that certain refugees have particular protection 
risks and needs and the scope of refuge needs to be flexible and accommodate this. There are 
many UNHCR publications and studies on the protection risks for women in refugee camps and 
other protection settings.243 There are also discussions of refugee children’s special protection 
needs and studies on the protections provided to child refugees through the CRC and other 
human rights instruments.244 The UNHCR’s Executive Committee calls on states to improve 
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existing protection programs by taking women, children and elderly refugees’ distinctive needs 
into account.245 The UNHCR and scholars also consider the risks faced by refugees with disa-
bilities and the interrelationship between the Refugee Convention and the Convention of the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’)246 in addressing their protection needs.247 In par-
ticular, Crock et al highlight the importance of healthcare and rehabilitation services for refu-
gees with disabilities.248 There have also been examinations of the particular risks for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex refugees and the protections that may be provided 
to them by refugee and international law.249 
The scope of refuge for Convention refugees reflects ideas of the temporality of refuge. With 
respect to refugees being able to build a future, there is agreement that refuge must include 
rights of solution (ways refugees can ‘respond to their predicament’).250 However, there is de-
bate about what these rights are. The UNHCR’s three durable solutions are voluntary repatria-
tion (where a refugee chooses to return to their country of origin and can do so safely and with 
dignity), local integration (the refugee remains in the host country and goes through process of 
legal, economic and social integration) and resettlement (a refugee is transferred from their 
current place of refuge to a third country and usually granted permanent residency).251 Based 
on the provisions of the Refugee Convention, Hathaway argues that the rights to solution are 
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voluntary re-establishment in the country of origin,252 voluntary repatriation after a fundamental 
change of circumstances in the country of origin,253 resettlement254 and naturalisation.255 Per-
haps less well developed in legal scholarship is how the content of refuge may enable refugees 
to address their past. Nevertheless, there is some acknowledgement that refuge must encompass 
healing from trauma. For example, article 25 of the European Union’s Directive on the Stand-
ards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection256 specifies, ‘[m]ember States 
shall ensure that persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious acts of vio-
lence receive the necessary treatment for the damage caused by such acts, in particular access 
to appropriate medical and psychological treatment or care’. A similar sentiment is reflected in 
the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa’s257 pream-
ble, which notes that the signatory states are ‘desirous of finding ways and means of alleviating 
[refugees’] misery and suffering’. 
While refuge is understood to address a wide range of refugees’ needs and includes a broad 
sweep of rights, there is also recognition that the content of refuge must correspond with the 
host country’s circumstances and length of time the refugee remains there. Comparing the con-
tent of refuge to the duty to rescue a drowning child, Betts and Collier argue that the extent of 
any additional obligations ‘depends on what it is feasible for us to do’.258 They posit that host 
states should ‘restore … basic features of normal life’ such as a home, employment and com-
munity to the extent they are able to.259 Gibney acknowledges that there are ‘limits [on] what 
one can reasonably demand of states in their response to refugees and asylum-seekers’.260 He 
suggests that states may, in some situations and on a case-by-case basis, curtail certain refugee 
rights if in doing so they will ‘preserve the integrity of asylum or … increase the number of 
refugees who receive protection’.261 The Refugee Convention has a complex method of deter-
mining the content of refuge with respect to host states’ resources and the strength of the refu-
gee’s bond with the host state. There are only a few absolute rights in the Refugee Convention; 
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most are granted on the same terms as nationals, favoured non-citizens or other non-citizens 
generally in the same circumstances. Also, the rights refugees are entitled to increase the longer 
the refugee is in the host state. Hathaway provides a detailed analysis of how this rights regime 
operates.262 
B Scope of Refuge for Palestinian Refugees 
There is far less written on the content of refuge for Palestinian refugees, but there is an under-
standing that it is similarly broad. With respect to UNRWA’s protection mandate, Barthol-
omeusz263 draws on United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’) resolutions to suggest that it 
covers the provision of ‘basic subsistence support’,264 food aid,265 healthcare,266 education267 
and housing for Palestinians whose homes were demolished or razed by Israeli forces;268 im-
proving ‘the quality of life’ for Palestinians living in camp environments269 and health condi-
tions in camps (in particular safe water and sanitation systems);270 and addressing the needs of 
poor Palestinian refugees who do not have access to the banking sector.271 While UNRWA’s 
protection mandate is usually seen in terms of protection of economic and social rights, scholars 
highlight that it also extends to protection of civil and political rights such as physical secu-
rity.272 In particular, while UNRWA is not responsible for security and law and order in camp 
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settings,273 the UNGA has resolved that UNRWA ‘undertake effective measures to guarantee 
the safety and security and the legal and human rights of the Palestinian refugees in the occupied 
territories’.274 Scholars also discuss UNRWA’s human development mandate.275 UNGA reso-
lutions confirm UNRWA’s role in the ‘provision of services for the well-being and human de-
velopment of the Palestine refugees’.276 The UN defines human development as ‘a process of 
enlarging people’s choices’ which requires ‘political, economic and social freedom [and] op-
portunities for being creative and productive, and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed 
human rights’.277As part of its human development mandate, UNRWA engages in provision of 
credit for enterprise and income-generating opportunities.278 
Another important aspect of the scope of refuge for Palestinian refugees is the recognition that 
it differs according to factors such as gender, age and disability. Bartholomeusz279 highlights 
that UNRWA’s protection mandate extends to addressing the needs and rights of women and 
children in accordance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (‘CEDAW’)280 and CRC.281 The UNGA has extended UNRWA’s mandate to 
encompass the rights of Palestinian refugees with disabilities in line with the CRPD.282 
These studies of the scope of refuge for Palestinian refugees reflect the temporal nature of ref-
uge and, in particular, the idea that it must allow refugees to look towards the future. This is 
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evident in UNRWA’s human development mandate, its mandate to provide education and busi-
ness development opportunities and the recognition that Palestinian refugees are entitled to du-
rable solutions.283 
C Scope of Refuge for Putative Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
With respect to putative refugees, there is debate about the appropriate way to discern the scope 
of refuge, but agreement that it must be much broader than negating the risk of persecution.284 
Mathew argues that international human rights law should inform the question as to whether 
the putative refugee would have the requisite protection in the internal protection alternative.285 
Hathaway and Foster contend that this approach may be ‘over-inclusive’ and ‘unwieldy’286 and 
suggest that the scope of protection can be determined with reference to the rights outlined in 
Refugee Convention.287 This is also the position put forward in the Michigan Guidelines on the 
Internal Protection Alternative.288 Pursuant to these approaches, refuge includes the rights and 
protections necessary to rebuild lives289 including access to ‘employment, public welfare, and 
education’.290 However, the UNHCR sets a narrower scope for what constitutes refuge in inter-
nal protection alternative cases: ‘basic human rights standards, including in particular, non-
derogable rights’.291 The UNHCR elaborates that ‘a person should not be expected to face eco-
nomic destitution or existence below at least an adequate level of subsistence’292 or ‘live in 
conditions of severe hardship’.293 
The putative refugees considered in this thesis are also prospective internally displaced persons 
(‘IDPs’).294 The international community has recognised that IDPs have specific protection 
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needs through the development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (‘Guiding 
Principles’).295 There is some support for reference to the Guiding Principles in international 
protection alternative cases.296 Additionally, in Africa there is the Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (‘Kampala Convention’).297 These 
two instruments indicate that the scope of refuge for IDPs is wide-ranging and differs depending 
on factors such as gender, age and disability. For example, the Guiding Principles confirm rights 
to life,298 liberty and security of person,299 freedom of movement,300 an adequate standard of 
living,301 medical care302 and education303 for IDPs during displacement. It also outlines rights 
specifically tailored to the situation of IDPs such the right to move freely in and out of camps304 
and right to be free from forced return or resettlement.305 The Kampala Convention stresses that 
states have a number of obligations with respect to IDPs including preventing sexual and gen-
der-based violence against IDPs306 and providing special protection to unaccompanied children, 
female heads of households, the elderly and persons with disabilities.307 
The scope of refuge for IDPs also includes solutions to displacement.308 Section V of the Guid-
ing Principles outlines solutions of return, resettlement and reintegration. There is no strong 
legal basis for IDPs being entitled to such rights,309 but, nevertheless, their inclusion in the 
Guiding Principles indicates that internal displacement should not be a permanent state of af-
fairs. Rather, states and other actors have a responsibility to assist IDPs to voluntarily return to 
their homes or resettle permanently in another part of the country. The Kampala Convention 
                                                          
295 Ibid. The Guiding Principles, ‘consolidate into one document the legal standards relevant to the internally dis-
placed drawn from international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law by analogy’: Francis Deng, 
‘Preface’ in Walter Kälin, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations’ (Paper No 32, American 
Society of International Law Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, 2008) v. 
296 Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Internal Displacement and the Right to Seek Asylum’ (2008) 27(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 
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obliges states to ‘seek lasting solutions to the problem of displacement by promoting and cre-
ating satisfactory conditions for voluntary return, local integration or relocation on a sustainable 
basis and in circumstances of safety and dignity’.310 The inclusion of durable solutions in the 
Guiding Principles and the Kampala Convention reflects ideas of refuge’s temporality; in par-
ticular, that it must encompass hope for a different and better future. 
Overall, scholarship and UN materials indicate that the scope of refuge for Convention refu-
gees, Palestinian refugees, putative refugees and IDPs is broad, but cannot be definitively 
drawn. Writing in 1966, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Felix Schnyder ex-
plained that ‘the sum total of the rights, benefits and obligations due to refugees by virtue of 
rules of international law – cannot be reduced to a single, let alone simple, formula’.311 Schny-
der was writing in relation to the different statuses granted to refugees from the Russian revo-
lution and post-World War II refugees. However, his statement is perhaps even more accurate 
today with the entry into force of the ICCPR, ICESCR, regional refugee and human rights trea-
ties and specialised international human rights instruments such as the CEDAW, CRC and 
CRPD, which all contain rights relevant to refugee protection and, for Palestinian refugees, 
UNRWA’s evolving mandate. 
VII WHAT IS THE THRESHOLD FOR ADEQUATE REFUGE? 
While refuge is understood to have a broad scope, one issue that has arisen is whether there is 
a minimum standard of refuge that can be considered sufficient. In this thesis, I examine where 
decision-makers set the bar for adequate refuge. The idea that there is a minimal threshold for 
adequate refuge is addressed in legal scholarship with respect to Convention refugees. Scholars 
argue that the rights in the Refugee Convention are not aspirational, but represent the minimum 
threshold of rights protection that a host country owes refugees in its jurisdiction or territory.312 
Providing historical context, McAdam explains that the Refugee Convention’s drafters settled 
on a ‘middle course’ in the sense that the rights in the Refugee Convention are ‘beyond the 
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lowest common denominator’, but standards more favourable to refugees were avoided due to 
concerns that ‘fewer states would ratify it’.313 By taking this approach, the drafters believed that 
the Refugee Convention would ‘give refugees a minimum number of advantages which would 
permit them to lead a tolerable life in the country of reception’.314 
In support of this position, the Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere315 stipulate that a 
host state can only transfer a refugee to a third country316 if, ‘in practice’, she or he will be 
treated in accordance with articles 2 to 34 of the Refugee Convention.317 This position is prem-
ised on the principle that a state cannot ‘contract out’ of its international legal obligations.318 
Hathaway and Foster also argue that the requirements of the Refugee Convention must be met 
in the third country based on the relative standards in the Refugee Convention.319 This position 
preserves refuge’s future focus, because many of the provisions in the Refugee Convention, 
such as the rights to work,320 education321 and durable solutions,322 enable refugees to imagine 
and plan the future directions of their lives. 
The UNHCR’s understanding of effective protection has been inconsistent. Its 2003 conclusion 
states that effective protection requires ‘accession to and compliance with the 1951 Convention 
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and/or 1967 Protocol … unless the destination country can demonstrate that the third State has 
developed a practice akin to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol’.323 However, in a 
2004 statement on effective protection and 2013 guidance on refugee transfers the UNHCR 
does not specify that the third country must comply with the rights in the Refugee Conven-
tion.324 Stevens criticises the UNHCR’s approach to effective protection because it does not 
contain all the rights in the Refugee Convention and ‘suggests that a lesser form of protection 
exists, which, though imperfect, is, nonetheless, in some way permissible’.325 
VIII THE REALITY OF REFUGE 
While the scholarship on refuge projects ideas about what refuge should look like, studies of 
and testimonies about places of refuge provide a different picture. To highlight the disjunctures 
between refuge as a concept and place, I outline evidence about life in different sites of refuge 
and the ways states curtail refugees’ ability to seek other places of sanctuary within and across 
borders. The scholarship on this issue is extensive and wide-ranging, so I focus only on the 
locales of refuge that arise in the case studies and expose the main concerns. This provides the 
background for the following chapters in which I explore the ways decision-makers respond to 
the incongruities between ideas and realities of refuge. 
A Refuge in a Refugee Camp 
Most of the world’s refugees do not live in a camp setting,326 but in some regions (such as 
Africa and Asia) encampment is a common method of accommodating refugees.327 The UN-
HCR recognises that camps create and compound protection risks and are, at best, a ‘compro-
mise’.328 One of the manifest problems with encampment is that it significantly restricts refu-
gees’ freedom of movement, which can inhibit family reunification and limit access to vital 
services, education and employment.329 Studies of life in a refugee camp show that there are 
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often threats to physical security330 (especially for female refugees),331 lack of access to educa-
tion and employment,332 few healthcare services,333 and inadequate shelter, sanitation, food and 
water.334 Further, many refugees who live in camps are in what the UNHCR calls a protracted 
refugee situation—a ‘long-lasting and intractable state of limbo’ where refugees’ ‘lives may 
not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs 
remain unfulfilled after years in exile’.335 Betts and Collier explain that ‘if camp life endures 
for too long it may lead to long-term reliance upon aid, exacerbate vulnerability, and erode 
people’s capacities for independence’.336 
States employ a variety of methods to confine refugees to camps.337 One of the main objectives 
is to segregate refugees from citizens and other residents in the host country through locating 
camps in remote border regions, requiring all refugees in their territory to reside there and heav-
ily restricting the circumstances in which they can leave and travel to other areas.338 The pro-
spect of life in a refugee camp and states’ powers to force refugees to reside in a camp arise in 
the cases I examine in Chapter Four. 
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B Refuge in the Global North 
Each year, hundreds of thousands (and in some recent years over a million) people lodge appli-
cations for international protection in European countries.339 Europe as a place of refuge arises 
in the case studies in Chapters Three and Five. While there are a number of stories evidencing 
the generosity shown by some Europeans towards refugees,340 there are serious concerns about 
the conditions in which many live. A particular country of concern is Greece. The UNHCR 
describes the conditions for refugees in Greece as ‘dire’.341 Reports on conditions in Greece 
expose blanket detention policies and significant restrictions on freedom of movement,342 high 
levels of violence,343 lack of adequate sanitation,344 little or no access to healthcare,345 inade-
quate provision of food and water,346 overcrowded conditions,347 no services for pregnant 
                                                          
339 Applications for international protection from people outside the European Union started to rise in 2013 with 
431,000 applications. In 2015 and 2016, there were approximately 1.3 million applications. These numbers 
dropped in 2017, which saw approximately 650,000 applications. See Eurostat, Asylum Statistics (2018) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Number_of_asylum_appli-
cants:_drop_in_2017>. 
340 For example, Passarlay writes that when he arrived in Greece, ‘a group of townspeople who had heard we had 
been brought ashore … stood waiting with blankets and food’: Passarlay and Ghouri (n 77) 226. After an infamous 
shipwreck in October 2013 in which 366 asylum seekers died, the mayor of Sutera (a small town in Sicily, Italy) 
announced that the town would open its doors to refugees and each refugee that arrived was entrusted to a local 
family. See Patrick Browne, ‘How this Tiny Italian Town Opened its Homes to Refugees’, The Local (online at 
15 February 2016) <https://www.thelocal.it/20160212/how-this-small-italian-town-has-opened-its-homes-to-ref-
ugees>; Lorenzo Tondo, ‘They are our Salvation: The Sicilian Town Revived by Refugees’, The Guardian (online 
at 19 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/sutera-italy-the-sicilian-town-revived-by-
refugees>. 
341 UNHCR, ‘Refugee Women and Children Face Heightened Risk of Sexual Violence amid Tensions and Over-
crowding at Reception Facilities on Greek Islands’ (Press Briefing, 9 February 2018) <http://www.unhcr.org/en-
au/news/briefing/2018/2/5a7d67c4b/refugee-women-children-face-heightened-risk-sexual-violence-amid-ten-
sions.html> (‘Refugee Women and Children Face Heightened Risk’). 
342 Human Rights Watch, Greece: Inhumane Conditions at Land Border (27 July 2018) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/27/greece-inhumane-conditions-land-bor-
der?mc_cid=0e50786a23&mc_eid=677b225ed4> (‘Greece: Inhumane Conditions’); Human Rights Watch, 
Greece: Asylum Seekers Locked Up (14 April 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/14/greece-asylum-seek-
ers-locked> (‘Greece: Asylum Seekers’). 
343 Amnesty International, EU: Asylum-Seekers Must be Moved from Appalling Conditions (14 December 2016) 
<https://www.amnesty.org.au/eu-asylum-seekers-must-be-moved-from-appalling-conditions/> (‘EU: Asylum-
Seekers Must be Moved’); Human Rights Watch, Greece: Inhumane Conditions (n 342); UNHCR, ‘Refugee 
Women and Children Face Heightened Risk’ (n 341). 
344 Amnesty International, EU: Asylum-Seekers Must be Moved (n 343); Human Rights Watch, Greece: Inhumane 
Conditions (n 342); Human Rights Watch, Greece: Asylum Seekers (n 342). 
345 Human Rights Watch, Greece: Inhumane Conditions (n 342); Human Rights Watch, Greece: Asylum Seekers 
(n 342). 
346 Human Rights Watch, Greece: Asylum Seekers (n 342). 
347 Human Rights Watch, Greece: Inhumane Conditions (n 342); UNHCR, ‘Refugee Women and Children Face 
Heightened Risk’ (n 341). 
 64 
women and new mothers348 or refugees with disabilities,349 and high levels of police abuse.350 
In particular, there have been safety concerns for female refugees, with the UNHCR reporting 
that hundreds have experienced sexual assault.351 Human Rights Watch has observed that ref-
ugees in Greece reported feeling ‘less than human’.352 Amnesty International reports that con-
ditions in some parts of Greece are so bad that many asylum seekers have ‘chosen to return 
“voluntarily” … to escape the conditions in which they are held and the uncertainty over their 
fate’.353 
Another country of concern that arises in the case studies in the thesis is Italy. Médecins Sans 
Frontières reports that many asylum seekers and refugees in Italy are socially marginalised354 
and living in ‘inhumane conditions’ without access to food, water, shelter or healthcare.355 
While the Italian government offers housing to some refugees, many are eventually forcibly 
evicted without provision of alternative accommodation.356 Studies of refugees’ integration in 
Italy indicate that the Italian government provides little support and refugees are left to their 
own resources.357 The UNHCR has claimed that in many Italian cities, refugees are ‘deprived 
of the dignity that the right to asylum should return them’.358 
The refugee settlement in Calais, France known as the ‘Jungle’ is also a place that arises in 
protection from refuge decisions. A 2015 study indicates that refugees living in the Jungle have 
inadequate food, water, shelter and sanitation359 and are subject to violence and police abuse.360 
In 2018, three UN Special Rapporteurs reported that asylum seekers and refugees are living in 
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inhumane and substandard conditions.361 There have also been allegations of sexual abuse per-
petrated against refugees (including children) by volunteers working in the refugee settle-
ment.362 While the French government officially closed the Jungle in October 2016,363 asylum 
seekers and refugees started re-entering the region in the months afterwards, and by 2018, up 
to 1,000 refugees were living in the Calais region.364 
European Union member states seek to control refugees’ movement through the Dublin Regu-
lation,365 with one of its objectives being to prevent refugees moving between European Union 
countries.366 While some refugees have been able to resist the constraints the Dublin Regulation 
imposes,367 it precludes many asylum seekers and refugees from travelling within the European 
Union to find a safe place of refuge.368 The Dublin Regulation allocates responsibility between 
member states for hearing an asylum seeker’s claim, but in practice it also ‘determines in which 
Member State the refugee will have to make her home’.369 Further, the Dublin Regulation pro-
duces ‘the most severe imbalances in the distribution of protection seekers’.370 This is because 
                                                          
361 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘France Urged by UN Experts to Take Effective Measures 
to Bring Water and Sanitation Services to Migrants’ (Media Release, 4 April 2018) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22917>. 
362 May Bulman, ‘Calais Jungle Volunteers Accused of “Sexually Exploiting” Camp’s Refugees’, Independent 
(online at 22 September 2016) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calais-jungle-volunteers-sex-
refugees-allegations-facebook-care4calais-a7312066.html>. 
363 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR: France Decision to Close Calais “Jungle” Camp Welcome; Proper Care in Next Steps 
Crucial’ (Media Release, 14 October 2016) <http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/briefing/2016/10/5800a2024/un-
hcr-france-decision-close-calais-jungle-camp-welcome-proper-care-next.html> (‘France Decision’). 
364 May Bulman, ‘More Than a Thousand Refugees Suffer “Inhumane” Living Conditions in Calais and Dunkirk, 
Warns UN’, Independent (online at 4 April 2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calais-ref-
ugees-living-conditions-france-dunkirk-un-warning-jungle-migrant-crisis-latest-a8288516.html>; UNHCR, 
France Decision (n 363). 
365 Regulation (EC) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2013 Establishing the 
Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for Inter-
national Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Re-
cast) [2013] OJ L180/31-180/59. There is currently a proposal for its reform: European Commission, ‘Proposal 
for a Regulation Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for 
Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country 
National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM (2016) 270 Final’ (4 May 2016). 
366 Vincent Chetail, ‘Looking Beyond the Rhetoric of the Refugee Crisis: The Failed Reform of the Common 
European Asylum System’ (2016) 5 European Journal of Human Rights 584, 598; Susan Fratzke, ‘Not Adding 
Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System’ (Report, Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2015) 1 
<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/not-adding-fading-promise-europes-dublin-system>. 
367 Martina Tazzioli, ‘Containment through Mobility: Migrants’ Spatial Disobediences and the Reshaping of Con-
trol through the Hotspot System’ (2018) 44(16) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2764. 
368 Jan-Paul Brekke and Grete Brochmann, ‘Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum Seekers in Europe, 
National Differences, and the Dublin Regulation’ (2015) 28(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 145. 
369 Cathryn Costello, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored’ 
(2012) 12(2) Human Rights Law Review 287, 314. 
370 Francesco Maiani, ‘The Dublin III Regulation: A New Legal Framework for a More Humane System?’ in 
Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker and Francesco Maiani (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum 
System: The New European Refugee Law (Brill, 2016) 101, 112. Note that there is debate about whether the Dublin 
Regulation results in southern border states having to take greater numbers of refugees: Fratzke (n 366) 9; Made-
line Garlick, ‘The Dublin System, Solidarity and Individual Rights’ in Vincent Chetail, Philippe De Bruycker and 
 66 
it is not designed to be a responsibility sharing mechanism. In determining the state that must 
hear and determine a person’s claim for asylum, it does not take into account member states’ 
varying capacities to provide protection and its very structure and design effectively allocates 
responsibility to border states.371 This has resulted in some European Union member states that 
have limited capacity hosting disproportionate numbers of refugees.372 
Another Global North country that is the subject of scrutiny in protection from refuge decisions 
is the United States. While there are numerous stories of refugees finding true sanctuary in the 
United States,373 for others the situation is bleaker. There are concerns about refoulement due 
to the United States taking stricter approaches to the refugee definition than other states.374 In 
2018, United States Attorney-General Jeff Sessions announced that refugee protection would 
not be available to those who face a real risk of domestic violence in their country of nationality 
or habitual residence.375 Also, the United States practices immigration detention376 and some 
asylum seekers ‘languish in detention for long periods of time’.377 Immigration detention func-
tions akin to a prison, with detainees having little privacy and being subject to abuse by 
guards.378 Psychiatrists have found that asylum seekers in immigration detention in the United 
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States have exceptionally high rates of anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation.379 For refugees 
who live in the community, many exist near or below the poverty line380 and are subject to 
discrimination,381 which affects their access to housing, education and healthcare.382 While 
some United States citizens also face these dilemmas, refugees experience them differently and 
more acutely.383 For instance, while government agencies encourage refugees to be self-suffi-
cient, refugees are not provided with adequate and appropriate assistance to gain employ-
ment.384 Besteman explains that government support is ‘provided for only a few months, and 
only limited support is available for English language classes, job skills programs, or mental 
health support for managing trauma or [post-traumatic stress disorder]’.385 
Many refugees who believe that they do not have proper protection in the United States cross 
the border to Canada.386 However, Canada and the United States have entered into an agreement 
pursuant to which an asylum seeker trying to cross from one country to the other via the land 
border can be summarily turned back, subject to some exceptions.387 A refugee living in the 
Unites States who wanted to find refuge in Canada was one of the plaintiffs who challenged 
this agreement in the Canadian Federal Court (discussed in Chapter Five). 
C Refuge in Remote Islands 
Australia sends people seeking international protection to Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New 
Guinea, pursuant to separate agreements with both nations. There has been scathing criticism 
of the conditions that asylum seekers and refugees are subject to in these countries.388 Most of 
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the asylum seekers and refugees on Manus Island and Nauru have been detained for significant 
periods.389 Many asylum seekers and refugees have been the victims of grave acts of violence 
both within these detention centres and after release into the community.390 In particular, there 
is evidence that refugees have endured sexual violence in Nauru and Manus Island.391 Most 
infamously, in a serious of violent incidents at the Manus Island detention centre in February 
2014, staff assaulted numerous detainees and one asylum seeker was killed.392 Detainees are 
separated from family members,393 have limited access to healthcare and education,394 live in 
overcrowded conditions with inadequate sanitation395 and often do not have sufficient food and 
water.396 There have been concerns about the ways these conditions are affecting refugees’ 
mental health, and the UNHCR confirms that over 80 per cent of the refugees in Nauru and 
Manus Island are suffering from depression or post-traumatic stress disorder.397 Boochani, a 
refugee on Manus Island, reflects on many of these issues, but also documents the boredom and 
frustration experienced by those transferred to Manus Island. He writes that they have to endure 
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‘[d]ays without any plans’398 and there is ‘nothing to occupy our time’. As a consequence, the 
Manus Island detainees have a ‘dismal and obscure future’.399 
Australia’s transfer of asylum seekers and refugees to Nauru and Manus Island is the current 
iteration of what successive governments have called the Pacific Solution or Pacific Strategy. 
The Pacific Solution commenced in 2001 and there have been different phases,400 but the over-
arching objective is to deter asylum seekers from coming to Australia401 and shift responsibility 
for refugees to other countries in the region.402 In announcing Australia’s agreement with Papua 
New Guinea in 2015, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said that the purpose of the deal 
was to ensure that ‘any asylum seeker who arrives in Australia by boat will have no chance of 
being settled in Australia as a refugee’.403 In Chapter Five, I consider decision-makers’ ap-
proaches to the legality of Australia’s various bilateral agreements with countries in the region. 
D Places of Refuge for Palestinian Refugees 
UNRWA provides protection and assistance to over five million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.404 Palestinian refugees’ 
legal status and the rights and benefits they are entitled to differ depending on the country in 
which they live.405 While Palestinian refugees have been resilient and employed various means 
to re-establish their communities after displacement,406 the situation for many is one of despair. 
One-third of Palestinian refugees in Gaza live in extreme poverty.407 Many Palestinian refugee 
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camps resemble slum conditions,408 are overcrowded and lack adequate infrastructure and san-
itation,409 and residents experience high levels of violence.410 Palestinian refugees living in and 
outside of camps are often subject to detention and arbitrary arrest411 and restrictions on their 
freedom of movement.412 Many Palestinian refugees do not have access to adequate and appro-
priate healthcare.413 Availability of work and education vary,414 but many Palestinian refugees 
feel that they have no future because of a dearth of study and employment opportunities.415 
When Palestinian refugees leave an UNRWA region and seek refugee protection, they confront 
article 1D of the Refugee Convention. Article 1D excludes Palestinian refugees from the Ref-
ugee Convention, but grants ipso facto refugee protection if their protection and assistance 
ceases for any reason. In Chapter Six, I discuss the extent to which article 1D can be considered 
a containment mechanism. I then explore decision-makers’ approaches to Palestinian refugees’ 
protection from refuge claims and whether they enable or inhibit Palestinian refugees in their 
searches for refuge outside the UNRWA region. 
E Refuge in an Internally Displaced Persons’ Camp 
People displaced from their homes due to factors such as conflict or human rights violations 
sometimes cannot or do not wish to cross an international border in search of refuge. They must 
look for safety within their own country and some seek sanctuary in IDP camps.416 These camps 
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can be considered an ostensible site of refuge, not only because they are intended to enable 
IDPs to escape the danger from which they are fleeing, but because of the presence of many 
international organisations authorised to provide protection to IDPs.417 However, these camps 
are often targeted for attack,418 there is a risk of abduction by militant groups,419 women face 
high levels of violence including domestic and sexual violence,420 there are restrictions on the 
extent to which IDPs can move within and outside the camps421 and there is often a lack of 
adequate food422 and shelter.423 A representative from the International Organization for Mi-
gration says of an IDP camp in Sudan that ‘the effects of continued displacement can be seen 
in the eyes of the women – a sense of stagnancy and lack of hope and dreams is felt as they 
become accustomed to camp life’.424 In her work with women in Kenyan IDP camps, Njiru 
witnesses the ‘continuing violence that women face in their everyday lives in the camps that 
are supposed to protect and provide for people fleeing violence’.425 
Whether a person can have adequate protection in an IDP camp is an issue I investigate in 
Chapter Seven. These cases have occurred in the United Kingdom and New Zealand and deci-
sion-makers must determine whether an IDP camp is an acceptable internal protection alterna-
tive. If not, the person will be able to enjoy refugee protection in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand respectively. The relevant restriction on refugee movement in these decisions is the 
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use of the Refugee Convention to contain people in need of protection in the Global South.426 
Chimni, Shacknove and Tuitt all highlight that after the Cold War ended, refugees were no 
longer politically convenient for Western liberal democracies.427 The increase in the processes 
around and technicality of refugee status assessment in Global North countries since then is 
indicative of their attempts to keep out what they see as the ‘new’ asylum seekers from the 
developing world.428 This tension is evident in the cases I examine in Chapter Seven, where 
decision-makers explicitly reference concerns about the Refugee Convention being used by 
refugees from the Global South to relocate to the Global North. 
IX CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that the concept of refuge is a robust one. There are different 
approaches to theorising refuge, but there is a shared understanding that it has restorative, re-
generative and palliative functions that address refugees’ past, present and future. Refuge op-
erates as a response to the particular dilemmas of those in need of protection and is variously 
expressed as a remedy, right, duty, process and status. It has a broad and flexible scope that 
responds to the specific needs of women, children and refugees with disabilities. The threshold 
for adequate refuge is a high one, encompassing much more than mere survival. However, many 
people who seek protection find themselves in places where the conditions may be comparable 
to or worse than the places they fled, and states implement a plethora of mechanisms to hamper 
their ability to travel in search of a genuine place of refuge. In protection from refuge claims, 
the ideal and reality of refuge both enter the judicial domain. In the following case studies, I 
draw on the ideas of refuge outlined in this chapter to examine how decision-makers conceptu-
alise refuge and navigate the discrepancies between refuge as a concept and place. I assess the 
implications these judicial approaches to protection from refuge claims have for refugees’ (or 
particular refugees’) ability to move within and across borders to find sanctuary. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO TRAVEL IN SEARCH 
OF REFUGE IN EUROPE 
I INTRODUCTION 
‘The conditions are so bad that describing them … cannot capture the squalor. You have to 
smell conditions like these and feel the squelch of mud mixed with urine and much else through 
your boots to appreciate the horror’.1 This is evidence given to a United Kingdom tribunal about 
the refugee settlement in Calais, known as ‘the Jungle’. The Jungle is one of the sites of osten-
sible ‘sanctuary’ that decision-makers confront in European protection from refuge claims. 
When seeking protection from these places, the asylum seeker and refugee litigants cannot di-
rectly plead that the respective host state does not comply with the rights in the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’)2 or the European Union’s Directive 
on the Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection.3 Rather, they 
invoke the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (‘ECHR’)4 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).5 These 
human rights claims only address individual transfers and do not directly challenge the validity 
of containment agreements. Nevertheless, they have potential to set precedents that jeopardise 
containment agreements’ continued operation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how decision-makers approach and determine pro-
tection from refuge cases grounded in human rights instruments. I assess the ways decision-
makers use human rights law to conceptualise refuge, in particular, its functions and nature. I 
examine whether, when doing so, they tailor their ideas about the functions and nature of refuge 
to take into account factors such as gender, age, family responsibilities and disability. I also 
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consider the extent to which these notions of refuge, when filtered through human rights instru-
ments, can disrupt containment policies and facilitate refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. 
I commence this exploration by outlining debates about the utility of using human rights law 
(in particular, human rights litigation) to thwart state policies. These theories provide the back-
drop for my investigation of the ways decision-makers approach human rights arguments in 
their determination of protection from refuge challenges. Next, I move to an analysis of the 
jurisprudence and argue that decision-makers in the European context initially approached ref-
uge as a remedy addressing refugees’ needs, but now see it as a scarce commodity that must be 
distributed on a needs basis to the refugees deemed most vulnerable. These changes to judicial 
approaches mean that while human rights litigation at first showed potential to obstruct con-
tainment agreements, human rights arguments have lost their potency. I then discuss the impli-
cations of this judicial shift for refugees of different genders and ages and those with care re-
sponsibilities and disabilities. I suggest that while the focus on additional vulnerabilities could 
have provided grounds to facilitate journeys for those who face the greatest challenges in trav-
elling across borders to find sanctuary, this has not occurred due to decision-makers’ notional 
consideration of factors such as gender and disability. 
II THE INDIVIDUAL V THE STATE: THE FORCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
To what extent can individuals use human rights law to counter state law and policy? What role 
do adjudicative bodies play in this process? These questions address a tension between contem-
porary human rights law’s framing and operation: human rights derive from personhood and 
not citizenship of a nation-state,6 but are often enforced through state machinery. This quandary 
has particular significance in refugee and migration contexts. Refugees and migrants make hu-
man rights arguments against a state in which they are not a citizen and usually in a way that 
clashes with that state’s perception of its national interests. 
One of the main contributors to this topic is Soysal, whose view is that the normative claim of 
human rights has the potential to eclipse state interests7 and transgress ‘the national order of 
things’.8 She argues that there is a model of citizenship based on nationality and one derived 
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from universal personhood that is increasingly contesting the national model.9 Soysal’s study 
is based on foreign guest workers, but to build her claim she refers to the power plays between 
states and domestic and supranational courts with respect to the refugee definition.10 She high-
lights that while states place restrictions on who can seek asylum, courts are broadening the 
definition of a refugee and this is one example of how human rights litigation can permeate 
national interests.11 
Drawing on Soysal’s work, Jacobson argues that human rights have transcended the state.12 His 
study of transnational migration highlights the devaluation of citizenship and individuals’ abil-
ity to make a claim on foreign states through the vehicle of human rights law.13 Jacobson high-
lights the role that the judiciary plays in this process, arguing that courts are staging a ‘quiet 
revolution’ and are often the ‘judicial tail wagging the legislative dog’.14 He suggests that if this 
trend continues, the territorial state will become an administration unit for a global order based 
on human rights.15 
Other voices are more pessimistic about the efficacy of using human rights to challenge state 
policies. For example, Douzinas argues that human rights ‘de-politicize conflict and remove 
the possibility of radical change’.16 His position is that human rights can only lead to ‘a marginal 
re-arrangement of the social edifice’.17 Individuals cannot rely on courts to uphold human rights 
arguments in a way that eclipses state interests, because courts are an arm of the state18 and 
human rights, initially conceived as transcendent grounds of critique,19 are designed to defend 
people against state institutions.20 Similarly, Koskenniemi argues that human rights lose their 
‘transformative effect’ once they are institutionalised through the bureaucracy or judiciary.21 
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He explains that through this process, rights arguments lose the ability to convey ‘a sense of 
pain and injustice’ and are ‘constantly deferring to political priorities’.22 
Protection from refuge claims grounded in human rights law fall within this debate. In all of the 
cases considered in this chapter and Chapter Four, asylum seekers and refugees are drawing on 
human rights law in an attempt to resist being sent to or trapped in a particular place of refuge 
pursuant to a containment policy. In doing so, they initiate a contest between their human rights 
and states’ interests. I consider the ways decision-makers approach these disputes and whether 
particular methods of judicial reasoning strengthen or diminish human rights claims when pitted 
against states’ desires to constrain refugees’ movements. 
III HUMAN RIGHTS AS A PRISM TO ENGAGE WITH THE CONCEPT OF REFUGE 
In early or initial European protection from refuge cases, decision-makers adopt what I de-
scribed in Chapter Two as a categorical approach to conceptualising refuge. They start their 
analysis by identifying what it means to be a refugee and, in particular, common experiences 
of refugeehood. They then use the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment or the 
right to family life as a vehicle to respond to refugees’ needs and predicaments. This categorical 
approach to refuge is evident across various international, supranational and domestic decision-
making bodies. I highlight the ways it allows decision-makers to engage with the concept of 
refuge and lends strength to refugees’ human rights arguments in the face of state interests. 
A Identifying Irreducible Experiences of Refugeehood 
A categorical approach to refuge is evident in the European Court of Human Rights’ 2011 de-
cision of M S S v Belgium and Greece.23 In this case, an Afghani asylum seeker challenged his 
transfer from Belgium to Greece made pursuant to the Dublin Regulation.24 One of his submis-
sions was that his experience of homelessness and poverty in Greece constituted inhuman and 
degrading treatment within the meaning of article 3 of the ECHR. There is no doubt as to the 
veracity of the applicant’s claims with respect to his living conditions. The Court observed that 
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the applicant ‘spent months living in a state of the most extreme poverty, unable to cater for his 
most basic needs: food, hygiene and a place to live’.25 
However, difficult living conditions alone cannot constitute a breach of the ECHR’s article 3. 
The Court referred to a previous decision in which it ruled that the ECHR does not oblige states 
to provide everyone in their jurisdiction with a home.26 The Greek government’s submissions 
stressed that to decide otherwise would ‘open the doors to countless similar applications from 
homeless persons and place an undue positive obligation on the States in terms of welfare pol-
icy’.27 Accordingly, the Court had to determine whether homelessness and extreme poverty 
amounted to a breach of article 3 for the particular applicant, recalling that the minimum level 
of severity for inhuman and degrading treatment is relative.28 
In answering this question, the Court specifically focussed on the applicant’s position as an 
asylum seeker. It stated that it attached ‘considerable importance to the applicant’s status as an 
asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable popu-
lation’.29 In doing so, the Court invoked an emerging concept of ‘group vulnerability’30 that it 
has used for not only refugees and asylum seekers but also other groups.31 In explaining why 
being an asylum seeker made the applicant ‘particularly vulnerable’, the Court referred to ‘eve-
rything he had been through during his migration and the traumatic experiences he was likely 
to have endured previously’.32 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights did not consider 
legal definitions of a refugee, but identified aspects of refugeehood most likely experienced by 
the majority of refugees. 
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Similar reasoning is apparent in relation to the applicant’s submission that detention in Greece 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. In relation to the conditions of detention, the 
Court emphasised that the cells were overcrowded (145 detainees per 110 square metres), there 
was a lack of adequate ventilation and water (detainees drink from toilets) and sanitation (access 
to toilets was restricted and there was no soap or toilet paper).33 The Court then stressed that 
the applicant’s distress in relation to these abhorrent conditions was ‘accentuated by the vul-
nerability inherent in his situation as an asylum-seeker’.34 
The European Court of Human Rights continued its categorical approach in Hirsi Jamaa v It-
aly,35 handed down just over 12 months later. This case was brought by 24 Somalian and Eri-
trean asylum seekers who had been part of a group of approximately 200 people who left Libya 
by boat with the aim of reaching the Italian coast. Italy intercepted the vessel and returned it to 
Libya pursuant to an agreement between the two countries. After confirming that the applicants 
were under Italy’s jurisdiction and, therefore, entitled to the rights and freedoms in the ECHR,36 
one of the issues was whether Italy breached article 3 by transferring the applicants to Libya. 
In determining the above issue, the Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the appli-
cants were seeking international protection and considered situations commonly experienced 
by asylum seekers in Libya. For example, the Court highlighted that ‘no rule governing the 
protection of refugees was complied with by Libya’ and that ‘no distinction was made between 
irregular migrants and asylum-seekers’.37 It also emphasised that the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees’ (‘UNHCR’) activities in Libya were not ‘recognised in any way by the 
Libyan government’ and the identity documents the UNHCR provided did not ‘guarantee the 
persons concerned any kind of protection’.38 This meant that refugees in Libya were ‘subjected 
to particularly precarious living conditions’ and ‘vulnerable to xenophobic and racist acts’.39 
The Court found that because Libya’s lack of protection of refugees and asylum seekers was 
well known and verified by a number of reputable organisations, Italy knew or should have 
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known that the applicants would be exposed to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in 
Libya and that they ‘would not be given any kind of protection’.40 
A categorical approach is also evident in some Human Rights Committee views. In a 2015 
view, the Committee considered a communication made by Jasin, a Somalian refugee, and her 
children (Jasin v Denmark).41 Jasin arrived in Italy in 2008 when her first child was a year old 
and Italy granted her subsidiary protection. The Italian government initially gave her accom-
modation in an asylum seeker reception centre, but later evicted her and did not offer any as-
sistance in finding housing or work. She had no option but to live on the street with her daughter. 
She became pregnant with her second child and the Italian government did not provide any 
medical care during the pregnancy and birth. Jasin travelled to Denmark, but Denmark at-
tempted to return her to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. Jasin and her children argued 
before the Committee that this would be a breach of article 7 of the ICCPR (no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). Similar to the 
categorical reasoning adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights 
Committee focussed on the authors’ need for complementary protection. It explained that its 
view with respect to a breach of article 7 of the ICCPR must be informed by ‘the unique status 
of the author and her children as asylum seekers entitled to subsidiary protection’.42 
The use of a categorical approach to inform the right to family life is evident in a 2015 decision 
by the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal.43 The first four applicants in this case were living in 
the ‘Jungle’ outside Calais. Three were unaccompanied minors and one was a 26-year-old who 
suffered significant mental health disorders. The other three applicants were their family mem-
bers who were seeking asylum in the United Kingdom. Pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, the 
first four applicants were required to lodge their protection applications in France. However, 
they relied on the right to family life in article 8 of the ECHR to petition to be transferred to the 
United Kingdom to be reunited with the last three applicants. The Tribunal approached the 
dispute on the premise that the Dublin Regulation and ECHR operate alongside each other.44 
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Due to the fact that article 8 is a qualified right (meaning that it is subject to permissible inter-
ferences)45 the Tribunal reasoned that the question to be determined was whether there is a 
disproportionate interference with the asylum seekers’ right to family life.46 
The applicants’ asylum-seeking experience was central to the Tribunal’s proportionality rea-
soning. The Tribunal listed a number of ‘factors in the proportionality equation’ that ‘tip the 
balance in favour of the [a]pplicants’.47 In addition to youth, one factor was the psychological 
damage they experienced as refugees: the Tribunal stressed that the applicants had ‘all fled the 
war in Syria, claiming to have suffered extreme trauma there’.48 Other determinants were the 
disruption and difficulties of displacement, especially with respect to family unity.49 Also, the 
Tribunal placed weight on the fact that the first four applicants mistrusted the French authorities 
due to deficiencies in the French asylum system and would suffer ‘mentally painful and debil-
itating fear, anxiety and uncertainty’ if ‘swift entry to the United Kingdom cannot be 
achieved’.50 
The centrality of the refugee experience to these decisions has links to what Mégret describes 
as one of ‘one of the most interesting and least studied puzzles of the contemporary develop-
ment of international human rights’.51 That is, human rights law is founded on ‘the sameness 
and unity of human beings’, but the existence of group-specific human rights treaties is ‘at least 
partly making a point about difference and pluralism’.52 In the context of writing about the 
Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’),53 Mégret suggests that the 
CRPD takes ‘one further step in the direction of recognizing that there are, within humanity, a 
number of groups of human beings whose distinct claims to human rights are based on irreduc-
ible experiences that require a tailoring of the general rights regime’.54 Applying Mégret’s ideas 
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to the refugee context, in these cases decision-makers identify experiences common to most 
refugees and asylum seekers such as trauma, precarious conditions due to not being a citizen of 
the host state, family separation and mistrust of state authorities. 
B Using a Categorical Approach to Delineate Refuge’s Objectives and Remedial Nature 
By focussing on the irreducible aspects of refugeehood, decision-makers adapt general human 
rights instruments to respond to refugees’ specific needs. They use the right to be free from 
inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to family life (rights not in the Refugee Con-
vention and generic, abstract rights not specifically designed to address refugeehood) as a prism 
to develop a purposive understanding of refuge and give effect to its remedial nature. 
For example, the European Court of Human Right’s judgment in M S S v Belgium and Greece 
reflected an understanding of the restorative and regenerative functions of refuge as well as the 
ways these relate to refuge’s temporality. A key aspect of the Court’s finding that Greece was 
in violation of article 3 was that the Greek government demonstrated complete indifference 
towards the applicant.55 By having no regard for the applicant’s plight, the Greek government 
showed ‘a lack of respect for [the asylum seeker’s] dignity’,56 caused him ‘feelings of fear, 
anguish or inferiority capable of inducing desperation’57 and placed him in a state of ‘prolonged 
uncertainty’.58 It was the applicant’s abysmal living and detention conditions, coupled with the 
Greek government’s indifference, which meant the applicant had a ‘total lack of any prospects 
of his situation improving’ that ‘attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope 
of Article 3 of the [ECHR]’.59 This reasoning manifests an appreciation that one of the functions 
of refuge is to restore a person’s bond with a nation-state and that this cannot occur if the host 
state treats the refugee or asylum seeker with complete apathy. Also reflected in this reasoning 
is the idea that asylum seekers and refugees need to be able to imagine and generate a future. 
This is evident in the Court’s emphasis on the applicant’s state of uncertainty and lack of any 
prospect of his situation improving. 
Further, the European Court of Human Rights’ reasoning gives character to the nature of refuge. 
While article 3 of the ECHR confers a right, the Court used it in a similar way to which a remedy 
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is often understood: a response to a wrong or harm. The Court conceptualised the relevant in-
justice as asylum seekers’ vulnerability.60 It recognised that, due to this acute and specific vul-
nerability, asylum seekers and refugees are ‘in need of special protection’.61 In particular, it 
referred to ‘the existence of a broad consensus at the international and European level concern-
ing this need for special protection, as evidenced by the [Refugee] Convention, the remit and 
the activities of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive’.62 The Court 
did not go as far as to bring all of these standards for special protection into the realm of article 
3 of the ECHR. Rather, through the medium of article 3 of the ECHR, the Court reasoned that 
host states cannot be apathetic or indifferent towards asylum seekers on their territories, but 
must respond with ‘due regard’ to their specific vulnerabilities.63 Thus, the Court used article 3 
of the ECHR not only as a right, but to facilitate a legal remedy being a state’s obligation to 
respond appropriately to refugees on its territory or in its jurisdiction. 
The European Court of Human Rights deepened its understanding of refuge’s restorative ob-
jectives in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy. In particular, its reasoning reflects an understanding that the 
restorative aspect of refuge is not only about re-establishing the bond between a refugee and a 
nation-state; it also should enable refugees the ability to lead a normal life in the host commu-
nity. This is seen in the Court’s observation that the applicants were ‘destined to occupy a mar-
ginal and isolated position in Libyan society’, because they were not given any form of special 
protection.64 Further, the Court extended its thinking with respect to nature of refuge; a host 
state not only must take action with respect to asylum seekers and refugees within its territory, 
but this response or remedy must manifest in some form of legal status. The Court conveyed 
this idea through its emphasis on Libya’s lack of special protection for refugees and its refusal 
to recognise the UNHCR’s activities with respect to designation of refugee status.65 
There is danger in conceptualising refuge with reference to refugees’ irreducible experiences. 
Ramsay warns that the refugee label ‘renders the personal lives of peoples who have fled their 
homes dissolvable into easily recognised tropes’ and ‘serves to homogenise and generalise what 
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are the diverse experiences of peoples who have been forced to flee their homes and seek asy-
lum’.66 However, in these early or initial cases, decision-makers tread a fine line between rec-
ognising that there are experiences common to all refugees, such as displacement and loss of 
political membership, but that the ways these are experienced differ with respect to factors such 
as age, gender, disability and family responsibilities. For example, in its 2015 decision of Jasin 
v Denmark, the Human Rights Committee used the right to be free from inhuman and degrading 
treatment to tailor the functions and nature of refuge to accommodate factors such as gender, 
family responsibilities and age. In particular, the Committee stressed that Denmark did not have 
assurances that Italy would receive ‘the author and her children in conditions adapted to the 
children’s age and the family’s vulnerable status, which would enable them to remain in It-
aly’.67 This reflects the restorative objectives (that a host state must establish a bond with the 
refugee) and temporality of refuge (that this must lead to an enduring relationship between the 
refugee and the host state), but also indicates that refuge must be adapted in an appropriate way 
for young children and a single female-headed family. 
The United Kingdom Upper Tribunal employed the right to family life in the ECHR to invoke 
the restorative, regenerative and palliative functions of refuge with particular sensitivity to age 
and disability. Most of the applicants were unaccompanied minors and one of the adult appli-
cants had a number of serious mental health conditions and, therefore, could be considered to 
have a disability.68 The Tribunal demonstrated an understanding that family reunification is an 
important aspect of restoring a normal life, in particular for unaccompanied minors and those 
who suffer from mental health conditions.69 Also, it recognised that being able to have security 
in a brighter future is an essential component of refuge with its emphasis on the need to prevent 
further ‘fear, anxiety and uncertainty’ caused by the first four applicants’ mistrust of the French 
asylum system.70 Finally, the Tribunal’s focus on the pain and trauma suffered by the asylum 
seekers71 has resonance with the idea that one role of refuge is to treat the suffering associated 
with persecution. Overall, the judgment displays an awareness of the particular and acute ways 
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children and those with mental health conditions experience the trauma of persecution and the 
need to be with family to be able to cope with and heal from these experiences. 
In summary, while McAdam72 and Hathaway73 correctly highlight that general human rights 
instruments do not address refugee-specific concerns, when decision-makers employ categori-
cal reasoning they shape these rights in a way that sees them respond to refugees’ predicaments. 
In particular, by identifying irreducible experiences of refugeehood, decision-makers use rights 
in generic human rights instruments to conceptualise the objectives and nature of refuge and 
tailor this to take into account factors such as age, gender, family responsibilities and disability. 
C Consequential Protection from Refuge Victories 
A categorical approach to determining protection from refuge claims not only delivers victories 
for the individual claimants, but has the potential to disrupt or jeopardise the continuation of 
containment agreements. After the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in M S S v 
Belgium and Greece, states stopped transferring asylum seekers to Greece even if Greece was 
the responsible member state pursuant to the Dublin Regulation.74 European refugee law schol-
ars hail the case as a landmark judgment75 and suggest that it has the potential to dismantle the 
Dublin Regulation or, at the very least, significantly compromise its operation.76 After the 
Court’s decision in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, Italy suspended its interception and push back agree-
ment with Libya.77 
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The approach taken by the Human Rights Committee also has significance for the Dublin Reg-
ulation’s operation, although it has received less attention due to it not being binding a decision 
by an ultimate appellate court. The Committee’s view was that states have to seek assurances 
that any transferees will be treated in accordance with their status as refugees or recipients of 
complementary protection.78 Only the dissenting member expressed concerns about the deci-
sion’s effect on the Dublin Regulation.79 
Accordingly, these decisions lend support to Soysal’s and Jacobson’s theories about the potency 
of human rights claims and the role of courts in arbitrating disputes between states and non-
citizens. In determining these protection from refuge challenges, the decision-makers explicitly 
recognised the tension between human rights claims and the national interest and explained 
why refugees’ human rights triumph. In M S S v Belgium and Greece, the European Court of 
Human Rights acknowledged that Greece was confronted with ‘considerable difficulties in cop-
ing with the increasing influx of migrants and asylum seekers’ and that the situation was ‘ex-
acerbated by the transfers of asylum-seekers by other member States in application of the Dub-
lin Regulation’.80 However, it confirmed that this does not excuse Greece from its obligations 
under article 3 of the ECHR.81 In Mallia’s assessment of the decision, she argues that the Court 
‘makes clear that human rights supersede the interest – or necessity – of States in controlling 
irregular immigration’.82 
Similarly, in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, the Court noted that ‘states which form the external borders 
of the European Union are currently experiencing difficulties in coping with the increasing in-
flux of migrants and asylum-seekers’.83 It also stressed that it does ‘not underestimate the bur-
den and pressure this situation places on the States concerned, which are all the greater in the 
present context of the economic crisis’.84 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that these concerns 
‘cannot absolve a state of its obligations’ under article 3 of the ECHR.85 Thus, human rights 
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prevailed over interception practices that have historically given states ‘the lethal luxury of a 
maritime Berlin wall’.86 
While article 3 of the ECHR is an absolute right in the sense that it is not subject to any excep-
tions and states cannot derogate from it,87 the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal’s decision indi-
cates that qualified rights can also override state interests. The Tribunal acknowledged that the 
Dublin Regulation and ECHR ‘sometimes tug in different directions’.88 The Tribunal was care-
ful to emphasise that neither ‘has any inherent value or status giving one precedence over the 
other’.89 However, the asylum seeker applicants succeeded in establishing a disproportionate 
interference with their right to family life90 and this enabled them to use court processes to 
continue their journey in search of refuge across the English Channel. 
IV REFUGE AS A COMMODITY 
The decisions discussed above may provide grounds for optimism with respect to the force of 
human rights arguments to enable refugees to continue their journey to find a genuine place of 
refuge and thwart containment agreements. However, the ways decision-makers approach pro-
tection from refuge challenges in the European context has shifted in subsequent decisions. 
While in early or initial cases, decision-makers adopt a categorical approach by identifying 
irreducible experiences of refugeehood, in later decisions the significance of being a person in 
need of international protection is lost and decision-makers look for an additional vulnerability 
beyond refugeehood. This obscures refuge’s remedial nature, promulgates impoverished un-
derstandings of refuge and renders human rights arguments less potent against states’ interests 
in restricting refugees’ movements. 
A From Vulnerable Refugees to the ‘Peculiarly Vulnerable’ Refugee 
The move away from a categorical approach to protection from refuge decisions in Council of 
Europe jurisprudence is evident in the seminal 2014 European Court of Human Rights’ decision 
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of Tarakhel v Switzerland.91 This case concerned a family of Afghani asylum seekers (two 
parents and six children) who first sought asylum in Italy before travelling to Switzerland. The 
Swiss government attempted to return the family to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, but 
the family resisted on the ground they would be exposed to a real risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment. In particular, their claim emphasised that they would be at risk of homelessness and 
they gave evidence that the number of asylum seekers in Italy far outstripped the number of 
places available in asylum seeker accommodation.92 Even when accommodation was available 
in reception centres, the evidence attested to ‘lack of privacy, insalubrious conditions and 
[widespread] violence’.93 
The Court’s decoupling of the relevance of refugees’ specific predicaments from the decision 
as to what constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment is apparent in its comparison of the 
conditions in Italy and Greece. While the Court noted that asylum seekers are a vulnerable 
group requiring special protection,94 this did not inform its reasoning. Unlike its earlier deci-
sions in M S S v Belgium and Greece and Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, the Court did not consider whether 
the risk of homelessness and insalubrious and unsafe conditions in reception centres would be 
inhuman and degrading for asylum seekers and refugees, recalling that the minimal severity is 
relative. Rather, the Court used the conditions in Greece (as described in M S S v Belgium and 
Greece) as a litmus test for conditions that act as a complete bar to all Dublin Regulation trans-
fers. The Court reasoned that while the conditions in Italy are problematic, they did not compare 
to the situation in Greece where there were ‘fewer than 1,000 places in reception centres to 
accommodate tens of thousands of asylum seekers and that the conditions of the most extreme 
poverty described by the applicant existed on a large scale’.95 On these grounds, the Court ruled 
that the conditions in Italy could not act as a bar to all transfers to that country and, therefore, 
transfers to Italy had be considered on a case-by-case basis.96 
Another example of the waning relevance of refugeehood to what constitutes inhuman and de-
grading treatment can be found in the United Kingdom High Court of Justice’s 2014 decision 
of R (Tabrizagh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.97 This case concerned six male 
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asylum seekers resisting a Dublin Regulation transfer to Italy. Two had experienced homeless-
ness, destitution and violence in Italy. The Court did not take into account their situation as 
asylum seekers in its consideration as to whether the conditions in Italy presented a real risk of 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Rather, similar to the European Court of Human Rights in 
Tarakhel v Switzerland, the United Kingdom High Court of Justice used the conditions in 
Greece as the relevant threshold. While there was no up-to-date evidence given to the Court 
regarding the accommodation available to asylum seekers and refugees in Italy, the Court was 
satisfied that the numbers ‘exceed the 1000 spaces which were available in Greece for the “tens 
of thousands” of asylum seekers at the time of MSS’.98 
When the focus on refugeehood declines, decision-makers look for a vulnerability beyond ref-
ugeehood. In Tarakhel v Switzerland, the distinguishing factor was that the applicants were a 
family with six children. The Court ruled that Switzerland would be in breach of article 3 if it 
returned the family to Italy, because it did not have ‘sufficient assurances that … the applicants 
would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children’.99 However, in R 
(Tabrizagh) v SSHD, the applicants could not point to any additional risk factors. The High 
Court of Justice ruled that a transfer to Italy did not present an article 3 risk and, in coming to 
this conclusion, a significant factor was that the claimants were young, single men100 and none 
had any individual vulnerabilities that could create an article 3 risk.101 A similar approach was 
taken by the European Court of Human Rights in A M E v The Netherlands,102 which concerned 
the transfer of a Somali asylum seeker to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. The Court 
held that the transfer would not be in violation of article 3 because ‘[u]nlike the applicants in 
the case of Tarakhel … who were a family with six minor children, the applicant is an able 
young man with no dependents’.103 
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This pattern of shifting focus from refugeehood to requiring some additional form of acute 
vulnerability is also evident in Human Rights Committee views. Just a year after the decision 
of Jasin v Denmark, the Committee considered a similar complaint in R A A and Z M v Den-
mark, but adopted different reasoning.104 R A A and Z M v Denmark concerned two Syrian 
refugees—a married couple expecting a baby. Both had been granted refugee status in Bulgaria, 
but, due to fears for their safety, left Bulgaria and sought protection in Denmark. Denmark 
arranged for their return to Bulgaria pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. The Committee did not 
place any significance on the authors’ refugee status. To trigger article 7 of the ICCPR they had 
to establish that their situation was exceptional in some way. The Committee concluded that ‘in 
these particular circumstances’,105 returning the couple to Bulgaria would amount to a breach 
of article 7 of the ICCPR. Crucial to this decision was that the couple were ‘in a particularly 
vulnerable situation’, because they would soon have a child, would be victims of racially mo-
tivated violence, would not be able to provide for themselves and the male author had a heart 
condition for which he would not receive appropriate treatment in Bulgaria.106 
The reasons why the Human Rights Committee changed its approach may be gleaned from the 
dissenting members who were concerned that article 7 of the ICCPR was being extended ‘be-
yond breaking point’.107 They explained that: 
With the possible exceptions of those individuals who face special hardships due to their 
particular situation of vulnerability which renders their plight exceptionally harsh and irrep-
arable in nature, non-availability of social assistance or delays in access to medical services 
do not in themselves constitute grounds for non-refoulement.108 
While this is a dissenting opinion, the Human Rights Committee’s switch from an expansive to 
a much narrower approach in just over a year perhaps indicates a realisation that its initial ap-
proach would apply to almost all asylum seekers and refugees resisting a Dublin Regulation 
transfer. Accordingly, they changed their emphasis in a way that prioritises refugees with ‘spe-
cial hardships’ or in a ‘particular situation of vulnerability’. 
Similar concerns are evident in the United Kingdom Court of Appeal’s reversal of the Upper 
Tribunal’s decision regarding the use of the right to family life to petition for a transfer from 
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France to the United Kingdom in 2016. The Court of Appeal stated that the Tribunal ‘set too 
low a hurdle for permitting [the Dublin] process to be displaced by Article 8 considerations’.109 
The dilution of refugeehood’s significance and search for some type of exceptionality is evident 
in the Court’s insistence that only in an ‘especially compelling case’ can the right to family life 
override the Dublin Regulation.110 The Court stressed that all asylum seekers, including unac-
companied minors, must first make their application for asylum in the country in which they 
are located and, only once they can show that the system in that country is not working for 
them, should they turn to the United Kingdom.111 The Court acknowledged that there would be 
exceptions to this, but they would be extreme and rare cases.112 The example the Court gave is 
a baby ‘left behind in France when the door of a lorry bound for England closed after his mother 
got onto the lorry’.113 The Court referred to an earlier judgment delivered by Lord Justice Laws 
to explain that the underlying rationale for this approach was because the Dublin Regulation’s 
purpose would be ‘critically undermined’ if ‘it were seen as establishing little more than a pre-
sumption as to which State should deal with the claim’.114 
This search for the exceptional asylum seeker or refugee is best encapsulated in the phrase 
‘peculiarly vulnerable’, formulated by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in its 2016 decision 
of NA (Sudan) and MR (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘NA (Sudan)’).115 
The case concerned a Sudanese and Iranian asylum seeker resisting return to Italy pursuant to 
the Dublin Regulation. The Court acknowledged that all refugees are vulnerable ‘simply by 
reason of the fact that they have had to leave their homes, in circumstances typically of great 
stress and often danger, and find themselves trying to make a new life, for an indefinite period 
and perhaps permanently, in a new country’.116 However, certain refugees such as unaccompa-
nied minors and pregnant women face additional difficulties and Lord Justice Underhill said, ‘I 
will refer to such persons as “peculiarly vulnerable”’.117 
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This notion of ‘peculiar vulnerability’ represents a change in the ways decision-makers under-
stand vulnerability. The idea of vulnerability is a controversial one in the refugee context. On 
one hand, some scholars recognise that a person who has travelled to a foreign land to seek 
international protection is in an inherently vulnerable position and that law and policy must take 
account of this.118 However, emphasising asylum seekers’ and refugees’ vulnerability leads to 
dehumanising depictions and understandings of refugees that downplay their agency119 as well 
as policy decisions that disempower refugees by, for example, causing them to be reliant on aid 
or welfare.120 The idea of vulnerability projected in these later decisions is different from the 
approach to vulnerability taken in early decisions. In M S S v Belgium and Greece, the European 
Court of Human Rights drew on the concept of vulnerability to highlight that asylum seekers 
and refugees were in a vulnerable position because they no longer had the protection of their 
state and were trying to eke out an existence in a foreign country.121 Thus, the Court did not use 
the concept of vulnerability in a dehumanising or disempowering way. The Court recognised 
that vulnerability is a result of the position refugees are in, rather than any innate or immutable 
qualities. However, in the move towards ‘peculiar vulnerability’ jurisprudence, decision-mak-
ers have shifted their focus to whether an individual is vulnerable due to personal factors such 
as health conditions and gender. This approach to vulnerability is a disempowering one. To 
establish a ‘peculiar vulnerability’, the narrative the litigant has to present is one in which they 
are at the mercy of exterior forces and have no ability to protect or fend for themselves. This 
obscures the resolve and tenacity needed to travel to make a claim for international protection 
and survive in adverse conditions such as being rendered homeless and having no means of 
acquiring basic necessities. 
Further, the shift towards identifying the exceptional or ‘peculiarly vulnerable’ refugee has 
transformed the nature of refuge from a remedy and provision of a legal status to a commodity. 
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Similar to the ‘hallmark of the welfare state’ where benefits are extended to ‘the most vulnera-
ble’,122 decision-makers have approached refuge as if it is a scarce resource that they should 
apportion on a needs basis. While it is well accepted that factors such as gender, age, family 
responsibilities and disability exacerbate protection risks, conceiving of refuge as a commodity 
to be distributed to the neediest is at odds with the idea of refuge in refugee law. Hathaway 
explains that in formulating the refugee definition, the Refugee Convention’s drafters ‘were at 
pains to carefully limit the beneficiary class’ and excluded ‘persons who have yet to leave their 
own country, who cannot link their predicament to civil or political status, who already benefit 
from surrogate national or international protection, or who are found not to deserve protec-
tion’.123 However, outside of these exclusions, refugees should be ‘conceived as a generic class, 
all members of which are equally worthy of protection’.124 
B Fragmented and Rudimentary Refuge  
This judicial commodification of refuge diminishes engagement with its restorative, regenera-
tive and palliative functions. What has been lost in this change in adjudicative reasoning is the 
use of human rights law as medium through which to elucidate refuge’s objectives. This is most 
starkly seen in the adoption of the conditions in Greece as a litmus test for conditions that place 
a complete bar on Dublin Regulation transfers. At no stage in its judgment in M S S v Belgium 
and Greece did the European Court of Human Rights specify that, to trigger article 3 protection, 
asylum seekers must establish that there is manifestly inadequate housing available in the pro-
spective host state. Rather, the Court considered whether the particular situation in which the 
applicant found himself (being homeless with no means of providing for himself) amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment and the applicant’s position as an asylum seeker was crucial 
to the Court’s decision. This categorical reasoning enabled the Court to adopt a purposive ap-
proach to refuge through the prism of article 3 and engage with its restorative and regenerative 
functions. However, in later decisions when there is no longer a focus on refugeehood, courts 
ask whether the conditions in the host country are comparable to Greece. This neuters the po-
tential for decision-makers to use human rights instruments to adopt a purposive approach to 
refuge. In particular, lack of consideration of the significance of being a refugee or asylum 
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seeker means that there is no longer an engagement with refuge’s restorative, regenerative and 
palliative functions. 
As a result, the idea of refuge reflected in these later decisions is a rudimentary one. By using 
the conditions in Greece as the relevant comparator, the European Court of Human Rights and 
domestic courts have set the threshold for what is deemed to be inadequate refuge as ‘the most 
extreme poverty … on a large scale’ and being left ‘without any means of subsistence’.125 The 
European Court of Human Rights has never used the right to be free from inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment as a platform to evaluate whether a host state complies with all of its obligations 
towards refugees. Nevertheless, homelessness, extreme poverty and having absolutely no 
means of subsistence are very low thresholds for what can be deemed an inadequate protection 
environment for refugees and asylum seekers. The reduction in the threshold for what is under-
stood to constitute adequate refuge is also evident in the Human Rights Committee’s jurispru-
dence. In its 2015 view (Jasin v Denmark), the Committee suggested that article 7 of the ICCPR 
could be triggered when the prospective host state does not comply with its international pro-
tection obligations to refugees. However, in its 2016 view (R A A and Z M v Denmark), the 
Committee narrowed the circumstances to situations where refugees cannot provide for them-
selves or will not be protected from physical violence.126 
The loss of a purposive approach fractures and truncates the concept of refuge. In earlier juris-
prudence, there is consideration of refuge’s temporality and the ways it should enable refugees 
to build a better future and heal from past trauma. In later decisions, there is no consideration 
of a refugee’s future and past. For example, in Tarakhel v Switzerland the European Court of 
Human Rights limited its focus to the conditions the asylum-seeking family would face on ar-
rival or shortly after arrival.127 It was satisfied that the Italian government would immediately 
take charge of them and concentrated only on the conditions in Italian reception centres. It did 
not consider the situation the family would be in once they left the centre. This is despite evi-
dence that the situation for asylum seekers and refugees in Italy often significantly deteriorates 
after they are forced to leave reception centres.128 They are not provided with accommodation 
or any assistance with entry into the work force and many are forced to live on the streets and 
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survive by begging for food.129 This preludes a consideration of the enduring relationship be-
tween the prospective host state and refugee. By focussing only on the circumstances immedi-
ately on arrival, the European Court of Human Rights also partially removed the place of refuge 
(Italy) from the judicial lens. 
Another example of the ways lack of a purposive approach obscures consideration of refugees’ 
futures and a full examination of the place of refuge is seen in the United Kingdom Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in NA (Sudan). The Court was satisfied that the applicant, who had been 
raped and rendered homeless in Italy, could return without a real risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment. This was because she would be assisted by non-government organisations (‘NGOs’) 
in the airport on her return to Italy and these NGOs would assist in finding her accommoda-
tion.130 The Court did not consider what other type of assistance these NGOs could provide and 
for how long she would be under their care. Limiting the enquiry in this manner is problematic, 
because a refugee relies on the host state’s protection until they find a durable solution and the 
host state’s obligations to the refugee should increase the longer the refugee remains in the host 
state.131 By only examining the situation immediately on or shortly after arrival, hope for a more 
promising future is diminished and the place of refuge remains largely out of judicial view. 
A further example of how refuge’s temporality is curtailed can be observed in the United King-
dom Court of Appeal’s reversal of the Upper Tribunal’s decision on the right to family life.132 
The Court of Appeal obscured refuge’s palliative function through its insistence that article 8 
of the ECHR can only be successfully invoked in rare circumstances such as a child being left 
behind when the door of a lorry closes just before it departs.133 This displaced the Tribunal’s 
focus on the ways family reunification can address the pain and suffering associated with per-
secution and displacement and severed consideration of the ways refuge should provide a space 
to heal from past trauma. 
The shift in decision-makers’ conceptualisation of refuge also diminishes human rights law’s 
potency with respect to challenging states’ interests in constraining refugees’ movements. What 
                                                          
129 Maurizio Ambrosini, ‘Better Than Our Fears? Refugees in Italy: Between Rhetorics of Exclusion and Local 
Projects of Inclusion’ in Susan Kneebone, Dallal Stevens and Loretta Baldassar (eds), Refugee Protection and the 
Role of Law: Conflicting Identities (Routledge, 2014) 235, 241; Médecins Sans Frontières (n 128) 14; Susan Zim-
mermann, ‘Irregular Secondary Movements to Europe: Seeking Asylum beyond Refuge’ (2009) 22(1) Journal of 
Refugee Studies 74, 90. 
130 NA (Sudan) (n 115) [213]–[219]. 
131 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees (n 73) 154. 
132 SSHD v ZAT (n 109). 
133 Ibid [95]. 
 95 
is apparent in the jurisprudence’s trajectory is that human rights law first proved somewhat 
robust in circumventing the Dublin Regulation other containment mechanisms and securing a 
transfer to an alternative place of refuge. However, decision-making bodies have now reined in 
the force of human rights law and only permit it to impinge on states’ interests in limited and 
exceptional circumstances. It means that only those refugees decision-makers deem to be ‘pe-
culiarly vulnerable’ can use court processes to continue their search for refuge. As noted in 
Chapter One, it is outside the scope of this thesis to investigate why there has been such a 
significant change in decision-maker approaches. Nevertheless, one possibility is that it is in 
response to the larger numbers of refugees that came to Europe as a result of the Syrian civil 
war. The number of applications for international protection in European countries from people 
outside the European Union started to rise in 2013.134 This peaked in 2015 and 2016, with 
approximately 1.3 million applications in both years.135 
V THE PECULIARLY VULNERABLE REFUGEE 
The ‘peculiarly vulnerable’ development in the jurisprudence could have provided strong 
grounds for women, parents, children and refugees with disabilities to be able successfully to 
use human rights law in protection from refuge challenges. However, the ways decision-makers 
approach this issue provides a mere semblance of human rights protection. In some cases, de-
cision-makers simply do not consider the ways factors such as age, gender and disability can 
exacerbate protection risks. In cases where decision-makers do turn their minds to these ques-
tions, they do so in a perfunctory manner. This further diminishes the potential to use human 
rights law to engage with the concept of refuge and enable refugees from more marginalised 
backgrounds to continue their quests for refuge. 
A Gender Blind Decisions 
There are a number of instances where the European Court of Human Rights wholly ignores 
gender in its assessment as to whether a transfer pursuant to the Dublin Regulation would be in 
breach of article 3 of the ECHR. For example, in 2013 the Court considered a case brought by 
a Somali woman granted refugee status in Italy.136 She became pregnant while in Italy after 
being raped. She travelled to the Netherlands and had another child there. She resisted being 
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transferred to Italy on the grounds that it would be a breach of article 3, but was unsuccessful. 
In 2015, the Court handed down a judgment in a case concerning an Eritrean woman who 
sought asylum in Italy and was granted residence, but ‘was not provided with (money for) food 
or medical assistance, and was forced to live on the street’.137 She travelled to the Netherlands 
in 2009, became pregnant and was subsequently diagnosed with human immunodeficiency vi-
rus. The Court held that transferring the applicant and her five-year-old daughter to Italy would 
not be in breach of article 3 of the ECHR. 
In neither of these cases did the Court consider being a single mother, having previously expe-
rienced sexual violence or having a significant health condition as factors that need to be con-
sidered in the decision as to whether there was a real risk of being exposed to inhuman and 
degrading treatment. This is despite myriad materials from the UNHCR and refugee law experts 
regarding the additional difficulties faced by women and female-headed households in many 
places of ostensible refuge.138 Further, in ignoring the risks of sexual violence for female asy-
lum seekers, the European Court of Human Rights disregarded its own jurisprudence. The Court 
has held on a number of occasions that rape can amount to inhuman and degrading treatment139 
and torture,140 and failure by the relevant authorities to investigate properly allegations of sexual 
violence can amount to a breach of article 3 of the ECHR.141 
B Notional Consideration of Gender, Age and Disability 
In cases where decision-makers do take account of gender, age and disability, they do so only 
superficially. This is evident in the United Kingdom Court of Appeal’s judgment in NA (Sudan). 
The Court accepted that NA was ‘peculiarly vulnerable’ because she was raped while in Italy, 
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had an overwhelming fear of being returned to the country in which she had been the victim of 
sexual violence, had no family to provide support and no ability to seek other forms of sup-
port.142 However, it concluded that the assistance provided by NGOs at the airport would alle-
viate these vulnerabilities without enquiring into the nature and level of assistance that they 
would provide beyond assistance with finding accommodation.143 
With respect to children’s protection from refuge claims, the European Court of Human Rights 
in Tarakhel v Switzerland acknowledged that children are ‘extremely vulnerable’ and ‘have 
specific needs that are related in particular to their age and lack of independence, but also to 
their asylum-seeker status’.144 It also referred to the obligation in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child145 to take appropriate measures to ensure that children seeking asylum receive ap-
propriate attention.146 Costello and Mouzourakis argue that the Court had the opportunity to 
develop this point further by referring to the principle of best interests of the child but declined 
to do so.147 However, in cases involving minors post-Tarakhel v Switzerland, the Court has 
taken a much more cursory approach to children’s rights and protection needs. In a case that 
concerned an adult Eritrean refugee with children resisting return to Italy, the European Court 
of Human Rights noted that her status as a single parent meant that she belonged to a ‘particu-
larly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection’.148 The 
Court held that returning her to Italy would not expose her to a real risk of inhuman and de-
grading treatment, because she would have ‘access to the available resources in Italy for an 
asylum-seeking single mother with a minor child’.149 However, there was no examination of 
whether these resources would be adequate and appropriate for her children. In particular, there 
was no consideration of the children’s ages or genders or any other factors that may be relevant 
to determining whether the resources available were adequate or appropriate. In other cases 
regarding the transfer of families with children to Italy (including the cases discussed above 
concerning single mothers), the European Court of Human Rights held that it was satisfied that 
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appropriate accommodation would be provided without inquiring as to the child asylum-seek-
ers’ needs.150 
Further, when considering additional vulnerabilities, decision-makers often fail to take into ac-
count the ways they intersect with a person’s position as an asylum seeker or refugee. This is 
apparent in A S v Switzerland,151 a case brought by a Syrian asylum seeker of Kurdish origin 
who resisted Switzerland’s attempt to transfer him to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. 
He suffered from significant mental and physical health conditions caused by the torture and 
trauma he experienced in Syria and, therefore, could be considered to have a disability. The 
applicant had two sisters in Switzerland and submitted that by being able to spend time with his 
sisters he had ‘regained a certain emotional stability in his life’.152 He argued that if forced to 
return to Italy, he would have no family to care for him and this would aggravate his mental 
health problems. 
This case involved not only Dublin Regulation jurisprudence but also case law relating to 
breaches of article 3 of the ECHR in situations of the expulsion of seriously ill persons.153 In 
his submissions, the applicant attempted to highlight the intersections between his health con-
ditions and his situation as an asylum seeker. He drew specifically on the reasoning in M S S v 
Belgium and Greece and argued that, as an asylum seeker, he belonged to ‘a particularly vul-
nerable group in need of special protection’.154 The European Court of Human Rights acknowl-
edged that in M S S v Belgium and Greece ‘considerable importance’ was attached to ‘the ap-
plicant’s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged 
and vulnerable population group in need of special protection’.155 However, the Court stressed 
that the expulsion of a seriously ill person would only breach article 3 in rare cases156 and the 
applicant’s case did ‘not disclose very exceptional circumstances’.157 
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In coming to this conclusion, the Court did not consider the intersections between having a 
disability and being an asylum seeker, in particular, that his mental and physical health condi-
tions were caused by the persecution he suffered in Syria. Further, in justifying the high thresh-
old in healthcare cases, the Court did not demonstrate an appreciation of the distinction between 
expelling a person to their home country and expelling an asylum seeker to an alternative place 
of refuge; the Court even used the phrase ‘country of origin’. The Court explained that 
‘[a]dvances in medical science, together with social and economic differences between coun-
tries, entail that the level of treatment available in the Contracting State and the country of 
origin may vary considerably’, but ‘Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting 
State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all 
aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction’.158 
Not only do decision-makers’ desultory approaches to the ways age, gender and disability may 
exacerbate protection risks make it more difficult for refugees to draw on human rights law to 
challenge Dublin Regulation transfers, they further disengage decision-makers from the con-
cept of refuge. These cases presented an opportunity for the respective courts to delineate ideas 
about the function and nature of refuge for children, single parents, those who have experienced 
sexual violence and those with disabilities. Unlike in decisions discussed earlier in this chapter, 
where decision-makers considered the ways these factors interact with irreducible experiences 
of refugeehood, in these judgments there is no or only nominal consideration of these intersec-
tions. For example, the Court’s failure in A S v Switzerland to recognise the compounding effect 
of being an asylum seeker on a person’s mental health condition means that there was no con-
sideration of refuge’s palliative function: that it should provide a space in which refugees can 
heal from past trauma and that this is often facilitated through family reunification. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have examined how decision-makers in the European context approach and 
determine protection from refuge claims grounded in general human rights instruments, rather 
than refugee-specific rights. This chapter argues that human rights law, despite not specifically 
addressing refugees’ predicaments, can be used to engage with the functions and nature of ref-
uge for those with or seeking international protection. In cases where this occurs, decision-
makers adopt categorical reasoning by placing weight on the litigants’ position as refugees and 
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asylum seekers and use human rights as prisms through which to invoke ideas about the objec-
tives of refuge as well as its remedial nature. These judicial approaches have provided grounds 
for large numbers of refugees to continue their search for refuge within Europe. However, these 
protection from refuge victories have been short lived. In subsequent decisions, the litigants’ 
experience as refugees or asylum seekers has become less relevant and decision-makers look 
for some type of additional vulnerability beyond refugeehood before they can trigger the pro-
tection of human rights law. As a result, the bridge between these human rights and ideas about 
the objectives and nature of refuge is severed. Refuge is approached as a scarce commodity and 
is stripped down to the barest minimum of protections. The waning relevance of refugeehood 
in these decisions supports Koskenniemi’s argument that human rights challenges defer to po-
litical priorities when they are unable to convey a sense of pain and injustice. It is the loss of 
focus on refugeehood and the nominal consideration of factors such as gender, age and disabil-
ity that distance decision-makers from considerations of what refuge should be. 
I have also suggested that human rights litigation, while first having potential to spark radical 
change, has ultimately proven impotent in challenging state interests with respect to refugee 
movements. The case law’s trajectory indicates a shift from a human rights approach to protec-
tion from refuge scenarios to one more focussed on containment and migration management 
(albeit still cloaked in human rights language). This aligns with Douzinas’ views on the role of 
the courts in human rights protection, especially his argument that human rights struggles can 
at best ‘lead to small individual improvements’, but ultimately ‘reinforce rather than challenge 
established arrangements’.159 
However, there is one important point of distinction. Douzinas suggests that the only way hu-
man rights can ‘reactivate a politics of resistance’ is through ‘the recognition of the absolute 
uniqueness of the other person and my moral duty to save and protect her’.160 The cases dis-
cussed in this chapter indicate that identifying common aspects of refugeehood is the factor that 
can harness the power of human rights arguments, especially when pitted against states’ con-
tainment mechanisms. When courts and other decision-making bodies ignore the relevance of 
refugeehood and concentrate on the uniqueness of the protection from refuge litigant, human 
rights arguments lose their potency in facilitating refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
USING HUMAN AND REFUGEE RIGHTS TO CONTINUE 
QUESTS FOR REFUGE IN AFRICA 
I INTRODUCTION 
One of the most powerful voices against encampment is that of anthropologist Harrell-Bond, 
who contends that ‘refugee camps are not good for anyone. No-one freely chooses to move into 
a refugee camp to stay. Everyone who can gets out of them as quickly as possible’.1 The refugee 
litigants described in this chapter are trying to do exactly this: they are drawing on human and 
refugee rights to avoid forced relocation to a refugee camp, or to leave the confines of a camp. 
In doing so, they are using courts in their quest to secure a place of refuge. Some are using 
courts to resist camp life and remain in a place where they feel they have attained a sense of 
refuge. Others are coming to courts to be able to continue their journeys in search of refuge by 
being able to travel onwards from a camp environment. However, their rights arguments collide 
with states’ justifications for confining refugees in their territory to a camp, in particular on 
national security grounds. 
The purpose of this chapter is to continue my examination of how decision-makers determine 
protection from refuge claims grounded in human rights instruments and, in particular, how 
they use human rights law to conceptualise refuge’s functions and nature and approach chal-
lenges to containment agreements. First, I show the similarities between the approaches adopted 
by African decision-makers and their European and international counterparts with respect to 
using human rights to engage with the objectives and nature of refuge. I then highlight the ways 
African decision-makers’ approaches to protection from refuge challenges are distinct and pro-
vide for a deeper understanding of refuge. Finally, I highlight that African decision-makers, 
similar to decision-makers in the European context, have changed their approaches to protection 
from refuge decisions and this has diluted judicial understandings of refuge as well as the force 
of human and refugee rights in challenging containment policies. Throughout each section, I 
consider the consequences of African decision-makers’ approaches to protection from refuge 
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claims for refugees of different genders and ages as well as refugees with care responsibilities 
and disabilities. 
In this chapter, I build on the idea suggested in the previous chapter that protection from refuge 
claims are most potent when decision-makers focus on the unifying aspects of refugeehood, 
rather than the uniqueness of the protection from refuge litigant. I argue that when decision-
makers draw on an abstract idea of refugeehood and then use the refugee litigant’s particular 
circumstances to inform human rights arguments, human rights law can be used to engage with 
ideas of refuge in a sophisticated manner and this proves powerful in challenging containment 
policies. However, when refugees’ individual circumstances are used to draw comparisons be-
tween refugees with respect to notions such as vulnerability, the concept of refuge is diluted 
and human rights arguments lose their force in the face of states’ containment policies. 
II FROM CATEGORICAL TO EXPERIENTIAL REASONING: ILLUMINATING REF-
UGE 
Analogous to early or initial protection from refuge cases considered in Chapter Three, in some 
forced encampment challenges, African decision-makers also employ categorical reasoning: 
they identify core or unifying aspects of the refugee experience and use this to adopt a purposive 
approach to refuge through the prism of human rights. However, in contrast to European and 
Human Rights Committee decision-makers, they engage more heavily with refugee litigants’ 
testimonies and, therefore, also exhibit experiential reasoning. Below, I discuss the ways Afri-
can decision-makers’ amalgamated categorical and experiential reasoning gives more vibrancy 
to the concept of refuge and lends even greater force to rights arguments in their contests with 
states’ interests. 
A Understanding Refugeehood 
Some African decision-makers contemplate the irreducible aspects of refugeehood and use this 
to inform human rights and consider refuge’s functions. An example of this categorical ap-
proach is evident in the High Court of Kenya’s decision in Kituo Cha Sheria v Attorney General 
(‘Kituo Cha Sheria’).2 Kituo Cha Sheria, a non-government organisation (‘NGO’), and seven 
refugees who had been living in Nairobi for many years brought this case in response to a 2012 
directive issued by the Kenyan government requiring all refugees in Kenya to move to one of 
Kenya’s two refugee camps (‘Directive’). The Directive was a response to a series of terror 
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attacks in urban centres in Kenya.3 The Court’s categorical approach to the petitioners’ human 
rights claim is evident from an early point in the judgment. Before considering the petitioners’ 
substantive arguments, the Court recognised that ‘[r]efugees are a special category of persons 
who are, by virtue of their situation, considered vulnerable’.4 Article 21(3) of The Constitution 
of Kenya 2010 (‘Kenyan Constitution’) provides that Kenya’s ‘state organs and public officers 
have the duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups’. While refugees are not explicitly 
identified as a vulnerable group in article 21(3), the Court was satisfied that they are a vulner-
able group within the meaning of this constitutional provision.5 By recognising that refugees 
are in a vulnerable position, the High Court of Kenya in Kituo Cha Sheria adopted a parallel 
approach to the European Court of Human Rights in M S S v Belgium and Greece.6 Although 
the High Court of Kenya referred to the Kenyan Constitution and the European Court of Human 
Rights drew on its own vulnerability jurisprudence, both used the concept of vulnerability to 
interpret the rights pleaded in a way that responds to refugees’ circumstances. 
One distinction is that the High Court of Kenya in Kituo Cha Sheria provided a more detailed 
account of the refugee experience. In explaining why refugees are a vulnerable group, the Court 
identified three core aspects of refugeehood. First, that refugees ‘have been forced to flee their 
homes as a result of persecution, human rights violations and conflict’.7 Second, that ‘[t]hey or 
those close to them, have been victims of violence on the basis of very personal attributes such 
as ethnicity or religion’.8 These understandings of refugeehood resonate with European deci-
sion-makers’ descriptions of refugees having to flee their homeland9 and enduring traumatic 
experiences there.10 However, the High Court of Kenya also stated that refugees are ‘vulnerable 
due to lack of means, support systems of family and friends and by the very fact of being in a 
foreign land where hostility is never very far away’.11 While the European Court of Human 
Rights recognised that refugees are vulnerable due to their experience of migration,12 the High 
                                                          
3 Ibid [5]; Robert Nanima, ‘An Evaluation of Kenya’s Parallel Legal Regime on Refugees, and the Courts’ Guar-
antee of their Rights’ (2017) 21 Law Democracy and Development 42, 56. 
4 Kituo Cha Sheria [2013] (n 2) [34]. 
5 Ibid [34]. 
6 [2011] I Eur Court HR 255 (‘M S S v Belgium and Greece’). 
7 Kituo Cha Sheria [2013] (n 2) [40]. 
8 Ibid [40]. 
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10 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department IJR [2016] UKUT 00061 (IAC) [17] (‘R v SSHD’). 
11 Kituo Cha Sheria [2013] (n 2) [40]. 
12 M S S v Belgium and Greece (n 6) [232]. 
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Court of Kenya went further and acknowledged that refugees are vulnerable due to the com-
pounding difficulties of building a life in exile after enduring acts of persecution. 
This richer understanding of the irreducible experiences of refugeehood enabled the High Court 
of Kenya to paint a more vivid picture of refuge through the prism of human rights. An example 
of this is the Court’s approach to the right to dignity in the Kenyan Constitution. The Court 
stated that the right to dignity: 
has to be understood against the backdrop of appreciating the vulnerability of refugees and 
the suffering they have endured, the trauma and insecurity associated with persecution and 
flight, the need and struggle to be independent and the need to provide for themselves and 
their families and the struggle to establish normalcy in a foreign country.13 
The Court explained that ‘[f]amily, work, neighbours and school all contribute to the dignity of 
the individual’,14 and that through these activities refugees have ‘established roots in the coun-
try’.15 It ruled that the Directive was in breach of refugees’ right to dignity, because if it were 
implemented ‘they [would] be uprooted from their homes and neighbourhoods’ and this would 
disrupt the ‘normalcy’ they have established.16 Through this reasoning, the Court used the right 
to dignity in the Kenyan Constitution to invoke refuge’s restorative, regenerative and palliative 
functions. While these ideas arise in some decisions in Chapter Three, the High Court of Kenya 
demonstrated a deeper appreciation of these concepts. By recognising that neighbourhoods are 
part of the right to dignity and refugees have ‘established roots’ in these communities, the Court 
conveyed that refuge’s restorative and regenerative functions must not only encompass refugees 
rebuilding what they may have lost due to persecution and displacement, but must include be-
coming part of the fabric of the host country’s social and cultural life. Moreover, by analysing 
these factors ‘against the backdrop’ of refugees’ suffering and past trauma, the Court recognised 
that refuge’s restorative and regenerative functions cannot be separated from its palliative ob-
jective: that re-establishment of a normal life and connections to community are integral to 
healing from past trauma. Thus, through the right to dignity in the Kenyan Constitution, the 
High Court of Kenya provided reflections on refuge’s temporality and, in particular, the ways 
it should simultaneously address refugees’ past, present and future. 
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The idea that refugees are entitled to be part of and share in the Kenyan community proved 
potent in the contest between human rights and state interests. The Court dismissed the Attor-
ney-General’s argument that the Directive was justified because it enhanced refugees’ wel-
fare.17 In doing so, the Court stressed that the petitioners, and refugees like them, had com-
menced employment or businesses and placed their children in school and, therefore, a policy 
of relocation and encampment would be ‘clearly detrimental’ to their welfare.18 
Additionally, the High Court of Kenya’s categorical approach was sensitive to the ways refuge 
must respond to the needs of refugees with family responsibilities and disabilities. This is evi-
dent in the Court’s assessment of whether the Directive infringed the right to fair administrative 
action in article 47 of Kenya’s Constitution. The Court interpreted this general human right in 
a way that responded not only to refugees’ specific needs, but to particular refugees’ needs. The 
Court reasoned that by virtue of the right to fair administrative action, ‘[e]very person who 
acquires refugee status under [Kenyan] law is entitled to be treated as such’.19 The Court ruled 
that a blanket directive that did not take into account individual circumstances such as refugees 
with serious health conditions or those with children was a violation of the right to fair admin-
istrative action.20 This reasoning showed an awareness that while there are irreducible aspects 
of refugeehood (such as flight, past trauma and the need to rebuild a life in exile), these chal-
lenges manifest differently depending on refugees’ particular circumstances. In the cases con-
sidered in Chapter Three, this only occurred when the particular litigants were parents or chil-
dren. 
Another difference between African and European protection from refuge challenges is that 
most of the rights pleaded in African forced encampment jurisprudence are qualified rights, 
meaning that they are subject to permissible limitations.21 Conversely, the overwhelming ma-
jority of European protection from refuge decisions are grounded in the right to be free from 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, which the European Court of Human Rights has 
ruled is an absolute right, meaning that there are no provisions for exceptions and no derogation 
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19 Ibid [62]. 
20 Ibid [62], [65]. 
21 See, eg, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27: Freedom of Movement (Article 12), 67th sess, UN 
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from it is permissible.22 Therefore, these decisions provide further insight on the value of cate-
gorical reasoning in decision-makers’ assessments as to whether a state’s limitations of refu-
gees’ rights are permissible. What is evident in African decision-makers’ proportionality as-
sessments is that decision-makers placed weight on the fact that the petitioners were refugees 
and ideas about refuge’s functions were channelled through fundamental principles of human 
rights law such as fairness, dignity, equality and freedom. In particular, the idea of surrogate 
state protection was used to defeat national security justifications for forced encampment poli-
cies. For example, the High Court of Kenya found that protection of national security was the 
Directive’s main rationale23 and acknowledged that when the government acts in the interest of 
national security it must ‘ordinarily be believed’ and ‘be given some margin of appreciation’.24 
However, the Court stated that by creating a blanket policy, the Kenyan government was ‘tar-
ring a group of persons known as refugees with a broad brush of criminality’, which is ‘incon-
sistent with the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom’.25 The Court further explained that the government needed to show that 
‘a specific person’s presence or activity in the urban areas is causing danger to the country and 
that his or her encampment would alleviate the menace’.26 The connection the Court drew be-
tween labelling all refugees as criminals and infringing the values of dignity, equality and free-
dom reflects the notion that host states are the surrogate protectors of refugees’ human rights. 
This idea proved powerful against justifications for forced encampment policies. The High 
Court of Kenya acknowledged that creating a refugee policy that responds to ‘the special cir-
cumstances of urban refugees’ may be costly, but stressed that ‘there will always be costs in-
volved in ensuring that the Constitution is complied with’.27 
On appeal, the Kenyan Court of Appeal took a similar approach. It ruled that the High Court of 
Kenya ‘struck the proper balance’ in weighing the petitioners’ rights against the interest of 
national security28 and upheld the initial ruling.29 It further held that the High Court of Kenya 
did not err in quashing the Directive.30 In its reasoning, it stressed that the Directive targeted 
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‘innocent’ people whose ‘only crime appears to be that they fled for their lives and freedom and 
sought refuge in Kenya’31 and that forced encampment would ‘[strike] at the very heart of their 
dignity and worth, their self-respect and their essential humanity’.32 The Court used excoriating 
language in describing the Directive as a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ and ‘a high-handed decision quite 
oblivious to and uncaring about the ensuing hardships that the target group of persons would 
thereby be exposed to’.33 The Court of Appeal’s association between refugees’ coming to 
Kenya to seek refuge and the Kenyan government acting with no concern for their welfare also 
reflects the idea that host states are the substitute protectors of refugees’ human rights. 
As a counterpoint to the High Court of Kenya’s categorical approach to forced encampment 
policies in Kituo Cha Sheria, a lack of consideration of the irreducible aspects of refugeehood 
and the ways this diminishes the force of human rights arguments is evident in the High Court 
of Malawi’s decision of Ex Parte Nsabimana v Department of Poverty and Disaster Manage-
ment Affairs (‘Nsabimana’).34 In 2006, the Republic of Malawi issued an order that confirmed 
that its Dzaleka and Luwani refugee camps were ‘the designated places of residence for all 
asylum seekers and refugees’ (‘Order’).35 The Order required all refugees living outside these 
camps to relocate there with the exception of those given express permission to reside outside 
the camps on medical, educational and other related grounds. A number of refugees challenged 
the Order, but the Court ruled that only the lead applicant, Nsabimana, had standing to bring 
the action.36 The rights pleaded were non-discrimination in article 20(1) of the Republic of Ma-
lawi (Constitution) Act 1966 (‘Malawian Constitution’) and the right to freedom of movement 
contained in article 26 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Conven-
tion’).37 
The High Court of Malawi did not consider the relevance of refugee status for the rights argu-
ments mounted by the lead litigant. This is evident in the Court’s determination of the lead 
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applicant’s argument that the Order was discriminatory within the meaning of the Malawi Con-
stitution. Article 20(1) of the Malawian Constitution provides that, ‘Discrimination of persons 
in any form is prohibited and all persons are, under any law, guaranteed equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth or other status’. 
The Court held that the Order was not discriminatory, because it applied to refugees of all na-
tionalities.38 However, an issue not considered was whether it was discriminatory on the 
grounds of ‘other status’. The Human Rights Committee has indicated that refugee status may 
be considered an ‘other status’ for the purpose of the right to be free from discrimination.39 
Unlike the High Court of Kenya in Kituo Cha Sheria, the High Court of Malawi did not consider 
what it means to be a refugee and the ways refugeehood gives rise to particular vulnerabilities. 
Without a focus on the nature of refugeehood, the constitutional prohibition of discrimination 
was not used as a medium through which to respond to refugees’ specific needs and proved 
feeble when pitted against the Malawian government’s forced encampment policy. 
At the end of Chapter Three, I suggested that protection from refuge claims grounded in human 
rights law are most potent when decision-makers focus on core or unifying experiences of ref-
ugeehood as opposed to the individual litigant’s unique circumstances. The idea that an abstract 
notion of refugeehood can be powerful in protection from refuge challenges draws on Mégret’s 
analysis of the ways general human rights are tailored to respond to particular groups that have 
distinct rights claims based on irreducible experiences.40 This conclusion also refutes Douzinas’ 
argument that human rights claims can only lead to significant change when there is a recogni-
tion of the right bearer’s ‘absolute uniqueness’.41 These decisions provide further support for 
Mégret’s position: the High Court of Kenya displayed a more detailed, comprehensive appre-
ciation of the nature of refugeehood than the decision-making bodies examined in Chapter 
Three, and this translated to richer understandings of refuge’s objectives and nature. 
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B Understanding Refugees 
Another distinctive aspect of decision-making in African forced encampment jurisprudence is 
that there is reflection on the irreducible experiences of refugeehood and also consideration of 
the particular refugees’ specific circumstances and needs. While there were glimpses of this 
type of reasoning in the Human Rights Committee’s and United Kingdom Upper Tribunal’s 
decisions examined in Chapter Three,42 African decision-makers go further and provide de-
tailed accounts of the refugee litigants’ day-to-day lives. They use this to inform their interpre-
tation and application of rights arguments. This is evident in Kituo Cha Sheria, where the High 
Court of Kenya outlined each petitioner’s particular circumstances early in its judgment43 and 
explicitly stated that this understanding was essential for making the determination.44 This 
method of reasoning is similar to experiential approaches to understanding refuge described in 
Chapter Two. Below, I discuss how combined categorical and experiential reasoning allows for 
a deeper understanding of refuge’s functions and nature and the ways refuge is responsive to 
the needs of families, children and refugees with disabilities. 
The High Court of Kenya provided a description of the seven refugee petitioners’ lives in Nai-
robi. It narrated their different connections to the community through religion, charity work, 
employment and business ownership. For example, the sixth petitioner was a Congolese refugee 
and a bishop at a church he started in Nairobi, which had over 300 parishioners from Congolese 
and Kenyan communities.45 The second petitioner provided translation services for Ethiopian 
texts46 and the fourth petitioner was a French teacher.47 There was also recognition of the fact 
that the petitioners had rebuilt their lives in Nairobi.48 The Court noted the third petitioner’s 
evidence that he was ‘fully integrated in Nairobi’.49 With respect to the sixth petitioner, the 
Court stressed that he and his family had ‘established [themselves] in Nairobi and built a social 
network’ and had ‘good relations with the locals and created a family within the church’.50 
There was also consideration of the petitioners’ race and nationality. For example, the fourth 
petitioner was a Rwandan Hutu and was concerned that he would be specifically targeted if 
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forced to relocate to a refugee camp due to an assumption that he took part in the Rwandan 
genocide.51 The fifth petitioner was an Ethiopian refugee who feared forced relocation to one 
of Kenya’s refugee camps due to their proximity to Kenya’s border with Ethiopia.52 The Court 
also took account of the petitioners’ past experiences. For example, it noted that the sixth peti-
tioner’s family members were killed in Kenya’s Katumba refugee camp.53 
Additionally, when discussing the seven refugee petitioners’ particular circumstances, the High 
Court of Kenya placed emphasis on age, family life and health conditions. For example, with 
respect to the second petitioner, the Court noted that he suffered from diabetes, hypertension 
and asthma and received healthcare from an international NGO based in Nairobi.54 The Court 
stressed that many of the petitioners were married, had children and grandchildren in Nairobi 
and that they were concerned that forced relocation to a camp would disrupt their education. 
For example, with respect to the second petitioner, the Court noted that his children attended 
school in Nairobi and had ‘established friends and playmates’,55 while the sixth petitioner had 
children and grandchildren who had ‘all studied and continue to study in Nairobi and relocating 
them to the camp will greatly interrupt their smooth learning’.56 
The Court drew on the petitioners’ particular circumstances and everyday lives in its assessment 
of their rights arguments and this experiential reasoning allowed for a deeper engagement with 
the concept of refuge. For example, in its reasoning with respect to the right to fair administra-
tive action in the Kenyan Constitution, the Court stressed that for the petitioner whose family 
members were killed in a refugee camp, ‘the threat of going back to a refugee camp brings back 
haunting memories’.57 Thus, through the prism of the general human rights in the Kenyan Con-
stitution, the Court engaged with refuge’s palliative function. It went further than the decisions 
discussed in Chapter Three by recognising that refuge should not only provide a space for heal-
ing from past persecution, but other types of painful experiences, and that the host state should 
avoid putting refugees in situations where they would be re-traumatised. 
In Chapter Three, I showed that in early or initial cases, decision-makers approached refuge as 
a remedy or legal status. This understanding of the nature of refuge is also reflected in Kituo 
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Cha Sheria, but the Court also conveys a sense that refuge is also a process. The Court used the 
right to dignity as a response to the wrongs and injustices faced by refugees in similar ways to 
how the decision-makers discussed in Chapter Three used the right to be free from inhuman 
and degrading treatment in a remedial fashion. Also, through the right to fair administrative 
action, the Court highlighted the significance of refugees having a recognised legal status. One 
reason for the Court’s ruling that the Directive interfered with this right was that it provided for 
the closure of refugee registration centres in urban areas.58 This would mean that many refugees 
would not able to renew their identity papers, which undermined the rights and protections to 
which they are entitled.59 However, by concentrating on the petitioners’ efforts in establishing 
connections in the Nairobi community, the High Court of Kenya’s judgment indicates that ref-
uge can also be conceived as a process. In its reasoning on the right to dignity, the Court demon-
strated an understanding that refuge is not bestowed but created, and that refugees who had 
‘established some normalcy’60 would have their right to dignity infringed if they were to lose 
the new life they have worked hard to create. In the part of the judgment that addresses the right 
to fair administrative action, the Court found that the Directive, by taking away the ‘accrued or 
acquired’ rights and entitlements without taking into account individual circumstances, was not 
reasonable or fair.61 While the idea of accruing rights may be antithetical to the notion that 
human rights are inherent and inalienable,62 the Court was referring to the petitioners having 
found employment, schools for their children and healthcare for ongoing medical conditions. 
The Court used the idea of fairness in Kenya’s constitutional Bill of Rights to reason that it 
would be unfair to disrupt refugees’ efforts in creating a sense of sanctuary by a blanket policy 
that did not take into account individual circumstances. This reflects the idea that refuge is a 
process that involves the state, the local community and refugees themselves. 
Further, the Court’s experiential approach illuminates refuge’s regenerative functions for refu-
gees and the host community. This is evident in the Court’s rejection of the Kenyan Govern-
ment’s argument that the Directive would protect and promote refugees’ welfare. The Court 
dismissed this argument on the grounds that the petitioners and other urban refugees were con-
tributing to the Nairobi community and confining them to camps would inhibit their ability to 
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continue to contribute.63 This indicates that for refugees, a place of genuine sanctuary should 
enable them to not just rebuild but grow their lives, and that the host country benefits from this 
process of rejuvenation. 
The High Court of Kenya’s use of experiential reasoning responds to Malkki’s concerns that 
when people are generically referred to as refugees, refugees ‘stop being specific persons and 
become pure victims in general’.64 Malkki argues that once this occurs, they no longer have 
‘the authority to give credible narrative evidence or testimony about their own condition’ and 
are rendered ‘universal man, universal woman, universal child, and, taken together, universal 
family’.65 The High Court of Kenya, by starting its analysis with identifying common aspects 
of refugeehood but also engaging with each petitioners’ unique circumstances, provided a space 
for their personal narratives to be heard. 
Nevertheless, there are risks in adopting experiential reasoning in determining protection from 
refuge claims. In Kituo Cha Sheria, the High Court of Kenya at certain points in the judgment 
came close to adopting an approach whereby those who had proved that they had contributed 
to the economic life of Nairobi were exemplary and deserving refugees who should not be 
forced to endure life in a refugee camp. The Court described the petitioners as ‘productive res-
idents’66 who were ‘independent and … contributing to the economy’,67 and stated that ‘con-
fining … persons of independent means … who are employed or carry on their business to 
refugee camps does not serve to solve the insecurity problem’.68 While gaining employment 
and contributing to the host community are core aspects of refuge’s restorative and regenerative 
functions, prizing values of autonomy and self-sufficiency could prioritise particular refugee 
narratives, specifically refugees who have the ability to gain employment or start their own 
businesses. The seven refugee petitioners in Kituo Cha Sheria were gainfully employed or suc-
cessful entrepreneurs, but not all refugees have ‘the language skills, educational background, 
and professional experience to be attractive to potential employees outside of self-created busi-
nesses’.69 
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More generally, focussing on values of independence and self-sufficiency risks adopting a gen-
dered understanding of refuge. Fineman critiques the assumption that the goal for individuals 
and families should be to become economically independent and self-sufficient.70 The conse-
quence of prizing economic self-sufficiency is that those who rely on state support are heavily 
stigmatised.71 Fineman’s argument is that dependency as opposed to autonomy is by far the 
more natural state: each person is dependent on others for care at many stages in their life (for 
example, childhood, old age and periods of disability or illness).72 Those who exit the workforce 
to provide care for others also become dependent on the state.73 In the refugee resettlement 
context, Ramsay argues that host countries impose ‘neoliberal logics of individualisation and 
self-sufficiency’ on newly arrived refugees by stressing the need to gain employment and be-
come self-sufficient.74 She explains that for female refugees this can provide ‘exciting possibil-
ities’ to ‘fulfil aspirations for further education’ and ‘employment’, but it also means that ‘the 
value of their lives is measured in terms of economic productivity and self-reliance rather than 
sociality and acts of regeneration’.75 Through valuing autonomy and self-sufficiency, refugees 
are expected to produce ‘particular kinds of futures that align with state interests’.76 
Prioritising independence and self-sufficiency is also antithetical to the nature of refuge embed-
ded in the Refugee Convention. An initial reading of the Refugee Convention may indicate that 
it stresses economic self-reliance; for example, it contains rights to education and employ-
ment.77 The travaux préparatoires also provide some evidence that the drafters considered eco-
nomic self-sufficiency to be an important aspect of refugee protection. The Memorandum by 
the Secretary-General to the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems stipu-
lated that: 
refugees will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them shelter. With 
the exception of ‘hard core’ cases, the refugees will no longer be maintained by an interna-
tional organization as they are at present. They will be integrated into the economic system 
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of the countries of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and for those of 
their families.78 
However, this sentiment is not repeated in the drafting history and, in particular, is not raised 
in the discussions on Chapter III of the Refugee Convention, which addresses employment 
rights. Further, Chapter III of the Refugee Convention is followed by a chapter on welfare 
rights. Most of these rights (housing, public relief, labour rights and social security) do not 
accrue until the refugee is lawfully staying in the host state’s territory.79 This means that the 
deeper the relationship between the refugee and host state, the more welfare rights a refugee is 
entitled to. Additionally, these welfare rights are available to all refugees without discrimination 
on the grounds of race, religion or country of origin.80 They are not reserved only for refugees 
who may not be able to achieve independence because of some form of disadvantage. More 
evidence for this position comes from the drafting history of the right to public relief (article 
23), the initial draft of which reads: 
The High Contracting Parties shall grant the relief and assistance accorded to nationals to 
refugees who are regularly resident in their territory and are unemployed, suffering from phys-
ical or mental disease and incapable because of their condition or age of earning a livelihood 
for themselves and their families, and also to children without support.81 
This initial wording reflects the idea that public relief should be extended only to those who 
need it due to some form of disadvantage. However, the International Refugee Organisation 
representative voiced concerns on two grounds.82 First, the enumerated groups were not wide 
enough (in particular, pregnant women and nursing mothers were not mentioned). Second, 
which groups receive public relief was an issue for national legislators. Therefore, he suggested 
a different formulation: 
In respect of public relief and assistance, the High Contracting Parties shall grant to refugees 
regularly resident in their territory the treatment accorded to nationals.83 
This was the preferred formulation and the one that was eventually adopted. Thus, pursuant to 
the Refugee Convention, welfare is provided not on the basis of specific needs or even on the 
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grounds of refugeehood. Rather, it is granted according to the welfare model adopted by the 
host state. Therefore, the Refugee Convention’s text and drafting history indicate that the draft-
ers understood that state support is a normal and inevitable aspect of the state/citizen relation-
ship. The model of surrogate state protection inscribed in the Refugee Convention is not one 
that assumes or prizes self-reliance. Instead, the presumption is that all refugees are most likely 
going to be in need of state assistance and this state assistance should increase, not decrease, 
the longer the refugee remains in the host state. 
Did the High Court of Kenya in Kituo Cha Sheria elevate independence and autonomy above 
other values and create a neoliberal conceptualisation of refuge? The Court came close to such 
an approach in its analysis of the predicament faced by the seventh petitioner – a legal aca-
demic.84 The Court noted that due to his ‘professional background, the petitioner’s services can 
only be offered in an environment where there are law faculties hence confinement to the camp 
would suffocate his means of survival’.85 The Court explained that forced relocation to a refu-
gee camp would be a breach of the right to fair administrative action, because it would threaten 
his right to work and right to dignity.86 While the connection between work and dignity has 
been recognised in the refugee law context,87 the judgment indicates that the reason this refugee 
could not be forced to relocate to a refugee camp was not because of his inherent right to dignity 
or work, but because he had professional qualifications that would be of no utility in a camp 
setting. The Court’s approach to this issue prompts the question of whether the outcome would 
have been different if this particular refugee was not a legal academic, but instead unemployed 
or carried out unskilled work that could have continued in a camp environment. Nevertheless, 
tainting the entire judgment in this manner would be unfair because at a number of points the 
Court stressed that the pleaded rights to fair administrative action and dignity also respond to 
refugees with health conditions that require specialised medical treatment and the needs of fam-
ilies caring for children.88 
Did the Court, by using experiential reasoning, create a gendered precedent through stressing 
the petitioners’ economic contributions? No female refugees were represented in Kituo Cha 
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Sheria. Despite this, the Court included women’s experiences by referring to some of the peti-
tioners’ female family members. For example, the Court described the sixth petitioner’s wife 
(also a refugee) as ‘a business woman’ who sold textiles, educated the ‘children from the pro-
ceeds of her business’ and had ‘built faithful customers from this business’.89 The Court noted 
that the couple had a daughter who was transitioning from primary to secondary school and 
another in her second year at university.90 This is significant, because the Court recognised 
women not only in caring roles but as entrepreneurs and students. Nevertheless, prioritising 
economic contributions could serve to disadvantage any future female litigants wanting to chal-
lenge forced encampment policies. Some do not wish to participate in the market force and 
those who do (or have no choice) often face additional gender-related barriers to gaining em-
ployment or starting businesses such as discrimination, pregnancy and breastfeeding and the 
expectation that they be the primary caregivers. Betts and Collier highlight that ‘[s]elf-reliance 
does not have uniform effects for everyone … [s]ome thrive while others merely survive’91 and 
that female refugees often earn significantly less than male refugees.92 However, the Court but-
tressed its focus on the economic contributions made by urban refugees with other considera-
tions such as contributions to Nairobi’s social and religious life93 as well as family responsibil-
ities and health conditions.94 Thus, the Court established an efficacious precedent for refugees 
from many backgrounds, but its particular focus on economic contributions indicates the risks 
associated with experiential reasoning in a protection from refuge context. 
Overall, the High Court of Kenya’s blended categorical and experiential reasoning provides a 
more nuanced lens on Mégret’s and Douzinas’ disparate contentions. When decision-makers 
blend the abstract or metaphysical notion of refugeehood with the individual refugee’s unique 
circumstances, this allows for a deeper connection with the concept of refuge. However, in 
doing this there is a danger that decision-makers may value certain refugee narratives over oth-
ers, such as the exemplary refugee who contributes to the host country’s economy. This risks 
making protection from refuge claims useful only for certain refugees who can fit these moulds 
and thwarting the concept of refuge by, for example, prioritising neoliberal values of independ-
ence and self-sufficiency and ignoring its broader palliative, restorative and regenerative objec-
tives. This indicates that the refugee litigant’s individual circumstances can inform this abstract 
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notion of refugeehood, but only to demonstrate the particular ways their rights would be in-
fringed – not to make distinctions between refugees based on concepts such as self-sufficiency. 
C Understanding Refugee Rights 
The pattern that I have shown across European and African protection from refuge decisions is 
that decision-makers, by adopting categorical reasoning or a blended categorical and experien-
tial approach, can interpret general human rights so that they respond to refugees’ specific pre-
dicaments. What does this mean for refugee-specific rights? Are they redundant or do they 
bolster protection from refuge claims? To explore these questions, I examine the ways African 
decision-makers interpret and apply Refugee Convention rights in protection from refuge 
claims. 
With respect to the connections between specific refugee rights and the notion of refuge, a 
categorical approach is still needed for these rights to act as a bridge to ideas about refuge’s 
objectives. This can be seen in a comparison between the High Court of Kenya’s and High 
Court of Malawi’s approaches to refugees’ specific rights to freedom of movement and resi-
dence in article 26 of the Refugee Convention. As part of the High Court of Kenya’s judgment 
in Kituo Cha Sheria regarding whether the Directive breaches article 26 of the Refugee Con-
vention, the Court examined the consequences for refugees of having their freedom of move-
ment and choice of residence curtailed.95 The Court explained that forcing all refugees to reside 
in refugee camps and the consequent closure of urban refugee registration centres would have 
‘deleterious effects’ on refugees’ other rights and freedoms.96 In particular, the Court high-
lighted that: 
New arrivals have nowhere to report their intention to apply for asylum or seek refugee status 
and, if they do the process is burdensome taking into account the vulnerability [sic]. Those 
whose identification documents have expired or are about to expire are put to great costs and 
expense to have the same renewed at peril to their livelihoods. Undocumented refugees and 
asylum seekers are left exposed to police harassment, extortion, arbitrary arrest and eventual 
prosecution for being in the country illegally. Undocumented refugees and asylum seekers 
within urban set ups cannot access humanitarian services from organisations that provide hu-
manitarian services which require identification as a pre-requisite for qualification of services. 
Some undocumented refugee children are denied access to public services such as schools 
and hospitals.97 
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In this part of its judgment, the Court used the rights to freedom of movement and choice of 
residence in the Refugee Convention to invoke other rights such as refugee identity documents, 
physical security, freedom from arbitrary arrest, education and healthcare. This is the inverse 
of what I have shown some decision-makers do with rights in general human rights instruments 
and it reinforces ideas about refuge’s objectives. The Court’s emphasis on the connections be-
tween refugee identity documents and avoiding police harassment reflects one aspect of ref-
uge’s restorative function: ensuring refugees’ safety and legitimate presence in the host state. 
While there is no explicit right to healthcare in the Refugee Convention, the association the 
Court drew between identity documents and access to hospitals also reflects the restorative ob-
jective of refuge, in particular, that the host state must act as a surrogate provider of essential 
services. In recognising that identity documents are essential for children to access education, 
the Court engaged both with refuge’s restorative function (that it should enable refugees to re-
establish a normal, everyday life) and regenerative objective (that refugees should be able to 
grow, develop and build a future). 
Conversely, the High Court of Malawi did not take such an approach in its assessment of the 
rights to freedom of movement and residence in article 26 of the Refugee Convention. The 
Republic of Malawi has made a reservation to that article, stating that it ‘reserves its right to 
designate the place or places of residence of the refugees and to restrict their movements when-
ever consideration of national security or public order so require’. The lead applicant in Nsabi-
mana argued that the reservation should not apply because the government of Malawi had not 
shown that he personally posed a threat to national security or public order. Also, if he were 
forced to return to one of Malawi’s refugee camps, this would disrupt his children’s schooling. 
However, the Court ruled that: 
to require refugees/asylum seekers to reside at designated camps is a sound administrative 
measure to ensure certainty of their population, provision of basic necessities, communication 
of information, protection of their persons and property, facilitation of repatriation etc. The 
State does not have to wait until there is an actual breakdown of national security and public 
order.98 
In its assessment of article 26 of the Refugee Convention, the High Court of Malawi did not 
consider the relevance of Nsabimana’s refugee status for the article’s limitation, especially with 
respect to the education of his children. The Court’s cursory assessment only took into account 
the state’s interests in restricting freedom of movement and not refugees’ particular needs to 
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move freely in the host state and choose their residence. The lack of consideration of the nature 
of refugeehood severs connection to ideas of refuge and dilutes the force of rights arguments in 
challenging forced relocation to a refugee camp. 
That a blended categorical and experiential approach to refugee-specific rights can heighten 
ideas about the objectives of refuge and sharpen the force of rights arguments against state 
interests is evident in the first instance and appeal decisions in Kituo Cha Sheria with respect 
to non-refoulement. The Directive did not explicitly provide that all urban refugees would be 
expelled from Kenya. Nevertheless, the High Court of Kenya found the Directive to be in vio-
lation of Kenya’s non-refoulement obligations.99 In coming to this determination, the Court 
used both categorical and experiential reasoning. It noted that refugees who have been living in 
the host country for long periods had ‘established roots and significant connections with local 
communities’. Being forced to relocate to a camp environment and, thus, ‘being exposed to 
conditions that affect their welfare negatively’ may ‘lead to a situation that forces some of the 
petitioners to leave the country’.100 The Court then explicitly referred to the fifth petitioner, 
who feared relocation to a refugee camp because ‘he would be subjected to the same persecution 
that he was subjected to in the Congo’.101 The Court found that the fifth petitioner ‘and others 
in like situations’ would be forced to leave Kenya.102 The Court ruled that both situations would 
amount to constructive or indirect refoulement.103 
Through this amalgamation of categorical and experiential reasoning, the judgment provides 
that refugees should not be forced to choose between life in a refugee camp where they will 
lose the life they have built or returning to their country of origin where their life or freedom 
would be threatened. While Durieux argues that non-refoulement should not be considered ref-
ugee law’s foundational principle because it is a negative obligation104 and refuge necessitates 
welcome into the host community,105 the High Court of Kenya utilised it to encompass the 
positive obligations associated with refuge. Through the principle of non-refoulement, the Court 
invoked refuge’s restorative and regenerative functions, in particular, that it should allow refu-
gees to rebuild their lives and create new relationships. On appeal, the Kenyan Court of Appeal 
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gave even greater force to the principle of non-refoulement in challenging state interests. It 
declared that non-refoulement is a peremptory norm of international law106 and stated that ‘it is 
not open for the State to go against a peremptory norm of international law and its having done 
so is alone sufficient to justify the quashing of the Directive’.107 
While the general human rights claims pleaded in African protection from refuge decisions are 
potent against forcible relocation to a refugee camp, refugee-specific rights have greater poten-
tial to dismantle the practice of encampment more generally. This is apparent in the High Court 
of Kenya’s approach to refugees’ rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence in 
Kituo Cha Sheria. The Court acknowledged that the refugee petitioners had freedom of move-
ment rights under the Kenyan Constitution,108 African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights,109 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)110 and Refugee Con-
vention.111 However, these freedom of movement and choice of residence rights are not identi-
cal. The Court highlighted in particular the differences between freedom of movement and 
choice of residence rights in article 39 of the Kenyan Constitution and article 26 of the Refugee 
Convention. Article 39(1) of the Kenyan Constitution provides that ‘every person has the right 
to freedom of movement’, but Article 39(3) states that only Kenyan citizens have the ‘right to 
enter, remain in and reside anywhere in Kenya’. The Attorney-General argued that refugees in 
Kenya do not have the right to choose their own places of residence, because Kenya’s Consti-
tution only bestows that right on citizens. However, the Court stated that article 39 of Kenya’s 
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Constitution must be read in conjunction with article 26 of the Refugee Convention.112 Article 
26 of the Refugee Convention provides that refugees lawfully in the territory of a host state113 
have the right to choose their places of residence. The High Court of Kenya held that the Di-
rective violated refugees’ right to choice of residence in article 26 of the Refugee Convention.114 
At no point in the judgment did the Court directly consider whether Kenya’s policy of encamp-
ment or the conditions in the camps infringe international, regional or domestic refugee or hu-
man rights law. This was because of the way the case was pleaded (the petitioners challenged 
their forced transfer to a refugee camp and not the policy of encampment per se). Nevertheless, 
it was at this point in the judgment that the High Court of Kenya came close to setting a prece-
dent that would render not only forced relocation of urban refugees to camps inconsistent with 
Kenya’s obligations under international refugee law, but put into question the legality of 
Kenya’s practice of encampment more generally. While the rights to freedom of movement and 
choice of residence in the Refugee Convention are qualified rights, the grounds on which states 
can limit these rights are less flexible than the grounds in general human rights instruments 
such as the ICCPR. The rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence in article 26 of 
the Refugee Convention are ‘subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the 
same circumstances’ (emphasis added). This means that for a forced encampment policy to be 
valid under the Refugee Convention, it must apply not only to refugees but to ‘aliens generally 
in the same circumstances’ which has been interpreted to mean other admitted non-citizens.115 
The likelihood that the Kenyan Government would include within a forced encampment policy 
other admitted non-citizens such as tourists or those with a visa that permits work or education 
is highly improbable. Thus, under the framework of the Refugee Convention, the Kenyan Gov-
ernment would have no realistic grounds on which to justify a forced encampment policy. This 
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is different from the grounds on which a state can justify restrictions on freedom of movement 
and residence under the ICCPR. Pursuant to art 12(3), these rights can be curtailed if those 
restrictions are provided by law; are necessary to protect national security, public order, public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others; and are consistent with the other rights in 
the ICCPR. Under the ICCPR’s framework, it is possible that the Kenyan Government could 
justify a policy of forced encampment for refugees. It would have to justify the policy on the 
grounds of, for example, public order. It would also have to ensure that such a policy does not 
offend the principle of non-discrimination in articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR.116 Distinctions 
on one of the grounds enumerated in articles 2(1) and 26 are permissible as long as they are 
reasonable, objective and achieve a purpose legitimate under the ICCPR.117 Thus, under the 
ICCPR framework, the Kenyan government has more flexible grounds on which to justify a 
forced encampment policy for refugees than it does under the Refugee Convention. This indi-
cates that the rights in the Refugee Convention, designed to address refugees’ specific needs, 
can be particularly potent in challenging state interests. 
The Kenyan Court of Appeal’s judgment further demonstrates refugee-specific rights’ power 
to contest containment policies. It upheld the High Court of Kenya’s decision that the Directive 
violated refugees’ rights to freedom of movement.118 It specifically confirmed that the first in-
stance judge was correct in reading article 39 of the Kenyan Constitution in conjunction with 
article 26 of the Refugee Convention on the grounds that article 2(6) of Kenya’s Constitution 
provides that international treaties ratified by Kenya form part of Kenyan law.119 In dismissing 
the Attorney-General’s appeal, the Court stressed that it is the duty of all courts to apply the 
provisions of Kenya’s constitutional Bill of Rights (which, by virtue of article 2(6), encom-
passes international human rights) ‘in a bold and robust manner’, even if the consequences are 
‘disruptive’ to ensure that ‘no aspect of social, economic or political life should be an enclave 
insulated from the bold sweep of the Bill of Rights’.120 By quashing the Directive,121 these two 
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decisions were a triumph of human and refugee rights over a state’s desire to constrain refugees’ 
movements and inhibit their quests for refuge. They were victories not just for the seven refugee 
petitioners, but for all refugees living in Kenya’s urban centres. The High Court of Kenya’s 
decision was also potentially a victory for all refugees in Kenya when taking into account its 
reasoning on the right to freedom of movement, which came close to providing a precedent 
indicating that Kenya’s practice of encampment was inconsistent with its human rights obliga-
tions. 
III FROM CATEGORICAL AND EXPERIENTIAL TO EXCEPTIONAL: THE DE-
SERVING REFUGEE 
In a shift similar to the one identified in Chapter Three, there has been a change in the way 
African decision-makers approach challenges to forced encampment policies. There is now a 
focus on finding the exceptional refugee. African decision-makers look for vulnerabilities in 
addition to refugeehood, but they also try to find the laudable or ‘good’ refugee who has made 
an exceptional contribution to their host country. I now outline the changes in judicial ap-
proaches to challenges to forced encampment policies. I argue that they have altered the concept 
of refuge, diluted the potential for rights arguments to challenge containment policies and ob-
structed refugees’ searches for refuge. 
A Diminishing Significance of Refugeehood and the Individualisation of Human and Refugee 
Rights Claims 
In forced encampment challenges initiated after Kituo Cha Sheria, African decision-makers no 
longer adopt a categorical approach to rights arguments. They do not start their reasoning by 
considering the irreducible experiences of refugeehood and how this may inform the interpre-
tation and application of human and refugee rights. Instead, they move directly to enquiring as 
to how forced encampment would affect each individual refugee and whether, on a case-by-
case basis, this would amount to a violation of their human rights. 
This shift first occurred in the High Court of Kenya’s 2014 judgment in Samow Mumin Mo-
hamed v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior Security and Co-ordination (‘Samow Mumin 
Mohamed’).122 In this case, 10 urban refugees unsuccessfully challenged a second directive 
issued by the Kenyan government requiring all refugees to relocate to one of Kenya’s two ref-
ugee camps (‘Second Directive’). The petitioners attempted to frame their case in line with the 
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precedent set by Kituo Cha Sheria. They argued that the Second Directive violated their funda-
mental rights and freedoms, in particular, ‘the right to equality and freedom from discrimina-
tion, right to human dignity, freedom and security of the person, right to privacy, freedom of 
movement and residence, right to own property, right to fair administrative action and the right 
to a fair hearing’.123 However, in determining their claims, the Court did not place any signifi-
cance on the petitioners’ refugee experience and, unlike in Kituo Cha Sheria, did not undertake 
its rights assessment against the backdrop of refugees being vulnerable persons within the 
meaning of the Kenyan Constitution art 21(3). Instead, the Court found against the refugee 
petitioners because they did not demonstrate ‘how the Directive affects their individual circum-
stances to the extent that their fundamental rights and freedoms are violated’.124 
The High Court of Kenya adopted the same test in the 2015 case of Refugee Consortium of 
Kenya v Attorney General (‘Refugee Consortium of Kenya’),125 in which the Second Directive 
was challenged by an NGO and a refugee petitioner acting in a representative capacity. In this 
subsequent challenge to the Second Directive, the High Court of Kenya clarified that in Samow 
Mumin Mohamed, ‘the Court did not … make a declaration that the [Second] Directive and 
press statement are unconstitutional, but held that the Petitioners in that case had failed to 
demonstrate how the Directive affects their individual circumstances’.126 The Court then ex-
plained that it was ‘at liberty to consider the constitutionality of the [Second] Directive by firstly 
determining whether or not the Petitioners in this matter have made a convincing case that it 
infringes upon their rights and fundamental freedoms’.127 
What is evident in this trajectory is a shift in judicial approaches to forced encampment chal-
lenges grounded in human and refugee rights arguments. At no point in the judgment in Kituo 
Cha Sheria did the High Court of Kenya require the seven refugee petitioners to prove individ-
ually that due to their specific circumstances their human and refugee rights would be violated. 
The Court referred to the petitioners’ individual circumstances but only to demonstrate how the 
Directive would violate their human and refugee rights. While in Samow Mumin Mohamed the 
Court emphasised that the petitioners did not bring the claim in any representative capacity,128 
neither did the refugee petitioners in Kituo Cha Sheria. Nevertheless, at a number of points in 
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the judgment in Kituo Cha Sheria, the Court referred to the petitioners and other refugees in 
their situation.129 This and the fact that the Court quashed the Directive indicates that it did not 
require the petitioners in Kituo Cha Sheria to establish how the Directive would affect their 
individual circumstances to the extent that their fundamental rights and freedoms would be 
violated. 
Nanima suggests that the petitioners in Samow Mumin Mohamed were unsuccessful because 
they did not comply with their obligation to plead their human rights claim with precision and 
clarity,130 but this argument is unconvincing. It is possible that the petitioners in Samow Mumin 
Mohamed did not argue their cases with the same degree of detail and precision as the petition-
ers in Kituo Cha Sheria, who had the assistance of an NGO. Another distinguishing factor is 
that in Kituo Cha Sheria, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees appeared as 
amicus curiae and provided significant assistance to the Court on the relevant legal issues, 
whereas it did not submit an amicus curiae brief in Samow Mumin Mohamed. However, the 
same judge of the High Court of Kenya, Justice Majanja, decided both cases and, as outlined 
above, took distinctly different approaches to both challenges. It is outside this thesis’ scope to 
investigate the reasons for shifts in decision-makers’ approaches to protection from refuge 
cases. Future research could investigate whether the domestic political environment may have 
influenced this change in judicial approach. 
B The Exceptional Refugee 
The loss of a categorical approach and the shift in judicial reasoning, whereby challenges to 
forced encampment are considered on a case-by-case basis, means that decision-makers look 
for exceptionalities beyond refugeehood. This is evident in the High Court of Kenya’s 2015 
judgment in Refugee Consortium of Kenya. The second petitioner was a refugee who was for-
cibly relocated to Dadaab Refugee Camp pursuant to the Second Directive. She and other ref-
ugees were taken to the camp after attending a church service. She had left her six children at 
home during the church service and was not allowed to see them or make arrangements for 
them before she was forcibly transferred to the camp and remained separated from them while 
living in the camp. She brought the petition on behalf of her six children and 48 other children 
separated from their parents as a result of the same incident. The Court started its analysis by 
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referring back to the precedent of Kituo Cha Sheria and acknowledging that refugees are vul-
nerable persons within the meaning of the Kenyan Constitution.131 It then noted that ‘[i]n addi-
tion to vulnerabilities which a person may face by virtue of being a refugee, the difficulties of 
a person’s situation is extrapolated if that person is also a child and belongs to another group of 
“vulnerable persons”’.132 
While the Court recognised the compounding effects of youth and refugeehood, the Court’s 
reasoning indicates that, if not for this additional vulnerability, the petitioners would not have 
been successful. The Court held that there had been a breach of the right to fair administrative 
action in Kenya’s constitutional Bill of Rights.133 However, unlike in Kituo Cha Sheria, where 
the Court broadly considered encampment’s effects on families, employment, access to 
healthcare, renewal of identity papers and previous trauma associated with camp environments, 
the Court in Refugee Consortium of Kenya limited its consideration to the second petitioner’s 
and other parents’ arrest and forced relocation after the church service while their children were 
at home. The Court reasoned that their right to fair administrative action was breached because 
the ‘affected parents were arrested while in Church, denied the opportunity to make arrange-
ments for the care of their minor children, detained and removed to the Refugee Camps’.134 
This is different from the Court’s reasoning in Kituo Cha Sheria on the right to fair administra-
tive action, in which it found that ‘[e]very person who acquires refugee status under our law is 
entitled to be treated as such. The Government Directive … being a blanket directive, is incon-
sistent with the provisions of … international law’.135 Under this reasoning, it is the govern-
ment’s obligation to take into account individual circumstances. However, in Refugee Consor-
tium of Kenya, the Court changed its reasoning in a way akin to shifting the burden of proof by 
requiring the petitioners to show why forced encampment affected their individual circum-
stances to such an extent that their fundamental freedoms were infringed. 
Unlike many of the protection from refuge challenges considered in Chapter Three in which 
decision-makers considered factors such as age and gender in a perfunctory manner, the High 
Court of Kenya, when considering refugees’ individual circumstances, demonstrated sensitivity 
towards the ways containment policies affect women, parents and children. This is most appar-
ent in its assessment of the petitioners’ argument that the forced relocation of refugee parents 
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to camps and subsequent separation from their children amounted to a breach of children’s 
rights to parental care, education and protection from neglect.136 The Court highlighted the ways 
the Second Directive harmed the children’s health, education and welfare. It noted that that 
some of the children were being breastfed at the time the Kenyan government forcibly relocated 
their mothers to Dadaab Refugee Camp and ‘consequently suffered malnutrition’.137 The Court 
stressed that many of the children represented by the second petitioner had to leave school 
because their parents were unable to pay school fees.138 Also, many were placed in dangerous 
positions because they had no income and their new guardians were not able to provide for 
them financially.139 
Nevertheless, a shift from categorical reasoning informed by core or unifying aspects of refu-
geehood to one where decision-makers look for some form of exceptionality beyond refugee-
hood renders rights arguments less efficacious in challenging containment policies. It also 
means that only certain refugees can successfully use court processes in their quest to find ref-
uge. At no point did the Court indicate that the Kenyan government’s forced encampment pol-
icy would imperil all refugee children’s lives and safety. This is in line with its insistence at the 
beginning of the judgment that the petitioners had to prove that the Second Directive infringes 
their fundamental rights and freedoms ‘in the specific circumstances and pleadings in [the] 
case’.140 While this case was a victory for the second petitioner and the other families she rep-
resented, it was not a victory for all urban refugees. Unlike in Kituo Cha Sheria, the High Court 
of Kenya did not quash the Second Directive, but only made an order for reunification in rela-
tion to the second petitioner and the other families she represented.141 While this case would 
have made a significant difference to the lives of the 48 represented children and their parents, 
it aligns with Douzinas’ argument that human rights litigation can ‘undoubtedly improve the 
lives of people’ through individual victories, but cannot lead to radical change.142 
Further, this exceptionality approach leads to impoverished understandings of refuge. For ex-
ample, in Samow Mumin Mohamed, the Court did not address the 10 refugee petitioners’ argu-
ments regarding the ways forced encampment would be a violation of their human rights such 
as the rights to dignity, equality and freedom from discrimination. Instead, the Court assessed 
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whether the petitioners would face persecution if forcibly transferred to refugee camps or 
whether their business would be disrupted. The Court found that ‘[u]nlike in the Kituo Cha 
Sheria Case, the petitioners have not established a basis for persecution if they return to the 
camps’.143 However, in Kituo Cha Sheria, only ‘some of the petitioners’ established that they 
would be persecuted if forcibly relocated to refugee camps.144 Further, in Kituo Cha Sheria, the 
Court considered the risk of persecution in the context of the right to fair administrative action. 
The petitioners in Samow Mumin Mohamed pleaded this right, but the Court did not address it. 
This reasoning confines the concept of refuge to the bare minimum of protection from persecu-
tion and obscures the broader and richer notions of refuge reflected in Kituo Cha Sheria such 
as the need to establish normalcy, heal from past trauma, create a new community and pursue 
education. It limits refuge’s objectives to a narrow conception of its restorative function (re-
establishing safety and security) and ignores its regenerative and palliative functions. 
In focussing on the petitioners’ identity as business owners, the Court skewed the nature of 
refuge from a remedy that addresses the difficulties associated with refuge to a reward. The 
Court found that ‘there is nothing to show that [the petitioners’] businesses will be disrupted’ 
and stressed that, like all other refugees living in refugee camps in Kenya, they could apply for 
movement permits.145 In making this determination, the Court implied that the petitioners’ work 
is not consequential or prestigious enough that it would be disrupted by forced relocation to a 
refugee camp. Unlike the legal academic in Kituo Cha Sheria who could not continue his pro-
fession in the confines of a camp or the other petitioners who were ‘productive residents’ and 
‘contributing to the economy’, the petitioners in Samow Mumin Mohamed did not meet these 
thresholds. This change in approach by the same judicial officer moves the jurisprudence in the 
direction of permitting individual challenges when the refugee petitioners can establish that 
they contribute to the Kenyan economy in unique or exceptional ways and, thus, are exemplary 
refugees who do not deserve to be relocated to a camp environment. Refuge is no longer un-
derstood to be a response to the vicissitudes of persecution and displacement, but a prize to be 
granted to the most meritorious refugees. This is an unhelpful decision for those who, because 
of factors such as age, gender, disability and family responsibilities, cannot become what is 
understood to be productive or exemplary refugees. It indicates that these refugees cannot make 
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use of courts in their journeys in search of refuge. It also ignores the situation of refugees con-
fined to a camp environment and who have never had the opportunity to contribute to Kenyan 
society. 
C An End to Encampment?  
All of the above cases concerned urban refugees resisting forced relocation to a refugee camp, 
but what about refugees in a camp environment who may have been living there for many years 
or who may have been born there and do not know any other home? In the cases examined so 
far in this chapter, the Courts could not directly address this issue (although, as discussed above, 
the High Court of Kenya in Kituo Cha Sheria adopted reasoning that came close to setting a 
precedent pursuant to which the practice of encampment would be seen as a breach of the Ref-
ugee Convention). A different type of protection from refuge challenge was made in Coalition 
for Reform and Democracy v Republic of Kenya (‘Coalition for Reform and Democracy’).146 
One of the issues in this 2015 case was whether an amendment to Kenya’s Refugee Act 2006 
that provided that refugees living in one of Kenya’s refugee camps shall ‘not leave the desig-
nated refugee camp without the permission of the Refugee Camp Office’147 violated refugees’ 
right to freedom of movement. This case was an opportunity for the High Court of Kenya to 
consider the legality of forcing refugees residing in camps to remain there. 
The Court’s approach to determining this claim continued its trajectory of lost focus on the 
significance of refugeehood and the consequential dilution of the force of refugees’ rights 
claims in the face of states constraining their mobility and ability to search for refuge. The 
diminishing significance of refugeehood is evident in the Court’s failure to consider the rights 
refugees are entitled to domestically, regionally and internationally. The Court acknowledged 
that refugees are entitled to freedom of movement under article 39 of the Kenyan Constitu-
tion.148 However, it did not acknowledge that refugees are considered vulnerable persons within 
the meaning of the Kenyan Constitution and that the government has a special duty to address 
their needs. While the Court referred to the Refugee Convention and Convention Governing the 
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Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa,149 it did so only with respect to provisions 
that confirm that refugees have a duty to conform to the host country’s laws and regulations.150 
The Court did not consider the rights to freedom of movement and residence in those instru-
ments, or other refugee-specific rights despite earlier precedent confirming that these rights are 
part of Kenyan law.151 
Without reference to these additional rights, the petitioners’ claim was a weak one. The Court 
dismissed the claim on the grounds that the ‘right to enter, remain and reside anywhere in Kenya 
is constitutionally reserved to citizens and therefore there is no violation of the right to freedom 
of movement in requiring that refugees wishing to leave the camp obtain permission from the 
Camp Officer’.152 It did not consider the greater freedom of movement and choice of residence 
rights refugees have pursuant to the Refugee Convention. 
Without adopting a categorical approach and considering the irreducible experiences of refu-
geehood, the Court did not reflect on the importance of freedom of movement for refugees and 
its connection to other rights such as education and healthcare. This dilutes the force of refugee 
rights in contests against state interests and narrows ideas of refuge. The Court did not reflect 
on the significance of freedom of movement rights for refugees and justified the requirement 
to remain in a camp unless permission to leave is granted on the grounds that it enabled the 
Kenyan government to ‘protect and offer security to refugees’ by ensuring the Camp Officer 
‘knows the whereabouts of each refugee’ which is particularly important for ensuring national 
security.153 This limits the notion of refuge to offering protection and security to refugees and 
ignores broader ideas of refuge associated with rebuilding lives, regenerating futures and heal-
ing from trauma. 
The approach taken by the High Court of Kenya in Coalition for Reform and Democracy was 
a missed opportunity for it to rule on the legality of encampment. If the Court adopted the same 
approach taken in Kituo Cha Sheria, it would have considered, with reference to domestic, 
regional and international human rights and refugee law, whether it is permissible to allow 
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refugees to leave camps only with government permission. The categorical approach taken in 
the earlier decision would have prompted the Court to consider whether such restrictions were 
an infringement of refugees’ rights in the context of their vulnerable position of having fled 
their homeland and needing to build a life for themselves in a foreign land. 
Further, the trajectory of forced encampment jurisprudence in Kenya means that human rights 
arguments are more useful for refugees who have managed to leave a camp environment or 
avoid it altogether and to establish residence in an urban area. Under the precedent of Kituo 
Cha Sheria, urban refugees were able to have the first Directive quashed on the grounds that 
the sense of normalcy they had established would be disrupted if forced to live in a refugee 
camp. While the subsequent decisions are less powerful, they still provide grounds for urban 
refugees to point to some exceptional, individual grounds as to why their rights would be in-
fringed by forced transfer to a refugee camp. The judgment in Coalition for Reform and De-
mocracy indicated no human rights grounds that refugees living in a camp environment can 
raise to avoid being confined there. There are many reasons why refugees living in camp envi-
ronments would face challenges in moving to an urban area such as disability, youth, old age 
and family responsibilities, and the judicial approaches to forced encampment jurisprudence in 
Kenya compound these challenges. 
Finally, when human rights arguments against forced encampment atrophy, refuge becomes 
relative. In a twist to the battles between refugees and the government in Kenya’s forced en-
campment saga, in 2017 the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights lodged a petition 
in the High Court of Kenya contesting the closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp.154 The Kenyan 
Government had ordered the camp’s closure along with the repatriation of all Somali refugees. 
The Court declared the decision to close Dadaab Refugee Camp null and void because it did 
not allow individual refugees to make representations about the closure and, thus, infringed the 
right to fair administrative action.155 This legal challenge sheds a different light on Harrell-
Bond’s observation that ‘refugee camps are not good for anyone’ and ‘[e]veryone who can gets 
out of them as quickly as possible’.156 The camp, which urban refugees petitioned against being 
transferred to and refugees in the camp fought for permission to leave, became a place that 
refugees and their advocates fought to keep open. 
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IV CONCLUSION  
This chapter’s objective was to continue my analysis of the ways decision-makers determine 
protection from refuge claims grounded in human rights arguments by comparing decision-
makers’ approaches in Africa with those in Europe. Looking across international, regional and 
domestic decision-making bodies and claims based in international, Council of Europe, African 
and domestic human rights and refugee law, I have identified three different approaches: cate-
gorical, blended categorical and experiential, and exceptionality reasoning. When decision-
makers employ categorical or blended categorical and experiential reasoning, they engage with 
the concept of refuge in a purposive manner. I have suggested that through the prism of human 
and refugee rights, decision-makers engage with refuge’s restorative, regenerative and pallia-
tive functions. They also use human rights law as a medium to recognise the nature of refuge 
as a remedy, legal status and process. Further, these approaches encompass the ways refuge 
must respond to refugees of different ages and genders as well as refugees with family respon-
sibilities and disabilities. This type of reasoning also lends potency to human rights arguments 
when pitted against states’ containment policies. They provide human rights grounds for large 
numbers of refugees to be able to continue their quests for refuge. 
However, I have also argued that these decision-making bodies have shifted to exceptionality 
reasoning. Refugeehood is given less emphasis and the protection from refuge litigant must 
establish why they are acutely vulnerable or otherwise exceptional or distinctive. This narrows 
the concept of refuge to minimalist ideas of refugee protection and truncates refuge’s tempo-
rality – in particular, the way it addresses refugees’ future and past. It usurps refuge’s remedial 
nature and transforms it into a commodity to be given to the most vulnerable or a reward to be 
bestowed on the most deserving. This approach thwarts the potential for human and refugee 
rights to dismantle containment policies, because it assesses the application of such policies to 
individual refugees on a case-by-case basis. While this exceptionality reasoning should, in the-
ory, mean that children, parents and refugees with serious health conditions are more likely to 
be successful in protection from refuge claims and continue their journeys in search of refuge, 
this is only the case when decision-makers are sensitive to how gender, age, family responsi-
bilities and disability are relevant to the experience of refuge. 
Overall, the trajectory of decision-makers’ approaches to and determination of protection from 
refuge claims grounded in human and refugee rights arguments indicates that these challenges 
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are most powerful when decision-makers conceptualise the figure of the refugee as a metaphys-
ical one based on the irreducible experiences of refugeehood. The refugee litigant’s individual 
circumstances can inform this abstract notion of refugeehood, but only to demonstrate the par-
ticular ways their rights would be infringed – not to make distinctions between refugees based 
on concepts such as vulnerability or self-sufficiency. Requiring refugees to establish that they 
are exceptional in some way dilutes the concept of refuge and diminishes the force of rights 
arguments in contests with state’s justifications for containment policies. It enables only par-
ticular refugees to turn to courts to continue their quest for refuge and often does not assist those 
who face the greatest challenges in travelling in search of refuge. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DIRECT CHALLENGES TO BILATERAL AND MULTILAT-
ERAL CONTAINMENT AGREEMENTS IN REFUGEES’ 
JOURNEYS IN SEARCH OF REFUGE 
I INTRODUCTION 
‘The journey was worth it. I’m happy I’m here. To go back, I lose my life’.1 Seidu Mohammed, 
a Ghanaian refugee, spoke these words after he had all of his fingers amputated. He had walked 
across the border from the United States to Canada in December 2016 in freezing conditions, 
suffered severe frostbite and almost died. The United States had refused to hear his asylum 
claim and he crossed into Canada in a remote area to avoid the operation of an agreement be-
tween the two countries pursuant to which Canada could have returned him to the United States. 
In this chapter, I examine legal challenges to this and other international containment agree-
ments. All of the refugee litigants are, similar to Seidu Mohammad, trying to escape from one 
country to another in their search for refuge, but in doing so confront state mechanisms designed 
to prevent or disrupt these journeys. However, unlike the refugee litigants in Chapter Three, the 
protection from refuge claimants discussed in this chapter are directly challenging a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement’s validity or operation.2 
This chapter provides different insights on the research questions posed in this thesis. In the 
previous two chapters, I investigated how decision-makers approach protection from refuge 
claims grounded in human and refugee rights law. The arguments that refugee and asylum 
seeker litigants plead in the cases discussed in this chapter are more wide-ranging. Human and 
refugee rights claims are present, but they are not the focal point. The arguments the litigants 
raise traverse many areas of domestic, regional and international law, and courts must assess 
which aspects of these bodies of law are relevant in determining the protection from refuge 
claim. Also, a contentious issue in these cases is whether these legal frameworks permit courts 
to pass judgment on another state’s laws and policies. The third difference is that, unlike the 
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previous two chapters where decision-makers’ focus was on refuge’s functions, in these cases 
decision-makers are grappling with the threshold of refuge other countries must meet. Because 
of these differences, the role of juridical and geographic boundaries is more salient in these 
cases. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways decision-makers approach juridical and 
geographic boundaries in determining protection from refuge claims that directly challenge the 
operation or validity of a multilateral or bilateral containment agreement. I commence this 
chapter by discussing theories of the relationship between law and borders, which will guide 
the analysis of the case law. I then examine the ways judges position juridical borders in con-
ceptualising the threshold and nature of refuge and determining a bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments’ legality and whether their manoeuvring of borders facilitates or frustrates refugees’ (or 
particular refugees’) journeys in search of refuge. I argue that when courts consider the signif-
icance of refugeehood and expand their juridical borders to permit assessment of sites of refuge 
in other states, they set high thresholds for refuge and disrupt the continuation of containment 
agreements. However, in later cases, courts ignore the salience of refugee status and retract their 
juridical borders. This means that there is no longer a minimum standard of refuge set in these 
protection from refuge cases and refugees become trapped in the resisted place of refuge, unable 
to continue their journey except in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. 
II BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES 
The relationship between law and borders is a perennial theme in refugee and migration law 
scholarship and one of the ideas to emerge is the multiplication and malleability of borders. 
Kesby argues that states do not have a single, distinct border, but many borders that strategically 
include or exclude people in different locations.3 Shachar draws a distinction between states’ 
geographic and juridical borders and highlights the ways juridical borders shift.4 She argues 
that: 
The firm borderlines drawn in the world atlas do not necessarily coincide with those adhered 
to, indeed created through, immigration law and policy. Instead, we increasingly witness a 
border that is in flux: at once more open and more closed than in the past … the location of 
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the border is shifting – at times penetrating into the interior, in other circumstances extending 
beyond the edge of the territory.5 
While Shachar focusses on how the parliament and executive expand and shift state borders, 
courts also engage in moving, enlarging and retracting legal boundaries. They do this when 
they consider the relevance of international law and foreign jurisprudence as well as the extent 
to which they examine and pass judgment on other states’ laws and policies. With respect to 
the relationship between decision-makers and juridical borders, Slaughter argues that many do-
mestic courts and tribunals engage in ‘transjudicial communication’, which involves courts 
around the world having a global conversation.6 Transjudicial communication can be vertical, 
which involves domestic courts drawing on decisions by international bodies.7 It can also be 
horizontal, whereby judges in domestic, supranational or international courts refer to each 
other’s jurisprudence.8 She suggests that such ‘judicial globalization’9 may lead to increased 
protection of human rights10 and ‘the gradual construction of a global legal system’.11 
Refugee law scholars draw on Slaughter’s idea of transjudicial communication to assess the 
extent to which decision-makers engage in comparative jurisprudence. They also share Slaugh-
ter’s view that it is a positive phenomenon for the development of common understandings of 
international rights and obligations. Lambert highlights that ‘refugee law provides tremendous 
opportunity in terms of seeking a greater transnational judicial role’.12 This is because it has 
‘evolved mostly under the influence of judges’ and there is no ‘international court competent 
to provide a common interpretation of the Refugee Convention’.13 However, her study of 
transjudicial communication among courts in European Union member states conducted with 
Goodwin-Gill indicates that ‘judges rarely use each other’s decisions’ and ‘the extent of this 
problem is remarkable’.14 They argue that in refugee law decisions, judges ‘ought to have some 
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regard to relevant case law from the jurisdictions of other states party to the Convention’.15 
However, in the European Union ‘while a transnational dialogue between judges exists, it is 
having no real impact’.16 Beyond the European Union and with respect to the refugee definition 
in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’),17 Hathaway and 
Foster argue that decision-makers engage in transjudicial communication and ‘the result has 
been a rich comparative jurisprudence concerning the key terms of the refugee definition, which 
shows a determined effort to engage with the international and comparative nature of the refu-
gee definition’.18 
In this chapter, I draw on the ideas of multiple and malleable borders and transjudicial commu-
nication in my assessment of how decision-makers set the threshold of refuge and determine 
direct challenges to a multilateral or bilateral containment agreement. I also consider the con-
sequences of decision-makers’ positioning of juridical borders for children, women, sexual mi-
norities and those with disabilities in their journeys in search of refuge. 
III SETTING A THRESHOLD FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION: THE ROLE OF 
BORDERS IN JUDICIAL REASONING 
In determining direct challenges to bilateral and multilateral containment agreements, courts 
confront what refugee scholars refer to as ‘protection elsewhere’ scenarios.19 Courts must de-
termine what aspects of refugee or human rights protection the third country must guarantee. 
In the challenges I examine below, courts must answer this question with reference to domestic 
or supranational legal instruments. In doing so, some courts extend their juridical borders ver-
tically to take into account international law, while others push their borders horizontally to be 
guided by comparative jurisprudence. Once they establish the threshold for adequate protection, 
they must determine the extent to which they can expand their judicial gaze across borders and 
                                                          
15 Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Search for One, True Meaning …’ in Guy Goodwin-Gill and Hélène Lambert (eds), 
The Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European 
Union (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 204, 204 (‘The Search for One, True Meaning’). 
16 Lambert, ‘Transnational Law’ (n 12) 9. 
17 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 
January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
18 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 
4–5. 
19 Michelle Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in 
Another State’ (2007) 28(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 233, 224–8. I do not classify the cases in 
Chapter Three as protection elsewhere cases because the decision-makers are determining the discrete question as 
to whether the transfer is compatible with the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment or the right to family 
life. They do not have to consider the broader question of what rights protections must be in place for refugees in 
other states.   
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pass judgment on a foreign state’s law and policy. Below, I examine the different ways courts 
in three seminal cases in Australia, Canada and the European Union manoeuvre their juridical 
borders in determining these two questions. The analysis indicates that adopting categorical 
reasoning by focussing on refugeehood or refugee status, an idea established in Chapters Three 
and Four, carries over into protection from refuge challenges where the litigants are directly 
challenging a bilateral or multilateral containment agreement. 
A Refuge Beyond Non-Refoulement?  
In direct challenges to bilateral and multilateral containment agreements’ legality or operation, 
courts in Australia, Canada and the European Union set markedly different thresholds for ade-
quate refuge in protection elsewhere contexts. The High Court of Australia in Plaintiff 
M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Plaintiff M106/2011 v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (‘Plaintiff M70’)20 set a high water mark for refugee protection. 
While not going as far as stipulating a precise threshold, the decision provides that the rights 
and protections in the Refugee Convention (not just the protection against refoulement) are 
relevant when determining the minimum threshold for adequate protection.21 In Canadian 
Council for Refugees v Canada (‘Canadian Council for Refugees’),22 the Federal Court of Can-
ada, at first instance, set the threshold much lower at protection from refoulement. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union in N S v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M 
E v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (‘N S 
and M E’)23 established a similarly low threshold, but one further removed from international 
refugee law: the right to not be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
While each Court is interpreting legal instruments from its own jurisdiction, the different thresh-
olds set are attributable to the ways they position their juridical borders and the significance 
they place on refugee status. This is evident in the High Court of Australia’s decision in Plaintiff 
M70, the first in a series of cases that challenged Australia’s offshore processing regime. Two 
asylum seeker plaintiffs, who were in Australian territory but whom the Australian government 
planned to transfer to Malaysia pursuant to an agreement between the two countries, instigated 
this case in Australia’s final appellate court. Australia entered into the Arrangement between 
                                                          
20 (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
21 Michelle Foster, ‘The Implications of the Failed “Malaysian Solution”: The Australian High Court and Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing at International Law’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 395, 418. 
22 [2007] FC 1261. 
23 (C 411/10) and (C 493/10) [2011] ECR I 13905. 
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the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement24 
(‘Malaysia Agreement’) pursuant to section 198A(1) of Australia’s Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
(‘Migration Act’). Section 198A(1) has subsequently been removed from the Migration Act, 
but, pursuant to the wording at the time, it provided that an asylum seeker on an offshore terri-
tory25 may be taken to another country if the Minister for Immigration has made a declaration 
under section 198A(3)(a) that the third country: 
(i) provides access, for persons seeking asylum, to effective procedures for assessing their need 
for protection;  
(ii) provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending determination of their refugee sta-
tus;  
(iii) provides protection for persons given refugee status, pending their voluntary repatriation to 
their country of origin or resettlement in another country; and 
(iv) meets the relevant human rights standards in providing that protection. 
The plaintiffs argued that the Minister’s declaration in respect to Malaysia was made ultra vires. 
This argument was based on the plaintiffs’ submission that the criteria in s198A(3)(a) of the 
Migration Act were jurisdictional facts. This meant that these criteria would have to be objec-
tively satisfied before the Minister could make a valid declaration. The lead majority (Justices 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell), as well as Justice Kiefel in a concurring opinion, accepted 
this argument.26 This finding allowed the High Court of Australia to then consider whether the 
Malaysia Agreement satisfied the criteria in section 198A(3)(a). 
While the High Court of Australia’s approach to whether the Malaysia Agreement was con-
sistent with the relevant criteria was essentially one of domestic statutory construction,27 its 
reasoning has resonance with categorical approaches to elucidating refuge. The categorical rea-
soning is subtler than the decisions considered in Chapters Three and Four, but is nevertheless 
detectable and consequential to the outcome of the decision. The lead majority in Plaintiff M70 
referred to the special position refugees occupy in international law. They did this through a 
process of textual legislative interpretation. The plaintiffs submitted that the word ‘protection’ 
in s 198A(3)(a) was ‘a legal term of art to describe the rights to be accorded to a person who is, 
                                                          
24 signed 25 July 2011. 
25 The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) amended the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) to designate certain places (such as Christmas Island) as ‘excised offshore places’. 
26 Plaintiff M70 (n 20) [109]. The significance of the lead majority’s conclusion that the criteria in section 
198A(3)(a) are jurisdictional facts (particularly from an administrative law perspective) is discussed in Mark 
Smyth and Matt Sherman, ‘Case Note – Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’ (2012) 
19 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 64. 
27 Tamara Wood and Jane McAdam, ‘Australian Asylum Policy all at Sea: An Analysis of Plaintiff M70/2011 v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the Australia–Malaysia Arrangement’ (2012) 61 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 274, 287. 
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or claims to be, a refugee under the Refugee Convention’.28 In line with this submission,29 the 
lead majority reasoned that the word ‘protection’ in section 198(3)(a) of the Migration Act 
‘must be understood as referring to access and protections of the kinds that Australia undertook 
to provide by signing the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol’.30 Their Honours 
explained that ‘this is most clearly evident from consideration of the requirement of s 
198A(3)(a)(iii): that the country in question “provides protection to persons who are given ref-
ugee status”’.31 Taking a slightly different approach by drawing on principles of statutory in-
terpretation,32 Justice Kiefel stated that a construction of section 198A(3)(a) that ‘closely ac-
cords with the fulfilment of Australia's Convention obligations … is to be preferred to one 
which does not’,33 and Chief Justice French confirmed that it ‘must be understood in the context 
of relevant principles of international law concerning the movement of persons from state to 
state’.34 
All of these approaches place significance on the fact that the plaintiffs were seeking recogni-
tion of their refugee status. This provided the Court with a bridge to consider what type of rights 
refugees are entitled to in international law. At this juncture, the High Court of Australia 
blended categorical reasoning with a rights-based approach to the meaning of section 
198A(3)(a) of the Migration Act. In doing so, the High Court of Australia extended its juridical 
border vertically to take into account international law on refugee protection. Each of the ma-
jority judges was satisfied that the word ‘protection’ in the Migration Act encompassed Aus-
tralia’s obligation of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention.35 However, the lead ma-
jority went further and stated that the concept of ‘protection’ and the criteria in section 198A(3) 
of the Migration Act were a ‘reflex of obligations Australia undertook when it became signatory 
to the [Refugee] Convention’.36 Thus, the word ‘protection’ referred to ‘provision of protec-
tions of all of the kinds which parties to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol 
                                                          
28 Plaintiff M70 (n 20) [63] (French CJ). 
29 Tamara Wood and Jane McAdam note that the lead majority ‘largely agreed’ with this submission: Wood and 
McAdam (n 27) 295. 
30 Plaintiff M70 (n 20) [118]. 
31 Ibid [119] (emphasis in judgment). 
32 When there is ambiguity in domestic legislation that implements an international treaty, Australian courts inter-
pret the legislation with reference to the context of the treaty and aim to provide an interpretation that is consistent 
with these international obligations: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 
287. This rule of statutory construction is discussed in Justice Kiefel’s judgment in Plaintiff M70 (n 20) [247]. 
This principle of interpretation is also used in other jurisdictions. See, eg, the Canadian decision of National Corn 
Growers Assn v Canada (Import Tribunal) [1990] 2 SCR 1324, 1371. 
33 Plaintiff M70 (n 20) [246]. 
34 Ibid [91]. 
35 Ibid [63] (French CJ), [117] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), [240] (Kiefel J). 
36 Ibid [118] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
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are bound to provide to such persons. Those protections include, but are not limited to, protec-
tion against refoulement’.37 Their Honours listed some of these other obligations such as free-
dom of religion, access to the courts and work and education rights.38 Justice Kiefel added that 
the reference to ‘relevant human rights standards’ in the Migration Act encompasses ‘standards 
required by international law’.39 
Extending its juridical borders vertically to take into account international law also led the Court 
to characterise the nature of refuge as a duty. The lead majority classified the rights and protec-
tions in the Refugee Convention as ‘obligations’ undertaken by signatory states40 and stressed 
that nation-states ‘are bound to accord to those who have been determined to be refugees the 
rights that are specified in’ the Refugee Convention’.41 Accordingly, the lead majority reasoned 
that reference to ‘protection’ in the Migration Act must be ‘construed as references to provision 
of access or protection in accordance with an obligation to do so’.42 This means that in trans-
ferring refugees to a third country, the prospective third country must have a legal obligation to 
accord the relevant rights and protections to refugees and reference to what occurs in practice 
is not sufficient. 
In establishing a high threshold for adequate refugee protection, Australia’s final appellate court 
did not engage in what Slaughter refers to as horizontal judicial communication. It did not con-
sider protection elsewhere cases from other jurisdictions, but was guided directly by the Refu-
gee Convention. While transjudicial communication may in some contexts strengthen human 
rights protection, when decision-makers engage in horizontal transjudicial communication but 
disregard the significance of refugeehood, this can result in bare minimum protections travel-
ling across national frontiers. This is evident in Canadian Council for Refugees, in which the 
applicants challenged the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims 
from Nationals of Third Countries (‘Canada/United States Agreement’).43 Pursuant to the Can-
ada/United States Agreement, asylum seekers who first arrive in the United States are barred 
from pursuing a claim for refugee protection in Canada, and those who first arrive in Canada 
cannot lodge an asylum claim in the United States. The Canada/United States Agreement only 
                                                          
37 Ibid [119] (emphasis added). 
38 Ibid [117], [119]. 
39 Ibid [240]. 
40 Ibid [117]. 
41 Ibid [117] (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid [135] (emphasis added). 
43 signed 5 December 2002, TIAS 04-1229 (entered into force 29 December 2004). 
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applies at a Canada/United States land border port of entry. If an asylum seeker makes a refugee 
claim at a land border port of entry, they can be summarily turned back, subject to some excep-
tions.44 The asylum seeking applicant in Canadian Council for Refugees was ‘John Doe’, a 
Columbian man living in the United States whose claim for refugee status was not entertained 
due to the one-year time bar.45 Due to the lack of protection available to him in the United 
States, he wanted to seek refugee protection in Canada. He had not attempted to enter Canada, 
because Canada would have denied him entry pursuant to the Canada/United States Agreement. 
The applicants grounded their challenge in many different aspects of domestic and international 
law. They sought a declaration that Canada’s decision to declare the United States a safe third 
country is unlawful pursuant to administrative law principles, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (‘Canadian Charter’),46 Refugee Convention and Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’).47 
In determining the appropriate threshold of refugee protection in the context of protection else-
where decisions, the Federal Court of Canada, at first instance, did not place significance on 
John Doe being a person seeking recognition of his refugee status. Unlike the High Court of 
Australia in Plaintiff M70, the Court was not guided by the rights available to refugees and 
those seeking recognition of their refugee status pursuant to the Refugee Convention. Instead, 
Justice Phelan referred to United Kingdom and Council of Europe jurisprudence ‘for compara-
tive purposes’ and to ‘establish international norms’.48 However, His Honour did this without 
questioning whether the approach adopted in those jurisdictions was consistent with the Refu-
gee Convention. Justice Phelan’s examination of United Kingdom and European Court of Hu-
man Rights case law led His Honour to conclude that when assessing the validity of a protection 
elsewhere agreement under international law, the only relevant consideration is non-re-
foulement and not the broader panoply of refugee rights.49 
                                                          
44 The exceptions relate to family reunification, unaccompanied minors and document holders, and there is also a 
public interest exception: ibid arts 4(2), 6. 
45 In the United States, those who do not file their application for asylum within a year of arriving in the territory 
are barred from claiming asylum: Immigration and Nationality Act 1952 8 USC § 1158(2)(B). There are some 
limited discretionary exceptions with respect to ineffective legal assistance, illness or disability (including legal 
disability) and changed circumstances in the asylum seekers’ country of origin or habitual residence: Aliens and 
Nationality 8 CFR § 208.4(a). 
46 Canada Act 1982 c 11, sch B pt I. 
47 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature 10 December 1984, 1456 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). 
48 Canadian Council for Refugees (n 22) [110]. 
49 Ibid [118], [125]. 
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Without focussing on John Doe being a person seeking refugee protection, the Federal Court 
of Canada was misguided in its selection of comparative sources. In particular, when referring 
to Council of Europe jurisprudence, the Court did not take into account that the European Court 
of Human Rights does not have jurisdiction to consider the Refugee Convention.50 There were 
other sources available to the Court to suggest that it was required to consider whether the 
United States respects the rights in the Refugee Convention. For example, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees’ (‘UNHCR’) position is that the asylum seeker and/or refugee 
must enjoy ‘effective protection’ in the third country.51 At the time, the UNHCR defined effec-
tive protection to include non-refoulement, but also ‘accession to and compliance with the 1951 
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol … unless the destination country can demonstrate that the 
third State has developed a practice akin to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol’.52 
Another available source was the Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere.53 The position 
in the Michigan Guidelines is that ‘effective protection’ means not only non-refoulement but 
compliance with all of the obligations outlined in the Refugee Convention.54 Also, expert evi-
dence given to the Court by two leading refugee law scholars indicated that rights beyond non-
refoulement should be considered in determining protection elsewhere decisions.55 
Further, by setting the threshold of refuge protection in protection elsewhere cases through se-
lective horizontal transjudicial communication, the Court did not consider international law in 
interpreting its domestic legislation. Canada entered into the Canada/United States Agreement 
pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001 (‘Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act’). While the relevant sections of the legislation predominantly focus on whether 
                                                          
50 The European Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction is limited to matters concerning the interpretation of the 
ECHR: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signa-
ture 4 November 1950, ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 32(1) (‘ECHR’). 
51 UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of ‘Effective Protection’ in the Context of Secondary Movements 
of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9–10 December 2002) (February 2003) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fe9981e4.html> (‘Summary Conclusions on the Concept of “Effective Protec-
tion”’).  
52 UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of ‘Effective Protection’ (n 51) [15(e)]. This was the most 
relevant UNHCR source available to the Federal Court of Canada at the time of judgment. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, in later publications the UNHCR does not specifically state that all of the rights outlined in the Refugee 
Convention (n 17) must be guaranteed by the receiving state. See UNHCR, Guidance Note on Bilateral and/or 
Multilateral Transfer Arrangements of Asylum-Seekers (May 2013) <http://www.ref-
world.org/pdfid/51af82794.pdf>; UNHCR, ‘Statement by Ms Erika Feller, Director, Department of International 
Protection, UNHCR, at the Fifty-Fifth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Pro-
gramme’ (7 October 2004). 
53 Fourth Colloquium on Challenges in Refugee Law, ‘The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere’ (2007) 
28(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 207. 
54 Ibid [8]. 
55 Affidavits of Professors James Hathaway and Kay Hailbronner: Michelle Foster, ‘Responsibility Sharing or 
Shifting: “Safe” Third Countries and International Law’ (2008) 25(2) Refuge 64, 67. 
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the prospective safe third country complies with its non-refoulement obligations56 (section 
101(e) permits the Governor in Council to designate countries that comply with non-re-
foulement obligations in the Refugee Convention and CAT as safe third countries), there was 
nevertheless an opportunity for the Court to refer to international law to set a higher threshold 
for refugee protection. In particular, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides that 
in deciding to designate a country as a safe third country, the Governor in Council must consider 
the country’s policies and practices with respect to claims under the Refugee Convention57 and 
its human rights record.58 Unlike the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff M70, the Federal Court 
of Canada did not extend its juridical border vertically to encompass Canada’s international law 
obligations when interpreting domestic legislation, thus missing an opportunity to bring a 
broader set of refugee rights into the frame of judicial consideration in setting the threshold for 
adequate refuge. 
Akin to the approach taken by the Federal Court of Canada in Canadian Council of Churches, 
in the leading European Union protection elsewhere case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union failed to place any significance on asylum seeking or refugeehood. It also engaged in 
selective transjudicial communication and circumscribed international law’s relevance. The 
case arose from questions referred by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and High 
Court of Ireland. One of the questions was whether, when transferring an asylum seeker to 
another European Union state pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, the transferring state should 
first consider whether the asylum seeker’s fundamental human rights would be observed. This 
question arose because the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and High Court of Ireland 
were hearing cases in which asylum seekers were resisting transfers to Greece pursuant to the 
Dublin Regulation. This question is distinct from the arguments raised in the cases discussed in 
Chapter Three. It does not concern asylum seekers using rights available under the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’)59 to 
resist transfer to another country pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. Rather, the question asks 
whether and when rights under European Union law, in particular, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (‘European Union Charter’),60 may prohibit transfers under the 
                                                          
56 Ibid 75. 
57 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, s 102(2)(b). 
58 Ibid s 102(2)(c). 
59 ECHR (n 50). 
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, opened for signature 7 December 2000, [2012] OJ C 
326/321 (entered into force 1 December 2009). 
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Dublin Regulation. Unlike the cases considered in Chapter Three, this case was a direct chal-
lenge to the Dublin Regulation’s operation. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union in N S and M E had the opportunity to articulate a 
high threshold for refugee protection. In particular, there was flexibility as to what it could deem 
to be a ‘fundamental right’. The rights the parties highlighted were articles 1 (human dignity), 
4 (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment), 18 (right to 
asylum), 19(2) (prohibition of removal where there is a serious risk of being subjected to the 
death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 47 (right to 
an effective remedy and a fair trial) of the European Union Charter. Also referenced were a 
number of European Union Directives on minimum standards for asylum seekers and refu-
gees.61 Many of these sources of European Union law make direct reference to the Refugee 
Convention. For example, article 18 of the European Union Charter provides that ‘the right to 
asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees’. The preambles to 
all of the European Union Directives the parties refer to62 state that the Common European 
Asylum System is designed to achieve the ‘full and inclusive application of the Geneva Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees 28 July 1951, as supplemented by the New York 
Protocol of 31 January 1967’. The UNHCR intervened in the case and argued that a transfer 
should be precluded when there is a ‘real risk of a breach of fundamental rights, including (but 
not limited to) serious breaches of the minimum standards laid out in the EU Asylum Direc-
tives’.63 The UNHCR also insisted that the Dublin Regulation, being secondary European Un-
ion legislation, ‘must be read as subject to fundamental rights, not the other way around’.64 The 
                                                          
61 Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers 
[2003] OJ L 31/18 (this has subsequently been recast: Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and 
Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection 
(Recast) [2013] OJ L 180/96); Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification 
and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need In-
ternational Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted [2004] OJ L 304/12 (this has subsequently been 
recast: Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on Standards 
for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, 
for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the 
Protection Granted (Recast) [2011] OJ L 337/9); Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Stand-
ards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status [2005] OJ L 326/13 (this has 
subsequently been recast: Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast) [2013] OJ L 180/60-
180/95. 
62 See above n 61. 
63 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Intervention Before the Court of Justice of the European Union in Joined Cases of N S and 
M E and Others’, Submission in N S v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M E v Refugee Applications 
Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, C-411/10 and C-493/10, 28 June 2011, [14]. 
64 Ibid [5]. 
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Advocate General Trstenjak concluded that ‘the transfer of asylum-seekers to a Member State 
in which there is a serious risk of violation of the asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights is incom-
patible with the [European Union Charter]’.65 
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted a much narrower approach. It 
described the purpose of the Common European Asylum System as ‘full and inclusive applica-
tion of the [Refugee] Convention’66 and acknowledged that article 18 of the European Union 
Charter requires that ‘the rules of the [Refugee] Convention and the 1967 Protocol are to be 
respected’.67 Nevertheless, the Court held that when transferring a refugee or asylum seeker 
pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, the sending state only has to consider whether they will be 
subject to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of article four of the European 
Union Charter.68 In coming to this position, the Court of Justice of the European Union did not 
consider the significance of refugeehood and the protections refugees are entitled to under Eu-
ropean Union and international law. Rather, the starting point was the need to preserve the 
continued operation and integrity of the Dublin Regulation. The Court reasoned that if minor 
breaches of the European Union Charter or relevant European Union Directives prevent a mem-
ber state from transferring an asylum seeker or refugee, the objective of the Common European 
Asylum System (to provide a speedy determination of the responsible member state) will be 
undermined. The Court of Justice of the European Union stressed that: 
At issue here is the raison d’être of the European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice and, in particular, the Common European Asylum System, based on mu-
tual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European 
Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights.69 
                                                          
65 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in N S v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M E v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, C-411/10 and C-493/10, 22 Septem-
ber 2011, [116]. 
66 N S and M E (n 23) [7]. 
67 Ibid [75]. 
68 Specifically, the Court holds that the only grounds upon which a European Union member state is prevented 
from transferring an asylum seeker to the responsible member state is, ‘[w]here they cannot be unaware that sys-
temic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State 
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for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 12; Tarakhel v Switzerland [2014] VI Eur Court HR 195. 
69 N S and M E (n 23) [83]. 
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This low threshold for refugee protection is also partly arrived at through selective transjudicial 
communication. The Court of Justice of the European Union handed down its judgment in N S 
and M E after the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in M S S v Belgium and Greece70 
and referred to that decision.71 However, in M S S v Belgium and Greece, the asylum seeker 
litigant specifically pleaded article 3 of the ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights was 
restricted in its ability to consider other legal instruments, in particular, the Refugee Convention 
and relevant EU Directives, to set a higher threshold for refugee protection. This is because its 
jurisdiction is limited to matters concerning the interpretation of the ECHR.72 Conversely, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in N S and M E had the opportunity to delineate a much 
more comprehensive threshold for refugee protection by reference to the spectrum of rights in 
the European Union Charter and relevant European Union Directives, all of which reference 
the Refugee Convention. As Costello explains: 
The referring national courts in [N S and M E] invited the [Court of Justice of the European 
Union] to go further than the ECHR, and explore the Charter’s additional protections. How-
ever, the Court declined, instead focusing only on Article 4 of the [European Union Charter] 
(Article 3 ECHR). There are many legally innovative paths not taken … The judgment is 
strikingly economical, in that the [Court of Justice of the European Union] traces a path al-
ready worn by [the European Court of Human Rights].73 
As a consequence of the Court’s approach to the questions posed, protection from refuge liti-
gants in the European Union are caught in a region that regards European Union law as su-
preme, does not entertain arguments grounded in broader international law and refers to Council 
of Europe jurisprudence in a way that has the effect of lowering protection standards. Thus, 
these cases are arbitrated in a European enclave in which the potential for refugees to invoke 
international refugee law to challenge transfer decisions and continue their journeys in search 
of refuge has been restrained. The prospect for a higher threshold for refugee protection is evi-
dent in some domestic decisions in which courts have been willing to refuse transfers on 
grounds other than article 4 of the European Union Charter. For example, in a case concerning 
transfer of an asylum seeker to Malta, the German Minden Administrative Court held that, due 
to serious shortcomings in the reception conditions in Malta, it could no longer be assumed that 
asylum seekers are treated in accordance with the European Union Charter, ECHR and Refugee 
                                                          
70 [2011] I Eur Court HR 255. 
71 N S and M E (n 23) [88]–[90], [112]. 
72 As noted above at n 50, the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction is limited to matters concerning the 
interpretation of the ECHR. 
73 Cathryn Costello, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012) 
12(2) Human Rights Law Review 287, 333. 
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Convention.74 Nevertheless, the test set down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
N S and M E is the one codified in the recast Dublin Regulation.75 Also, in a subsequent case, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that when unaccompanied minors have lodged 
asylum applications in more than one European Union member state, the responsible member 
state is the one in which they are physically located.76 This decision took into account the prin-
ciple of best interests of the child,77 and the Court reasoned that it is not in the child’s best 
interest to unnecessarily prolong the asylum application procedure.78 
A comparison between these three seminal cases from Australia, Canada and the European 
Union indicates that, in establishing a standard for adequate refuge in protection from refuge 
challenges, a higher threshold is set when courts consider refugees’ special position in interna-
tional law and extend their juridical border vertically to encompass the rights and obligations 
in international law and, specifically, the Refugee Convention. In all three cases, the courts had 
the opportunity to do this pursuant to the legal instruments pleaded, but only the High Court of 
Australia did so. Conversely, the Federal Court of Canada and the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union engaged in selective horizontal transjudicial communication without placing sig-
nificance on refugee status and set much lower standards for adequate refuge. 
B Manoeuvring Juridical Borders in Protection Elsewhere Challenges 
While courts in Australia, Canada and the European Union have set different thresholds for 
adequate protection, in this section I examine where these courts position their juridical borders 
in determining whether the third country meets these thresholds. When the judiciary aligns its 
juridical borders with that of the legislature and executive, conceptualisations of refuge’s 
threshold prove powerful in undermining bilateral and multilateral containment agreements and 
enabling refugees to continue their voyages in search of refuge. For example, Australia’s Mi-
gration Act allows the Australian government to send asylum seekers to another country. The 
High Court of Australia in Plaintiff M70 interpreted that legislation in a way that permitted an 
assessment of that country’s law and practice with respect to refugee protection. In particular, 
                                                          
74 Verwaltungsgericht Minden [Minden Administrative Court] decision of 12 January 2015, 1 L 551/14.A. 
75 Regulation (EC) 604/2013 of 29 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the 
Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Mem-
ber States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast) [2013] OJ L180/31-180/59, art 3(2). 
76 M A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-
648/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:367, 6 June 2013) [66]. 
77 Ibid [57], [60]. 
78 Ibid [61]. 
 149 
in characterising refuge as a duty owed to refugees by nation-states, the Court conducted an 
examination of Malaysia’s legal obligations towards refugees. The Court found that Malaysia 
had no obligation to provide refugees with the protections and rights outlined in the Refugee 
Convention.79 The Court highlighted that Malaysia was not a signatory to the Refugee Conven-
tion or its Protocol and had not made a ‘legally binding arrangement with Australia obliging it 
to accord the protections required by those instruments’.80 Also, the Court stressed that Malay-
sia did not provide for refugee status in its domestic law and did not undertake any activities 
with respect to refugee registration, but instead left these tasks to the UNHCR. On these 
grounds, the lead majority ruled that the Minister made the declaration under the Migration Act 
without power and the refugee plaintiffs could not be transferred to Malaysia.81 In her judgment, 
Justice Kiefel added that the state itself must undertake refugee status assessment and cannot 
defer the obligation to the UNHCR.82 The Court also indicated that in addition to assessing 
legal obligations, there should also be an examination of the third country’s practices.83 Chief 
Justice French emphasised that ‘[c]onstitutional guarantees, protective domestic laws and in-
ternational obligations are not always reflected in the practice of states’.84 Thus, the High Court 
of Australia brought its juridical borders in line with those of the executive and the legislature. 
By doing so, the Court had a significant role in facilitating the plaintiffs’ and other refugees’ 
access to a place of refuge. 
While the Federal Court of Canada set a much lower threshold for adequate refuge, when ex-
amining whether the United States complied with the principles of non-refoulement as the ‘min-
imum recognized standard’,85 the Court aligned its juridical borders with those of the Canadian 
legislature and executive. To determine if the Governor in Council acted reasonably in con-
cluding that the United States complied with its non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and CAT, the Court conducted a thorough investigation of United States refugee 
law and policy. This assessment included consideration of United States legislation and case 
law, expert evidence regarding the operation of United States refugee law and policy, and UN-
HCR comments on refugee law and policy in the United States. Justice Phelan held that the 
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United States did not comply with its non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Conven-
tion,86 because of its one-year bar,87 exclusion of people from refugee status for reasons imper-
missible by the Refugee Convention88 and equivocal approach to gender claims.89 Further, Jus-
tice Phelan found that the United States did not comply with its non-refoulement obligations 
under CAT, because there was no absolute bar on deportation to a country where a person faces 
a real risk of torture.90 Thus, even though Justice Phelan set a bare minimum standard for refu-
gee protection, His Honour’s judgment provided a protection from refuge victory: the Court 
declared the Canada/United States Agreement ultra vires, and this provided grounds for refu-
gees in the United States to travel to Canada in search of refuge. This is largely due to the 
Federal Court of Canada expanding its juridical border to enable it to assess and pass judgment 
on United States refugee law and policy. 
Another way in which the Federal Court of Canada manoeuvred juridical borders to reach 
across the geographic border in Canadian Council for Refugees was through Justice Phelan’s 
approach to the Canadian Charter. The applicants pleaded that the Canada/United States Agree-
ment violated sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter (the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person and the right to equality). While John Doe, the asylum seeker applicant, was not 
within Canadian territory and had not approached the Canadian border, Justice Phelan found 
that the rights in the Canadian Charter extended to him. Justice Phelan reasoned that if John 
Doe had approached the Canadian border and was under the control of Canadian immigration 
officials, the Charter would apply to him. However, if he did in fact approach the border, he 
would have been denied entry into Canada and returned to US authorities. On this basis, Justice 
Phelan explained that: 
it would be pointless to force a claimant in the US to approach Canada, and then be sent back 
to US custody in order to prove that this would in fact happen. Given other findings by this 
Court as to the operation of the US system, that individual could be exposed to the very harm 
at issue before the Court.91 
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Through this reasoning, the Court set up a ‘legal fiction – imagining John Doe as having ap-
proached the border without requiring to do so’.92 This legal fiction enabled the Court to shift 
the border and bring John Doe ‘within the fold of constitutional protection’.93 The Court held 
that the Canada/United States Agreement offended article 7 of the Canadian Charter because 
refugees’ life, liberty and security were put at risk because the United States did not comply 
with its non-refoulement obligations in the Refugee Convention and CAT.94 The right to equal-
ity was also violated because the Canada/United States Agreement ‘discriminates against and 
exposes people to risk [of refoulement] based solely on the method of arrival in Canada, a 
wholly irrelevant Charter consideration’.95 These breaches could not be justified pursuant to 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter.96 The Court’s manoeuvring of juridical borders is significant 
in the context of refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. John Doe did not have to make the 
arduous and risky journey to the Canadian border to trigger Canada’s domestic human rights 
law in making his protection from refuge claim. 
There is discernible discomfort with respect to juridical borders penetrating geographic borders 
in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision in N S and M E. It may seem incon-
gruous to examine the role of borders in European Union protection elsewhere decisions. The 
European Union is a ‘community committed to the removal of internal borders’.97 It has a su-
pranational agreement on standards for refugee protection, a regional responsibility sharing 
agreement and a regional human rights instrument, questions or disputes about which can be 
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union. This may suggest that borders, either 
geographic or juridical, diminish in significance. Nevertheless, unlike the High Court of Aus-
tralian in Plaintiff M70 and the Federal Court of Canada in Canadian Council for Refugees, 
which undertook a rigorous examination of Malaysian and Unites States refugee law and policy 
respectively, the Court of Justice of the European Union indicated that European Union member 
states should be cautious in examining and passing judgment other European Union member 
states’ law and practice. The Court of Justice of the European Union does not determine factual 
disputes, so did not rule on whether the United Kingdom and Ireland could transfer the asylum 
seekers to Greece. Nevertheless, it stressed that there must be an assumption that all European 
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Union member states comply with the requirements of the European Union Charter, Refugee 
Convention and ECHR.98 This is because the Common European Asylum System ‘was con-
ceived in a context making it possible to assume that all the participating states … observe 
fundamental rights, including the rights based on the [Refugee Convention], and on the 
ECHR’.99 Thus, there was a retraction of courts’ juridical borders and the geographic borders 
of individual European Union states became salient, making it more difficult for refugees to 
turn to courts to continue their quests to find refuge. 
C Gendered Juridical Borders 
In extending their juridical borders to enable a consideration of law and policy in foreign states, 
the High Court of Australia and Federal Court of Canada not only delivered protection from 
refuge victories, these decisions were of particular significance for child refugees, women ref-
ugees with a well-founded fear of gender-based violence, sexual minorities and refugees with 
disabilities in their journeys in search of refuge. In Plaintiff M70, the High Court of Australia 
declined to answer the question of whether it would be in the second plaintiff’s (an unaccom-
panied minor) best interests to transfer him to Malaysia. This is because it found the Malaysia 
Agreement unlawful. Nevertheless, in referring to the Refugee Convention to determine the 
appropriate threshold for protection, the High Court of Australia at a number of points in the 
judgment referenced the rights to education in the Refugee Convention and, in particular, the 
obligation to accord refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to 
elementary education.100 Chief Justice French stated that one of the ‘salient’ findings of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs’ assessment of Malaysia’s treatment of refugees is that lack of 
official status impedes access to formal education.101 The right to education is particularly im-
portant for refugee children and the approach taken by the High Court of Australia indicates 
that it is a necessary consideration in cases where refugees are resisting transfer to an alternative 
place of so-called refuge. 
The Federal Court of Canada’s extension of its juridical borders enabled consideration of the 
relationship between gender, sexuality and non-refoulement. One argument the applicants 
raised was that the United States’ equivocal approach to gender claims created a refoulement 
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risk for female refugees, especially those basing their claim on family violence.102 Another ar-
gument was that the one-year time bar disadvantaged female refugees and those making sexual 
orientation claims, because they were more likely than male asylum seekers to file for asylum 
outside of the one-year period.103 This is because they most likely would not know that the 
refugee definition can encompass claims grounded in sexual orientation and family violence, 
and in any event they would be reticent to disclose the details necessary to make a protection 
claim on these grounds.104 The Court assessed the gendered operation of United States refugee 
law105 and agreed that these aspects of United States refugee law and policy created a re-
foulement risk for female refugees and refugees making sexuality claims.106 These findings 
formed part of the Court’s decision that the Governor in Council’s determination that the United 
States complies with its non-refoulement obligations was unreasonable.107 
By extending the Canadian Charter’s reach across the geographic border and finding the Can-
ada/United States Agreement inconsistent with the Canadian Charter, the Federal Court of Can-
ada’s decision was of particular value for refugees who would face the greatest impediments in 
travelling to the Canadian border. As discussed in Chapter Two, it is well established that fe-
male refugees, children and refugees with care responsibilities and disabilities are less likely to 
be able to make these arduous journeys. Also, by removing the necessity to present at the border 
to trigger Canadian Charter protection, the Federal Court of Canada’s decision defuses the risk 
of being subject to immigration detention. Arbel explains that when asylum seekers and refu-
gees come to the border, they are often summarily returned to the United States and immedi-
ately placed in immigration detention.108 While conditions of immigration detention in the 
United States are problematic for people of all genders,109 female refugees who are rejected at 
Canada’s border with the United States ‘are more likely to be detained under worse conditions 
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of confinement’.110 This is because, while men are transferred to a dedicated immigration de-
tention facility, women are ‘more likely to be held in mixed-purpose facilities or local jails, 
sometimes under questionable conditions of confinement’.111 Because they are not in dedicated 
immigration detention facilities, they are not given appropriate assistance to advance their asy-
lum claim or challenge a deportation order and may simply ‘fall off the radar’.112 
IV MISALIGNED BORDERS 
Subsequent to the landmark cases of Plaintiff M70 and Canadian Council for Refugees, there 
has been a shift in the way Australian and Canadian courts approach challenges to bilateral 
containment agreements. In these earlier cases, where some content was given to the threshold 
of refuge, the courts framed the matter in a way that enabled them to consider and pass judgment 
on the state of refuge in a foreign country. However, in subsequent cases, courts have manoeu-
vred juridical borders to avoid having to cast judgment on the allegedly inadequate place of 
refuge. Below, I outline these changes and discuss the consequences for the judiciary’s concep-
tualisation of refuge and asylum seekers’ and refugees’ ability to cross international borders in 
search of sanctuary. 
A Asymmetrical Borders 
While the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff M70 and the Federal Court of Canada in Cana-
dian Council for Refugees expanded their juridical borders, in subsequent decisions these ju-
ridical borders have been retracted. In the Australian context, this is partly due to amendments 
to domestic legislation. In response to the High Court of Australia’s decision in Plaintiff M70, 
the Australian government passed the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing 
and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) (‘Regional Processing Act’).113 The Regional Processing 
Act removed section 198A from the Migration Act and inserted new sections 198AA to 198AH. 
These provisions give the Minister for Immigration the power to designate a third country as a 
‘regional processing centre’.114 The only condition for the exercise of this power is that the 
Minister thinks that it is in the national interest.115 The reforms specifically provide that ‘the 
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designation of a country to be a regional processing country need not be determined by refer-
ence to the international obligations or domestic law of that country’.116 
The situation created by the amendments to the Migration Act has resonance with Kesby’s 
observations that states have multiple borders that ‘strategically include or exclude people in 
different locations’.117 In particular, while the executive’s juridical border can extend outwards 
to contemplate transferring asylum seekers to other countries, the judiciary’s juridical border 
cannot similarly extend to examine refugee law and policy in those countries. Pursuant to these 
amendments, Nauru and Papua New Guinea have been designated as regional processing cen-
tres. Asylum seekers have been sent to Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island since 
August 2012, but Australia retains a significant degree of control of the asylum seekers and the 
facilities in which they are accommodated.118 Thus, Australia has expanded its juridical border 
outside of its territory and into the territory of other nation-states. At the same time, the Regional 
Processing Act restricts the Australian judiciary’s ability to look to international law and Papua 
New Guinea’s and Nauru’s law and practice in arbitrating the legality of Australia’s offshore 
processing regime. This is evident in Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Bor-
der Protection (‘Plaintiff S156’),119 a case brought by an Iranian asylum seeker detained in 
Papua New Guinea. The High Court of Australia was asked to determine, inter alia, whether 
the Minister had validly designated Papua New Guinea as a regional processing country.120 The 
asylum seeker argued that the Minister is obliged to take into account factors such as Australia’s 
and Papua New Guinea’s international law obligations, Papua New Guinea’s domestic law and 
practice, and the conditions in which asylum seekers were being detained. In a unanimous judg-
ment, the Court rejected this submission on the grounds that section 198AB(2) of the Migration 
Act provides that the only condition for the Minister’s exercise of power is that he or she ‘thinks 
that it is in the national interest’ which is ‘largely a political question’.121 
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A similar situation of multiple and misaligned borders exists in Canada, but was not brought 
about by legislative change. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal overturned Justice Phelan’s 
judgment and restored the validity of the Canada/United States Agreement.122 In doing so, the 
Federal Court of Appeal adopted a different interpretation of the Immigration and Refugee Pro-
tection Act, and one that limits judicial oversight of the Governor in Council’s decisions. The 
Federal Court of Appeal held that Justice Phelan erred in ruling that the United States’ compli-
ance with the Refugee Convention and CAT was a condition precedent to the Governor in 
Council exercising delegated authority.123 Rather, the only requirement was that the Governor 
in Council considered the factors outlined in the relevant sections of the Immigration and Ref-
ugee Protection Act (such as the United States’ human rights record and its policies and prac-
tices with respect to claims under the Refugee Convention) and, ‘acting in good faith’, desig-
nated the United States as a country that complied with its non-refoulement obligations and was 
‘respectful of human rights’.124 By adopting a different interpretation of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act, the Federal Court of Appeal retracted the juridical boundary in a way 
that does not permit consideration and assessment of refugee law and policy in the United 
States. This creates multiple and misaligned borders similar to those in the Australian context: 
the executive’s juridical border extends horizontally to take into account the law and practice 
of other states, but the judiciary’s juridical border does not have the same reach. 
While the motivations behind judicial approaches to protection for refuge claims are outside 
this thesis’ scope, one reason why the Federal Court of Appeal adopted a different interpretation 
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act may be due to a reticence to pass judgment on 
another state’s compliance with its human rights obligations. This concern may be heighted 
when taking into account the diplomatic ties and geographic proximity of Canada and the 
United States. However, if the asylum seeker is in Canada’s territory and makes such a claim, 
Canadian courts usually have no choice but to assess the allegations. Such is the case when 
those subject to the death penalty in the United States cross the border into Canada and resist 
extradition.125 Conversely, for protection from refuge litigants outside Canada’s territory such 
as John Doe, juridical borders remain malleable and can be manoeuvred by decision-makers to 
short-circuit claims involving an assessment of another state’s human rights compliance. Thus, 
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John Doe and other protection from refuge claimants in his position wanting to cross interna-
tional borders in search of refuge are made acutely aware of the ‘persistent impact of sover-
eignty’,126 as opposed to the prospect of a transnational legal order. 
Not only is there a retraction of the judiciary’s juridical border, the appeal decision restrained 
the reach of constitutional protections. While the Federal Court of Canada extended the Cana-
dian Charter’s reach beyond Canada’s geographic borders and into United States’ territory, the 
Federal Court of Appeal limited its application to those at or within Canada’s geographic bor-
ders. The Federal Court of Appeal held that the rights in the Canadian Charter were not trig-
gered, because ‘John Doe never presented himself at the Canadian border’.127 The Court stated 
that Justice Phelan’s ‘conclusion that John Doe should nevertheless be considered as having 
come to the border and as having been denied entry runs directly against the established prin-
ciple that Charter challenges cannot be mounted on the basis of hypothetical situations’.128 The 
consequence for refugees in the United States wanting to have recourse to Canadian courts to 
continue their journey in search of refuge is that they now have to make the journey to the 
Canadian border. 
Similarly, the High Court of Australia has also limited the reach of constitutional protections 
and this is evident in its decision in Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection (‘Plaintiff M68’).129 This case was initiated by a Bangladeshi asylum seeker trans-
ferred to and detained on Nauru, but sent back to Australia for medical treatment. She sought 
an injunction against the Minister and officers of the Commonwealth and a writ of prohibition 
preventing them from removing her to Nauru if she were to be detained there. After she filed 
the proceedings, Nauru introduced ‘open centre arrangements’, whereby asylum seekers would 
not be detained, but would be granted permission to leave between certain hours. Therefore, the 
plaintiff would not be detained if sent back to Nauru as long as Nauru continued with its open 
centre arrangements. The Court was satisfied that the plaintiff had standing to bring the claim, 
because it would ‘determine the question whether the Commonwealth is at liberty to repeat that 
conduct if things change on Nauru and it is proposed, once again, to detain the plaintiff at the 
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centre’.130 The issue the High Court determined was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a dec-
laration that the conduct of the Commonwealth in relation to her past detention was unlawful. 
In answering this question, the High Court of Australia restrained the reach of constitutional 
limits on the Commonwealth’s executive power to detain. The majority (Chief Justice French 
and Justices Kiefel and Nettle with Justice Keane concurring) held that these protections would 
not apply to the plaintiff once Australia transfers her to Nauruan authorities.131 
The High Court of Australia not only limited the reach of constitutional protections, but drew 
a sharp boundary between the actions of the governments of Australia and Nauru. It found that 
the plaintiff was detained by Australia for the purposes of removing her to Nauru,132 but, there-
after, she would be detained by Nauru.133 The majority created a clear demarcation of respon-
sibility, despite the fact that the processing centres in Nauru were established at Australia’s 
request, Australia funds the operation of the centres, Australia deploys contractors to carry out 
the running of the centres, and Australian government staff are present at the centres.134 This 
creation of a neat juridical boundary is also apparent in the Court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s 
argument that her detention would be invalid under article 5(1) of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Nauru135 and that sections 198AHA(2) and 198AHA(5) of the Migration Act ‘should 
not be construed as referring to detention which is unlawful under the law of the country where 
the detention is occurring’.136 The majority found that the authority given in section 198AHA 
is not qualified by the requirement that the laws passed by Nauru in relation to regional pro-
cessing ‘be construed as valid according to the Constitution of Nauru’.137 It also stressed that it 
is not for the High Court of Australia to examine the constitutional validity of another state’s 
laws.138 Justice Keane explained that section 198AHA(2) is not ‘conditional upon a judgment 
by the domestic courts of this country as to the validity of the laws of Nauru’139 and highlighted 
that ‘considerations of international comity and judicial restraint militate strongly against’ such 
a construction.140 
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The creation of a neat boundary between Australia and Nauru has created a situation of multiple 
and misaligned borders that enables the governments of Australia and Nauru to remain unac-
countable for their actions. In the Memorandum of Understanding between Nauru and Aus-
tralia, Australia accepts some responsibility for those transferred to Nauru with respect to their 
detention, assessment of refugee status, deportation or settlement in Nauru or a third country. 
A Senate Committee report in 2015 concluded that, due to the Australian government’s in-
volvement with the setting up and running of the centre, Australia has obligations under inter-
national and domestic law in relation to the care of asylum seekers in the centre and holds joint 
obligations with Nauru in respect to the asylum seekers’ human rights.141 In making this assess-
ment, the Committee’s views are in line with the principle that a state carries its human rights 
obligations with it when acting extraterritorially.142 The Committee further stated that ‘[t]he 
Government of Australia’s purported reliance on the sovereign and legal system on Nauru in 
the face of allegations of human rights abuses and serious crimes at the [Regional Processing 
Centre] is a cynical and unjustifiable attempt to avoid accountability for a situation created by 
this country’.143 The High Court of Australia in Plaintiff M68 had an opportunity to recognise 
that the Australian government was acting extraterritorially in Nauru and that its obligations 
should extend with it across borders. However, due to the juridical boundary drawn by the 
majority judges, Australia can continue to operate in Nauru without the limitations placed on it 
by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Court’s oversight. Also, Nauru’s 
treatment of refugees and asylum seekers remains outside the judicial lens, because of the High 
Court of Australia’s unwillingness to pass judgment on Nauru’s refugee law and policy. 
The consequence of the ways the judiciary in Australia and Canada manoeuvred juridical bor-
ders in these cases is that the idea that there is a threshold for adequate refuge in protection 
elsewhere scenarios has disappeared from jurisprudence. The High Court of Australia has 
shifted from a high threshold for adequate refuge guided by the rights in the Refugee Conven-
tion to an approach whereby no threshold for adequate protections is set. In Canada, while the 
first instance decision set the threshold only at the protection from refoulement, the appeal de-
cision removed this baseline level of protection. 
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Further, the courts’ conceptualisation of the nature of refuge has shifted from a duty to a dis-
cretion. Macklin argues that the Canada/United States Agreement reflects ‘the notion that ref-
ugee protection is a form of humanitarianism, motivated by kindness, not by duty’ and refugees, 
as beneficiaries, cannot ‘choose the donor’.144 In their initial decisions, Canadian and Australian 
courts conceptualised refuge as an international obligation. However, in subsequent cases, the 
idea of refuge promulgated is one of discretion that states can assign to third countries without 
judicial oversight. 
As a result of these changes, the prospect of a successful challenge to these bilateral contain-
ment agreements is illusory. All challenges to Australia’s offshore processing regime subse-
quent to Plaintiff M70 have been unsuccessful.145 At the time of writing, there was a challenge 
afoot to the Canadian/United States Agreement and the applicants had filed evidence regarding 
the treatment of refugees in the United States pursuant to changes to law and policy made by 
President Donald Trump.146 However, if the Federal Court follows the Federal Court of Ap-
peal’s approach to the Canadian Charter and Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, any 
changes to refugee law and policy in the United States will remain outside the judicial lens. 
B The Gendered Nature of Malleable and Misaligned Borders 
The changes in judicial approaches seen across Canadian and Australian cases have gendered 
consequences in the context of refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. In the Australian context, 
the approach taken in Plaintiff M70 enabled consideration of factors such as age in conceptual-
ising the threshold for refuge. Subsequent cases, in particular, Plaintiff M68, provided an op-
portunity to advance the courts’ conceptualisation of refuge with respect to considerations of 
gender. While there has been criticism of the conditions all asylum seekers and refugees in 
Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island are subject to,147 there is particular concern about 
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female asylum seekers. There have been reports of sexual violence against women in immigra-
tion detention in Nauru.148 There is also evidence that women released from immigration de-
tention and living in shared accommodation in Nauru paid for by the Australian government 
endure unsafe and insecure conditions.149 However, by retracting its juridical border, the High 
Court of Australia has removed judicial scrutiny of these injustices in refugees’ legal challenges 
to be transferred permanently to or remain in Australia. 
With respect to Canadian jurisprudence, the Federal Court’s approach to the exercise of exec-
utive power pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act enabled a consideration 
of the gendered operation of United States’ refugee law and policy. It also provided a gender-
sensitive interpretation on the non-refoulement obligations in the Refugee Convention and 
CAT. However, the appeal decision rendered these considerations irrelevant. Also, by requiring 
asylum seekers and refugees in the United States to present at the Canadian border to trigger 
Canadian Charter protections, the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision disadvantages female 
refugees and places them at heightened risk. Due to factors such as care responsibilities or lack 
of financial independence, female asylum seekers are less likely to be in a position to make the 
journey to the Canada’s border with the United States. Those who do and are summarily re-
turned face the prospect of being detained, not in dedicated immigration detention centres, but 
in remote and mixed-purpose jail facilities.150  
C Judicial Dissonance  
The retraction of juridical borders gives rise to disharmony between courts in different coun-
tries, which imposes greater difficulties for asylum seekers and refugees wanting to cross inter-
national borders in their searches for refuge. This is evident in a failed attempt by asylum seek-
ers on Manus Island to secure a transfer to Australia through successive litigation in the Su-
preme Court of Papua New Guinea and the High Court of Australia. In Belden Norman Namah 
v Hon Rimbink Pato, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration (‘Belden Norman 
Namah’),151 the asylum seekers challenged the legality of their detention before the Supreme 
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Court of Papua New Guinea. The Court stated that the asylum seekers on Manus Island were 
‘forcefully brought into [Papua New Guinea]’152 and acknowledged that the litigation’s ultimate 
aim was to secure their removal from the Manus Detention Centre and transfer to Australia.153 
The Court found that the asylum seekers’ detention was in violation of the right to liberty in 
section 42 of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea. In coming to this conclusion, the Court 
engaged in categorical and rights-based reasoning. It placed emphasis on the fact that those in 
the Manus Detention Centre were seeking recognition of their refugee status and discussed Pa-
pua New Guinea’s international obligations as a signatory to the Refugee Convention.154 The 
Court also referred to the UNHCR’s detention guidelines and noted that the UNHCR had re-
ported that the conditions in the Manus Detention Centre ‘lack some of the basic conditions and 
standards required’.155 The Court ruled that Papua New Guinea’s Memorandum of Understand-
ing with Australia was unconstitutional and invalid.156 It ordered the governments of Australia 
and Papua New Guinea to take all steps necessary to cease and prevent the continued unconsti-
tutional and illegal detention of the asylum seekers at the Manus Detention Centre.157 
While the asylum seekers’ challenge to the bilateral agreement between Papua New Guinea and 
Australia was successful in the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, they could not secure a 
transfer to Australia without a similar victory in the Australian courts. Four months after the 
Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea handed down its judgment in Belden Norman Namah, an 
Iranian asylum seeker held in the Manus Detention Centre challenged the validity of the Mem-
orandum of Understanding between the two countries before the High Court of Australia in 
Plaintiff S195/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘Plaintiff S195’).158 One 
issue the Court addressed was whether Australia’s entry into the Memorandum of Understand-
ing with Papua New Guinea and subsequent Regional Resettlement Arrangement was beyond 
the power of the Commonwealth of Australia159 by reason of the Supreme Court of Papua New 
Guinea’s decision in Belden Norman Namah. One argument the plaintiff advanced was that 
‘the Constitution denies to the Commonwealth any legislative or executive power to authorise 
or take part in activity in another country which is unlawful according to the domestic law of 
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that country’.160 In its judgment, the High Court of Australia referred to this proposition as 
‘novel and sweeping’161 and stated that: 
neither the legislative nor the executive power of the Commonwealth is constitutionally lim-
ited by any need to conform to international law. Equally there should be no doubt that neither 
the legislative nor the executive power of the Commonwealth is constitutionally limited by 
any need to conform to the domestic law of another country.162 
These two decisions are indicative of the dissonance that can occur between domestic courts 
when juridical borders are misaligned and the consequences for refugees’ quests for refuge. 
The Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea stretched its juridical border more broadly than the 
Australian High Court. While it based its decision on the right to liberty in the Constitution of 
Papua New Guinea, it also took into account Papua New Guinea’s international law obligations 
such as those under the Refugee Convention and made an order directed to Australia. Con-
versely, the High Court of Australia referred exclusively to Australian domestic law and ignored 
the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea’s decision in Belden Norman Namah. This incongru-
ity is partly due to Australia’s lack of a federal Bill of Rights or Human Rights Act as well as 
the absence of a regional human rights regime in the South Pacific. This gives rise to a situation 
where asylum seekers are trapped within a place of unsafe and inadequate refuge, unable to 
wield legal arguments to continue their journey to find genuine sanctuary. 
V THE TRAPPED REFUGEE 
As a result of the ways judges manoeuvre juridical borders in challenges to containment agree-
ments, are particular refugees more likely to be successful in using courts in their searches for 
refuge? In Chapters Three and Four, I argued that refugees have to be viewed as exceptional in 
some way, acutely vulnerable or exemplary to succeed in protection from refuge claims 
grounded in human rights law. What is the figure of the refugee that emerges from changes to 
judicial approaches to protection from refuge cases in which a containment agreement’s oper-
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ation or validity is directly challenged? In this section, I argue that while some scholars con-
ceive of refugees who are subject to bilateral containment agreements as in a state of exception 
or beyond the pale of law, a more accurate understanding is that asylum seekers and refugees 
are trapped within multiple and misaligned borders, unable to wield legal arguments to continue 
their journey to find genuine sanctuary except in extreme and exceptional circumstances. 
A State of Exception or State of Exceptionality? 
In the Canadian context, Arbel argues that refugees in the United States wanting to cross into 
Canada in search of refuge are in a state of liminality. She explains that after the Federal Court 
of Appeal’s decision, the asylum seeker applicant, John Doe, was ‘[s]tripped of recourse to 
effective legal action under the Canadian law, and suspended between two conflicting direc-
tives, his predicament is that of liminality: he is still subject to the law, but left bereft by it’.163 
She notes that this ‘is in many ways reminiscent of the “state of exception” as discussed by 
Agamben’.164 
Conceiving of John Doe as a person suspended in a liminal state misses an essential dynamic 
in the scenario. Perhaps it can be said that John Doe, as an asylum seeker in the United States, 
is in a state of exception: he is subject to United States asylum laws, but also abandoned by 
them because he is prevented from lodging his claim for refugee status due to the one-year bar. 
However, his attempt to trigger Canadian legal protections and continue his journey in search 
of refuge there provides additional layers of complexity obscured by an Agambenian frame-
work which focusses on the relationship between the sovereign and the individual165 and does 
not contemplate situations where a refugee is in one place of refuge, but wants to escape to 
another. These missing dynamics are evident in Arbel’s analysis. She describes John Doe as in 
an ‘impossible bind’, because he is required to present at the Canadian border to trigger the 
Canadian Charter, but the Canada/United States Agreement prevents him from doing so.166 This 
is not quite accurate. It is true that the Federal Court of Appeal required John Doe to present at 
the Canadian border to trigger Charter protection, but there is nothing in the Canada/United 
States Agreement to prevent him from doing this. It may be very difficult in a practical sense 
for John Doe and protection from refuge claimants in his position to reach the border, and they 
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may be taking great risks in making the journey, but they are not legally prevented from trav-
elling to the border. Therefore, it is not correct to say that John Doe is bound by the law but 
bereft by it. According to the Federal Court of Appeal, John Doe was never subject to the Ca-
nadian Charter. Similarly, while John Doe is subject to the Canada/United States Agreement, 
he is not bereft by it. He was able to challenge the Agreement in Canadian courts. Both the 
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal entertained his argument regarding the validity of 
the Governor in Council’s designation of the United States as a safe third country. He was not 
required to be within Canadian territory or present at the border for Canadian courts to hear this 
argument. Further, the Federal Court of Appeal left open the possibility of asylum seekers in 
the United States being able to mount a claim under the Canadian Charter by presenting at the 
border and triggering the Canadian Charter’s protection.167 
A more complete way to understand John Doe’s predicament is that he is an asylum seeker in 
a country that does not provide him with adequate refuge, but he is trapped there, unable to 
trigger a neighbouring country’s legal protections to continue his journey to find sanctuary. He 
is trapped because the Federal Court of Appeal retracted its juridical border, refused to under-
take an assessment of United States refugee law and policy, and required him to present at the 
border to trigger protections in the Canadian Charter. Therefore, the only option for John Doe 
and asylum seekers in his position is to travel to the border to enliven Canadian Charter protec-
tions or cross into Canada in a way that avoids the operation of the Canada/United States Agree-
ment through a remote border region or by air travel. Both options are risky and would be 
impossible for the majority of asylum seekers and refugees in the United States, many of whom 
would not have the finances or physical ability to make the journey. Those with care responsi-
bilities or disabilities that effect their mobility are less likely to be able to cross successfully 
from the United States into Canada. Further, by presenting at the border to trigger the protection 
of the Canadian Charter, asylum seekers risk being summarily returned to the United States, 
placed in immigration detention and possibly deported. Seeking refuge in Canada from the 
United States requires extraordinary—for some, impossible—feats of bravery. 
B Beyond the Pale of Law or Trapped Between Dissonant Legal Systems? 
Drawing on Arendt’s theory of the right to have rights, Larking argues that refugees locked up 
in detention centres funded by liberal democracies, such as those on Nauru and Manus Island, 
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cannot ‘be considered to exist within the privileged pale of law’.168 This is because, unlike 
citizens, permanent residents or lawful visitors, they are not the bearers of ‘a constituted legal 
personality’.169 While they are ‘occasionally subjects of pity, compassion and “humanitarian 
concern”’, they are ‘never full subjects of justice, law and rights’.170 
When the High Court of Australia first retracted its juridical borders in Plaintiff S156, it was 
possible to conceptualise asylum seekers in the Manus Island detention centre as being beyond 
the pale of law. They were not full subjects of justice, law and rights, because the High Court 
of Australia did not entertain their arguments regarding their treatment in Papua New Guinea 
and instead deferred to what the Minister of Immigration believed to be in the national interest. 
One could also say that these asylum seekers were suspended in a state of liminality: they were 
subject to Australian law (the Migration Act stated that they can be transferred to an offshore 
territory and the Memorandum of Agreement between Australia and Nauru provided for their 
transfer), but are bereft by it (Australian courts would not examine complaints about the transfer 
or conditions in which they are detained). 
Nevertheless, if we rest the analysis at this point, we are missing an important element: that the 
asylum seekers were in Papua New Guinea’s territory and, therefore, beneficiaries of Papua 
New Guinea’s human rights protections. In their protection from refuge challenge before the 
Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea (Belden Norman Namah), the asylum seekers had a con-
stituted legal personality. They were not objects of humanitarian concern or pity, but full bear-
ers of rights. They were also not in a state of liminality, because, while they are subject to Papua 
New Guinean law, they were not bereft by it. Rather, they were able to use the human rights 
protections in Papua New Guinea’s Constitution to argue successfully against their confinement 
in the Manus Island detention centre. 
However, due to misaligned juridical borders, asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea were only 
able to trigger human rights law to obtain a partial victory, the closing of the Manus Detention 
Centre. They could not use legal processes to secure their ultimate aim, which was transfer to 
Australia. They were not beyond the pale of law or in a liminal state, but were trapped within 
multiple and misaligned juridical borders, unable to use courts to escape from a place of inad-
equate refuge and continue their journeys in search of genuine sanctuary. Thus, in the South 
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Pacific region at least, the prospect of a transnational jurisprudence that bolsters human rights 
protection remains far off. 
The only way asylum seekers and refugees can escape their entrapment and continue their 
searches for refuge in the South Pacific region is by virtue of extraordinary circumstances. This 
is evident in the aftermath of the High Court of Australia’s decision in Plaintiff M68. As a result 
of this judgment, asylum seekers and refugees in Nauru or in Australian territory awaiting trans-
fer to Nauru are trapped within multiple and misaligned juridical borders. The Australian gov-
ernment can transfer them to Nauru and cooperate in their detention or containment in open 
processing centres through its extraterritorial expansion of its juridical borders. However, they 
cannot challenge their detention or the conditions they are subject to before Australian courts. 
They are able to challenge their detention under the Constitution of Nauru.171 However, given 
the High Court of Australia’s decision in Plaintiff S195/2016, even a successful challenge is 
unlikely to result in the asylum seekers being transferred to Australia. Nevertheless, the Minis-
ter for Immigration permitted the asylum seeker litigant in Plaintiff M68 to remain in Australian 
territory. Her story ‘triggered an outpouring of public support’ for asylum seekers in specific 
situations172 and inspired the ‘Let Them Stay’ campaign.173 As a result of this grassroots cam-
paign, she and other asylum seekers understood to have special protection needs such as chil-
dren, cancer patients, those identified as a suicide risk and victims of sexual assaults have been 
permitted to stay in Australia.174 However, they only have permission to stay on a temporary 
basis and at the Minister’s discretion.175 Another example of a transfer in an exceptional cir-
cumstance after a sustained public campaign is the Australian government’s agreement to bring 
a terminally ill asylum seeker to Australia to receive palliative care after a petition signed by 
over 2,000 doctors, organisations and Australian residents.176 
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In addition to extra-legal grounds for a transfer, asylum seekers and refugees in Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea have initiated cases against the Minister for Immigration in Australian 
courts seeking to be brought to Australia. The refugees have to ground their pleading in private 
law (they alleged a breach of the Minister’s duty of care), because there is no public law cause 
of action available to them that would secure a transfer to Australia. The relief sought in these 
claims has been granted only in exceptional circumstances and only to access medical care. For 
example, in two interlocutory matters, the Federal Court of Australia ordered the Australian 
government to transfer a child asylum seeker on Nauru who had attempted suicide so that they 
could receive specialist child mental healthcare.177 In these cases, the Court drew heavily on 
the reasoning in Plaintiff S99/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,178 in 
which a refugee who had been raped on Nauru after becoming unconscious during an epileptic 
fit became pregnant as a result of the rape and wanted to terminate the pregnancy. The Austral-
ian Minister for Immigration transferred her to Papua New Guinea to have the abortion, but she 
commenced civil proceedings in Australia and pleaded that the Minister owed her a duty of care 
to arrange for a safe and lawful abortion and this duty would be breached if he forced her to 
undergo the procedure in Papua New Guinea. The Federal Court of Australia found that the 
Minister owed her a novel duty of care.179 Critical to this decision was the Court’s assessment 
of her situation of being in a position of vulnerability and completely reliant on the Minister for 
Immigration for access to appropriate medical assistance.180 These cases indicate that private 
law claims for transfers from Nauru and Papua New Guinea will only be successful in excep-
tional circumstances where the asylum seeker or refugee is considered vulnerable in some way. 
Also, courts have not ordered a permanent transfer to Australia.181 The Australian government 
has recently passed legislation to permit temporary transfers for people currently in Nauru and 
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Manus Island, but only if the refugee or asylum seeker has been assessed by doctors as requiring 
urgent medical treatment.182 
When trapped between multiple and misaligned juridical borders and without the ability to es-
cape through some form of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, refuge becomes rela-
tive. The judicial dissonance in the saga of challenges to Australia’s offshore processing regime 
has given rise to a situation in which the asylum seekers and refugees on Manus Island, who 
launched litigation in the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea to have the Manus Detention 
Centre closed, later petitioned for it to remain open. After the judgment in Beldon Norman 
Namah, the Papua New Guinean government started closing down the Manus Detention Centre, 
but the Australian government insisted that it would not bring any asylum seekers from the 
centre to Australia.183 Many of the asylum seekers and refugees in the Manus Detention Centre 
were afraid of leaving the centre because they felt they would not be safe in the Manus Island 
community.184 They argued for the Manus Detention Centre to be kept open, but the Supreme 
Court of Papua New Guinea dismissed the action.185 Thus, similar to the trajectory of forced 
encampment jurisprudence in Kenya, what asylum seekers on Manus Island saw as an unac-
ceptable and inadequate place of refuge became the only space of protection available to them 
and they fought to keep it open. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I set out to build on my analysis of decision-maker approaches to protection 
from refuge cases. In Chapters Three and Chapter Four, I examined how decision-makers de-
termine protection from refuge challenges grounded in human and refugee rights law. In this 
chapter, I investigated protection from refuge claims in which these rights are part of a broader 
range of legal arguments pleaded. Four patterns emerge across these chapters. First, decision-
makers adopt robust ideas of refuge when they adopt categorical reasoning by interpreting legal 
instruments with reference to experiences common to refugeehood or refugees’ position in in-
ternational law. In this chapter, when decision-makers adopt this approach, they set a high 
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threshold for refuge and characterise it as a duty. Second, in initial or early cases, decision-
makers approach protection from refuge challenges in a way that disrupts containment agree-
ments, but subsequent decisions ensure their continuation. Third, as part of this change, deci-
sion-makers excise or partially excise the place of refuge from the judicial lens. For example, 
in Chapter Three I highlighted that European decision-makers only consider the circumstances 
upon immediate arrival and in this chapter judges retract their juridical borders. Fourth, once 
this shift occurs, the refugee or asylum seeker must be exceptional in some way or be the ben-
eficiary of extraordinary circumstances to continue their journeys in search of refuge. 
The additional element of complexity in the cases I examine in this chapter is the role of borders 
in judicial decision-making. The analysis indicates that taking account of refugees’ special po-
sition and invoking international law may set higher thresholds for adequate refuge as opposed 
to referring to comparative jurisprudence. Thus, lack of horizontal transjudicial communication 
should not always be viewed as a ‘problem’.186 I am not suggesting that transjudicial commu-
nication is inherently problematic or should be discouraged. In some contexts, it has enabled 
courts in different jurisdictions to reach ‘correct and authoritative’ interpretations of many as-
pects of refugee law.187 However, an understanding of refugeehood and refugees’ status in in-
ternational law must guide decision-makers in their use of comparative jurisprudence in pro-
tection from refuge contexts. 
Once decision-makers determine the threshold for adequate refuge, decision-makers must be 
willing and able to extend their juridical boundaries across geographic borders. In the protection 
from refuge decisions examined in this chapter, decision-makers excise consideration of the 
place of refuge through retracting their juridical borders. These later decisions give rise to a 
situation where borders’ salience is simultaneously diminished and enhanced to the detriment 
of refugees: governments extend their juridical borders extra-territorially to transfer to or keep 
refugees in third countries, but courts retract their juridical borders to avoid passing judgment 
on sites of refuge in other nation-states. 
These multiple and misaligned borders trap refugees in an inadequate place of refuge and make 
it impossible for them to continue their journeys in search of genuine sanctuary except in ex-
ceptional or extraordinary circumstances. However, the protection provided in these atypical 
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circumstances is less secure, being achieved extra-legally, or the transfers are only for tempo-
rary periods. Through this process, the idea of a threshold for adequate refuge dissipates and 
the nature of refuge morphs from a duty to a discretion. Due to the changes in the ways courts 
approach these protection from refuge challenges, their answer to the ‘essential question’ of 
‘“Whose refugee?” is all too easily answered by a curt “Not mine”’.188 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SEEKING REFUGE AS A PALESTINIAN REFUGEE 
I INTRODUCTION 
Palestinian refugees are one of the largest refugee groups in the world1 and constitute the long-
est standing protracted refugee situation.2 They were also the only group of refugees excluded 
from the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’)3 when it was 
drafted. The majority of Palestinian refugees live in the Middle East region and receive protec-
tion and assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees 
in the Near East (‘UNRWA’). While Palestinian refugees have worked hard to rebuild their 
communities in exile,4 many feel they have a bleak existence. Samar, a 20-year-old living in a 
Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon exclaims, ‘“We have no rights and no future. We have a 
lot of problems; We can’t work freely, we cannot own a house, we cannot move around. We 
are treated as if we are not human”’.5 Some Palestinian refugees leave these environments in 
search of better protection conditions. These journeys are particularly difficult and precarious 
for Palestinian refugees, many of whom are stateless.6 In their journey to find refuge further 
                                                          
1 Susan Akram, ‘Myths and Realities of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Reframing the Right of Return’ in Susan 
Akram et al (eds), International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Routledge, 2011) 13, 13 (‘Myths and 
Realities’); BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residence and Refugee Rights, Q and A: What You Need to 
Know about Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (May 2015) 5 <http://www.badil.org/phoca-
downloadpap/badil-new/campaining-tools/brochures/2015/Q&A-en-2015.pdf>; Terry Rempel, ‘Who Are Pales-
tinian Refugees?’ (2006) 26 Forced Migration Review 5, 5. The most recent figures are that there are 5.4 million 
refugees under UNRWA’s mandate and 19.9 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, totalling 25.3 million 
refugees globally: UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017 (25 June 2018) 2 <http://www.un-
hcr.org/en-au/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html> (‘Global Trends’). This means that 
Palestinian refugees account for approximately one out of every five refugees in the world. They were considered 
the largest group of refugees until recently when the numbers of Syrian refugees reached a reported 6.3 million, 
making them the largest group of refugees in the world: ibid. 
2 Akram, ‘Myths and Realities’ (n 1) 13; Susan Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status’ (2002) 31(3) 
Journal of Palestinian Studies 36, 36 (‘Palestinian Refugees’); BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residence 
and Refugee Rights (n 1); UNHCR, Global Trends (n 1). 
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 
January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
4 See Nadya Hajj, Protection Amid Chaos: The Creation of Property Rights in Palestinian Refugee Camps (Co-
lumbia University Press, 2016). 
5 Clancy Chassay and Duncan Campbell, ‘Middle East: Life Inside the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon’, 
The Guardian (online), 30 May 2007 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/29/syria.israelandthepales-
tinians>. 
6 Brookings Institution, The State of Statelessness in the Middle East (15 May 2015) <https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/future-development/2015/05/15/the-state-of-statelessness-in-the-middle-east/>; Abbas Shiblak, 
‘Stateless Palestinians’ 26 Forced Migration Review 8, 8; Lex Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 1998) ch 5. Statelessness is defined as ‘a person who is not considered 
as a national by any State under the operation of its law’: Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
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abroad, Palestinian refugees confront article 1D: the Refugee Convention’s only exclusion and 
‘contingent inclusion’ clause.7 Human rights arguments are relevant to these article 1D cases 
and borders play a role in their determination, but the other significant element is the movement 
of those in need of protection from the developing to the developed world. Depending on how 
decision-makers approach these claims, and, in particular, where they set the scope of refuge, 
Palestinian refugees will continue to be contained in the UNRWA region or they will have a 
pathway to secure refugee protection further abroad. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how decision-makers approach and determine pro-
tection from refuge claims grounded in the Refugee Convention and in situations where refu-
gees would be shifting their place of refuge from the Global South to the Global North. To 
guide this exploration of decision-makers’ approaches to these claims, I draw on scholarship 
that employs critical race theory and third world approaches to international law (‘TWAIL’) to 
expose the ways the Refugee Convention acts to contain those in need of protection in the de-
veloping world. I commence this chapter by outlining this literature and discussing how it ap-
plies to Palestinian refugees’ unique status under the Refugee Convention. I then examine how 
decision-makers determine the scope and nature of refuge for Palestinian refugees and discuss 
the consequences for Palestinian refugees’ ability to secure a place of genuine refuge. I argue 
that particular approaches come close to setting a broad scope of refuge for Palestinian refugees 
and characterising the nature of refuge as right as well as a duty. However, decision-makers 
approach these protection from refuge claims in a way that narrows and truncates the scope of 
refuge for Palestinian refugees and inhibits Palestinian refugees’ ability to find a place of refuge 
outside the UNRWA region. These approaches create additional barriers for female Palestinian 
refugees in their searches for a place of genuine refuge. 
                                                          
opened for signature 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entry into force 6 June 1960) art 1 (‘1954 Statelessness 
Convention’). Many Palestinian refugees fit within this definition—Jordan is the only country in which UNRWA 
operates to have granted collective citizenship to Palestinian refugees: Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees’ (n 2) 51. 
However, article 1(2)(i) of the 1954 Statelessness Convention contains an exclusion clause similar to article 1D of 
the Refugee Convention (n 3). 
7 Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees’ (n 2) 39; Guy Goodwin-Gill and Susan Akram, ‘Brief Amicus Curiae on the 
Status of Palestinian Refugees under International Law’ (2000) 11 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 187, 
191; Mutaz Qafisheh and Valentina Azarov, ‘Article 1D’ in Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner and Felix 
Machts (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) [25]. 
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II THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AS A CONTAINMENT MECHANISM 
Approximately 85 per cent of the world’s refugees are hosted in developing regions.8 This is 
predominantly because these host states share borders with or are close to countries producing 
large numbers of refugees. Refugees seek safety in these nearby countries and, while some do 
not want to travel any further, those who do face a number of barriers in reaching places of 
refuge further afield. In reflecting on this problem, the United Nations Secretary-General ex-
plains that ‘[s]tronger solidarity with refugee-hosting countries in the [G]lobal South is abso-
lutely a must’.9 
Some scholars argue that the Refugee Convention and the ways states implement it compound 
these inequities.10 In this chapter, I draw on two of the most well known proponents of this 
position, Tuitt and Chimni, who draw on critical race theory and TWAIL respectively to ad-
vance their positions. Some of Tuitt’s and Chimni’s critiques of the Refugee Convention have 
subsequently been addressed by legal developments and I discuss this below, but neither Tuitt 
or Chimni specifically consider the Refugee Convention’s treatment of Palestinian refugees. I 
outline Tuitt’s and Chimni’s scholarship and consider how their insights apply to Palestinian 
refugees in their use of the Refugee Convention to secure a different place of refuge. 
Tuitt argues that the creation of refugee law and refugee definitions in the first half of the twen-
tieth century11 served as a type of containment mechanism in the sense that this new area of 
international law restricted, rather than facilitated, movement across international borders.12 
Tuitt explains that international refugee law’s ‘supposed positive benefit’ is the principle of 
                                                          
8 UNHCR, Global Trends (n 1) 2, 15. 
9 António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres 
at United Nations Headquarters’ (Press Conference, SG/SM/18580, 20 June 2017) 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sgsm18580.doc.htm>. António Guterres was formerly the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. 
10 See, eg, Catherine Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws in Australia and Canada 
(University of British Columbia Press, 2005) 85; Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal 
Democracies and the Response to Refugees (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 3; Emma Larking, Refugees and 
the Myth of Human Rights: Life Outside the Pale of Law (Ashgate, 2014) 128; Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-
War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Clarendon Press, 1995) 88–94. 
11 For a discussion of the international instruments pertaining to and defining refugees in the first half of the twen-
tieth century prior to the adoption of the Refugee Convention (n 3) in 1951, see Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The 
Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 16–20 (‘The Refugee in International Law’). 
12 Patricia Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race: The European Response to “New” Asylum Seekers’ in Paddy 
Ireland and Per Laleng (eds), The Critical Lawyers’ Handbook 2 (Pluto Press, 1997) 96 (‘Defining the Refugee 
by Race’). Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention (n 3) provides, ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion’. 
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non-refoulement.13 However, she writes that we can only conceive of international refugee law 
granting such a benefit if before its emergence migrants ‘were confronted with closed state 
borders’.14 Tuitt argues that this is ‘manifestly not the case’15 and draws on Hathaway’s asser-
tion that the emergence of international refugee law in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century coincided with the withdrawal of the benefit of free movement of persons across inter-
national borders.16 Thus, the creation of refugee categories did not empower those in need of 
protection ‘to move more freely than they had been in the days before the introduction of refu-
gee status’.17 Further, the position of those who do not fit within refugee definitions ‘became 
qualitatively worse’, because they had been stripped of the benefit of ‘free and unfettered’ 
movement.18 In sum, the creation of international refugee law was not prompted by a desire to 
extend a benefit to the included category of refugees, but to remove a benefit previously enjoyed 
by the excluded category (those who do not meet refugee definitions).19 
Tuitt contends that the definition of a refugee in the Refugee Convention perpetuates the ineq-
uities between the Global North and Global South with respect to responsibility for refugees. 
This is because the refugee definition has a Western or European ‘ideological slant’.20 In par-
ticular, the persecution requirement includes as refugees those who can prove that they are the 
victim of harms ‘thought to emanate from culpable acts’,21 but excludes ‘human suffering 
                                                          
13 Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race’ (n 12) 98. 
14 Ibid 98. 
15 Ibid 98. 
16 James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991) 1, cited in Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by 
Race’ (n 12) 98. 
17 Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race’ (n 12) 98. 
18 Ibid 99. 
19 Ibid 97. 
20 Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race’ (n 12) 100. See also Patricia Tuitt False Images: The Law’s Construction 
of the Refugee (Pluto Press, 1996) 14–16 (‘False Images’). 
21 Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race’ (n 12) 101. 
 176 
caused by accident or natural disaster’.22 (This concern has now been partly addressed by sub-
sequent jurisprudence and legal reforms.23) Tuitt also argues that the alienage requirement24 
disadvantages those who cannot travel to make a claim for international protection, especially 
women and children.25 Tuitt explains that while ‘movement’, particularly journeying across 
borders, is refugees’ ‘signifier’, ‘territorial boundaries, cultural perceptions, age and disability 
all conspire to curtail movement … and constantly to withhold the “official” designation “ref-
ugee” from those most deserving or it’.26 
Additionally, even in situations where the Refugee Convention should respond to refugees from 
the Global South, Western states have interpreted or used it in a way that denies international 
protection to those from the developing world. Tuitt claims that many of what were seen as the 
‘new’ asylum seekers from Asia and Africa who came to the Global North in larger numbers 
during the 1990s would have fit within the refugee definition.27 However, Western states did 
not consider them to be refugees and ‘continued to perceive the majority of these refugees ac-
cording to their excluded status’.28 Similarly, Chimni contends that Western states disavowed 
the Refugee Convention as anachronistic once the Cold War ended and ‘refugees no longer 
possessed ideological or geopolitical value’.29 The ‘new’ refugees were not politically valuable 
                                                          
22 Ibid 101. 
23 There is also acceptance that a person will have a well-founded fear of persecution if targeted by non-state actors 
and the state cannot or will not protect them: see, eg, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar 
(2002) 210 CLR 1 [29]–[31] (Gleeson CJ), [112]–[114] (Kirby J) (‘Khawar’); Directive 2011/95/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 13 December on Standards for the Qualification of Third Country Nationals 
or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons 
Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (Recast) [2011] OJ L 337/9-
337/26, art 6(c) (‘Directive 2011/95/EU’). There is also protection for people fleeing indiscriminate harm: Di-
rective 2011/95/EU arts 2(f), 15(b)–(c) provide protection to those who, if returned to their country of origin, 
would face a real risk of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment, or a serious and individual 
threat to their life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed 
conflict. 
24 To qualify as a refugee, a person must be ‘outside the country of his [or her] nationality’ or ‘not having a 
nationality’ is ‘outside the country of his [or her] former habitual residence’: Refugee Convention (n 3) art 1A(2). 
25 Patricia Tuitt, ‘Rethinking the Refugee Concept’ in Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (eds), Refugee 
Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 106, 116 
(‘Rethinking the Refugee Concept’); Tuitt, False Images (n 20) 11–14. 
26 Tuitt, ‘Rethinking the Refugee Concept’ (n 25) 116. 
27 Tuitt argues that they were not new refugees, but only new to Western states: Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by 
Race’ (n 12) 103; Tuitt, False Images (n 20) 69–71. 
28 Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race’ (n 12) 103. 
29 BS Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South’ (1998) 11(4) Journal of Refugee 
Studies 350, 351 (‘Geopolitics’). See also BS Chimni, ‘From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards 
a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems’ (2004) 23(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 55, 58 (‘From 
Resettlement’). 
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to Western states, because they were no longer people fleeing communist regimes but ‘individ-
uals fleeing the Third World’.30 Global North states created a ‘myth of difference’31 by claiming 
that the ‘new’ asylum seekers coming from developing countries were ‘economic migrants ra-
ther than political refugees’.32 (Subsequent to Chimni’s publications, there is now some juris-
prudence that responds to these critiques.33) 
With respect to refugee status assessments, Tuitt and Chimni both argue that decision-makers 
restrict the Refugee Convention’s responsiveness to claimants from third world countries 
through purported objectivism.34 This is a process, whereby decision-makers undertake an as-
sessment of concepts such as reasonableness, safety or well-founded fear that is supposedly 
objective, but is ‘tainted with local perceptions and thus fails to be context specific’.35 Chimni 
and Tuitt contend that ‘objectivism’ eclipses the refugee’s voice and prioritises the state’s sub-
jective views over the refugee’s experiences.36 For example, Chimni suggests that in applying 
the cessation clause,37 objectivism permits states ‘alone to decide when there has been a suffi-
cient change in the circumstances of the country of origin’ and ignore refugees’ views about 
whether it is safe for them to return.38 
Chimni not only critiques Western governments’ and decision-makers’ politicised use of the 
Refugee Convention, he has refugee law scholars in his sights. He argues that refugee law 
                                                          
30 Chimni, ‘Geopolitics’ (n 29) 351; Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29) 58. 
31 Chimni, ‘Geopolitics’ (n 29) 351. 
32 Ibid 356. Chimni also argues that this shift gave rise to Western states supporting repatriation as the preferred 
durable solution: Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29). He suggests that due to this change in preference, states are 
able to use the Refugee Convention (n 3) as a containment mechanism through the operation of the cessation 
clause: at 61–3. 
33 Many jurisdictions recognise that discriminatory denial of economic and social rights can constitute a well-
founded fear of persecution: see, eg, RRT Case No N94/04178 (Unreported, Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, 
10 June 1994) (discriminatory denial of healthcare was found to constitute persecution); Chen Shi Hai v Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170 ALR 553 [31] (‘Chen Shi Hai’); BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 
800091 [90] (‘BG (Fiji)’); MK (Lesbians) Albania v Secretary of State for the Home Department CG [2009] 
UKAIT 00036 [353] (‘MK (Lesbians)’); Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: 
Refuge From Deprivation (Cambridge University Press, 2007) (‘International Refugee Law’); Michelle Foster, 
‘Non-Refoulement on the Basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation: The Scope of Complementary Protection in In-
ternational Human Rights Law’ (2009) New Zealand Law Review 257 (‘Non-Refoulement’). 
34 Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29) 62; Tuitt, False Images (n 20) 85. 
35 Tuitt, False Images (n 20) 85. 
36 Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29) 61–2; Tuitt, False Images (n 20) ch 5. 
37 Chimni is referring specifically to the Refugee Convention’s (n 3) article 1C(5), which provides that the Refugee 
Convention, ‘shall cease to apply to any person’ if ‘[h]e [or she] can no longer, because the circumstances in 
connexion with which he [or she] has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail 
himself [or herself] of the protection of the country of his [or her] nationality’. 
38 Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29) 62. 
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scholarship ‘has been dominated by a positivist tradition which limits the possibility of engage-
ment with politics’.39 He explains that this positivist approach ‘views international law as an 
abstract system of rules which can be identified, objectively interpreted, and enforced’ and an-
ything ‘outside the system of rules is designated as politics’.40 As a result, refugee law scholars 
ignore the political forces that influenced refugee law’s creation and continue to affect its in-
terpretation and defend ‘principles which are completely out of tune with historical and political 
realities’.41 
Tuitt and Chimni, in critiquing the Refugee Convention as a mechanism that contains those in 
need of protection in the Global South, do not consider Palestinian refugees’ specific situation. 
The only express reference to Palestinian refugees is in Chimni’s critical assessment of durable 
solutions, in which he does not include Palestinians among the refugees in the developing world 
trying to seek a place of refuge in the Global North.42 Instead, he classifies them as wanting ‘to 
return to their country of origin’.43 While Palestinian refugees agitate for the right to return,44 
some journey to states that are signatory to the Refugee Convention to find a genuine place of 
refuge and confront the application of article 1D, which excludes Palestinian refugees from the 
Refugee Convention, but also grants ipso facto refugee status if United Nations (‘UN’) protec-
tion or assistance ceases for any reason. Below, I draw on Chimni and Tuitt’s ideas to guide my 
analysis of decision-makers’ approaches to Palestinian refugees’ protection from refuge claims. 
III ARTICLE 1D AS A CONTAINMENT MECHANISM 
Detailed examinations of the circumstances surrounding article 1D’s drafting and states’ dis-
parate interpretations of its meaning and application are available.45 Of relevance to this chapter 
is whether article 1D can be considered a mechanism that contains Palestinian refugees in the 
UNRWA region and frustrates their attempts to seek protection elsewhere. Below, I position 
article 1D’s drafting history and courts’ and scholars’ differing interpretations against the back-
drop of Tuitt’s and Chimni’s scholarship to illuminate and orient article 1D’s containing effects. 
                                                          
39 Chimni, ‘Geopolitics’ (n 29) 352. 
40 Ibid 352. 
41 Ibid 353. 
42 Chimni, ‘From Resettlement’ (n 29) 73. 
43 Ibid 73. 
44 Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees’ (n 2) 41; John Quigley, ‘Displaced Palestinians and the Right to Return’ (1998) 
39(1) Harvard International Law Journal 171, 171. 
45 Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees’ (n 2) 40–3; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 
11) 151–7; James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 
2014) 509–21 (‘The Law of Refugee Status’); Qafisheh and Azarov (n 7). 
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When the Refugee Convention was being drafted, the overwhelming majority of Palestinian 
refugees were receiving protection and assistance from UNRWA and the now non-operational 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (‘UNCCP’).46 Representatives from 
Arab nations took the view that Palestinian refugees should not be part of the Refugee Conven-
tion, because the UN was responsible for Palestinians’ situation and, thus, bore direct respon-
sibility for them.47 They also stressed that Palestinian refugees should be repatriated and the 
drafters assumed that an early solution would be achieved.48 The exclusion of Palestinian refu-
gees from the Refugee Convention was also supported by European and North American states 
because they were reticent to accept ‘a new, large group of refugees’.49 Therefore, as a result 
of an ‘uneasy and ironic conformity’,50 Arab, European and North American states agreed that 
Palestinian refugees should be excluded from the Refugee Convention and continue to be as-
sisted by UNRWA and UNCCP in the Middle East region. 
The Egyptian delegate suggested that, while Palestinian refugees should be excluded from the 
Refugee Convention, they should automatically receive the benefits of the Refugee Convention 
if UN protection or assistance ceases without Palestinian refugees’ position being definitively 
settled.51 The drafters agreed with this proposal on the grounds that it would ensure that Pales-
tinian refugees receive continuity of international protection.52 As a result of this compromise, 
article 1D provides: 
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agen-
cies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
protection or assistance. 
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such 
persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the 
                                                          
46 The UNCCP still exists and reports annually to the United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’), but has been 
inactive since the mid-1960s: Terry Rempel, ‘From Beneficiary to Stakeholder: An Overview of UNRWA’s Ap-
proach to Refugee Participation’ in Sari Hanafi, Leila Hilal and Lex Takkenberg (eds), UNRWA and Palestinian 
Refugees: From Relief Works to Human Development (Routledge, 2014) 145. 
47 Mostafa Bey, Egyptian Representative, United Nations General Assembly, UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, UN Doc 
A/CONF.2/SR.29 (28 November 1951). For further discussion, see Akram, ‘Palestinian Refugees’ (n 2) 40; Good-
win-Gill and Akram (n 7) 201–2. 
48 Bey (n 47) 16; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 11) 153. 
49 Mr Rochefort, French representative, United Nations General Assembly, UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting, UN Doc 
A/CONF.2/SR.19 (26 November 1951) 11. See also Mr Warren, United States representative, ibid. 
50 Amer Mohamed El-Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1103 [16] (‘El-Ali’). 
51 Bey (n 47) 6. 
52 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (n 11) 154. 
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General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the 
benefits of this Convention. 
Thus, article 1D’s first paragraph excludes Palestinian refugees from the Refugee Convention’s 
ambit,53 but its second paragraph provides that they are ipso facto entitled to the benefits of the 
Refugee Convention if their UN protection and assistance ceases for any reason. 
Applying Tuitt’s ideas to article 1D’s drafting history indicates that it is both a containment 
mechanism for Palestinian refugees (in the sense that it confines them to the UNRWA region) 
and a provision that frees Palestinian refugees from the Refugee Convention’s containing ef-
fects. Article 1D disenfranchises Palestinian refugees to a far greater extent than other refugees. 
The benefit of free movement is removed, they cannot access the ‘supposed benefit’ of non-
refoulement and to receive protection and assistance they must remain in an UNRWA area of 
operation (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank). However, article 1D’s 
second paragraph liberates Palestinian refugees from the refugee definition’s Western ideolog-
ical slant: they are automatically accepted as part of the ‘included’ category and can journey to 
a country signatory to the Refugee Convention and receive the benefits of refugee protection 
without having to satisfy the refugee definition.54 
Nevertheless, article 1D is a clause ‘pregnant with ambiguity’,55 and where the balance between 
containment and liberation from containment lies in Palestinian refugees’ quests for refuge de-
pends on the manner in which it is interpreted. One of the main debates on the interpretation of 
article 1D is whether it should have a ‘historically bounded’ interpretation (it applies only to 
those receiving UN protection and assistance when the Refugee Convention was drafted in 
1951) or a ‘continuative’ interpretation (it also applies to their descendants and Palestinians 
displaced as a result of subsequent hostilities).56 If the former interpretation is adopted, the 
group of Palestinian refugees excluded from the Refugee Convention will get smaller over time 
and article 1D will eventually become redundant.57 This was the approach taken by the Court 
                                                          
53 While it does not mention Palestinian refugees specifically, it is well accepted that article 1D applies to Pales-
tinians who were displaced as a result of the creation of Israel: El-Ali (n 50) [22]; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 
The Refugee in International Law (n 11) 151–2; Hathaway and Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (n 45) 510; 
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 13: Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, UN Doc HCR/GIP/16/12 (December 2017) 1–5 (‘Guide-
lines on International Protection No 13’). 
54 The UNHCR states that ‘ipso facto’ means that the Palestinian refugee is entitled to the rights in the Refugee 
Convention (n 3) as long as articles 1C, 1E and 1F of the Refugee Convention do not apply: UNHCR, Guidelines 
on International Protection No 13 (n 53) [29]–[31]. 
55 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v WABQ (2002) 197 ALR 35 [18] (‘WABQ’). 
56 Hathaway and Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (n 45) 513. 
57 El-Ali (n 50) [24]. 
 181 
of Appeal of England and Wales in Amer Mohamed Eli-Ali v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.58 The Court held that article 1D only applies to Palestinian refugees in receipt of 
UN protection or assistance in 1951.59 The Federal Court of Australia took a similar position in 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v WABQ.60 The Court ruled that the term ‘at 
present’ refers to the class of Palestinian refugees eligible to receive UN protection or assistance 
in 1951.61 Hathaway and Foster support this ‘historically bounded’ interpretation of article 
1D.62 They explain that: 
The ultimate demise of Art. 1(D) exclusion is, in our view, a result that is not only legally 
correct, but also deeply principled, as it will restore Palestinians to the position of all other 
groups who are entitled to protection as refugees so long as they meet the requirements of the 
refugee definition.63 
With respect to the Refugee Convention’s constraining effect on Palestinian refugees’ searches 
for refuge, Australian and United Kingdom courts as well as Hathaway and Foster reach a bal-
anced position. Palestinian refugees not in receipt of or in the class eligible to receive UN pro-
tection and assistance in 1951 (the majority alive today) do not need to remain in an UNRWA 
area of operation to receive protection and assistance. They can, like all persons in need of 
                                                          
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid [28]. The Court reasoned that a continuative interpretation of article 1D is inconsistent with its plain lan-
guage: ‘at present’ cannot be read to mean those who later receive assistance or those who are now receiving 
assistance: at [33]. Further, the ipso facto entitlement to the benefits of the Refugee Convention (n 3) confers on 
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63 Ibid 515. 
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protection, make the journey to a state party to the Refugee Convention. Nevertheless, to obtain 
refugee protection they must satisfy the refugee definition and are subject to its constraining 
effects. (As noted above, some of the critiques with respect to the Western bias in the refugee 
definition have been at least partly addressed by developments in jurisprudence and legal re-
forms.) Further, Hathaway and Foster, in advocating for this position on both legal and ethical 
grounds, provide a counterpoint to Chimni’s criticism that refugee law scholars analyse the 
Refugee Convention in a political vacuum. 
Other jurisdictions have adopted a different interpretation of article 1D. The Court of Justice of 
the European Union’s position is that article 1D applies to anyone who is presently entitled to 
UNRWA’s protection and assistance as long as they have availed themselves of that protec-
tion.64 The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal similarly rejected a historically 
bounded interpretation of article 1D.65 The Tribunal ruled that article 1D continues to apply to 
all Palestinian refugees entitled to receive UN protection and assistance.66 It based its conclu-
sion on a reading of article 1D in its historical context,67 the drafters’ intentions68 and article 
1D’s object and purpose, which the Tribunal said is to ensure that Palestinian refugees continue 
to receive protection as a special class and ‘avoid overlapping agency competence for the pro-
tection of Palestinian refugees’.69 These European Union and New Zealand decisions are con-
sistent with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (‘UNHCR’) position that 
article 1D applies to Palestinian refugees displaced from Israel in 1948 and subsequent hostili-
ties and their descendants.70 Similarly, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that article 1D should 
be interpreted as ‘persons who were and/or are now receiving protection and assistance’.71 This 
is based on a purposive approach to article 1D: its objective is to ensure that Palestinians are 
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treated as a special and distinct group of refugees and not merged into the general refugee prob-
lem.72 
As a consequence of this interpretation of article 1D, Palestinian refugees continue to be ex-
cluded from the Refugee Convention and must remain in the UNRWA region if they want 
international protection and assistance. The justifications for this interpretation, in particular, 
that it preserves Palestinian refugees’ special treatment, can be seen through the lens of 
Chimni’s critique that legal positivism obscures historical and contemporary political realities. 
Ensuring that Palestinian refugees receive a unique form of protection was only one motivating 
factor for their exclusion. The other factors, as noted above, were that European and North 
American states did not want Palestinian refugees in their territories and Arab states wanted to 
limit their responsibilities as hosts by encouraging their repatriation. Further, reference to a 
special protection regime for Palestinian refugees ignores the fact that UNRWA, due to finan-
cial difficulties and funding cuts,73 struggles to offer the protection and assistance it is mandated 
to provide.74 
Nevertheless, pursuant to this interpretation, Palestinian refugees retain ipso facto entitlement 
to the benefits of the Refugee Convention in the event that UN protection or assistance ceases 
for any reason. Therefore, the crucial question is: what is the scope of UN protection and assis-
tance and what factors determine that Palestinian refugees are not in receipt of either? This 
question has received much less attention than the well-established debate on whether article 
1D should have a historically bounded or continuative interpretation. It is also the question that 
arises in protection from refuge claims made by Palestinian refugees and, therefore, is critical 
for the investigation undertaken in this thesis. When Palestinian refugees seek ipso facto enti-
tlement to the benefits of the Refugee Convention, they must establish that the situation they 
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faced in, for example, a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, was such that UN protection and 
assistance can be deemed to have ceased. Thus, through the prism of article 1D, they are seeking 
protection from a place that is, notionally at least, providing refuge to thousands of other Pal-
estinian refugees. 
Depending on the approach decision-makers take to these protection from refuge claims, article 
1D’s second paragraph can provide a mechanism for large numbers of Palestinian refugees to 
claim ipso facto refugee status in Europe or New Zealand, or it can establish grounds for only 
a few Palestinian refugees in specific circumstances to do so, perpetuating the containment of 
most Palestinian refugees in the UNRWA region. 
IV A BROAD SCOPE OF REFUGE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
In examining the scope of refuge set in these decisions, two ideas established in previous chap-
ters carry over: the importance of categorical reasoning and the risks of transjudicial commu-
nication in diluting the concept of refuge. At a point in AD (Palestine),75 the New Zealand 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal espoused a broad understanding of the protections avail-
able to Palestinian refugees under international law. In doing so, the Tribunal adopted a blended 
categorical and rights-based approach similar to the reasoning the High Court of Australia em-
ployed in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Plaintiff 
M106/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘Plaintiff M70’).76 In Plaintiff M70, 
the lead majority placed significance on the plaintiffs being persons seeking recognition of their 
refugee status and referred to the rights in the Refugee Convention. In AD (Palestine), the New 
Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal focussed on Palestinian refugeehood and then 
considered the protections to which Palestinian refugees are entitled. The Tribunal outlined who 
is a Palestinian refugee and reviewed UNRWA’s ‘working definition’ from 1948 onwards.77 It 
then examined the meaning of the word ‘protection’ in the specific context of Palestinian refu-
gees.78 
Through this process, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal delineated a wide 
ambit of protection. Referencing Bartholomeusz’s79 work on UNRWA’s ‘multidimensional’ 
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and ‘individualised protection activity’,80 the Tribunal referred to the UN’s ‘endorsement of 
UNRWA performing protection-related activities in relevant UN General Assembly resolu-
tions, often with direct reference to applicable international human rights treaties’.81 In partic-
ular, it discussed Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian 
Refugees in the Near East,82 in which the UN General Assembly encourages UNRWA to ‘con-
tinue making progress in addressing the needs of rights of children, women and persons with 
disabilities’83 in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’),84 the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’),85 and 
the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’).86 By setting the scope of 
protection and assistance for Palestinian refugees with reference to UNRWA’s mandates and, 
specifically, the human rights instruments in those mandates, the Tribunal adopted a broad un-
derstanding of what refuge encompasses for Palestinian refugees. It also acknowledged that this 
scope of refuge is a malleable one that differs according to factors such as age, gender and 
disability. 
Further, by invoking these legal instruments, the Tribunal positioned the nature of refuge for 
Palestinian refugees as a right and a duty. The Tribunal did not characterise UNRWA’s human-
itarian assistance as an act of charity, discretion or political benevolence, but as a right Pales-
tinian refugees are entitled to under international law. The Tribunal classified the humanitarian 
assistance UNRWA provides as having ‘an inherent protection element’.87 It based this on the 
rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’)88 
‘not merely being aspirational in nature’ but ‘fully fledged rights with both duty bearers and 
beneficiaries’.89 Therefore, ‘UNRWA’s provision of education and health services and activi-
ties … directly and necessarily involves the protection of the right of Palestinian refugees to 
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the highest standard of health and education under articles 12 and 13 of ICESCR’.90 Recognis-
ing UNRWA’s humanitarian assistance as a right is particularly important in the context of 
economic, social and cultural rights. The ICESCR stipulates that developing countries may de-
termine the extent to which they guarantee economic rights to non-nationals.91 This clause 
would apply to most Palestinian refugees who are not nationals in their country of refuge (Jor-
dan is the only UNRWA region country that permits Palestinian refugees to acquire citizen-
ship).92 By referring to the ICESCR through UN General Assembly resolutions that inform 
UNRWA’s mandate, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal situated the hu-
manitarian assistance Palestinian refugees are entitled to as a right that the UN, through 
UNRWA, has a duty to address. 
The importance of a blended categorical and rights-based approach, as opposed to rights-based 
reasoning alone, can be seen by comparing the Tribunal’s understanding of protection and as-
sistance with those of the UNHCR and Goodwin-Gill and McAdam. In its guidelines on article 
1D,93 the UNHCR does not define the words ‘protection and assistance’ in article 1D. Accord-
ingly, it does not consider the nature and extent of protection and assistance Palestinian refugees 
are entitled to under international law. Instead, in considering when article 1D’s inclusionary 
paragraph is triggered, the UNHCR moves directly to when protection and assistance can ‘cease 
for any reason’.94 The UNHCR’s position is that UNRWA’s protection or assistance may cease 
if a Palestinian refugee faces a threat to their life, physical security or liberty, or other serious 
protection concerns such as ‘sexual or gender-based violence, torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, human trafficking and exploitation, forced recruitment, severe dis-
crimination, or arbitrary arrest or detention’, or there is a situation of ‘civil unrest, widespread 
insecurity or events seriously disturbing public order’.95 While the UNHCR includes human 
rights concepts in its guidelines on article 1D’s contingent inclusion clause, it is not guided by 
Palestinian refugees’ specific situation. The reference to harms such as torture and civil unrest, 
while not exhaustive, is much narrower than the Tribunal’s approach which was to refer to the 
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protection and assistance UNRWA is mandated to provide, including provisions of socio-eco-
nomic rights such as health and education. Similarly, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam do not con-
sider the meaning of the words ‘protection and assistance’ in article 1D, but move straight to 
determining the circumstances in which protection and assistance cease.96 They say that the 
phrase ‘ceased for any reason’ can encompass many reasons why protection or assistance has 
come to an end, including ‘persecution, violation of human rights, or violence’.97 While their 
position is broader than the UNHCR’s and their reference to human rights puts their under-
standing of the scope for refuge for Palestinian refugees in line with that of the New Zealand 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal, it is not grounded in the specific protection and assistance 
regime established for Palestinian refugees by the UN.98 
Applying Tuitt’s ideas on the Refugee Convention as a containment mechanism on top of this 
analysis suggests that the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s understanding 
of refuge (at the aforementioned part of its judgment) is a powerful one for Palestinian refugees. 
As noted above, Palestinian refugees were triply disenfranchised through article 1D: like other 
refugees, they no longer had the benefit of free movement, but they were also prohibited from 
accessing the ‘supposed positive benefit’ of non-refoulement, and to receive protection and as-
sistance they had to remain in an UNRWA region. By defining the ambit of protection and 
assistance with reference to UNRWA’s mandate, it could be said that once this special protec-
tion and assistance ceases for any reason (for example, UNRWA cannot provide access to ed-
ucation due to funding difficulties), Palestinian refugees are entitled to the benefits of the Ref-
ugee Convention on an ipso facto basis. This liberates Palestinian refugees from the contain-
ment imposed by article 1D’s first paragraph (interpreted by the Tribunal as having continuative 
effect) as well as the containing effects of the refugee definition in article 1A(2) of the Refugee 
Convention. It provides grounds for large numbers of Palestinian refugees to be able to leave 
the UNRWA region, if they wish, and travel in search of refuge elsewhere. 
However, while the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal recognised that protec-
tion and assistance for Palestinian refugees must be understood with reference to UNRWA’s 
evolving mandate, it moved away from this position in determining when article 1D’s inclu-
sionary paragraph is triggered. It referred to the ‘degree of compulsion which must exist in 
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order for the second paragraph of article 1D to apply’99 and stated that to ipso facto obtain the 
benefits of the Refugee Convention, the Palestinian refugee must have left the UNRWA region 
‘involuntarily’,100 or, in other words, it must have been a ‘forced departure’.101 Where did these 
ideas of compulsion and involuntariness derive from? They do not sit well with article 1D’s 
text, which refers to UN protection and assistance ceasing ‘for any reason’. They also do not 
align with the Tribunal’s reasoning that all Palestinian refugees are beneficiaries of UNRWA’s 
protection and assistance mandate. Ideas of compulsion and involuntary departure creep in to 
the judgment through the Tribunal’s reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
decision in Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott.102 In this case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union had to determine the same question as the New Zealand Immigration and Protection 
Tribunal: when does UN protection and assistance cease for Palestinian refugees? In its ap-
proach to this question, the Court of Justice of the European Union did not consider the meaning 
of the term ‘protection and assistance’ and, in particular, what it may encompass for Palestinian 
refugees. It did not refer to UNRWA’s mandate or international law for guidance. Instead, the 
Court focussed on the refugee’s departure from the relevant UNRWA field of operation and 
ruled that a ‘voluntary decision to leave’ cannot amount to cessation of protection or assis-
tance,103 but being ‘forced to leave for reasons unconnected with that person’s will’ may indi-
cate that UNRWA’s protection or assistance has ceased.104 The New Zealand Immigration and 
Protection Tribunal, in seeking to limit the circumstances in which Palestinian refugees can 
trigger article 1D’s inclusionary clause, engaged in horizontal transjudicial communication and 
brought the European Union’s test of involuntariness and forced migration into New Zealand 
jurisprudence. 
Despite the conundrum of ‘forced migration’ being heavily discussed in refugee studies litera-
ture,105 it has never been a question that refugee law judges have been required to grapple with. 
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This is because the refugee definition is prospective. Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention 
asks whether a person would have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to their country 
of nationality or habitual residence. At no point must a decision-maker enquire as to whether a 
person’s departure from their country of nationality or habitual residence was voluntary or 
forced. The Court of Justice of the European Union’s requirement of involuntariness or com-
pulsion in article 1D cases, adopted by the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal, 
introduced such a consideration into refugee law for the first time. 
V FROM RIGHTS PROTECTION TO MERE SURVIVAL: CIRCUMSCRIBING THE 
AMBIT OF REFUGE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
By insisting on involuntary departure, decision-makers in the European Union and New Zea-
land narrow and truncate the scope of refuge for Palestinian refugees. Below, I outline how the 
involuntariness requirement limits the notion of refuge to physical survival, disregards rights 
particularly important to women and imports Western ideas of fault into article ID. 
A Refuge as Protection of Life 
While the concept of forced migration is widely considered to be a misnomer, because crossing 
a border is inherently an exhibition of agency,106 if one accepts that a person can be ‘forced to 
leave for reasons unconnected with that person’s will’,107 then the circumstances giving rise to 
that involuntary departure must be exceptional or extreme. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union indicated that departure will be deemed involuntary when UNRWA cannot guarantee 
the living conditions ‘commensurate with [its] mission’ and the Palestinian refugee’s personal 
safety is threatened.108 However, UNRWA’s protection and assistance mandate is much broader 
than merely ensuring basic living conditions and protecting physical security. While UNRWA’s 
mandate includes ‘basic subsistence support’,109 it also encompasses education and social ser-
vices and human development programs. Also, while UNRWA’s mandate includes undertaking 
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effective measures to guarantee Palestinian refugees’ safety and security,110 it also extends to 
addressing their human rights more broadly.111 Threats to life and security of the person are 
serious human rights issues covered by of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights112 articles 6 and 9 and, of relevance to the Court of Justice of the European Union, arti-
cles 2 and 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.113 However, by 
insisting that departure be involuntary and, therefore, predicated by extraordinary circum-
stances, the Court of Justice of the European Union prioritised protection of these rights above 
others such as liberty, freedom of movement, education, healthcare and rights to work. By fo-
cussing only on living conditions and personal safety, the scope of refuge is limited to physical 
survival. This curtails the broader aspects of refuge for Palestinian refugees such as gaining an 
education and building a career in exile. It also restricts decision-makers’ assessment of the 
place of refuge: by limiting consideration of the UNRWA area of operation to the circumstances 
leading up to departure, the broader aspects of life in, for example, a Palestinian refugee camp, 
are obscured. 
B Women’s Physical Security Ignored 
Drawing on Tuitt’s and Chimni’s critique of objectivism, decision-makers have applied their 
own assessment of whether the departure was involuntary and the refugee’s assessment of the 
reasons for their flight is rendered redundant. This narrows the breadth of protection and assis-
tance Palestinian refugees are entitled to under international law in a way that has gendered 
consequences. This is evident in a 2013 Belgian case, decided subsequent to Mostafa Abed El 
Karem El Kott, concerning a stateless Palestinian refugee who had spent most of her life in 
Lebanon’s Burj el-Shemali Camp.114 She claimed refugee status in Belgium on the grounds that 
she was facing forced marriage in Lebanon but, being a Palestinian refugee, was excluded from 
the Refugee Convention. After reviewing the reasoning in Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott, the 
Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation stipulated that article 1D’s inclusionary paragraph 
would only be triggered if the asylum seeker personally found herself in grave danger and 
UNRWA was unable to offer her living conditions that meet the objectives with which it is 
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tasked.115 The Council acknowledged the harsh living conditions in the camp, but found that 
the applicant was not personally in grave danger. Accordingly, the Council concluded that the 
applicant did not leave Lebanon for reasons beyond her control or against her will. In this case, 
the Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation inserted its assessment for what constitutes a 
feeling of grave danger prompting involuntary departure and determined that forced marriage 
is not a serious enough to be compelled to leave against one’s will. 
This decision can also be critiqued on the ground that forced marriage raises the prospect of 
sexual intercourse without consent, which is a threat to personal safety in line with the test in 
Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott. However, more fundamentally, UNRWA is responsible for 
addressing women’s human rights in accordance with the CEDAW, which includes prohibition 
of forced marriage.116 By not being able to protect her from forced marriage, UNRWA was not 
providing her the protection it is mandated to provide. However, she was unable to trigger the 
inclusionary paragraph in article 1D because she could not satisfy the Belgian authorities that 
she was personally in grave danger. Thus, the involuntary departure approach truncates the 
scope for the protection and assistance for Palestinian refugees in a way that has particularly 
problematic consequences for women facing gendered harms such as forced marriage. 
C Discriminatory Denial of Protection 
The test adopted in New Zealand imposes additional hurdles for Palestinian refugees wanting 
to trigger article 1D’s inclusionary paragraph. The New Zealand Immigration and Protection 
Tribunal stated that the circumstances leading to an involuntary departure ‘must have some 
enduring quality and be of a sufficiently serious character so as to perpetuate the claimant’s 
refugee-like character’.117 The Tribunal adopted this test even though it agreed that by virtue of 
the phrase ‘ipso facto’ in article 1D’s inclusionary paragraph, Palestinian refugees seeking the 
benefits of the Refugee Convention are not required to satisfy the refuge definition in article 
1A(2).118 While the Tribunal did not specify what circumstances would perpetuate a refugee-
like character, the application of the test to the facts indicates that Palestinian refugees have to 
demonstrate discriminatory denial of human rights. The Tribunal first summarised evidence 
about the general circumstances in Gaza including high unemployment,119 poverty,120 lack of 
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infrastructure,121 civil unrest,122 high levels of violence123 and restrictions on freedom of move-
ment.124 The Tribunal also noted that UNRWA was facing ‘its most serious financial crisis 
ever’.125 However, these circumstances were not sufficient for the claimants to establish that 
UNRWA’s protection and assistance had ceased. The Palestinian refugees in this case were 
Christians and the Tribunal considered the situation for Christians in Gaza, particularly dis-
crimination in employment126 and risks to physical security for Christians who publicly practise 
their religion.127 It was ‘the cumulative effect of these matters’ that satisfied the Tribunal that 
UNRWA’s protection and assistance had ceased.128 Accordingly, the Palestinian refugees in 
this case were only successful because they could establish, in addition to the general conditions 
in Gaza, discrimination on religious grounds. 
The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s approach to article 1D’s inclusionary 
paragraph has parallels with Tuitt’s critique that the definition of a refugee in the Refugee Con-
vention’s article 1A(2) has a Western ideological slant due to its insistence on establishing fault. 
By requiring evidence of something beyond the general living conditions in Gaza and looking 
to religious discrimination, the Tribunal imported the idea of culpability into article 1D’s sec-
ond paragraph. It ensured that article 1D’s inclusionary paragraph cannot be triggered by factors 
such as poverty or generalised violence which are seen as ‘harms of less discriminating 
origin’,129 but that Palestinian refugees must establish a harm that is personally directed towards 
them for illegitimate reasons. While Tuitt critiques the idea of culpability in the refugee defini-
tion, she acknowledges that this ‘conception of fault’ is embedded in the Refugee Convention’s 
text and is, therefore, not pillorying refugee law judges.130 However, the New Zealand Immi-
gration and Protection Tribunal inserted the idea of culpability into article 1D with no textual 
basis for doing so. The need to demonstrate discriminatory denial of human rights when seeking 
confirmation of refugee status under article 1A(2) is consistent with the text, context and pur-
pose of the Refugee Convention,131 but this is not the case for the inclusionary paragraph in 
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129 Tuitt, ‘Defining the Refugee by Race’ (n 12) 101. 
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of one of the enumerated grounds is justified. While two people may fear deprivation of fundamental human rights, 
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article 1D. The ordinary meaning of the words ‘when such protection or assistance has ceased 
for any reason’ indicates that a Palestinian refugee should not have to establish that protection 
and assistance have ceased for reasons of, for example, their religion or political opinion. Also, 
the purpose of article 1D’s second paragraph is to ensure the continuity of international protec-
tion for Palestinian refugees. This is defeated if the inclusionary paragraph can only be triggered 
by Palestinian refugees who can establish that denial of their fundamental human rights has a 
discriminatory element. 
New Zealand’s fault-based conception of involuntary departure further narrows decision-mak-
ers’ approach to the scope of refuge for Palestinian refugees. While the Tribunal acknowledged 
the difficult living conditions in Gaza, the Tribunal is only satisfied that the Palestinian refugees 
‘felt compelled to leave Gaza … because of fears for their safety if they were to practice their 
religion’.132 The Tribunal’s focus on physical safety and religious discrimination renders most 
of UNRWA’s broad protection and assistance mandate, especially with respect to education, 
healthcare, infrastructure and business development, irrelevant to article 1D decisions. It sug-
gests that Palestinian refugees who travel outside an UNRWA region because they are poor, 
cannot access adequate healthcare or feel they have no future because of lack of education and 
employment prospects have not been forced to leave due to direct discrimination and attacks. 
Instead, they exercise choice and cannot trigger the inclusionary paragraph in article 1D. 
VI THE INVOLUNTARY REFUGEE 
The notion of involuntariness not only curtails ideas about the ambit of refuge for Palestinian 
refugees, but, as I explain below, makes it almost impossible for Palestinian refugees to use 
article 1D in their journeys to seek protection outside the UNRWA region except for in excep-
tional situations. 
A Involuntary Flight: An Oxymoron? 
Insisting that Palestinian refugees establish involuntary flight magnifies and complicates an 
already existing injustice in the international refugee regime. Tuitt observes that to trigger ref-
ugee protection a person has to cross an international border, but such movement does not mean 
                                                          
if one fears it for reasons of, for example, their political opinion, that person is more likely to be socially margin-
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that their needs are any greater or their claim to international protection is any stronger than 
those who remain inside territorial boundaries.133 Rather, the alienage requirement exists due 
to the international legal prohibition of interference with another state’s territorial integrity134 
and is a ‘practical impediment to the expansion of refugee law’.135 The requirement of move-
ment across international borders disadvantages those who face greater obstacles in attempting 
such travel, in particular women and children.136 Palestinian refugees making protection from 
refuge claims not only have to make the journey to a country signatory to the Refugee Conven-
tion (a practical impediment for many Palestinian refugees), but have to establish that this jour-
ney was an involuntary one. 
This creates an evidentiary paradox for Palestinian refugees, which limits the circumstances in 
which they can use article 1D to seek a place of refuge outside the UNRWA region. As noted 
above, most scholars agree that no matter how serious the danger a person is fleeing from, the 
decision to cross a border to escape is a demonstration of agency. This is even truer in the case 
of Palestinian refugees. While life in, for example, a Palestinian refugee camp, may be bleak, 
continuing to live in the region and resisting local integration lends at least symbolic strength 
to Palestinians’ assertion of the right to return. Also, Palestinian refugees who are stateless face 
a number of hurdles in gaining documentation that would enable them to undertake transconti-
nental travel to Europe or the Antipodes. A decision by a Palestinian refugee to leave an 
UNRWA field of operation and travel across borders to seek protection as a Convention Refu-
gee is a significant and burdensome one. The element of compulsion introduced by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union and adopted by the New Zealand Immigration and Protection 
Tribunal places Palestinian refugees in a double bind. The inclusionary aspect of article 1D can 
only be triggered by leaving an UNRWA field of operation, an act that is inherently an exhibi-
tion of agency, yet to obtain the benefits of the Refugee Convention Palestinian refugees must 
prove that departure was involuntary. This incongruity obscures the difficult and often distress-
ing choices that must be made when leaving a home (albeit for Palestinian refugees, a temporary 
one), family and community in search of refuge in unfamiliar territory. 
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When determining whether flight was involuntary, European and New Zealand decision-mak-
ers prioritise particular narratives and this limits the circumstances in which Palestinian refu-
gees can draw on article 1D in their searches for refuge. The stories decision-makers favour 
echo Chimni’s and Tuitt’s observations on Western states’ reactions to the ‘new’ asylum seek-
ers. Chimni and Tuitt explain that when larger numbers of refugees from the developing world 
started to arrive in Global North countries, they were perceived as ‘bogus’ refugees pursuing a 
better life in the developed world and were distinguished from the authentic refugee fleeing 
political strife.137 Neither the Court of Justice of the European Union or New Zealand Immi-
gration and Protection Tribunal are satisfied that poverty, poor access to healthcare and lack of 
education and employment prospects are enough to prompt a Palestinian refugee to flee against 
their will. Rather, according to their decisions, forced departure is predicated by something 
more than dire humanitarian circumstances. The Court of Justice of the European Union fo-
cussed on threats to personal safety and the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal 
emphasised discriminatory denial of human rights. By doing so, these decision-makers repro-
duced, in the article 1D context, the distinction between the genuine refugee fleeing political 
and religious persecution and the fraudulent economic migrant. These approaches to article 1D 
indicate that a Palestinian refugee for whom UN protection and assistance has ceased because 
they do not have the means to survive or access to education or employment may be considered 
an object of humanitarian concern, but not a person entitled to the benefits of the Refugee Con-
vention. This status is reserved for those who have been the victim of some form of targeted or 
discriminatory harm. 
B Gendered Understandings of Involuntariness 
When determining whether targeted or discriminatory harm triggers involuntary flight, deci-
sion-makers have favoured harms that emanate in the public sphere and can be considered po-
litically motivated. This limits the ability for female Palestinian refugees to use article 1D to 
find refuge outside the UNRWA area. This has resonance with Tuitt’s observation that refugee 
status assessment procedures are ‘geared towards eliciting evidence of political involvement’ 
and do not encourage evidence of other kinds of harms that may, for example, evidence gender 
persecution.138 Favouring these particular narratives can be seen through comparing the out-
come of the Belgian case discussed above regarding a Palestinian woman subject to forced 
                                                          
137 Tuitt, False Images (n 20) 70; Chimni, ‘Geopolitics’ (n 29) 351. 
138 Tuitt, False Images (n 20) 44–5. Since this publication, decision-makers have interpreted the Refugee Conven-
tion’s (n 3) article 1A(2) in a manner that makes it more responsive to gender-based violence. For example, it is 
 196 
marriage with a subsequent Belgian decision concerning a Palestinian refugee who had worked 
as a photojournalist in Gaza.139 The refugee in the latter case gave evidence that while working 
as a photojournalist, he was injured by live fire from the Israeli army and received threats from 
both the Israeli army and Hamas. The Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation found that, due 
to these attacks and threats, he left Gaza for reasons independent of his will. The Council noted 
that he should not be required to retreat from informing the public about the human rights vio-
lations occurring in Gaza to avoid these threats to his life. While the Council accepted that a 
person injured by live fire is compelled against his will to leave an UNRWA field of operation, 
the same result was not reached with respect to a woman subject to forced marriage. Both the 
right to physical security and prohibition of forced marriage are protected by international hu-
man rights law and covered by UNRWA’s mandate. However, it is perhaps easier to persuade 
a decision-maker that potentially lethal physical harm occurring in a public space would lead 
to involuntary departure than the prospect of forced marriage, which involves unknown future 
harms that would most probably occur behind closed doors. It indicates that the element of 
compulsion, introduced in the European Union and New Zealand, may mean that only those 
who can demonstrate dramatic and heroic narratives can make use of the inclusionary clause in 
article 1D in their searches for refuge beyond the UNRWA region. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This chapter builds on the analysis undertaken in the previous case studies. Despite the legal 
differences between the protection from refuge claims studied in this and previous chapters, 
there are a number of similarities. First, this chapter indicates that when decision-makers take 
a categorical approach by reflecting on the nature of refugeehood (in this case, Palestinian ref-
ugeehood), they engage with the concept of refuge and give it a broad and rich meaning. Sec-
ond, in an effort to limit the legal grounds on which a refugee can seek a different place of 
refuge, decision-makers partially excise the place of refuge from consideration and focus on 
the particular protection from refuge claimant and why their circumstances may be exceptional. 
This produces minimalist understandings of refuge, ensures the continuation of containment 
mechanisms and inhibits refugees’ ability to use courts and other decision-makings bodies in 
their searches for refuge. One difference is that in this case study, there was no clear protection 
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from refuge victory. In previous chapters, judicial engagement with the concept of refuge pro-
duced successes likely to apply to large numbers of refugees. In this chapter, there was a mo-
ment early in the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal’s decision that outlined a 
broad scope of refuge for Palestinian refugees, but this was diluted with the Tribunal’s reference 
to involuntary departure and discriminatory denial of human rights. 
The additional factor present in this case study is that these protection from refuge claims are 
grounded in the Refugee Convention and trigger states’ concerns that it provides a pathway for 
refugees to shift their place of refuge from the Global South to the Global North. European 
Union and New Zealand decision-makers’ approaches to these protection from refuge claims 
entrench article 1D as a containment mechanism. In these jurisdictions, Palestinian refugees 
continue to be excluded from the Refugee Convention because article 1D is deemed to have 
continuative effect, but can only trigger the inclusionary second paragraph in limited and ex-
ceptional situations. As a consequence, many Palestinian refugees not enjoying the breadth of 
protection or assistance that UNRWA is mandated to provide will also not be able to secure a 
genuine place of refuge in other parts of the world. This is particularly significant in the current 
European context, where many of those seeking protection due to the Syrian civil war are Pal-
estinians refugees.140 While the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, a human rights focussed non-
government organisation, views the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision in Mo-
stafa Abed El Karem El Kott as a landmark victory that ‘opens the way for tens of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees to be recognized as refugees in [European Union] countries’,141 I suggest 
that it significantly restricts the circumstances in which Palestinian refugees can obtain interna-
tional protection pursuant to article 1D of the Refugee Convention. 
Through their approaches to article 1D’s second paragraph, European Union and New Zealand 
decision-makers only rescue Palestinian refugees who resemble Cold War-inspired, Western 
notions of a refugee. They prioritise those who have been specifically targeted with a form of 
harm manifesting in the public sphere, but disregard those subject to gender-based violence or 
whose needs emanate from less discriminating circumstances such as hunger, poverty and idle-
ness due to lack of education and employment. As a consequence, these forms of suffering and 
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need remain an ‘extensive unattended moral arena which states seek strategically to avoid’.142 
This is acutely problematic in the Palestinian context. Palestinian refugees were excluded from 
the Refugee Convention partly because they were seen as a special group of refugees who de-
served a unique protection regime, but states agreed to grant them ipso facto refugee status once 
their UN protection and assistance ceased for any reason. UNRWA has been facing a funding 
crisis for a number of years and the situation has recently deteriorated due to the United States’ 
(UNRWA’s biggest donor) 2018 decision to cut aid to UNRWA.143 In response to these funding 
cuts, the head of UNRWA, Pierre Krähenbühl, in an open letter to UNRWA staff stressed that 
Palestinian refugees ‘cannot be simply wished away’.144 Yet, through these approaches to arti-
cle 1D in the European Union and New Zealand, decision-makers are washing their hands of 
this significant humanitarian problem. The only Palestinian refugees who can ipso facto secure 
the benefits of the Refugee Convention are those whose circumstances are deemed to mimic 
the archetypal political refugee. The rest remain the responsibility of an underfunded and over-
stretched agency struggling to fulfil its protection and assistance mandate. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESISTING THE PROSPECT OF REFUGE IN AN INTER-
NALLY DISPLACED PERSONS’ CAMP 
I INTRODUCTION 
After visiting internally displaced persons’ (‘IDP’) camps in Nigeria in 2016, Chaloka Beyani, 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced People, 
reflected, ‘camps should offer protection for those in need yet I am alarmed to learn that many 
are in fact the settings for violence, exploitation and abuse of the most vulnerable’.1 In this 
chapter, I examine decision-makers’ responses to cases in which putative refugees2 are resisting 
the prospect of seeking refuge in an IDP camp. These are protection from refuge challenges, 
because the putative refugee is wanting protection from a place that, notionally at least, is serv-
ing as a place of refuge to hundreds or thousands of IDPs. Such claims arise in internal protec-
tion alternative cases where decision-makers consider whether a putative refugee will have pro-
tection if they relocate to another part of their home country. In some of these cases, the putative 
refugee argues that if they internally relocate they will have no option but to live in an IDP 
camp. Most of these claims have arisen in the United Kingdom but there is one case from New 
Zealand.3 
The purpose of this chapter is to continue my examination of how decision-makers approach 
protection from refuge claims grounded in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(‘Refugee Convention’)4 and give rise to a concern that the Refugee Convention is being used 
                                                          
1 End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, Mr Chaloka Beyani, on His Visit to Nigeria, 23 to 26 August 2016 (22 January 2016) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20427&LangID=E>. 
2 As noted in Chapter One, putative refugees are persons outside their country of origin or habitual residence whose 
circumstances indicate they satisfy one part of the refugee definition (a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), but who have 
not yet established another aspect of the refugee definition (that they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves 
of the protection of their country of origin or habitual residence). 
3 As noted in Chapter One, I conducted an extensive search of internal protection case law in Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the United States and European Union member states on LexisNexis, Westlaw and Refworld. The 
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has arisen in cases where protection under the Refugee Convention (below n 4) is being sought. The issue of 
internal relocation to an IDP camp has arisen in some decisions in which the individuals bringing the case are not 
entitled to refugee protection. In Chapter One I outlined why these decisions are outside the scope of this thesis. 
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
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as a pathway for migration from the Global South to the Global North.5 The main difference is 
that the protection from refuge claimants in the cases examined this chapter are not yet recog-
nised refugees. Rather, they are both putative refugees and prospective IDPs. Thus, I begin this 
chapter by revisiting Tuitt’s scholarship and outline her ideas on why it is the IDP, as opposed 
to the refugee, that is ‘the figure that is most promising of a new political consciousness’.6 I 
then use this idea to explore how decision-makers conceptualise the scope and nature of refuge, 
respond to the conflict between a person’s need for refuge and states’ desires to control their 
borders, and whether, as a result, particular refugees are more likely to be able to secure a place 
of refuge in the Global North. I argue that decision-makers have approached these claims in a 
manner that delineates a broad scope of refuge and reflects an understanding with respect to the 
nature of refuge that it is a shared responsibility. However, in more recent jurisprudence, deci-
sion-makers narrow the scope of refuge, ideas of international cooperation are lost and putative 
refugees must prove that they are exceptional in some way to secure protection in the Global 
North. This frustrates both women’s and men’s journeys in search of refuge and compounds 
the inequities between the developing and developed world in relation to caring for those in 
need of protection. 
II INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: NEGLECTED IN REFUGEE LAW AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
In her early scholarship on the Refugee Convention as a containment mechanism, Tuitt argues 
that there are many different notions of who is a refugee,7 but the definition in the Refugee 
Convention has become the dominant understanding.8 This definition ‘captures only a tiny por-
tion of the whole corpus of meanings within the notion of refugee’.9 In particular, the alienage 
requirement ‘as it is employed in international refugee law clearly helps to contain refugees’.10 
                                                          
5 These concerns are reflected in a United Kingdom House of Lords (now the United Kingdom Supreme Court) 
judgment in which the Court stressed that the Refugee Convention’s (n 4) function is ‘not to procure a general 
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ticular, constricting the situations in which refugees can move from the developing to the developed world: Penel-
ope Mathew, ‘The Shifting Boundaries and Content of Protection: The Internal Protection Alternative Revisited’ 
in Satvinder Juss (ed), The Ashgate Research Companion to Migration Law, Theory and Policy (Ashgate, 2013) 
189, 205–6. 
6 Patricia Tuitt, ‘Refugees, Nations, Laws and the Territorialization of Violence’ in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia 
Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject (Ashgate, 2004) 37, 48 (‘Refugees, Nations, 
Laws’). 
7 Patricia Tuitt, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee (Pluto Press, 1996) 14 (‘False Images’). 
8 Ibid 14–15. 
9 Ibid 16. 
10 Ibid 12. 
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Further, she argues that by requiring refugees to cross an international border, refugee law 
‘[c]onsciously … separates the strong from the weak’, because many of those in need of inter-
national protection cannot leave their country of origin or habitual residence due to factors such 
as age, gender and disability.11 The concept of alienage is a malleable one that allows states ‘to 
retain control over the world refugee map’ by introducing non entrée mechanisms such as visas 
and carrier sanctions that inhibit a person’s ability to leave their home country in search of 
refuge abroad.12 Therefore, IDPs are ‘not only disenfranchised within their state of origin or 
domicile, but disenfranchised from the law’.13 Additionally, the alienage requirement has re-
sulted in refugees being ‘conceived of as a moving entity’14 and that movement as ‘synonymous 
with humanitarian need and suffering’.15 
In more recent scholarship, Tuitt expands on these ideas and argues that scholars have neglected 
the figure of the IDP in scholarship on rightlessness16 and bare life.17 She contests that the 
refugee is ‘the classic instance of the rightless person’18 and argues that IDPs are, similar to 
refugees, excluded from the nation-state except in territorial terms.19 The refugee does not chal-
lenge the idea of the ‘nexus of state, territory and identity’, but is the ‘tangible product of a legal 
imagination that is all too wedded to the territorially bound nation’.20 Conversely, the IDP, 
being ‘neither meaningfully within, nor formally outside, the nation-state’,21 threatens the idea 
of the territorially bounded state and indicates that ‘there can be no fixed or impermeable border 
separating the inside of a nation and its outside’.22 Thus, it is the IDP, rather than the refugee, 
that can ‘radically disrupt the comforting image of secure, stable, bounded nations’.23 While 
there have been developments on IDP rights since Tuitt’s writings,24 with Cantor going so far 
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15 Tuitt False Images (n 7) 14. 
16 Hannah Arendt, cited in Tuitt, ‘Refugees, Nations, Laws’ (n 6) 37. 
17 Giorgio Agamben, cited in Tuitt, ‘Refugees, Nations, Laws’ (n 6) 37. 
18 Tuitt, ‘Refugees, Nations, Laws’ (n 6) 38. 
19 Ibid 45. 
20 Ibid 47. 
21 Ibid 46. 
22 Ibid 47. 
23 Ibid 51. 
24 In 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa, opened for signature 23 October 2009, 49 ILM 86 (entered into force 6 December 2012). 
Twenty-seven countries now have national laws or policies relating to internal displacement: The Internal Dis-
placement Monitoring Centre, IDP Laws and Policies: A Mapping Tool (2018) <http://www.internal-displace-
ment.org/law-and-policy/>. 
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as to argue that IDP law is emerging ‘as a distinct field of law’,25 this does not take away from 
Tuitt’s central thesis. It remains the case that by virtue of the fact that IDPs have not crossed an 
international border, they cannot access refugee protection. 
III REAL AND MEANINGFUL REFUGE 
The protection from refuge litigants in the cases examined in this chapter are not IDPs in the 
precise sense that Tuitt discusses. Rather, they are people who have managed to leave their 
homeland to seek international protection. However, the figure of the IDP looms large in these 
decisions and, in particular, decision-makers’ approaches to the nature and ambit of refuge. In 
United Kingdom cases in the early 2000s and the one New Zealand case to consider this issue, 
decision-makers position the protection from refuge litigant as a prospective IDP. Decision-
makers examine the situation for IDPs in the country of origin, in particular, their specific needs 
and whether the relevant authorities had capacity to provide protection to them. Similar to the 
pattern identified in previous chapters, this is an example of categorical reasoning—decision-
makers start their analysis by focussing on the predicaments faced by IDPs. For example, in a 
decision concerning whether an Afghani putative refugee could internally relocate to Kabul, 
the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority considered evidence about the challenges 
faced by IDPs in Kabul. The Authority noted that ‘the current upswing in the insurgency since 
2006 has increased the numbers of [IDPs] coming to Kabul which, in turn, has placed strain on 
the city’s capacity to provide them with basic levels of social welfare’.26 The Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority cited a report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which 
stated that ‘a lack of basic economic and social rights is the primary cause of ongoing displace-
ment and the main obstacle to durable integration of internally displaced persons’.27 After con-
sidering this evidence, the Authority concluded that the ‘likelihood that the appellant would end 
up in an IDP camp in Kabul is all too real. In no way does this provide meaningful protection 
to him’.28 
Similarly, in one of the earliest United Kingdom cases raising the question of internal relocation 
to an IDP camp, the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal positioned the putative 
refugee as a prospective IDP. It considered evidence of the difficulties faced by IDPs in the 
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relevant country and the relevant authorities’ ability to provide protection. This 2002 case con-
cerned whether a 22-year-old man from eastern Sierra Leone could internally relocate to Free-
town.29 The Tribunal noted that if he did, he would ‘be thrown into the general mele [sic] of 
expecting support from international agencies, along with the mass of other internally displaced 
persons and returnees’.30 Despite being a ‘young, independent and fit man’,31 he would be ‘at 
best, placed in a camp where conditions are described as “sub-human” and face medical condi-
tions described as some of the worst in the world’.32 The Tribunal ruled that he would not have 
‘meaningful protection’ in an IDP camp.33 
Taking a categorical approach does not mean that the prospective IDP’s individual circum-
stances are ignored. In early United Kingdom jurisprudence, decision-makers examine the dif-
ficulties faced by all IDPs, specifically, the relevant authorities’ lack of capacity to provide 
protection, but also demonstrate an understanding of the ways factors such as age and health 
concerns can exacerbate challenges associated with internal displacement. For example, in a 
2002 decision, the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal considered whether a 
Kurdish man from Iraq could internally relocate to the Kurdish Autonomous Area, where it was 
likely that he would end up living in an IDP camp.34 The Tribunal considered evidence of the 
situation for IDPs in the autonomous area and highlighted that ‘40% of internally displaced 
persons in the region under Kurdish administration live in settlements with standards of water 
and electricity supplies, sanitation, drainage and road access that were below average for the 
area’,35 and IDPs survive only on United Nations (‘UN’) rations.36 The Tribunal ruled that there 
was no internal protection alternative, because he would probably end up living in an IDP camp 
in which the conditions were ‘abominable’.37 In coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal also 
took into account the disadvantage to the man in accessing employment and government facil-
ities due to his lack of Kurdish language skills, the fact that he would have no family support 
and had medical and psychological problems that would be exacerbated without such support 
networks.38 In 2005, the Tribunal considered a case concerning whether an 18-year-old man 
from Southern Sudan could internally relocate to Khartoum, where he may have no choice but 
                                                          
29 PO (Risk-Return-General) Sierra Leone CG [2002] UKIAT 03285. 
30 Ibid [27]. 
31 Ibid [27]. 
32 Ibid [27]. 
33 Ibid [28]. 
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to live in an IDP camp.39 The Tribunal referred to evidence from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) that described the conditions in the camps as ‘harsh’40 
and ‘precarious’41 and stated that inhabitants faced significant threats to their physical secu-
rity.42 The Tribunal ruled that he would not have protection in a camp environment.43 As part 
of its decision, the Tribunal emphasised that the putative refugee was a young man who had 
lost all of his family and would ‘be returned to an IDP camp in Khartoum’ where he would 
‘have no support network’.44 
Through positioning the putative refugee as a prospective IDP, decision-makers generate an 
understanding of the nature of refuge that, to some extent, speaks to Tuitt’s concerns about the 
‘unattended moral arena’ of internal displacement and the containment of those in need of pro-
tection in the Global South. One theme that emerges across these decisions is that the putative 
refugee, as a prospective IDP, would be returning to a situation in which the relevant care pro-
viders are under-resourced. The New Zealand decision stressed that the city of Kabul was facing 
challenges in providing for IDPs’ basic welfare. The United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal in the decisions discussed above highlighted that IDPs survive off UN rations and rely 
on assistance from international agencies. By taking this approach, decision-makers conceptu-
alise refuge as something that involves the state or international community45 providing care. 
Understanding refuge as something bestowed by the state or international community is not 
necessarily inconsistent with notions of refuge as a process discussed earlier in this thesis. In 
these cases, decision-makers acknowledge that refuge cannot be entirely self-made, but requires 
an authority able and willing to provide care and protection. If the relevant authority cannot 
provide adequate care, then the putative refugee does not have an internal protection alternative 
and is entitled to refugee status in New Zealand or the United Kingdom. As a consequence of 
this understanding of what refuge requires, countries in the Global North take responsibility for 
those with a well-founded fear of persecution who would otherwise be part of the large numbers 
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Displacement (UN ESCOR, 54th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (22 July 1998)) principle 3(1) confirms 
that the state has ‘the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to inter-
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of people relying on assistance from overstretched governments or international agencies. This 
has resonance with Kritzman-Amir’s idea, discussed in Chapter Two, that responsibility for 
refugees should be primarily determined by reference to states’ varying capacity to care for 
refugees.46 
The ways these decision-makers conceptualise the nature of refuge are significant in the context 
of debates over the correct test for internal protection alternative cases. New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom adopt different tests when considering whether a putative refugee can inter-
nally relocate. Both agree that the putative refugee must be able to access the internal protection 
alternative safely47 and her or his well-found fear of persecution must be negated.48 Both juris-
dictions acknowledge that there also must be affirmative state protection, but the tests for dis-
cerning this differ. In New Zealand, the test is whether they can ‘genuinely access … domestic 
protection which is meaningful’.49 This includes consideration of whether ‘basic norms of civil, 
political and socio-economic rights will be provided by the State’50 using the rights in the Ref-
ugee Convention as a guide.51 The test in the United Kingdom is whether it would be unduly 
harsh or unreasonable for the putative refugee to internally relocate.52 
Scholars have criticised the reasonableness test on the grounds that it does not prioritise human 
rights considerations and can lead to inconsistent outcomes.53 Refugee law experts advocate for 
states to determine internal protection alternatives with reference to the rights in the Refugee 
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tive’ (1999) 21(1) Michigan Journal of International Law 134, 139 (‘Michigan Guidelines on the IPA’). 
52 Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426 [21] (‘Januzi’). A reasonableness test is 
also used in Australia and Canada: SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18, [32]; 
Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 FC 706, 711. 
53 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 
352 (‘The Law of Refugee Status’); Mathew (n 5) 192; Bríd Ní Ghráinne, ‘The Internal Protection Alternative 
Inquiry and Human Rights Considerations – Irrelevant or Indispensable?’ (2015) 27(1) International Journal of 
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Convention54 or a slightly broader human rights enquiry.55 While these rights-based approaches 
are consistent with a good faith interpretation of the Refugee Convention,56 they do not squarely 
address the problem of the discrepancies in levels of protection between countries in the Global 
North and Global South. Most of the rights in the Refugee Convention are not absolute, but 
relative to what the state of origin provides its nationals or foreigners ‘generally in the same 
circumstances’.57 Similarly, realisation of rights in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights58 is measured by a state’s available resources.59 Thus, these two 
instruments acknowledge and permit discrepancies between levels of rights protection in de-
veloped and developing countries.60 What is noteworthy about the above decisions is that, 
through conceptualising refuge as something to be bestowed by an appropriate authority, they 
address the problem of states or international agencies having limited capacity to care for large 
numbers of people in need of protection. They provide that when the relevant authorities are 
under-resourced, the putative refugee remains the responsibility of New Zealand or the United 
Kingdom. Approaching protection from refuge claims in this manner is in line with the notion 
of international cooperation in the Refugee Convention’s preamble. It also is a counterpoint to 
Tuitt’s argument that law closes down or discourages enquiries about ‘pressing humanitarian 
concerns’.61 In these cases, decision-makers consider evidence of the difficulties IDPs face and 
the ways they are compounded when the relevant authorities cannot or do not provide protec-
tion. Their conceptualisation of refuge as something that must be bestowed by a state or organ-
isation able and willing to do so permits these refugees to continue their quest for refuge. This 
means that their journeys in search of refuge will not be fragmented by having to return to their 
home country and seek protection in an IDP camp. 
There is only one United Kingdom case from the early 2000s in which it was found that it would 
not be unreasonable for a putative refugee to internally relocate to an IDP camp.62 The case 
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concerned a Pashtun man from Mazar, Afghanistan. The issue was whether he could relocate 
to Kabul or an area in the south of Afghanistan which was in an exclusively Pashtun area. One 
issue that arose was that if he internally relocated, he might have no option but to live in a 
UNHCR refugee camp for Pakistani refugees that also provided protection to Afghani IDPs. 
The United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal reasoned that ‘it would be difficult to 
regard being under UNHCR protection in a UNHCR camp as being unduly harsh’, because it 
would be ‘difficult to believe that people would be invited to make use of those camps if they 
were not basically humanitarian’.63 The Tribunal accepted these camps are ‘basically humani-
tarian’ without considering any evidence regarding the actual conditions in these camps.64 Nev-
ertheless, the focus in this decision was whether the prospective IDP would have protection and 
there is identification of an international organisation that provided such protection. Thus, this 
decision relied on an understanding of the nature of refuge as something that must be bestowed 
by the state or international community. 
With respect to the scope of refuge, in none of these cases did the decision-makers discuss what 
is meant by ‘meaningful protection’ in great depth. This may be because they accepted almost 
without question that an IDP camp is not a viable internal protection alternative. They did not 
need to justify their decision beyond reference to the ‘abominable’ and ‘subhuman’ conditions 
in the camps. Nevertheless, the types of protections identified in the judgments cover a spec-
trum of breaches of civil and political as well as socio-economic rights such as physical secu-
rity; social welfare; access to food, water and shelter; and availability of employment and gov-
ernment services. This is in line with the test Mathew proposes for the availability of an internal 
relocation alternative: whether the putative refugee would have human rights protection in the 
proposed place of relocation.65 Also, the New Zealand case discussed the need for there to be 
durable solutions to the situation of internal displacement and, in particular, that IDPs should 
be able to integrate into a new community.66 Reference to this array of rights indicates an ap-
preciation that the prospective IDP is not only entitled to a sense of safety and adequate living 
conditions, they must also have the ability to live a normal life through having access to em-
ployment and government services, integrating into the community and eventually finding a 
solution to displacement. This is a broad understanding of the scope of refuge and reflects ideas 
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of refuge’s temporality, in particular, that it must enable refugees to imagine and work towards 
a better future. If a prospective IDP will not enjoy these protections because the relevant au-
thorities are already overburdened with providing care to large numbers of IDPs, they can re-
main in and lay claim to a place of refuge in New Zealand or the United Kingdom. 
When decision-makers take this approach, the figure of the IDP is able to disrupt the boundaries 
between the Global North and Global South in a way that permits large numbers of prospective 
IDPs to continue their quest for refuge in a developed country. In these cases, decision-makers 
position the prospective IDP not as the rightless figure Tuitt describes in her scholarship, but as 
a rights-bearing subject. They are entitled to live a safe and normal life under the care of an 
authority that has capacity to provide them with protection. This approach does not address the 
problem that many people with a well-founded fear of persecution cannot leave their homeland 
to seek international protection, but it does circumscribe the Refugee Convention’s operation 
as a containment mechanism. These decisions indicate that refugee law can operate as an in-
strument that enables refugees to continue their search for a genuine place of refuge and help 
to achieve a fairer distribution of refugee responsibility. In their determination of these protec-
tion from refuge cases, decision-makers treat the fact that there are many people in the country 
of origin who do not have adequate protection in line with Mathew’s observation that this 
‘simply confirms the sad reality that there are many IDPs who are unable to exercise their right 
to seek asylum’.67 
IV REFUGE AS THE CHANCE OF MERE SURVIVAL 
There has been a shift in the ways United Kingdom decision-makers approach the question of 
whether an IDP camp can serve as an internal protection alternative. Because of this change, 
the presence of large numbers of IDPs in the country of origin takes on a different significance. 
This results in a narrow and impoverished understanding of refuge and the entrenchment of the 
Refugee Convention as a mechanism to contain those in need of protection in the Global South, 
impeding refugees’ quests for refuge. This turnaround is partly attributable to the 2006 United 
Kingdom House of Lords decision of Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(‘Januzi’).68 This case concerned four putative refugees whose claims for protection had been 
denied on the grounds that they had an internal protection alternative.69 The common issue on 
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appeal was whether decision-makers must examine the prospective internal protection alterna-
tive with reference to the standards espoused in leading international human rights law instru-
ments including the rights in the Refugee Convention. The prospect of an IDP camp serving as 
an internal protection alternative was an issue relevant to three of the appellants, but the United 
Kingdom House of Lords did not make any ruling on this aspect of their case. 
Lord Bingham gave the lead judgment. He considered the approach adopted in New Zealand, 
which involves examining whether the putative refugee would have access to the rights outlined 
in the Refugee Convention in the internal protection alternative.70 Lord Bingham compared this 
to the approach adopted by the England and Wales Court of Appeal, which involved ‘a com-
parison between the conditions prevailing in the place of habitual residence and those which 
prevail in the safe haven, having regard to the impact that they will have on a person with the 
characteristics of the asylum-seeker’.71 Lord Bingham preferred the England and Wales Court 
of Appeal’s approach. He reasoned that there is no logical reason for importing all of the rights 
in the Refugee Convention into the test for internal relocation—these rights apply to refugees 
in a host state, not to those within their home country.72 Lord Bingham also expressed concern 
that a broad human rights enquiry may have the ‘unintended’ and ‘anomalous’ consequence of 
providing a pathway for migration from the Global South to the Global North: 
Suppose a person is subject to persecution for Convention reasons in the country of his na-
tionality. It is a poor country. Standards of social provision are low. There is a high level of 
deprivation and want. Respect for human rights is scant. He [or she] escapes to a rich country 
where, if recognised as a refugee, he [or she] would enjoy all the rights guaranteed to refugees 
in that country. He [or she] could, with no fear of persecution, live elsewhere in his [or her] 
country of nationality, but would there suffer all the drawbacks of living in a poor and back-
ward country. It would be strange if the accident of persecution were to entitle him [or her] to 
escape, not only from that persecution, but from the deprivation to which his [or her] home 
country is subject.73 
The United Kingdom House of Lords held that decision-makers are not required to undertake 
a broad human rights enquiry in internal protection alternative cases.74 Rather, the test of 
whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh or unreasonable only requires consideration 
of whether the putative refugee would be free from persecution and would have the ‘most basic 
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of human rights’,75 such as the right to life and right not to be subjected to cruel or inhuman 
treatment.76 The Court stressed that if the putative refugee could ‘lead a relatively normal life’ 
in the internal protection alternative ‘judged by the standards that prevail in his [or her] country 
of nationality generally’, it would ‘not be unreasonable to expect him [or her] to move there’.77 
There are a number of critical examinations of the United Kingdom House of Lord’s decision 
in Januzi that argue that the test it established for internal relocation is not a good faith inter-
pretation of article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.78 The question for this thesis is how it 
has affected decision-makers’ conceptualisation of the nature and scope of refuge for putative 
refugees resisting the prospect of seeking refuge in an IDP camp. As discussed above, when the 
question of an IDP camp serving as an internal protection alternative first arose in the United 
Kingdom, decision-makers positioned the prospective IDP as a person in need of protection 
who is entitled to be under the care of an authority that has the capacity to provide that protec-
tion. Immigration judges conceived of refuge as something that must be bestowed and accepted 
that if the relevant authority is under-resourced, then the putative refugee did not have an inter-
nal protection alternative. These decisions are also imbued with an ethic of international coop-
eration. However, in post-Januzi jurisprudence, these understandings of the IDP and ideas of 
refuge have diminished and decision-makers have determined that an IDP camp is an acceptable 
internal protection alternative in almost all cases in which the issue has been arbitrated. 
This change was first evident in HGMO (Relocation to Khartoum) Sudan CG (‘HGMO’),79 
which concerned the three Sudanese appellants who had their matters remitted back to the 
United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal by the United Kingdom House of Lords in 
Januzi and one other Sudanese asylum seeker from Darfur. One issue for the Tribunal was 
whether the putative refugees could internally relocate to Khartoum where they may have had 
to seek refuge in an IDP camp. Expert evidence indicated that the Sudanese government pro-
vided no protection to those living in IDP camps,80 denied humanitarian groups access to the 
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camps,81 actively destroyed the camps82 and forcibly relocated their inhabitants.83 One of the 
expert witnesses concluded that ‘IDP camps and squatter settlements in Khartoum state provide 
no security for IDPs’.84 Other evidence concerning the IDP camps before the Tribunal attested 
to arbitrary arrest,85 arbitrary detention,86 acts of violence,87 and lack of access to education88 
and employment.89 However, the Tribunal determined that internal relocation to an IDP camp 
would not be unreasonable or unduly harsh, because the living conditions in the camps were 
‘not markedly different from the living conditions in Sudan as a whole’.90 The Tribunal noted 
that ‘we particularly bear in mind the fact that most people in Sudan live at subsistence level 
and that over 70% of those who live in urban conurbations are slumdwellers’.91 
Comparing the putative refugee/prospective IDP to the population at large shuts down investi-
gation of whether the conditions the general population face are due to the state’s difficult eco-
nomic circumstances or its attitude to human rights protection.92 It also disregards the idea that 
IDPs are entitled to a special form of refuge that must be bestowed by the state. In this decision, 
the Tribunal ignored the relationship between the state and prospective IDP. Focussing instead 
on the conditions experienced by the general population and using this as the comparator re-
moves the potential for these decisions to promote ideas of cooperative refuge between the 
Global South and Global North. That others in the country of origin similarly do not receive 
protection is no longer a reason to provide the putative refugee with protection, but grounds on 
which to expel them back to their homeland. Comparison to the rest of the population also 
diverts judicial attention away from the setting of the camp and whether it can provide a sense 
of refuge. 
Instead of examining whether the state is willing and able to provide protection to the prospec-
tive IDP, decision-makers sometimes consider whether the putative refugee has family that can 
provide assistance. This morphs understandings of refuge from something granted by the state 
or international community to, at best, something provided privately through family members. 
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This is evident in SK (FGM – ethnic groups) Liberia CG,93 a 2007 case concerning whether a 
Liberian woman could internally relocate from a rural to an urban area where she may have had 
no choice but to live in an IDP camp. The United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
noted that there was evidence of sexual violence perpetrated against IDPs living in the camps.94 
However, the Tribunal did not enquire as to the type and level of protection provided (if any) 
against the risk of sexual violence in IDP camps. The Tribunal concluded that ‘[w]hilst these 
may occur, we are unaware of any evidence that suggests that in general, lone women within 
such camps are as such at real risk of rape’.95 One reason the Tribunal ruled that it would not 
be unduly harsh to expect her to live in an IDP camp was because her partner in the United 
Kingdom would send her money.96 Thus, the Tribunal did not focus on the protection that Li-
beria provides to IDPs, but what protection the woman could access through family connec-
tions. 
A similar line of reasoning is evident in AMM and Others (Conflict; Humanitarian Crisis; Re-
turnees; FGM) Somalia CG.97 This 2011 case concerned whether a Somali putative refugee 
could internally relocate to an IDP camp in Somalia’s Afgoye Corridor. The United Kingdom 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal stated that relocation to an IDP camp would be unreasonable 
‘unless there is evidence that the person concerned would be able to achieve the lifestyle of 
those better-off inhabitants of the Afgoye Corridor settlements’.98 Whether a returnee could 
achieve such a lifestyle would depend on the putative refugee ‘having family or other signifi-
cant connections with such better-off elements’.99 Without the protection of family or signifi-
cant connections, the returnee would not be able to ‘eliminate the risks inherent in IDP 
camps’.100 In this case, the Tribunal did not consider what (if any) state protection is available 
to IDPs in camps in the Afgoye Corridor, but the availability of family support. 
Focussing on the putative refugee’s family transmogrifies the concept of refuge. Unlike state 
protection, which is grounded in a state’s international legal obligations, family support and 
remittances are voluntary. These approaches remove the idea of refuge as a duty the state must 
honour and delivers a precarious form of refuge hinged on private individuals’ unpredictable 
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generosity. It is also a problematic understanding of refuge from a gender perspective, because 
it ignores the fact that the family is sometimes the source of protection concerns. A person may 
not be able to leave a dangerous family situation if their family members are the only ones 
providing protection to them against the dangers of life in an IDP camp. 
Decision-makers’ approaches to these protection from refuge claims have also narrowed the 
scope of refuge. While early 2000s jurisprudence in the United Kingdom concerning internal 
relocation to an IDP camp did not specifically outline the appropriate scope of refuge, decision-
makers took into account a range of civil and political and socio-economic rights including 
physical security and access to employment and government services. In later decisions, the 
scope has been narrowed to adequate living conditions. This is an understanding of refuge akin 
to humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of events such as conflict or natural dis-
aster.101 This minimalist conceptualisation of refuge is far removed from the more comprehen-
sive ideas of refuge for putative refugees or IDPs outlined in Chapter Two. A narrow scope of 
refuge is evident in HGMO, in which the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
focussed only on living conditions and ignored the many other human rights concerns raised in 
the evidence. As noted above, it ruled that relocation to an IDP camp would not be unreasonable 
or unduly harsh because ‘the living conditions’ in the camps were ‘not markedly different from 
the living conditions in Sudan as a whole’.102 This generates a narrow scope of refuge for puta-
tive refugees and prospective IDPs. In particular, human rights violations that are of particular 
concern to IDPs such as forced relocation and restrictions of freedom of movement remain 
outside the judicial lens. 
Another example of United Kingdom decision-makers shrinking the scope of refuge is the 
United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s decision in SK (FGM – ethnic groups) 
Liberia CG.103 The Tribunal placed weight on a United States State Department Report that 
‘paints a picture of the camps which, whilst clearly not without problems, shows that they gen-
erally provide reasonable living conditions’.104 Crucial to the Tribunal’s decision was that the 
living conditions in the camps were acceptable, and the risk of sexual violence was of secondary 
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importance. Thus, the Tribunal’s conceptualisation of adequate refuge was a place where a per-
son can survive because they have access to adequate food, water and shelter. 
As a result of decision-makers’ dilution of the concept of refuge in these cases, the figure of the 
IDP has lost its ability to disrupt state boundaries and the Refugee Convention’s effect of con-
taining those of need of protection in the Global South is entrenched. By pitting the putative 
refugee against the country of origin’s population at large, the image of the IDP decision-mak-
ers conjure up in these decisions is a threatening one: she or he is one of hundreds and possibly 
thousands that could travel across international national borders and claim refuge in the United 
Kingdom. Decision-makers rein in the IDP’s ability to pierce the boundary between the Global 
South and Global North by positioning her close to the ‘classic instance’ of the rightless person 
Tuitt describes in her scholarship. The IDP is disenfranchised from her state of origin due to 
having a well-founded fear of persecution, but also disenfranchised from law: she is not under-
stood to be a rights-bearer, but only entitled to the same living conditions as the rest of the 
population in her homeland. The prospective IDP in these protection from refuge decisions is 
even further disenfranchised than the IDP Tuitt describes. Tuitt investigates the IDP’s situation 
before she leaves her homeland. While Tuitt emphasises that travelling across international 
borders is only possible for a select few, it is at least still a potential recourse. The IDPs in these 
cases have already exercised this option. 
V THE RESILIENT REFUGEE 
By narrowing the scope of refuge to adequate living conditions and using the country of origin’s 
population at large as a comparator, immigration judges in the United Kingdom sidestep the 
need to examine the availability of state protection in IDP camps. The prospective IDP with no 
state protection has nothing but their own abilities, or in some cases family connections, to 
defend and make a life for themselves in the hostile conditions of an IDP camp. This moves 
decision-makers’ focus to the prospective IDP’s personal circumstances. To resist the prospect 
of life in an IDP camp, the putative refugee must prove that they are exceptional in some way. 
For example, in HGMO, the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal accepted that 
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while it would generally not be unreasonable for a Sudanese putative refugee to internally re-
locate to an IDP camp, this may not be the case for those with an ‘extreme and exceptional’ 
health condition,105 single women or female-headed households.106 
There is one case in which decision-makers accepted that a prospective IDP’s personal circum-
stances might render refuge in an IDP camp unreasonable. In KH (Sudan) v Secretary of Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department,107 the England and Wales Court of Appeal considered 
whether it would be unreasonable for a 20-year-old Sudanese putative refugee to internally 
relocate to Khartoum where it was likely that he would live in an IDP camp. The case was on 
appeal from the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, which had ruled that it 
would not be unreasonable for him to seek protection in an IDP camp because he was a ‘young 
apparently healthy adult’.108 The England and Wales Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
HGMO indicated that, as a general rule, it would not be unreasonable for a putative refugee to 
find refuge in an IDP camp in Khartoum.109 However, the Court confirmed that this general 
finding must be tempered by the individual’s particular circumstances.110 The Court described 
the appellant’s circumstances as ‘stark’, because he had ‘lost all his living relatives, killed by 
those responsible for conditions in those camps’.111 The case was remitted back to the United 
Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal with the instruction that the decision as to whether 
internal relocation to an IDP camp would be unduly harsh must take into account that fact that 
the man would live with ‘the everyday knowledge that those responsible for such conditions 
are also responsible for the death of his every living relative’.112 Any reconsideration of this 
case has not been reported. Nevertheless, the England and Wales Court of Appeal’s judgment 
reflects the idea that refuge must have a palliative role and that a place that would traumatise a 
putative refugee is not a place that can provide genuine sanctuary. 
However, in most cases involving the prospect of having to seek refuge in an IDP camp, immi-
gration judges refer to the putative refugee’s personal circumstances in a way that substantiates 
the decision that internal relocation to an IDP camp is not unreasonable or unduly harsh. In 
                                                          
105 HGMO (n 79) [260]. 
106 Ibid [307]. 
107 [2008] EWCA Civ 887. 
108 Cited in KH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 887, [33]. 
109 Ibid [36]. 
110 Ibid [36]. 
111 Ibid [36]. 
112 Ibid [36]. 
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particular, decision-makers refer to personal circumstances in a way that positions the prospec-
tive IDP as a person with the talent or fortitude to endure the most hostile conditions. For ex-
ample, in SK (FGM – ethnic groups) Liberia CG, the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal confirmed that it would be unreasonable to expect most single women to internally 
relocate in Liberia, because they would face economic destitution.113 Nevertheless, the Tribunal 
found that internal relocation was not unreasonable in this case, because the putative refugee 
was a ‘healthy and obviously resourceful woman of some intelligence’.114 Due to her good 
health, capabilities and being a woman ‘of some intelligence’, the Tribunal was satisfied that it 
was possible that she may not have to resort to living in an IDP camp and she would not have 
to prostitute herself to survive financially.115 Thus, the Tribunal portrayed the putative refugee 
as having the personal strength and ability to survive in hostile conditions. 
A similar approach is evident in Petition of GAO,116 concerning a Sudanese woman who faced 
the prospect of life in an IDP camp if she internally relocated. The immigration judge reasoned 
that she may not need to live in an IDP camp, because she was a ‘single woman who is fit, able 
to work and able to support herself in a relatively troubled environment’.117 However, in the 
event that she had to live in an IDP camp, it would not be ‘such a traumatic change of lifestyle 
that she would be unable to adapt to life in an IDP camp, should that prove necessary’.118 The 
judge also took into account that ‘she has previously traded in the market’ and this ‘would give 
her a wider experience than those who were only farmers’.119 The judge relied on the peti-
tioner’s previous trade experience in determining that ‘refuge in an IDP camp, should it be 
required, would not be unreasonable’.120 Again, the decision-maker depicted the prospective 
IDP as different from and more capable than other single women in Liberia due to her prior 
work experience and being ‘fit’. 
Further examples of this type of reasoning are evident in cases involving male putative refugees 
who face the prospect of life in an IDP camp if they internally relocate. Decision-makers often 
refer to male refugees’ gender and innate or acquired abilities in justifying why it would not be 
unduly harsh for them to endure even the most brutal camp environments. For example, in JK 
                                                          
113 SK (FGM) (n 93) [69]. 
114 Ibid [64]. 
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117 Initial decision cited in Petition of GAO [2010] CSOH 92, [5]. 
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(Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the United Kingdom Asylum and Im-
migration Tribunal found that a putative refugee had an internal relocation alternative in an IDP 
camp in Kosovo and this ruling was upheld on appeal.121 The decision-maker emphasised the 
putative refugee’s ‘marketable skills’ (a metalworking qualification and fluency in several lan-
guages) and that he was ‘single and in good health’.122 However, in some cases, decision-mak-
ers deem an IDP camp an appropriate internal protection alternative for male putative refugees 
solely on the grounds of youth and gender. For example, in NO v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department,123 it was held that a 30-year-old Sudanese man could internally relocate to 
an IDP camp in Khartoum despite conditions being ‘grim’.124 The immigration judge reasoned 
that he was ‘a young man with no dependants [sic]’ who must have had considerable resources 
to come to the UK.125 While not having any education, he could survive economically in a camp 
environment by performing physical labour.126 Another example is a case concerning whether 
a Chechen putative refugee could internally relocate to Ingushetia where many Chechens were 
living in IDP camps.127 Evidence in the case attested to human rights abuses in the camps oc-
curring on a ‘significant scale’128 and that the living conditions ‘vary from difficult to unbeara-
ble, with many inhabiting overcrowded, dank, dilapidated buildings that enable diseases like 
tuberculosis and pneumonia to flourish’.129 Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Asylum and Im-
migration Tribunal found that the conditions in the camps were not ‘so severe as to render 
internal relocation for a young Chechen male unreasonable or unduly harsh’.130 
Characterising prospective IDPs in this manner serves to justify and sanitise the act of refusing 
international protection to a person with a well-founded fear of persecution knowing that they 
may have no choice but to seek refuge in an IDP camp. The subtext of these judgments is that 
while life in an IDP camp would be insufferable for most, we are only returning those with the 
resilience and fortitude to protect and provide for themselves. This is the antithesis of Tuitt’s 
                                                          
121 JK (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1321, [34] (‘JK Serbia’). 
122 Initial decision cited in ibid [20]. 
123 [2008] CSIH 19 XA152/06. 
124 Initial decision cited in ibid [5]. 
125 Ibid [5]. 
126 Ibid [5]. 
127 RM (Young Chechen Male – Risk – IFA) Russia CG [2006] UKAIT 00050. 
128 Ibid [42]. 
129 Ibid [41]. 
130 Ibid [47] (emphasis added). Three years later, the Tribunal considered a case concerning whether it was unrea-
sonable for a Chechen woman to internally relocate to an IDP camp in Ingushetia: OY (Chechen Muslim women) 
Russia CG [2009] UKAIT 00005. The Tribunal found that a Chechen woman, ‘could not now relocate to an IDP 
camp’ because the local Ingush authorities were no longer accepting new IDPs in the camps and were pressuring 
Chechen IDPs to return to Chechnya: at [68]–[70]. Therefore, the distinguishing factor in this case was not the 
conditions in the camps, but that the putative refugees would no longer be able to access the camps. 
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contention that it is the moving entity (a person who crosses international borders) who is seen 
as ‘synonymous with humanitarian need and suffering’.131 In these cases, decision-makers de-
pict those who have travelled to the Global North as courageous and resilient and, on this basis, 
able to forge protection for themselves in even the most adverse and hostile environments. This 
usurps the main way in which those with a well-founded fear of persecution can trigger refugee 
protection—crossing international borders. It creates a double bind similar to the one present 
in article 1D cases: a putative refugee will only be protected from an IDP camp if they have no 
ability to protect themselves, but the very act of travelling long distances to make an asylum 
claim is demonstrative of fortitude and resilience. Female refugees are especially disenfran-
chised by this conundrum. They are less likely than their male counterparts to be able to make 
the journey to the Global North to seek protection, but those who do are deemed strong and 
capable enough to protect themselves. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This is this thesis’ final case study examining how decision-makers approach and determine 
protection from refuge claims. Similar to previous chapters, I observed that decision-makers 
have employed a categorical approach by conceptualising refuge by first considering the posi-
tion or predicament of the person seeking international protection. As shown in this chapter, 
some decision-makers position the putative refugee as a prospective IDP and imagine what their 
life would be like in an IDP camp. This gives rise to a broad understanding of the scope of 
refuge, but also a sensibility of international solidarity unseen in any other protection from 
refuge claims. However, in line with other case studies in this thesis, there has been a transition 
in which decision-makers produce rudimentary notions of refuge, remove the place of refuge 
from consideration and focus on the particular protection from refuge litigant and ask whether 
they are exceptional in some way. In the United Kingdom, where the overwhelming majority 
of these protection from refuge claims have arisen, in earlier jurisprudence there is a recognition 
that refuge involves a nation-state or other authority bestowing protection but in later judgments 
refuge is understood as something an individual can forge themselves. Protection from refuge 
will only be granted when the putative refugee can establish that they are exceptionally vulner-
able, but decision-makers characterise these putative refugees as resilient because they have 
made long journeys to claim asylum. 
                                                          
131 Tuitt False Images (n 7) 14. 
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Portraying the protection from refuge claimant as strong and courageous denotes an understand-
ing that refuge can be self-made and obscures the perversity of expecting a putative refugee to 
seek refuge in an IDP camp. It also solidifies the boundaries between the Global North and 
Global South by distorting the one method available to those with a well-founded fear of per-
secution to secure a remedy: mobility. For decision-makers in these protection from refuge 
claims, the refugee as a moving entity is not ‘synonymous with humanitarian need and suffer-
ing’. Rather, the fact that the putative refugee has travelled to the United Kingdom and provided 
for themselves as an asylum seeker is evidence that they can contend with the vicissitudes of 
life in an IDP camp. This trajectory—decision-makers first approaching protection from refuge 
claims in a way that imbues the concept of refuge with a sophisticated and rich meaning and 
facilitates searches for genuine places of sanctuary, but later changing to an approach that di-
lutes the notion of refuge and inhibits these journeys—is evident across all case studies in this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: ELUSIVE REFUGE 
I INTRODUCTION 
I began this thesis by looking at refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. Some of these journeys 
are relatively short ones, where those in need of international protection seek refuge in a neigh-
bouring country. Others are much longer and involve multiple international border crossings 
and transcontinental travel. Refugees’ voyages to find a place of refuge are often fragmented 
due to containment mechanisms and challenges imposed by factors such as gender, age, care 
responsibilities and disability. To be able to continue their quests for refuge, many refugees and 
asylum seekers turn to courts and other decision-making bodies. The aim of this thesis was to 
understand the role this litigation plays in refugees’ searches for a place of genuine refuge. 
Accordingly, the research question asked how decision-makers approach and determine protec-
tion from refuge claims. I also examined how decision-makers conceptualise refuge, respond 
to contests between refugees’ need for a place of genuine refuge and states’ interests in control-
ling refugees’ movements, and whether the determination of these legal challenges prioritises 
particular refugees in their search for refuge. While there is a large body of literature on how 
decision-makers approach refugee definitions, this thesis assessed how decision-makers ap-
proach the remedy: refuge. 
Throughout each of the case studies, there is a period or moment in which decision-makers 
engage with the concept of refuge. Through adopting what I identified in Chapter Two as cate-
gorical reasoning (sometimes in conjunction with experiential and rights-based reasoning), de-
cision-makers use domestic, regional and international legal frameworks as prisms to outline 
robust ideas about refuge’s functions, nature, threshold and scope. These conceptualisations of 
refuge prevail over states’ desires to constrain refugees’ movement within and across borders. 
These judicial approaches provide grounds for large numbers of refugees to continue their quest 
for refuge, but decision-makers also demonstrate an understanding of particular refugees’ 
needs. However, these protection from refuge victories are ephemeral. In each type of protec-
tion from refuge scenario, decision-makers transition from a categorical approach to exception-
ality reasoning and remove or partially remove the place of refuge from the judicial lens. This 
produces minimalist and impoverished notions of refuge and means that protection from refuge 
challenges are determined in a way that defers to states’ interests. Not only do these decisions 
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obstruct refugees in their searches for refuge, decision-makers often neglect difficulties faced 
by women, children, sexual minorities and refugees with care responsibilities and disabilities. 
This chapter’s purpose is to highlight the significance of these findings for refugee law schol-
arship and the international protection regime more broadly, as well as indicate the questions 
they raise for future research. First, I discuss how my analysis of judicial approaches that give 
a rich meaning to the concept of refuge responds to scholars’ identifications of current dilem-
mas in refugee law and advances the literature on refuge. Second, I consider how the judicial 
dilution of the concept of refuge poses risks to the future directions of refugee law. Third, I 
highlight how the analysis in this thesis adds new dimensions to scholarly assessments of the 
progress of decision-makers’ approaches to and understandings of gender. Overall, I argue that 
the trajectory of decision-makers’ approaches to protection from refuge claims has rendered 
refuge elusive. 
II REFUGE AS A POTENT CONCEPT  
One pattern evident throughout all the case studies in this thesis is that when decision-makers 
approach the concept of refuge in a purposive manner or give it a broad or rich meaning, they 
start their reasoning by focussing on refugees’ or internally displaced persons’ (‘IDPs’) predic-
ament or position. The refugee or IDP figure initially conjured up in these judicial approaches 
is an abstract one. In Chapters Three and Four, I argued that European, African and United 
Nations decision-makers identified irreducible experiences of refugeehood such as having to 
forge an existence on a foreign land and suffering from past trauma. In Chapter Five, I noted 
that the High Court of Australia positioned refugees as persons entitled to special protections 
under international law. In Chapter Six, I observed that the New Zealand Immigration and Pro-
tection Tribunal identified who was a Palestinian refugee and enquired as to the protection and 
assistance they were entitled to under international law. In Chapter Seven I discussed decision-
makers in the United Kingdom and New Zealand who considered the difficulties faced by IDPs, 
in particular, that the authorities providing care were overburdened and under-resourced. 
I labelled this approach to protection from refuge claims as ‘categorical’, because it is informed 
by the categories of people who need international protection. This type of reasoning is not 
unique to adjudicative decision-makers. As outlined in Chapter Two, scholars from a number 
of disciplines use this method to outline and defend ideas of refuge. However, it is powerful 
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and significant in the judicial context, because it enables decision-makers to mould legal frame-
works in a way that responds to refugees’ needs and entitlements. For example, in Chapter 
Three, I highlighted how decision-makers used the right to be free from inhuman and degrading 
treatment to address refugees’ needs to establish a bond with their host state. In Chapter Four, 
I showed that Kenyan courts used the right to dignity to respond to refugees’ need to build a 
meaningful life in a new country. In Chapter Five, I observed how the High Court of Australia, 
through domestic legislation, referred to the refugee-specific rights regime in international law 
to position refuge as a duty owed to refugees by nation-states and set a high threshold for ade-
quate refuge. In Chapter Six, I described the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribu-
nal’s conceptualisation of refuge in the Palestinian context as a right and duty and highlighted 
how it responded to refugees’ need to build a life in exile. In Chapter Seven, I discussed how 
decision-makers in New Zealand and the United Kingdom used their different legal tests to 
create an understanding of refuge as a shared endeavour. 
Some refugee law scholarship positions refugee law as ‘relentlessly local’ and argues that ‘we 
tend to frame questions and answers within national or regional frameworks’.1 This thesis indi-
cates that, despite divergent legal frameworks, there are similarities in judicial ideas of refuge 
across international borders. In Chapter One, I outlined that one significant aspect of this thesis 
was that it could provide an indication of the contours of refuge as a legal concept in situations 
where refugees are requesting or resisting transfer within and across borders. By employing 
categorical reasoning, decision-makers in different jurisdictions use distinct legal frameworks 
to respond to refugees’ needs and entitlements. Through this approach to protection from refuge 
claims, decision-makers across the globe are adopting shared notions of refuge. Throughout the 
case studies, decision-makers understand refuge to have restorative, regenerative functions and 
palliative functions that address refugees’ present, future and past; as a remedy, right, duty, 
process and shared responsibility; to have an identifiable threshold; as having a broad scope 
encompassing a range of civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights; and as a 
flexible concept that can take into account particular refugees’ needs. 
Some aspects of these judicial understandings of refuge cement or advance ideas of what refuge 
is or should be when compared to the literature discussed in Chapter Two. With respect to 
refuge’s functions, African and European decision-makers have recognised that one of refuge’s 
                                                          
1 Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank, ‘Introduction, Gender in Refugee Law – From the Margins 
to the Centre’ in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee Law: From the 
Margins to the Centre (Routledge, 2014) 1, 11 (‘Introduction’). 
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objectives is to enable refugees to heal from past trauma. This palliative aspect of refuge is 
present in studies in psychology, anthropology and history, but it is not a central idea in legal 
understandings of refuge. The decision-makers in the protection from refuge victories discussed 
in Chapters Three and Four made the palliative function of refuge a primary consideration in 
protection from refuge claims. In relation to the nature of refuge, Kenyan courts understood 
refuge as a process between the refugee and host country. This is a notion of refuge common 
in anthropological literature, but Kenyan decision-makers made it part of legal notions of ref-
uge. In relation to refuge’s threshold, the High Court of Australia is the only court to have 
recognised that states must be guided by the broader rights in the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’)2 beyond non-refoulement when transferring refu-
gees to another state and those rights must be guaranteed in law and practice. With respect to 
the scope of refuge, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal was the first deci-
sion-making body to refer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinians in 
the Near East’s (‘UNRWA’) mandate to discern the content of refuge for Palestinian refugees. 
Finally, in this thesis’s last case study, I highlighted instances in which decision-makers con-
ceptualised refuge as a responsibility that must be shared between the developed and developing 
world. Kritzman-Amir is one of the few scholars to argue that responsibility for hosting refu-
gees should primarily be determined by which state is best resourced to care for them.3 These 
internal relocation alternative decisions brought ideas of a more equitable distribution of those 
in need of protection into jurisprudence by indicating that Global North states must provide 
refugee protection when the relevant authorities in the Global South are already overstretched. 
Another aspect of protection from refuge victories is that decision-makers approach the dispute 
in a way that allows them to consider refuge as a concept and place. By doing so, they consider 
the disjunctures between the idea of refuge and the place in which the refugee is or will be 
located. For example, in Chapter Three I highlighted that the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal 
took ideas of refuge’s restorative, regenerative and palliative functions and examined the ways 
life in the Jungle refugee settlement inhibited these objectives. The High Court of Kenya con-
sidered these same functions and emphasised why they could not be achieved in a camp envi-
ronment. The High Court of Australia focussed on some of the rights in the Refugee Convention 
                                                          
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 
January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
3 Tally Kritzman-Amir, ‘Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in Refugee Law’ (2009) 
34(2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 355, 362, 372. 
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and explained why they would not be guaranteed in law or practice in Malaysia. The New 
Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal emphasised the need for IDPs to have durable 
solutions and determined that this could not be realised in an IDP camp in Kabul. By juxtapos-
ing the idea and reality of refuge, decision-makers position refugees as being entitled to a legal 
remedy, but living in a world that all too often denies them these protections.4 This creates a 
potent tension between refuge as a concept and place that refugees can wield to continue their 
quests for refuge. 
Studies of refugees’ perspectives of refuge indicate that a sense of refuge is something gradually 
attained through the refugee building relationships in the host country—it is not achieved im-
mediately upon entering a country of refuge.5 Therefore, I am not suggesting that the refugee 
litigants who were successful in their protection from refuge claims would have immediately 
achieved a feeling of refuge. This is unlikely as there is evidence of human rights concerns for 
asylum seekers and refugees in countries many refugees are trying to access such as Australia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom.6 Nevertheless, by determining protection from refuge chal-
lenges in a way that enables, rather than impedes, refugees’ journeys, decision-makers enliven 
the prospect that refuge can be realised. These decisions empower refugees to continue to work 
towards a different and better future, which is an important aspect of refuge. 
The identification of judicial use of categorical reasoning and comparisons between the concept 
and place of refuge responds to Betts and Collier’s call for scholars to investigate the conditions 
under which law can be used to reshape the current refugee system.7 In Chapter One, I outlined 
that this thesis would shed light on the ways courts cement or alter the current inequities in 
location of and responsibility for refugees. Many of the decisions discussed in this thesis disrupt 
                                                          
4 This has parallels with Rancière’s observation that human rights arguments are potent when persons can show 
that they ‘have not the rights they have and have the rights they have not’: Jacques Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject 
of the Rights of Man’ (2004) 103(2–3) South Atlantic Quarterly 297, 302. 
5 Catherine Besteman, Making Refuge: Somali Bantu Refugees and Lewiston, Maine (Duke University Press, 
2016); Georgina Ramsay, Impossible Refuge: The Control and Constraint of Refugee Futures (Routledge, 2018). 
6 See, eg, Jennifer Allsopp, Nando Sigona and Jenny Phillimore, ‘Poverty Among Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
in the UK: An Evidence and Policy Review’ (Working Paper No 1/2014, Institute for Research into Super Diver-
sity Working Paper Series, 2014); Australian Human Rights Commission, Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Human 
Rights: Snapshot Report (Second Edition) (2017) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/asylum-seekers-
and-refugees/publications/asylum-seekers-refugees-and-human-rights-snapsho-0>; Jesuit Social Services, The 
Living Conditions of People Seeking Asylum in Australia (December 2015) <http://jss.org.au/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/12/Asylum_Seeker_Position_Paper_-_December_2015.pdf>; Cécile Rousseau et al, ‘Health Care Ac-
cess for Refugees and Immigrants with Precarious Status: Public Health and Human Rights Challenges’ (2008) 
99(4) Canadian Journal of Public Health 290; John Van Kooy and Dina Bowman, ‘“Surrounded by So Much 
Uncertainty”’: Asylum Seekers and Manufactured Precarity in Australia’ (2019) 45(5) Journal of Ethnic and Mi-
gration Studies 693. 
7 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System (Allen Lane, 2017) 209. 
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containment mechanisms and provide grounds for a more equitable refugee protection system. 
When decision-makers employ categorical reasoning by contemplating refugees’ predicament 
or position and mould legal frameworks in a way that responds, they engage with ideas of ref-
uge. When they then use these understandings of refuge as a concept to cast judgment on places 
of refuge within or outside their borders, they draw out the disparities between refuge as a 
concept and place. This juxtaposition of ideas and realities of refuge provides powerful grounds 
to challenge laws designed to obstruct refugees’ movements within and across borders. For 
example, the High Court of Kenya’s decision in Kituo Cha Sheria v Attorney General8 used 
ideas about refuge’s restorative, regenerative and palliative functions to strike down the Kenyan 
government’s forced encampment policy. The European Court of Human Rights similarly em-
ployed ideas of what refuge is designed to achieve in its rulings that refugees cannot be sent to 
Libya9 and Greece,10 rendering inoperable Italy’s bilateral agreement with Libya and signifi-
cantly affecting the Dublin Regulation’s operation. The High Court of Australia drew on ideas 
of refuge as a duty in its decision that the Australian government’s asylum seeker transfer agree-
ment with Malaysia was invalid.11 United Kingdom and New Zealand tribunal members pro-
vided strong grounds for Global North countries to continue to host those in need of protection 
who would otherwise add to the burden of already overstretched developing states and interna-
tional organisations. 
These initial judicial approaches to protection from refuge claims facilitate journeys for refu-
gees who traditionally face the greatest impediments when travelling in search of refuge. In 
Chapter One, I stated that this thesis could indicate whether courts and other decision-making 
bodies can provide a forum to make refugees’ journeys in search of refuge more realisable for 
refugees from more marginalised backgrounds. While in all of these protection from refuge 
victories decision-makers commence by conjuring up an image of an abstract refugee or IDP, 
in many cases, decision-makers then consider the ways refuge must respond to refugees with 
specific needs. For example, the Human Rights Committee, through the prism of the right to be 
free from inhuman and degrading treatment, recognised that refuge must be adapted to address 
the difficulties faced by single mothers. The High Court of Kenya, through the right to fair 
administrative action, stressed that refuge must cater to people with disabilities. The High Court 
                                                          
8 [2013] Kenya Law Reports (High Court of Kenya, Constitutional and Human Rights Division). 
9 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy [2012] II Eur Court HR 97. 
10 M S S v Belgium and Greece [2011] I Eur Court HR 255. 
11 Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Plaintiff M106/2011 v Minister for Immi-
gration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
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of Australia, through its emphasis on the right to education in the Refugee Convention, handed 
down a decision of particular value for child refugees. Thus, judicial approaches to early or 
initial protection from refuge claims render refuge a dynamic concept: it is not a static idea 
fixed according to predetermined notions of refugees’ needs, but a malleable one that can re-
spond to refugees of different genders, ages and sexualities as well as refugees with disabilities 
and care responsibilities. 
These observations raise a number of questions for further research. First, how do decision-
makers’ conceptualise refuge in other contexts? I have focussed on cases in which a refugee 
was seeking rescue from or transfer to a place of refuge. This is because I wanted to explore the 
ways judicial ideas of refuge facilitate or impede refugees’ journeys. However, ideas of refuge 
may also be embedded in other types of claims refugees bring before courts and other decision-
making bodies. For example, when refugees challenge changes to their host states’ laws and 
policies on access to healthcare or welfare.12 What ideas of refuge are reflected in these deci-
sions? Do they differ from the concept of refuge emerging in protection from refuge challenges? 
Do they respond to the particular needs of refugees from more marginalised backgrounds? Also, 
I only examined protection from refuge decisions in cases where reasons for decision are pub-
licly available. Whether unreported first instance judgments or initial decision-makers (often 
public servants) adopt a similar approach is an issue for future investigation.13 
The identification of categorical reasoning and decision-makers’ construction of the ‘abstract’ 
refugee or IDP may provide the basis for future enquiries in the field of refugee law and other 
areas more broadly. Can this judicial approach provide an antidote to refugee law’s parochial-
ism in other contexts? Is it an approach observable in rights claims made, not by refugees, but 
others with shared or ‘irreducible’ experiences and does it deliver similar legal victories? Fur-
ther, is the adoption of categorical reasoning influenced by the ways legal advocates or amici 
curiae frame their submissions or engage in legal argument with decision-makers? 
 
                                                          
12 See, eg, Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care, The Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Daniel Garcia 
Rodrigues, Hanif Ayubi and Justice for Children and Youth v Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration [2014] FC 651. 
13 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank highlight that this is a methodological challenge in researching decision-making 
in refugee law: Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 1) 7–8. This would most likely arise with respect 
to the case law discussed in Chapters Three, Six and Seven. 
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III DIMINISHING REFUGE  
The robust ideas of refuge adopted in the decisions discussed above have been replaced with 
minimalist notions of refuge. In protection from refuge claims made in the European context, 
decision-makers’ conceptualisations of refuge changed from a legal remedy that has restorative, 
regenerative and palliative functions to a scarce commodity to be given to the most vulnerable. 
African decision-makers also switched from approaching refuge as a legal remedy designed to 
enable refugees to rebuild a meaningful life and heal from past trauma to one that is reserved 
for those judged the most vulnerable or most deserving. In direct challenges to bilateral and 
regional containment agreements, ideas about the nature of refuge shifted from a duty to a dis-
cretion, and the idea that there needs to be a threshold for adequate refuge dissipated from the 
jurisprudence. For Palestinian refugees, the concept of refuge was diluted from a right to an act 
of charity, and the ambit of refuge was narrowed from broad human rights considerations to 
protection of physical security. For prospective IDPs, notions of refuge withered to encompass 
only living conditions. The idea that refuge requires a state or international organisation willing 
and able to provide protection and that refuge is a shared duty also disappeared. Decision-mak-
ers later understood refuge as something that could be self-made and insisted that Global North 
states were not obligated to provide protection when states or international organisations in the 
Global South were under-resourced. 
Another aspect of these protection from refuge challenges that promulgate impoverished no-
tions of refuge is that decision-makers partially or completely excise the resisted place of refuge 
from the judicial lens. European decision-makers limited their consideration to the circum-
stances the refugee will face immediately on arrival in the prospective place of refuge and ig-
nored the continuing relationship between the refugee and host state. Kenyan decision-makers 
paid no heed to the harms of camp life. Courts in Australia and Canada manoeuvred juridical 
borders in a manner that renders irrelevant the protection conditions in other nation-states. In 
the Palestinian context, the lens narrowed to consider the circumstances surrounding departure, 
thus removing from consideration many aspects of life for a Palestinian refugee in an UNRWA 
area of operation. For prospective IDPs, decision-makers no longer focussed on what life would 
be like in an IDP camp, but widened their gaze to consider the conditions experienced by the 
population in general. 
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By disengaging from the concept of refuge and removing or partially removing the place of 
refuge from the judicial lens, decision-makers defuse the tension in protection from refuge 
claims. Protection from refuge litigants can no longer draw on ideas of refuge to establish that 
they are entitled to special protection, but also point to the resisted place of refuge to highlight 
the non-existence of this care. It is only in the Australian context that these shifts are partly due 
to legislative change. In all other protection from refuge situations, decision-makers disengage 
with ideas of refuge and move away from a full examination of the resisted place of refuge 
without legislators’ influence. 
By circumscribing the concept of refuge and limiting consideration of the resisted place of ref-
uge, decision-makers also disrupt refuge’s temporality. As noted in Chapter Two, ideas about 
refuge’s functions, nature, threshold and scope address refugees’ past, present and future. What 
is lost in this jurisprudence is the idea that refuge should offer a sense of hope to refugees and 
allow them to imagine and build a future. Decision-makers in the European context drifted 
away from ideas of hope for the future by examining only the circumstances the refugee would 
face immediately on return and disregarding the future relationship between the host state and 
refugee. This lost focus on the future is evident in forced encampment jurisprudence when de-
cision-makers shifted from using human rights law to address refuge’s regenerative functions 
and instead used it to identify vulnerable or deserving refugees. It occurred in challenges to 
bilateral containment agreements where decision-makers no longer assessed the conditions of 
refuge in foreign countries with reference to the rights in the Refugee Convention and refugees 
became trapped between multiple and misaligned borders, unable to use legal processes to con-
tinue their journeys in search of refuge. It is evident in Palestinian cases in which decision-
makers examined whether they were forced to leave an UNRWA area operation as opposed to 
the life they would live if they had to return. It can be observed in cases in which decision-
makers satisfied themselves that an IDP camp did not present living conditions markedly worse 
than the rest of the population, rather than considering whether the prospective IDP would be 
able to regain a semblance of a normal life. By approaching protection from refuge decisions 
in this manner, decision-makers erase hope for a different and better future. 
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Decision-makers’ dilution of the notion of refuge risks refugee law developing in an asymmet-
rical fashion: widening the categories of people entitled to international protection, but dimin-
ishing the protection to which they are entitled.14 Over the last few decades, courts and other 
decision-making bodies have demonstrated ‘extraordinary judicial engagement with the [Ref-
ugee] Convention definition’.15 For example, courts have declared that women and sexual mi-
norities can constitute a particular social group;16 that harm by non-state actors can amount to 
persecution if the state cannot or will not provide protection;17 and that persecution can encom-
pass denial of economic, social or cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.18 This 
jurisprudence has evolved understandings of who is a refugee and enabled a wider range of 
people to enjoy refugee status. While courts have contributed to a dynamic interpretation of the 
refugee definition,19 this thesis suggests that subsequent to initial protection from refuge victo-
ries there has not been the same approach to the remedy, refuge. What can be observed are the 
beginnings of a misaligned development between questions of who qualifies for protection and 
the nature and extent of protection states must provide. A dynamic approach to the refugee 
definition alongside a minimalist approach to the idea of refuge risks expanding the circum-
stances in which international protection is triggered, but narrowing and truncating the protec-
tion owed. 
As a result of these changes to decision-makers’ approaches to protection from refuge claims, 
adjudicative bodies no longer provide fora to facilitate refugees’ journeys in search of refuge. 
Rather, courts and other decision-making bodies have become another mechanism that impedes 
these voyages. Decision-makers have stopped using the different legal frameworks pleaded in 
protection from refuge claims to help to create a more equitable system of responsibility shar-
ing. Instead, they employ these legal frameworks in a manner that perpetuates existing inequi-
ties. The only way refugees can continue their search for refuge through the institutions of 
                                                          
14 Kate Ogg, ‘Protection from “Refuge”: On What Legal Grounds will a Refugee be Saved from Camp Life?’ 
(2016) 28(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 384, 414. 
15 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 
4–5. 
16 Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Shah [1999] 2 
All ER 545 at 556–7 (Lord Steyn), 563–4 (Lord Hoffman), 569 (Lord Hope); Minister for Immigration and Mul-
ticultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 at [32] (Gleeson CJ), [130]–[131] (Kirby J) (‘Khawar’). 
17 Khawar (n 16) [29]–[31] (Gleeson CJ), [112]–[114] (Kirby J). 
18 For example, in RRT Case No N94/04178 (Unreported, Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, 10 June 1994) 
discriminatory denial of healthcare was found to constitute persecution. See also Chen Shi Hai v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19, [31]; BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 800091, [90]; MK (Lesbians) 
Albania v Secretary of State for the Home Department CG [2009] UKAIT 00036, [353]. 
19 Hathaway and Foster (n 15) 4–5. 
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courts and other decision-making bodies is through establishing that they are atypical in some 
way. 
I do not address why courts and other decision-making bodies across various jurisdictions have 
made this about-turn, but throughout the thesis I have offered some speculations and sugges-
tions for future research. It may be that what has been dubbed the European refugee ‘crisis’20 
has affected decision-makers’ approaches to protection from refuge claims made by refugees 
in European countries. A study of the political environments in which forced encampment liti-
gation takes place may shed some light on why Kenyan decision-makers have changed their 
approaches to these legal challenges. An understanding of how diplomatic ties between nation-
states may influence judicial decisions could be useful in the context of direct challenges to 
bilateral containment agreements. Such a study would be particularly timely in the Canadian 
context, with a new challenge to the agreement between Canada and the United States21 
prompted by President Donald Trump’s changes to refugee law and policy. 
While the reasons for this shift in judicial approaches to protection from refuge claims are be-
yond the scope of this thesis, the fact that there has been a pronounced change is significant. In 
Chapter One, I highlighted that legal concepts do not only serve pragmatic ends, but are a re-
flection of norms and values. There are always ‘conflicting visions’ about how a state and/or 
the international community must or should treat refugees and asylum seekers.22 Adjudicative 
bodies (courts in particular) play an important role in contributing to both the legal and norma-
tive debate, because they often clash with the executive and legislature23 and provide an ‘alter-
native narrative’.24 That decision-makers have shifted from broad and comprehensive to mini-
malist understandings of refuge suggests that courts and other adjudicative bodies are becoming 
less inclined to counter states’ positions on appropriate standards of refugee protection. What 
                                                          
20 The influx of refugees from the Syrian civil war into Europe is often referred to as a ‘crisis’, especially by 
politicians and the media, but some refugee law scholars resist the term ‘crisis’ on the grounds that the number of 
refugees are manageable for the European Union: Geoff Gilbert, ‘Why Europe Does Not Have a Refugee Crisis’ 
(2015) 27(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 531, 531. For an examination of the use of the term ‘crisis’ in 
international human rights law, see Benjamin Authers and Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Crisis and the Quotidian in 
International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 44 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 19. 
21 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Coop-
eration in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, signed 5 December 2002, 
TIAS 04-1229 (entered into force 29 December 2004). 
22 Mary Crock, ‘In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the Management 
of Refugee Flows’ (2003) 12(1) Pacific Rim Law and Policy 49. 
23 Mary Crock, ‘Judging Refugees: The Clash of Power and Institutions in the Development of Australian Refugee 
Law’ (2004) 25(1) Sydney Law Review 51; Marinella Marmo and Maria Giannacopoulos, ‘Cycles of Judicial and 
Executive Power in Irregular Migration’ (2017) 5(1) Comparative Migration Studies 16, 16–18. 
24 Marmo and Giannacopoulos (n 23) 4. 
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has occurred through this transition is the loss of a powerful conflicting vision or alternative 
narrative on how a state or the international community should respond to those who come in 
search of refuge. 
IV THE GENDERED EXCEPTIONAL REFUGEE 
Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank provide the most recent examination of gender, refugee law 
and decision-making in 2014. They suggest that refugee law jurisprudence has moved on from 
a situation where women’s experiences are ignored.25 In the 1980s, decision-makers understood 
the ‘classic refugee’ to be a political dissident fleeing state oppression, which ‘was a much 
better fit for men than for women’.26 After decades of sustained feminist engagement with ref-
ugee law, policy-makers and decision-makers now ‘put gender on the tick-box list of topics for 
consideration’.27 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank’s study is an ‘international comparative pro-
ject on gender-related persecution and [refugee status determination]’.28 This is a reflection of 
the literature on gender and decision-making in refugee law more broadly that overwhelmingly 
focusses on decision-makers’ approaches to refugee definitions, as opposed to their understand-
ings of refugee protection. 
This thesis indicates that decision-makers’ approaches to gender in some protection from refuge 
contexts is far behind the progress made in consideration of gender in refugee status assess-
ments. For example, in their employment of the exceptional refugee trope in protection from 
refuge claims made by Palestinian refugees, decision-makers reproduce the archetypal refugee 
fleeing physical harms emanating from the public sphere. These judgments are gender blind in 
the sense that they ignore or discount risks women are more likely to face in places of so-called 
refuge such as forced marriage. They are also gendered in that they create precedents more 
likely to assist male Palestinian refugees in their searches for refuge. There are also gender-
blind decisions in jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, where decision-
makers do not consider factors such as gender, pregnancy and previous experience of sexual 
violence in their consideration of whether a return under the Dublin Regulation would pose a 
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. By switching the focus from the refugee definition to 
the remedy (refuge), this thesis illustrates that, in some contexts, refugee law decision-makers 
                                                          
25 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 1) 3. 
26 Ibid 3. 
27 Ibid 1. 
28 Ibid 9. There is only one chapter in Arbel, Dauvergne, and Millbank’s edited collection concerning what I call 
protection from refuge challenges, Arbel’s study of litigation on the bilateral agreement between Canada and the 
United States, which I drew on in Chapter Five. 
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have not made the basic progression from gender-blind decisions that create legal tests more 
fitting for men than women to including gender as an important unit of analysis. 
While some protection from refuge challenges are arbitrated in this manner, in others decision-
makers acknowledge that gender, as well as factors such as sexuality, youth and disability, are 
important factors that must be considered. This puts these protection from refuge decisions in 
line with refugee status assessments where decision-makers ‘routinely’ consider questions of 
gender.29 However, this thesis reveals that many decision-makers are not engaging with ques-
tions of gender in any substantive way, but are approaching them in a perfunctory manner. This 
comes across most strongly in the chapters on European protection from refuge claims (Chapter 
Three) and internal relocation (Chapter Seven), where decision-makers acknowledge that, for 
example, single women may be more vulnerable in certain places of refuge, but determine that 
they will have adequate protection because of assistance provided by non-government organi-
sations or family members. There is no assessment as to the nature of assistance provided and 
whether and how this may insulate the woman from the particular risks to which she may be 
exposed. 
These desultory approaches to gender in protection from refuge claims raise the same query 
Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank ask in the refugee status assessment context: when ‘the argu-
ment can no longer be for jurisprudential inclusion’, how do we facilitate ‘more meaningful, 
more complicated, more substantive analysis’?30 This thesis provides some insights on this 
question. As discussed above, protection from refuge claims are more successful for all refugees 
(including refugees from more marginalised backgrounds) when decision-makers start their 
reasoning by considering the irreducible aspects of refugeehood, rather than focussing on the 
specific refugee litigant’s circumstances. This finding is a controversial one in the context of 
refugee jurisprudence. Scholars and the UNHCR encourage refugee law judges to take account 
of factors such as gender, sexuality, age and disability in their decisions,31 and this is a position 
                                                          
29 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 1) 1. 
30 Ibid 6. 
31 See, eg, Deborah Anker, ‘Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 133; Alice Edwards, ‘Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law’ in Erica Feller, 
Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consulta-
tions on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 46; Constance MacIntosh, ‘When “Feminist 
Beliefs” Became Credible as “Political Opinions”: Returning to a Key Moment in Canadian Refugee Law’ (2005) 
17(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 135; UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 1: 
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/GIP/02/01 (7 May 2002); UNHCR, Guidelines on International 
Protection No 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity Within the Context 
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I have advocated for in previous research.32 However, this thesis indicates that when decision-
makers move directly to these considerations without first considering the notion of refugee-
hood, the result is ‘invidious comparisons between categories’, and Arbel, Dauvergne and Mill-
bank warn of this.33 For example, the idea of the ‘peculiarly vulnerable’ refugee in European 
protection from refuge decisions disadvantages male refugees, because, by virtue of their gen-
der, decision-makers do not deem them to be peculiarly vulnerable. Even refugees whom juris-
prudence identifies as vulnerable often cannot make successful protection from refuge claims, 
because decision-makers do not consider them as vulnerable as others. For example, there is 
jurisprudence in the United Kingdom that indicates that most single women would not be ex-
pected to seek refuge in an IDP camp, yet decision-makers find reasons why the particular 
female refugee bringing the claim would not be vulnerable in a camp setting. Conversely, in 
cases where decision-makers start from a general understanding of the predicament of refugee-
hood and then add to that an appreciation of the ways factors such as gender and age heighten 
the risks intrinsic to seeking refuge, decision-makers engage with a person’s gender, age or 
disability in more meaningful, substantive and complicated ways. For example, in Chapter 
Three I observed that the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal has explored the risks of unaddressed 
psychological trauma for unaccompanied minors and connected it to the importance of family 
reunification. In the same chapter, I discussed how the Human Rights Committee, through the 
prism of the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment, has acknowledged the 
difficulties faced by single mothers in many places of supposed refuge. In Chapter Four, I high-
lighted that the High Court of Kenya emphasised the importance of healthcare for refugees with 
disabilities and used this in its assessment of why forced encampment is a violation of the right 
to fair administrative action. These decisions illustrate the ways decision-makers can use legal 
frameworks to construct robust and intricate understandings of refuge that respond to refugees’ 
specific needs. 
By asking the gender question in the context of protection from refuge challenges, this thesis 
raises new questions for research. One dynamic that arises in protection from refuge scenarios 
that is not encountered in refugee status assessments is that decision-makers can remove or 
partially remove the resisted place from judicial view. This does not arise in refugee status 
                                                          
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc 
HCR/GIP/12/01 (23 October 2012) (‘Guidelines of International Protection No 9’). 
32 Kate Ogg, ‘Separating the Persecutors from the Persecuted: A Feminist and Comparative Examination of Ex-
clusion from the Refugee Regime’ (2013) 26(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 82. 
33 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 1) 6. 
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assessments where decision-makers are required to consider the harms in the refugee’s country 
of origin or habitual residence. When decision-makers do this, they place the gendered harms 
that occur in places of so-called refuge outside the court’s purview. For example, this is evident 
in M68’s failed bid in the High Court of Australia to resist her transfer to Nauru.34 Excising the 
resisted place of refuge from the judicial gaze gives rise to a situation where protection from 
refuge can only be obtained through risky or extra-legal means. In Chapter Five, I noted that, 
despite M68 being unsuccessful in the High Court of Australia, a broad section of the Australian 
community successfully rallied to prevent M68 and other refugees from being transferred to 
Nauru. An important question for future research is the role that gender plays in these extra-
legal attempts to obtain protection from refuge. The discourse surrounding the Let Them Stay 
campaign indicates that gender is an important variable in these extra-legal campaigns to protect 
refugees from places of only nominal refuge. For example, the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions’ 2017 statement on the Let Them Stay campaign advocates that pregnant women, chil-
dren and families should allowed to stay in Australia.35 A survey conducted by the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission in 2016 suggests that M68’s story and, in particular, her role as 
mother to a child born in Australia led to a ‘softening in the hardline stance voters have on 
asylum seekers’.36 This prompts questions as to why there has not been the same level of sus-
tained community engagement with respect to single men in Australia’s offshore processing 
centres and why there was no such campaign raised for S99, a woman who had been raped on 
Nauru and wanted access to country in which it would be safe for her to terminate the preg-
nancy.37 
Another research gap this thesis indicates is the lack of decision-maker guidance on questions 
of gender, age, sexuality and disability for situations in which refugees are using courts and 
other decision-making bodies to seek rescue from or transfer to a place of refuge. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) has published guidance for decision-
makers on questions of gender and sexuality in refugee status assessments.38 Canada has also 
                                                          
34 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 257 CLR 42. 
35 Australian Council of Trade Unions, Let Them Stay (2017) <https://www.actu.org.au/media/1033413/actu-re-
lease-170828-let-them-stay.pdf>. 
36 Lewis, Peter, ‘Babies of Asylum Seekers Have Stirred Our Conscience’, ABC News (online at 17 February 2016) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-17/lewis-babies-of-asylum-seekers-have-stirred-our-con-
science/7175138>. 
37 Plaintiff S99/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] 243 FCR 17. 
38 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Ar-
ticle 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc 
HCR/GIP/02/01 (7 May 2002); UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 9 (n 31). 
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published gender guidelines for decision-makers when interpreting the refugee definition.39 
Creating decision-maker guidance for protection from refuge scenarios would be challenging 
due to the different legal frameworks governing these actions. Nevertheless, neither the UN-
HCR’s guidelines on effective protection,40 or bilateral and multilateral containment agree-
ments,41 or the internal protection alternative,42 all of which are relevant to the legal challenges 
in this thesis, mention gender. Similarly, the Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere43 
and Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative44 are also silent on gender. The 
only guidance given to decision-makers on the role gender can play in protection from refuge 
challenges is the UNHCR’s guidelines on article 1D, which briefly mentions that gender and 
sexual orientation and sexual and gender-based violence should be relevant to article 1D deci-
sions.45 It is important to provide guidance to decision-makers about the concept of refuge and 
the ways it must take account of different refugees’ needs. 
A further question for future research that this thesis points to is the role of gender in decision-
makers’ approaches to men’s protection from refuge claims. In Chapters Three and Seven (Eu-
ropean protection from refuge claims and international protection alternative jurisprudence), I 
unearthed a number of cases where decision-makers’ characterisation of the refugee or asylum 
seeker litigant as a young, healthy, single man is part of the reasons why the claim is rejected. 
There is some consideration of male refugee law litigants from a gender perspective, but most 
focus on refugee status assessment and, in particular, gender-related persecution.46 This reflects 
Spijkerboer’s observation that ‘in both academic and non-academic (refugee) legal discourse, 
                                                          
39 Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gen-
der-Related Persecution (13 November 1996). 
40 UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of ‘Effective Protection’ in the Context of Secondary Movements 
of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 December 2002) (February 2003) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fe9981e4.html>. 
41 UNHCR, Guidance Note on Bilateral and/or Multilateral Transfer Arrangements of Asylum-Seekers (May 
2013) <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51af82794.pdf>. 
42 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 4: ‘Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative’ Within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc 
HCR/GIP/03/04 (23 July 2003). 
43 Fourth Colloquium on Challenges in Refugee Law, ‘The Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere’ (2007) 
28(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 207. 
44 First Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, ‘Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection 
Alternative’ (1999) 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 134. 
45 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 13: Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, UN Doc HCR/GIP/16/12 (December 2017) [22], [24] 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a1836804.html>. 
46 See, eg, Thomas Spijkerboer, Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum 
(Routledge, 2013); Jenni Millbank, ‘From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on 
the Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13(2/3) International Journal of 
Human Rights 391; Caitlin Steinke, ‘Male Asylum Applicants Who Fear Becoming the Victims of Honor Killings: 
The Case for Gender Equality’ (2013) 17(1) City University of New York Law Review 233. 
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the dominant view is that gender is relevant only to a particular set of cases, if at all. That is, 
only a limited number of “gender specific” applications for asylum are assumed to raise issues 
of gender’.47 Decision-makers’ reference to a person’s gender as a reason to conclude that he 
can be sent to or kept in a place ostensible refuge that poses serious harms is a concerning 
development and one antithetical to feminist engagement with refugee law which aims to de-
velop a more gender-sensitive interpretation of refugee law for people of all genders, sexualities 
and ages. In resetting the agenda for analysis of gender in refugee law, Arbel, Dauvergne and 
Millbank outline a number of important issues for future research.48 I would add to this agenda 
an increased focus on decision-makers’ approach to gender in men’s claims for protection be-
yond gender-related persecution claims and refugee status assessment. 
V CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I explored how decision-makers approach and determine protection from refuge 
claims and whether their approaches facilitate or undermine refugees’ (or only certain refu-
gees’) searches for places of genuine sanctuary. Scholars of refugee and forced migration stud-
ies often use metaphors or images to reflect the ways law positions refugees. Refugees are de-
scribed as ‘between sovereigns’,49 ‘beyond the pale of law’,50 in a situation of ‘liminality’51 or 
in a ‘state of exception’.52 These depictions do not capture the relationship between law and 
refugee journeys discussed in this thesis. Refugees searching for safe havens are not suspended 
in an in-between space, placed in a legal vacuum or exist outside law’s reach. Rather, there are 
instances in which decision-makers approach protection from refuge claims in ways that build 
a powerful picture of refuge. In doing so, they deliver refugees significant legal victories that 
enable them to continue their search for refuge within and across borders. However, there has 
been a shift in decision-makers’ approaches to these claims, atrophying ideas of refuge and 
inhibiting refugees’ ability to seek a place of genuine sanctuary. 
An image or metaphor that encapsulates this trajectory is the character of Tantalus from Greek 
mythology. As punishment for his crimes, Zeus condemned Tantalus to stand in a pool of water 
underneath the branches of a fruit tree. Perpetually hungry and thirsty, every time he reached 
                                                          
47 Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (Ashgate, 2000) 9. 
48 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, ‘Introduction’ (n 1) 11–14. 
49 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
50 Emma Larking, Refugees and the Myth of Human Rights: Life Outside the Pale of Law (Ashgate, 2014). 
51 Efrat Arbel, ‘Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of Rights: Examining the Safe Third Country Agreement 
between Canada and the United States’ (2013) 25(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 65, 83. 
52 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, tr Kevin Attell (University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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for the fruit the branch would retract just out of reach and each time he bent down to drink the 
water it would recede. While refugees have not committed any crimes by searching for safe 
havens, like the figure of Tantalus they are reaching for something that they can envisage, but 
remains elusive. Decision-makers play a role in elucidating vivid images of refuge through 
judgments in which they outline powerful ideas about its functions, nature, threshold and scope. 
However, when refugees approach courts and other decision-making bodies, adjudicators posi-
tion refuge just out of grasp. This is first brought about by ephemeral protection from refuge 
victories: while decision-makers initially create powerful precedents that overturn or disrupt 
containment policies and practices, they claw them back in later decisions. Just when refugees 
and their advocates think that the pathway to refuge has been opened, decision-makers circum-
scribe these legal avenues for facilitating refugees’ searches for refuge. Second, decision-mak-
ers remove the possibility of realising refuge through their shift to impoverished ideas of what 
refuge is. This means that, while robust notions of refuge exist in jurisprudence, refugees cannot 
take hold of them when they come to courts and other decision-making bodies. Third, this image 
arises because even those refugees who should be in a position to make successful protection 
from refuge claims (those whom jurisprudence identifies as exceptional in some way) are rarely 
able to use these legal frameworks to continue their search for a place of genuine refuge. Deci-
sion-makers create tests that indicate that refugees from more marginalised backgrounds can 
use litigation to seek protection from a place of so-called refuge, but in individual cases find 
reasons for why these refugees cannot avail themselves of these legal protections. Finally, Tan-
talus is an apt simile because decision-makers approach these challenges in a way that cements 
the current global inequities in refugee responsibility. For many refugees, the place of refuge is 
achingly close—across a land border, over a stretch of water, outside the confines of a camp or 
even in the country in which the refugee is currently located. Decision-makers’ approaches to 
these refugees’ legal claims diminish, rather than enliven, the prospect of realising refuge in 
these places. 
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